RUFINO ALVERO, PEDRO ALVERO, FORTUNATA ALVERO-RAMIREZ AND EUSTAQUIO BAYOT, PETITIONERS, VS. MARIANO REAS AND PAULA VDA. DE ALVERO, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioners seek the review and reversal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, in its Case CA-GR No. 32290-R, reversing the one rendered in their favor by the Court of First Instance
of Leyte in Civil Case No. 2729.

On 12 February 1960,
petitioners commenced a suit in the
court of origin, seeking to quiet title to a parcel of land in Nalibunan, Abuyog, Leyte, described in the complaint and covered
by Tax Declara­tion No. 565; to recover the same from private respondents
herein and to collect damages.  From the
pleadings of the parties it can be gathered that both sides claim title from
the late Cipriana Alvero;
but while plaintiffs predicate their ownership as successors of Alejandra Alvero, who acquired
the land from Cipriana by succession and purchase of
the shares of her coheirs, defendants, in turn, asserted that four heirs of Cirpriana Alvero, to wit, Rufino Alvero (one of
plaintiffs), Alejandra Alvero,
defendant Mariano Reas and Norberto Alvero (deceased husband of defendant Paula Vda. de Alvero) had verbally
partitioned the land in question in 1938, the other heirs of Cipriana having received other properties; that each partitioner had since then possessed his respective share
as exclusive owner, the oral partition having been ra­tified in writing in
1949.  Said defendants further pleaded
title by adverse possession.

The Court of First Instance upheld the contentions of plaintiffs
(petitioners in the case before us) because of a decision in favor of Cipriano Alvero, rendered by the
Court of Land Registration in Tac­loban, Leyte, in its Case No. 235, which decision was rendered on
21 June 1937, and of the sale by heirs of Cipriana of
their interest in favor of coheir Alejandro Alvero,
petitioners’ predecessor.  The Court
adjudged petitioners to be the owners of the disputed land, and ordered
defendants (now respondents) to restore possession and pay P20.00 a month until
actual return of the land to plaintiffs, plus costs.

Upon appeal duly interposed, the Court of Appeals reversed the
Court of First Instance on the basis that the decision in favor of Cipriana was not entered or transcribed in the manner
provided in Section 41 of the
Land Registration Act (Act 496) and no decree nor certificate of title was ever
issued, hence Cipriana’s title to the land did not
become indefeasible or imprescriptible.  Said the Court of Appeals:

“The decision in the land registration case (G. L. R. O.
Record No. 51534) rendered on June 21, 1937 adjudicating the whole area in favor of Cipriana
Alvero is
unavailing. ——– Said decision
lost its vigor and enforceability. 
Although it became final, the same was not executed.  There was no final decree entered neither a
certificate of title issued thereunder.  It is
nothing but a statement of the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto.^[1] ——– Inasmuch as the
time within which it could have been enforced had long expired ‘the judgment is
not merely dormant but dead.’ ——– It did never toll or suspend the running of
the prescriptive period.  In com­puting
the period of adverse possession of land, the time of pendency
of any abandoned, or otherwise discontinued action in respect thereto is to be
treated as though such action had never been ins­tituted.[3] ——–“

With respect to the second issue of
prescription, the Court of Appeals found that –

“Defendants-appellants have
proven preponderantly that they have been in actual, open,
public, continuous possession under claim of exclusive ownership over the land
in question for more than 10 years before the instant suit was lodged in the court below. 
Such possession has ripened into ownership by and through prescription.”[4]

In arriving at the aforesaid conclusion,
the Appellate Court observed that plaintiffs’ cause of action commenced to run
from 1940 upon the death of Alejandra Alvero from whom plaintiffs Eustaquio
Bayot and Fortunata Alvero-Ramirez derived their title of ownership to the
land.[5] It found proved that after the death of Alejandra, the persons “who appeared to have taken
possession of the land” left by her were Rufino Alvero, Norberto Alvero
and Mariano Reas. 
Eustaquio Bayot
and Fortunata Alvero-Ramirez
did not exercise any right of possession and ownership over their supposed
shares.[6] It was likewise found that as early
as 1948, Norberto Alvero leased his share in the partition to third persons where a sawmill and lumberyard were
installed.  Rufino
Alvero, plaintiff-appellee,
was an instrumental witness to the lease contract.[7] On 12 October 1949, Mariano Reas, Norberto and
Rufino Alvero ratified or
confirmed in a public instrument their long time possession by partitioning the
land among themselves into four (4) parts, with Rufino
Alvero taking
two shares.  These portions were
subsequently declared for taxation purposes and this fact was admitted
by the plaintiffs in the complaint.[8] Rufino Alvero has been an
occupant and possessor of his shares of the land (Lots 2 and 7, Exhibit “13”).[9] When these lands were traversed by municipal
roads later, it was to these
persons, among others as recognized owners, that com­pensation was paid for the
right-of-way secured by the Municipal Government.

Plaintiffs-petitioners do not question in this instance the correctness of the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the decision in favor
of their predecessor, Cipriana Alvero,
albeit rendered in a land registration case,
acquired no greater force than an ordinary judgment and could be defeated by
prescription.  That in the absence of
proper entry of judgment and a decree of registration the land involved did not
become registered land, is clear from the provisions of sections 41, 45 and 46
of the Land Registration law (Act 496). 
But petitioners vigorously challenge the holding that the defendant
acquired ownership by adverse possession.

The findings of the Court of Appeals upon this issue, that de­fendants
ever since 1949 held the land as exclusive owners, and exercised acts of
dominion thereon, while petitioners never had possession thereof, are findings
of fact that are binding upon this Court, whose jurisdiction in this class of
cases is limited to reviewing errors of law.

Under Article 1116 of the New Civil Code, prescription already
running before the effectivity of this Code shall be
governed by the laws previously in force. 
In this particular case, the law applicable is the Code of Civil Procedure, specifically Sections 40 and 41
thereof.  The Court of Appeals having
ruled that defendants-appellants had been in possession of the land adversely,
continuously and in the concept of owners since 1949, at least, they have
acquired title over the land through acquisitive prescription, pursuant to
Section 41 which reads –

“Title to land by prescription.  – Ten years actual adverse possession by any
person claiming to be owner for that time of any land or interest in land,
uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or
otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued,
shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and
complete title, saving to the person under disabilities the rights secured
by the next section.  In order to
constitute such title by prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person under or
through whom he claims must be actual, open, public, continuous, under a
claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants
. . . . . . . . . . .“[10]

Prescription lies under the said section even in the absence of
good faith and just title.

As regards the contention that Mariano Reas
could not acquire a portion of the property covered by Tax Declaration No.
11592 (Exhibit “H”) for the reason that he was merely an administrator thereof, the Court of Appeals ruled
that “we find the same both factually and legally impossible”
(Resolution on Motion to Reconsider, Annex “C” of Petition, page 7);
and added –

“But under the circumstances, such relationship had been
repudiated long ago by Mariano Reas.  He was in exclusive possession of the land
in the concept of an owner as previously shown. 
No fruit nor moiety of the produce of the land was given to anyone who
claimed to have appointed him to administer the property consisting of only 1926
hectare of land – – – – – – – – – -.”[11]

The Court went on further to say that if
an administrator repudiates his representative capacity, at least in so far as
the land in dispute is concerned, and sets up an independent, exclusive, and
hostile right in himself, openly and notoriously, his possession may become
adverse to the heirs or devisees of the estate, providing, of course, that they
are under no disability,[12] and it
found plaintiffs-appellees Eustaquio
Bayot and Fortunata Alvero-Ramirez to be under no disability.

Thus, the decision of the trial court was reversed by the Court
of Appeals and the complaint was dismissed. 
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the plaintiffs but the same
was denied in a Resolution dated 9
November 1967.  The dispositive portion reads –

“PREMISES CONSIDERED, we are of the considered view that,
while we do not agree with the original findings of this Court that appellants
have been in the adverse possession of the land in question even before 1937
when the said land was the subject of a decision in a land registration case, we
still find that the action of plaintiffs-appellees,
as held in the previous decision of this Court, has long prescribed and that
appellants have acquired ownership of the land in question by acquisitive
prescription, having been in adverse possession of the same for more than ten
(10) years.  The motion for
reconsideration is hereby denied.[13]

The facts and the law on which the decision is based have been
clearly and distinctly set forth.  The
findings, of facts are supported by substantial evidence.  The extra-judicial partition of 12 October 1949 can hardly be
disputed.  It was alleged in the
complaint[14] and, therefore, admitted as such.[15] The admission of its existence, although the partition is branded as unlawful, binds the
petitioners in so far as their knowledge
of the same is concerned.  It was precisely that knowledge which made them file the action to quiet the title to, and be declared as sole and exclusive owners of the land described in the complaint.

It is contended by the petitioners that they discovered this parti­tion, and specifically the perfidy of administrator Mariano Reas,
only in February, 1960 as a result of which the complaint was filed on 12 February 1960.  But as the Court of Appeals correctly found, this is
belied by the fact that Rufino Alvero, who is one of
petitioners-­plaintiffs, was even a party and signatory to the 12 October 1949 extra-judicial
partition.  The requisites for acquisitive
prescription under Section 41, Act 190, were found to have been
complied with when the Court of Appeals concluded that
“defendants-appellants have proven
preponderantly that they have been in actual, open, public, continuous possession under claim of
exclusive title
of ownership over the land in question for more than 10 years before the instant suit was lodged – – – – – – -.  Such possession has ripened into ownership by and
through prescription.”[16]

Section 41, Act 190, makes it clear that the ten-year
prescriptive period may be had “in whatever way such occupancy
may have commenced or continued”.  Hence, even if appellants should have sold a
piece of the land previously, such sale will not bar their right to set up adverse possession
for themselves over the same property partitioned by them later as long as the conditions specified in
Section 41 are shown to exist. 
These conditions were found by the Appellate Court to have been complied
with.

Petitioners further claim that certain exhibits have been tampered with
or falsified.  In effect, this Court is urged to examine
and weigh the documentary evidence presented by the parties. 
In Santa Ana, Jr., vs. Hernandez,[17] it was
held by this Court
that the credibility of witnesses and the weighing of conflicting evidence
are matters within the exclusive authority of the Court of Appeals, and it is
not necessarily bound by the conclusions of the trial court.  The decision went further to state
that barring a showing that the findings
complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion, such findings
must stand, for the Supreme Court is
not expected or required to examine and contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the
parties.  The law creating the Court of
Appeals was intended mainly to take away from the Supreme Court the work
of examining the evidence and confine
its task for the determination
of questions which do not call
for the reading and study of transcripts containing the testimony of
witnesses.  In Fortus
vs. Novero,[18] it was
likewise ruled by the Supreme Court that where the query necessarily invites
calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and the
probabilities of the situation, the question must be factual for the
Appeals Court to solve.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the herein petition for certiorari is denied.  The decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution
denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed.  With costs against petitioners.

Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Citing De Los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil. 22.

[2] Citing 50 C. J. S. 422.

[3]
Citing Arboso vs. Andrade, 87 Phil. 782,
785-786.

[4]
Page 20, Decision.

[5]
Citing Article 1150 of the New Civil
Code which reads ?

“The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which
ordains otherwise, shall be counted
from the day they may be brought.”

[6]
Emphasis supplied.

[7]
Exhibit “2”, pages 13-14,
Decision.

[8]
Paragraph 6, infra.

[9]
Page 15, Decision.

[10]
Emphasis supplied.

[11]
Emphasis supplied.

[12]
Citing 1 Am. Jur. 863; See also Section 42, Act 190,
which provides –

“Exceptions in favor of
persons under disability.  If a
person en­titled to bring the action mentioned in the preceding sections of
this chapter is, at the time the
cause of action accrues, within the age of minority, of unsound mind, or in
prison, such person may after the expiration of ten years from the time the
cause of action accrues, bring such action within three years after such
disability is removed.

[13]
Emphasis supplied.

[14]
Paragraph 6 of the complaint reads –

“That on October 12, 1949, the defendant Mariano Reas and the late
husband, Norberto Alvero, of the other
defendant Paula Vda.
de Alvero, in unlawful understanding with others, executed an extra-judicial partition
of one hectare of the land afore-mentioned,
and adjudicated to each of them 1/4 of said portion; and subsequently, they declared for
taxation purposes said portions in their
names under Tax Declarations Nos. 11592, 11593, 11594 and 11595.”

[15]
Cunanan vs. Amparo,
80 Phil.
227, citing McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil.
248.

[16]
Page 20, Decision.

[17]
L-16394, 17 December 1966,18 SCRA 973.