PALANAN LUMBER & PLYWOOD CO., INC., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE & NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, AND THE DISTRICT FORESTER OF ISABELA, PE…

Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary
injunction.

The private parties, petitioner Palanan
Lumber & Plywood Co., Inc. and respondent Palanan
Logging Enterprises, Inc., among several other persons and entities, applied
for the occupation and commercial utilization of a forest concession of 50,000
hectares situated at San Mariano and Palanan, Isabela, per Forestry Adminis­trative Order No. 11-13,
which required of the applicants their possession of the necessary capital and
resources to install a veneer, plywood and wallboard factory, pulpwood and
paper mills and other wood processing plant within definite time limits.

After screening the applications, the committee created for the
purpose, Committee No. 2 of the Bureau of Forestry, submitted its findings,
dated 17 July 1961,
recommending award in favor of Palanan Logging Enterprises,
Inc.  Acting thereon, then Acting
Director of Forestry, Tiburcio S. Serevo,
issued an order, dated 11 September 1961, granting the award and the
corresponding license (O.T. 799-63) to the said company, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources.

Petitioner Palanan Lumber & Plywood
Co., Inc. moved for reconsideration.  The
Director of Forestry, M. P. Pecson, in an order,
dated 24 August 1962 found the motion meritorious and, therefore, set aside the
order of 11 September 1961 and awarded 25,000 hectares to movant
Palanan Lumber & Plywood Co., subject to the
approval of the Department Secretary, and without prejudice to the disposition
of the other 25,000 hectares which could be applied for by Palanan
Logging Enterprises, Inc.

Palanan Logging appealed to the
Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources.

On 3 June 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural
Resources, Benjamin M. Gozon, decided in favor of the
appellant and nullified the Director’s order of 24 August 1962.

Palanan Lumber & Plywood Co., Inc.
in turn moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied by the Department
Secretary in an order on 9 September
1963; hence, said company appealed to the President of the Philippines.

On 12 November 1964, the Secretary of Justice and concurrently
Acting Executive Secretary, Salvador Mariño, rendered
a decision, “By authority of the President”, finding the two
contending firms to have substantially similar qualifications to operate and
develop the forested area and, on equitable considerations, ordered its
division into two equal parts and awarded to the said firms 25,000 hectares
each.

The contending parties were then summoned to a conference with a
view to implementing the decision of the Committee.  Palanan Logging
Enterprises, Inc., however, not satisfied with the adminis­trative decision,
filed on 1 September 1965, a petition for cer­tiorari and prohibition, with
preliminary injunction, with the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
alleging that the President’s decision was illegal and in abuse of discretion,
and citing as respondents the Palanan Lumber &
Plywood Co., Inc., the District forester of Isabela,
the Director of forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources
and the Executive Secretary.  The case
was docketed in the said court as Special Civil Case No. 1821.

On 3 September 1965, the Court of First Instance of Isabela issued ex parte
a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondents therein
(petitioners herein) from carrying out the decision of the Executive Secretary,
on a bond of P30,000.00.

The respondents below duly filed their Answers and moved for a
preliminary hearing for the dismissal of the petition.  A preliminary hearing was held, but, on 30 April 1966, the court denied the
dismissal of the case.  Said respondents
moved for re­consideration.

After inaction by the court on the motion for more than 110 days
fruit the time the respondents therein filed their latest pleading, which was a
sur-rejoinder, and with the preliminary injunction
continued in force all the while, the petitioners filed the present petition
with the Supreme Court.

This Court, on 25
January 1967, issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
the enforcement of the preliminary injunction issued by the lower court.

The issues raised are: 
whether the Court of First Instance of Isabela
has jurisdiction over the subject-matter of its Special Civil Case No. 1821;
whether it has jurisdiction to issue in said case an injunction against the
respondents therein; and whether it gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the ex parte writ of preliminary
injunction.

The herein petitioners concede the power of judicial review by
provincial courts of first instance of the decisions of national officials, but
would confine such power only in those cases where no prohibitory action is
involved.  Thus, it is contended that the
petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, that was
filed in Special Civil Case No. 1821 of the respondent court, not being limited
to the review of the legality or illegality of the decision of the Executive
Secretary but also seeking to control the acts of national officials who hold
their offices in Manila and Quezon City cannot be
taken cognizance of by the Isabela court; that the
true subject-matter of the said special civil case is the proceeding held and
action taken by the said officials, not the forested area, which is merely an
incident thereto.

The respondents traverse the above argument as follows:  that while the respondent national officials
hold their offices in Manila and in
Quezon City,
the decision dividing the forest concession would be enforced in Isabela where the concession is located, said area being
the subject-matter of the case.

We agree with petitioners that the respondent Court acted without
jurisdiction in issuing a preliminary injunction against the petitioners
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Director of Forestry, who have their official residences in Manila
and Quezon City,
outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent Court of First
Instance of Isabela. 
Both the statutory provision (section 44 of the Judiciary Act, R. A.
296) and the settled jurisprudence of this Court^[1]
unani­mously affirm that the extraordinary writs issued by the Courts of First
Instance are limited to and operative only within their respective provinces
and districts.

Contrary to the submission of respondents, the ruling in Gayacao vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. L-21066, April 30, 1965, has not varied the
rule, at least in so far as prohibitory writs are con­cerned.  The Gayacao case
conceded the power of the provincial Courts of First Instance to take
cognizance of cases involving judicial review of administrative decisions, where
the sole issue before the Court, is “whether the decision of respondent
public officials was legally correct or not”; but it clearly reaffirmed
the non jurisdiction rulings previously cited where writs of injunction are
issued or sought in order to control acts of non­resident officials.  This Court said in the Gayacao
case:

“The doctrines invoked in support of the theory of non
jurisdiction (Castaño vs. Lobingier,
7 Phil. 91; Acosta vs. Alvendia, G.R. No. L-14598, October 31, 1960; Samar Mining vs. Arnado,
G.R. No. L-17109, June 30, 1961.)
are inapplicable in that those cases involved petitions for writs of
injunction  seeking to control the
actions of courts or officers outside the territorial jurisdiction of the res­pondents
involved.  Here the sole point
in issue is whether the decision of the respondent public officers was legally
correct or not.” (Emphasis supplied).

Since the petition before the respondent Court of First Instance
of Isabela not only questioned the legal correctness
of the decision of the Office of the President, in splitting the forest
concession between both contending logging companies, but also sought to enjoin
enforcement of that decision, it is evident that even under the Gayacao ruling, the respondent Court could not
validly issue the writ of injunction complained of when the officials sought to
be restrained were not stationed within its territory.

The real issue before the Court below was the correctness of the
ultimate decision reached by the respondent Executive Secretary, and
jurisdiction to restrain its implementation was not conferred by the accidental
location of the forest land in dispute within the province
of Isabela.

Even conceding, ad arguendo,
that the respondent Isabela Court possessed
jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction against the herein petitioner
national officials, still its issuance ex parte
constituted an improvident and abusive exercise of that jurisdiction,
warranting our setting it aside.  The
reasons are plain.

1)     
The petition of the Palanan
Logging Enterprises, Inc. in the Court below asked it to review and annul a
decision regularly reached by competent executive officials, in a matter within
their jurisdiction.  Such a decision
carries with it a presumption of regula­rity and validity that is not to be
lightly brushed aside without giving a previous hearing to the deciding
functionaries, out of the deference and courtesy due to representatives of a
coequal and coor­dinate department.

2)     
In the Court below, respondent Palanan Logging Enterprises, Inc., merely charged that
(Petition, par. 11) -?

“11.   The order of the then Director of Forestry
Mateo Pecson (Annex “B”) which was affirmed
by the Office of the President (Annex “E”) although the same is
illegal, arbitrary and null and void for having been rendered with gross abuse
of discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction and/or without jurisdiction,
is threatened to be enforced by respondents Director of Forestry and District
Forester of Isabela as shown in a letter to your
petitioner dated July 23, 1965, true copy of which is hereto attached and
marked as Annex ‘G’ hereof.”

which is a mere conclusion, without
alleging facts to support the same.

3) The said petition of Palanan Logging
assails the financial capacity of its rival Palanan
Lumber a Plywood Co., Inc., contrary to the conclusions on their comparative
ability reached by then Secretary of Justice, and concurrently Executive
Secretary, Hon. Salvador Marino, in his executive decision of November 12, 1964
(Annex “B” of Petition in this Court).  It is a well settled principle that findings
of fact of executive officials in matters within their jurisdiction are not
subject to review or modification by the Court, in the absence of arbitrariness
of grave abuse of discretion.^[2]

“x x x x.  The invariable
rule set by this Court in reviewing administrative decisions of the Executive
branch of the Government is that findings of fact made therein must be
respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not
overwhelming or preponderant (Ang Tibay
vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635); that it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the
conflicting evidence, determine the credi­bility of the witnesses, or other
wise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the
sufficiency of the evidence (Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre,
81 Phil. 682); that the administrative decision in matters within the executive
jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion,
fraud, or error of law (Lovina vs. Moreno, G.R. No. L-17821,
Nov. 29, 1962).” (Timbancaya vs. Vicente, et al., G.R. No. L-19100, 27 Dec. 1963).

Abuse of discretion, is of course, not proved by mere charges to
that effect made by an interested party in his complaint or plead­ing, but must
be duly demonstrated by competent evidence at a proper hearing or trial, which
in the case now before us has not yet been held.

4) On the face of the petition, the action taken by the Executive
Secretary, in deciding to split a vast forest area equally between the two contesting
applicants for logging concessions, has been declared by this Court, in a
similar case, to be in accord with the fundamental policy that “natural
resources should be opened to the exploitation by as many qualified applicants
as possible in order to disperse in the most equitable manner the rich bounties
of our natural resources and thereby prevent the concentration of wealth in the
hands of a few.” (Extensive Enterprises Corp. vs. Sarbro
& Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-22386, May
16, 1966; 17 SC Rep. Annot. 51).

What aggravates the action taken by the respondent Court is that
it failed to act on petitioners’ motion for reconsideration dated May 25, 1966,
until January 1967 when this case was filed, i. e.
for over six months.

As the respondent Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to
control the actions of the petitioner national officials who are outside its
districts; the petition filed in said Court by Palanan
Logging Enterprises not containing averments of fact sufficient to constitute a
cause of action, and the preliminary injunction having been issued ex parte, in abuse of discretion, we are forced to
conclude that a writ of certiorari lies to annul the actuations complained of.

It is not amiss to recall here that time and again3
this Court has had occasion to deplore the readiness of some judges to grant
and issue injunctions ex parte against
acts of public functionaries, ignoring the presumption of regularity and
validity of official actuations, in disregard of the deference and courtesy due
to a co-ordinate branch of the government, and with no other guide than the far
from impartial assertions in pleadings of interested parties, which a summary
hearing would have shown to be either dubious or unfounded.  The result has been that all too often, the
public interest has been prejudiced through unnecessary delays.  It bears repeating here that preliminary in­junctions
remain extraordinary remedies that should be dispensed with
circumspection, and that both sides should be first heard whenever possible.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby granted and the
respondent Court prohibited from taking cognizance of civil case No. 1821 of
the Court of First Instance of Isabela.  The prelimi­nary injunction heretofore issued
by this Supreme Court is hereby made permanent. 
Costs against respondent Palanan Logging Enter­prises,
Inc.

SO ORDERED.

Dizon, Makalintal,
Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Ruiz Castro, and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., concurs fully in
the opinion and adds a few words on the question of jurisdiction.

^[1] Castaño vs. Lobingier, 7
Phil. 91; Acosta vs. Alvendia, G.R. No. L-14598,
October 31, 1960; Samar Mining vs. Arnado,
G.R. No. L-17109, June 30, 1961;
Alhambra Cigar vs. Regional
Office No. 2, G.R. No. L-20491, August
31, 1965.

^[2] Pajo vs. Ago et al., G.R. No. L-15414, June 30, 1960; Commissioner of
Customs vs. Valencia,
100 Phil. 165; Timbancaya vs. Vicente et al., G.R.
No. L-19100, 27 December 1963.

3
Suarez vs. Hon. Andres Reyes, et al., G.R. No. L-19828, Feb. 28, 1963; Commissioner of
Immigration vs. Hon. Gaudencio Cloribel, et al., G.R. No. L-23838, Dec. 28, 1964; The Chief of the Philippine
Constabulary vs. The Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, G.R. Nos. L-22308, L-22343, March 31, 1964; Hon. Martiniano
P. Vivo v. Hon. Gaudencio Cloribel,
G. R. No. L-23239, Nov. 23, 1966;
Vda. de Villanueva vs. Ortiz, G.R. No. L-11412,
May 28, 1958; and Coloso vs. Board of Accountancy, G.R. No. L-5750, April 20, 1953 and the cases cited
therein.

150
Clean

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