G. R. No. L-16884. January 31, 1963
NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKER’S UNION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MELQUIADES G. ILAO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAMARINES NORTE, PARACALE-GUMAUS CONSOLIDATED MINING C…
DIZON, J.:
Labor Association, a legitimate labor union, (hereinafter referred to
as the Confederation) was duly certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of all the employees of the Paracale Gumaus
Consolidated Mining Company, Inc., a duly organized domestic
corporation, with main offices at Gumaus, Paracale, Camarines Norte
(hereinafter referred to as the Company).
On December 19, 1959 , the Company entered into a closed-shop
bargaining agreement with the Confederation—to be effective from
January 1, 1960 to January 1, 1962 —undertaking, among other things, to
employ only members of the latter in good standing and to dismiss any
employee who has been expelled or certified as having lost good
standing therein.
On February 16, 1960, the National Mines and Allied Worker’s Union
, another labor organization with principal offices at Larap, J.
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, filed with the Court of Industrial
Relations, Bicol Branch, a petition for certification election (Case
No. IV-MC Bicol) praying that it be certified as the sole agent of the
workers and employees of the Company for purposes of collective
bargaining, alleging that it represented the majority of said
employees, and that the Confederation no longer enjoyed the confidence
and did not represent said majority.
On March 28, 1960, the Company received a letter from the
Confederation requesting that an employee by the name of Jorge Patinio
be dismissed, he no longer being a member of the Confederation. In
accordance with their collective bargaining agreement Patinio was
dismissed two days later.
On April 5, 1960 , the National Mines and Allied Workers’ Union
filed with the Court of Industrial Relations, Bicol Branch, a complaint
charging the Company, its general superintendent, G, M. Budiselic, the
Confederation and its president, Fermin Lapuz, with unfair labor
practice (Case No. 22 ULF Bicol). The complaint alleged that the
Company had been committing discriminatory acts against members of the
plaintiff Union who were employed therein, citing particularly the
dismissal of Jorge Patinio, without any valid ground or cause.
On April 8, 1960, pending determination of the certification
election and the charge of unfair labor practice mentioned heretofore,
the Company filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte
an action for injunction, with a petition for preliminary injunction to
restrain the National Mines and Allied Workers’ Union from picketing
its premises and molesting it with respect to the contract of
closed-shop agreement with the Confederation and its members. (Civil
Case No. 1207) The following day, the Court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ex-parte, enjoining the National Mines
and Allied Workers’ Union “from molesting plaintiff in its peaceful
labor relations with the Camarines Norte Confederation of Miners and
Labor Association and its members, and from picketing, threatening and
harassing plaintiff corporation and its employees in the peaceful
routine of their work.” The present petition for certiorari, with
preliminary injunction, was subsequently filed by the National Mines
and Allied Workers’ Union against the Company, its general
superintendent and the Hon. Melquiades G. Ilao, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Norte, to annul the latter’s order granting
a writ of preliminary injunction and to prohibit him from taking
cognizance of Civil Case No. 1207 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Upon the facts stated above, it seems clear that the respondent
judge erred in issuing ex-parte the writ of preliminary injunction
complained of. There being at the time two pending proceedings in the
Court of Industrial Relations, namely, one for certification election
and the other for unfair labor practice, the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur had no jurisdiction to issue an anti-picketing
injunction—whether final or preliminary—in relation to the matters
involved in the two proceedings aforementioned. That was already within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations (United
Pepsicola Sales Organization etc., to Cañizares, G.R. No. L-12294, Jan.
23, 1958 ).
But even if said Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to
entertain the principal action and the petition for preliminary
injunction, it could not issue the latter writ by merely following the
provisions of Rule 60, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, but should have
done so in accordance with those of Section 9 (d) of Republic
Act 875 which require the court to set the petition for hearing and
receive evidence—which was not done in the present case.
Lastly, it should be noted that the temporary restraining order
complained of could be effective, in accordance with the legal
provision last mentioned, only for five days, the same becoming1 void
and of no effect after the fifth day, by operation of law (United
Pepsicola, supra).
Wherefore, we hold that the respondent judge (court) has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 1207. As a
result, the writ of preliminary injunction issued ex-parte in said case
is declared void. Cost against the respondents except the respondent
judge.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador , Concepcion , Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.