G.R. Nos. L-20589-90. March 21, 1968
ERNESTO DEL ROSARIO, PETITIONER, VS. VICTORINO DE LOS SANTOS, TOMAS DE LOS SANTOS AND THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.
FERNANDO, J.:
This petition for the review of a decision of the Court of
Agrarian Relations represents still another attempt to assail the validity of
Section 14 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1955,[1]
which empowers a tenant
“to change the tenancy contract from one of share tenancy to the leasehold
tenancy and vice versa and from one crop-sharing arrangement to another of the
share tenancy.” Such attempts in
the past on the part of landowners were
singularly unsuccessful, its validity having been consistently upheld. A similar fate is in store for the effort of
petitioner-landowner in this case. The
decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations must be upheld.
Two petitions were filed by now-respondents Victorino
de los Santos and Tomas de los
Santos before respondent Court of Agrarian Relations on April 28, 1961, manifesting their desire, as
tenants of herein petitioner-landowner, Ernesto del Rosario, to take advantage
of Section 14 and to adopt the leasehold system provided, thus changing their
previous status as tenants. In the
answer submitted on May 5, 1961, the validity of the above legal provision was
challenged. It was not until October 26,
1962, that a decision was rendered by the Court of Agrarian Relations,
rejecting the claim of unconstitutionality of the above section as without merit and declaring the relationship between respondent tenants
and petitioner-landowner to be one of leasehold tenancy effective as of
the agricultural year 1961-1962 in a joint decision on the two petitions filed
before it. From the aforesaid joint
decision, this petition for review was
filed. As in the case of the proceedings before the Court of Agrarian
Relations, a single opinion suffices to dispose of the matter and to reaffirm once again the
constitutionality of Section 14 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act.
1. Tenancy legislation is a manifestation of the deep and earnest
concern to solve an age-old problem that has afflicted Philippine society, with
its roots going back to the nineteenth century.
The framers of the Constitution mindful of the then growing feeling of
dissatisfaction with the ability of the government to cope with the poverty and
misery of the vast majority of our people inserted the protection to labor[2]
and social justice[3]
provisions of the Constitution. Thus
they left no doubt-about the validity of remedial legislation intended to
minimize, if not to do away entirely with, the oppressive condition that
usually was associated with agricultural labor.
In no sphere of governmental activity then could there be less
receptivity to claims on the part of those adversely affected that thereby
their property rights were not given the respect the Constitution affords. More specifically as far as the social
justice principle is concerned, there is the translation into reality of its
significance as popularized by the late President Magsaysay:
He who has less in life should have more in law.
In the second year of his term, the Agricultural Tenancy Act of
1955 was passed. The particular provision, once again assailed
in this litigation, as previously mentioned, vested in the tenants “the
right to change the tenancy contract from one of share tenancy to leasehold
tenancy and vice versa and from one-crop-sharing arrangement to another of the
share tenancy.”[4] Its validity was first sustained in De Ramas v. Court of Agrarian Relations.[5]
This Court, through Justice Labrador, spoke of the objective of
the law thus: “The purpose of this Act, according to Section 2 thereof, is
‘to establish agricultural tenancy relations between landholders and tenants
upon the principle of social justice; to afford adequate protection to the
rights of both tenants and landlords, to insure an equitable division of the
produce and income derived from the land; to provide tenant-farmers with incentives
to greater and more efficient agricultural production; to bolster their
economic position and to encourage their participation in the development of
peaceful, vigorous and democratic rural communities.'”
Its justification in the light of our history was stressed in
this wise: “The history of land tenancy, especially in Central Luzon, is a
dark spot in the social life and history of the people. It was among the tenants of Central Luzon
that the late Pedro Abad Santos, acting as a saviour of the tenant class, which for generations has been
relegated to a life of bondage, without hope of salvation or improvement,
enunciated a form of socialism as a remedy for the pitiful condition of the
tenants of Central Luzon. It was in
Central Luzon also that the tenants forming the PKM organization of tenants
and, during the war, the Huk-balahap, rose in arms
against the constituted authority as their only salvation from permanent thraldom. According
to statistics, whereas at the beginning of the century we had only 19% of the
people belonging to the tenant class, after 60 years of prevailing, the
percentage has reached 39%. It is the
desire to improve the condition of the peasant class that must have impelled
the Legislature to adopt the provisions as a whole of the Agricultural Tenancy
Act, and particularly Section 14 [thereof].”
The opinion in the De Ramas decision, after setting forth that the legal question
posed was whether there was an unconstitutional impairment of the
obligation of an existing contract, explained why the answer must be in the
negative. Thus: “Obligations of contracts must yield to
a proper exercise of the police power when such power is exercised, as in this
case, to preserve the security of the State and the means adopted are reasonably
adapted to the accomplishment of that end and are not arbitrary or
oppressive.” The De Ramas decision was subsequently followed in several cases.[6]
Then in Ilusorio v. Court of Agrarian Relations,[7] in sustaining once again the validity of
the above Section 14, this Court, in an opinion by the then Justice, now Chief
Justice, Concepcion, declared: “We find no
cogent reason to depart from the view we have so far adhered to, which is in
consonance with our consistent jurisprudence on the police power of the
State.” As distinguished from the
De Ramas holding, the objection to the validity of
Section 14 in this case was premised not only on the alleged impairment of an
existing obligation but likewise on the transgression to the freedom of
contract concept which is embraced in the liberty safeguarded by the due
process clause. Its validity then as a
police power measure is now beyond question.[8]
It thus appears
indisputable that reinforced by the protection to labor and social justice
provisions of the Constitution, the attribute of police power justifies the
enactment of statutory provisions of this character. That public interest would be served by
governmental measures intended
to aid the economically underprivileged is apparent to all. Nor is the means relied upon to attain such a
valid objective unreasonable or oppressive.
Considering that in the adjustment or reconciliation of the conflicting
claims to property and state authority, it suffices that there be a rational
basis for the legislative act, it is easily understandable why, from the
enactment of the Constitution with its avowed concern for those who have less
in life, the constitutionality of such legislation has been repeatedly upheld.
Thus prior to the
Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1955, there were previous statutes which likewise
passed the test of validity in earlier decisions. The first decision of importance is Tapang v. Court of Industrial Relations.[9] In
that case, the argument that the then Tenancy Law[10] was unconstitutional because it impaired the
obligation of contracts was considered by the court to be without any force as
outside of the fact that the contract entered into between the petitioner and
the husband of the respondent during his lifetime and the respondent herself
after his death was without a fixed period, the work being accomplished from
year to year, the Constitution ordains the promotion of social justice and the
protection to labor, specially to working women. Then came Ongsiako
v. Gamboa,[11] which sustained the retroactive effect of an
amendatory act[12] to then tenancy statute as against the
contention that there was a violation of the non-impairment clause. This constitutional provision is no bar,
according to this Court, for legislation affecting existing conditions enacted
by the State in the proper exercise of the police power.
The unanimous opinion of
this Court in the recently decided Genuino v. Court
of Agrarian Relations,[13] with its unqualified approval of the power
of Congress to abolish share tenancy, as reflected in the latest legislation on
the subject,[14] as against the contention that with the
limitation on the freedom of contract there is a deprivation of property
without due process of law, evinces unmistakably the firmness with which it
adheres to the view that the police power is of sufficient amplitude and scope
to free from the taint of constitutional infirmity legislation intended to ameliorate the sad plight of Filipino tenants
and agricultural workers. Thereby, this
Court has manifested its fidelity to the constitutional intent so obvious from a cursory glance at the applicable provisions of the Constitution.
That will explain why every challenge hurled against the validity of
this particular provision was, from the outset, doomed to futility.
2. In addition, another issue which according to the petition for
review is “now squarely raised before this [Court] is whether or not the
use of a tractor of a land-owner in addition to his carabao
and farm implements is a ground for a disqualification of said land-owner to
undertake the personal cultivation of his own land and the ejectment
of his tenants” pursuant to the Agricultural Tenancy Act?[15] That point would have been deserving of
further inquiry were it not for the express finding of the Court of Agrarian
Relations that respondent, now petitioner before this Court, “does not
have the bona fide intention to cultivate the landholding in question
personally”.[16] That
is a
finding of fact supported by substantial evidence, and as such, binding upon
this Court. It cannot therefore be
disturbed on appeal.[17] The latest formulation of the above principle
as set forth
in Lapina v. Court of Agrarian Relations,[18] in an opinion by Justice Dizon, is to the effect that its finding of fact must be
accepted “unless it is shown to be unfounded or arbitrarily arrived at, or
that the [Court] had failed to consider important evidence to the
contrary.” There is no occasion
therefore to consider further the issue of whether or not the ejectment of now respondents-tenants would lie.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations
now under review is affirmed. With costs
against petitioner.
Reyes, Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., on official leave.
[1]
“SEC. 14. Change of System. – The tenant shall have the right to
change the tenancy contract from one of share tenancy to the leasehold tenancy
and vice versa and from one crop-sharing arrangement to another of the share
tenancy. If the share tenancy contract
is in writing and is duly registered, the right may be exercised at the
expiration of the period of the contract.
In the absence of any written contract, the right may be exercised at
the end of the agricultural year. In
both cases the change to the leasehold system shall be effective one
agricultural year after the tenant has served notice of his intention to change
upon the landholder.” (Republic Act No. 1199)
[2]
“The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women
and minors, and shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and
between labor and capital in industry and agriculture * * *.” Art. XIV, Section 6, Constitution of the Philippines.
[3]
“The promotion of social Justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people should be the concern of the State.” Art. II, Section 5, Constitution of the Philippines.
[4]
Section 14, Republic Act No.
1199.
[5]
G.R. No. L-19555, May 29, 1964.
[6]
Macasaet v. Court of Agrarian Relations, G.R.
No. L-19750, July 17, 1964;
Uichangco v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. L-20275-9, May 31, 1965; Gamboa
v. Pallarca, G.R. No. L-20407, March 31, 1966; Vda.
de Quizon v. Ortiz, G.R. No. L-20905, April 30, 1966.
[7]
G.R. No. L-20344, May 16, 1966.
[8]
Subsequent to Ilusorio v. Court of Agrarian
Relations, the validity in Section 14 was upheld in Reyes v. Santos,
G.R. No. L-19961, September 14, 1966;
Enriquez v. Cabangon, G.R. No. L-21697, September 23, 1966; Tinio v. Macapagal, G.R.
No. L-21012, February 25, 1967;
Diaz v. Molina, G. R. No. L-21150, April 27, 1967.
[9]
72 Phil. 79 (1941).
[10]
Com. Act No. 461 (1939).
[11]
86 Phil. 50 (1950).
[12]
Republic Act No. 34 (1946).
[13]
G.R. Nos. L-25035 and L-25036, February
28, 1968.
[14]
Agricultural Land Reform Code, Republic Act No. 3844 (1963).
[15]
Section 50(a) of Republic Act 1199.
[16]
Decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Annex “R” of the
petition, p. 7.
[17]
Cahilo v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-13431, Nov. 24, 1959; Yusay
v. Alojado, G.R. No. L-14881, April 30, 1960; Ulpiendo
v. Court of Agrarian Relations, G.R. No. L-13891, Oct. 31, 1960; Canada
v. Rubi, G.R. No. L-15595, Dec. 29, 1960; Mateo v.
Duran, G.R. No. L-14314, Feb. 22, 1961;
Tomacruz v. Court of Agrarian Relations, G.R.
Nos. L-16542-43, May 31, 1961;
De Santos v. Acosta, G.R. No. L-17564, Jan. 31, 1962; Ilusorio v.
Santos, G.R. No. L-15788, March 30, 1962; De Domingo v.
Court of Agrarian Relations, G.R. No. L-12116, April 28, 1962; Estrada v. Court of Agrarian
Relations, G.R. No. L-17481, April 28,
1962; De la Cruz v. Dollete, G.R.
No. L-17932, May 30, 1962;
Benson v. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-18189, Dec. 29, 1962; Silva v.
Cabangon, G.R. No. L-14801, Jan. 31, 1963; Bermudez v. Fernando, G.R.
No. L-18610, April 22, 1963;
Toledo v. Court of Agrarian
Relations, G.R. No. L-16054, July 31,
1963; Salazar v. Santos,
G.R. No. L-15890, Feb. 29, 1964;
Villaviza v. Panganiban,
G.R. No. L-19760, April 30, 1964;
Cruz v. Pangan, G.R. No. L-19749, May 30, 1964; Evanado
v. Blanco, G.R. No. L-17602, June
30, 1964; Tuvera v. De Guzman, G.R.
No. L-20547, April 30, 1965;
Casaria v. Rosales, G.R. No. L-20288, June 22, 1965; Enriquez v. Cabangon, G.R. No. L-21697, Sept. 23, 1966.
[18]
G.R. No. L-20706, September 25, 1967.