G. R. No. L-16827. January 31, 1963
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC. REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING PARTNER, GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JOSE AGUIRRE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
BARRERA, J.:
Inc., registered owner of a parcel of land known as the Sta. Mesa
Heights Subdivision, situated at Quezon City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1267 (37686-Rizal) of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, has filed to recover possession and damages against
individuals who claim ownership of portions thereof as their own for
having purchased the same from other persons said to be
successors-in-interest of one Telesforo Deudor, who, in turn, is
alleged to have possessed the property as its owner since prior to 1893
by virtue of an “informacion posesoria’ issued in 1893, and registered
with the Register of Deeds of Manila.
Issues having been joined after the defendant in the instant case
has filed his answer and counterclaim, the case was tried and on
December 21, 1959 , the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
plaintiff, which in part reads:
“DECISION
* * * * * * *
“From the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, it has
been sufficiently established that plaintiff is a domestic corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines ; that
plaintiff is the registered owner of a parcel of land known as the Sta.
Mesa Heights Subdivision located in Quezon City and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1267 (Exb. A); that sometime in October, 1951,
the defendant, without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff and
through force, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered into the
possession of a portion of 500 square meters, more or less, within the
said parcel of land of plaintiff aforestated and situated in Barrio
North Tatalon, Quezon City, and constructed thereon his house, as shown
in the subdivision plan (Exh. B and B-1); that as a consequence of
these acts of usurpation by the defendant, the plaintiff has suffered
and still continue to suffer damages at the rate of P150.00 a month for
its reasonable use and occupation, and that plaintiff exerts its rights
thereon.“The defendant testifying in his own behalf
declared that he bought the lot in question from one Agustin do Torres
on March 3, 1950, as Per Deed of Sale, Exhibit 1, said Agustin de
Torres being one of the signatories in the Compromise Agreement [dated
March 16, 1953] (Exh, 2), entered into between the plaintiff and the
Deudors in Civil Cases Nos. Q-135, Q-139, A-174, Q-177, and Q-186; that
ho constructed his house and other improvements since that time, all
valued at P45,000,00, and nobody interrupted his possession, which was
peaceful and in concept, of owner from then up to the present.“In the answer as well as in the evidence, defendant would rely upon
certain provisions in the above-mentioned Compromise Agreement. Those
provisions would seem to grant individuals listed under Annexes B and C
of the Compromise Agreement the right, either to purchase the lots they
might have attempted to acquire from the Deudors, or to seek refund of
what they might have paid the Deudors on the agreed purchase price.
Without resolving here the issue whether said stipulations pour autrui
are still enforceable despite the Deudors’ failure to deliver, and the
virtual withdrawal of any such rights of defendant by the filing of
this ejectment suit, due to his failure to enter into a contract to
sell with the plaintiff, the registered owner, notwithstanding the
expiration of over five (5) years from the execution of the Compromise
Agreement, the Court believes that enforcement of the right to purchase
or seek refund from J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., in a question apart
and distinct from the issue of who, as between J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. and defendant, is entitled to possession of the land in litigation
herein.“Possession is art attribute of ownership, and the
Compromise Agreement of March 16, 1953, did not in any conceivable way
operate to legalize the occupation and enjoyment thereafter of the
premises, by any person like the defendant who is a mere intruder. Even
under the Compromise Agreement, the right of a Deudor purchaser to
continue in possession must be preceded by, and based on, a contract to
sell between J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and the Deudor purchaser.
Hence, conformably with an owner’s right to possess his property, J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc., as registered owner, has the right to possess
and enjoy the subject land, to the exclusion of defendant.“Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant and all persons claiming under him, ordering them
to vacate the premises in question, and to remove the house and other
constructions therefrom; ordering said defendant to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P90.00 per month, from the date of the usurpation,
until the plaintiff is restored to the possession thereof, and to pay
the costs.“SO ORDERED.”
From this decision, defendant brought to us directly the present
appeal, announcing that he would raise only questions of law. In his
brief, he makes five assignments of error which, in synthesis, present
the sole question as to who is the owner of the land in dispute and
therefore entitled to the possession thereof.
The validity of appellees’ registered ownership of the land in
question as evidenced by its certificate of title issued in 1914 has
been recognized and re-affirmed in a series of decisions rendered by
this Court in a number of cases involving the same identical question.[1]
There is absolutely no new fact or circumstance presented in the case
at bar which would justify deviation from the settled doctrine on this
matter, considering the fact that the claim of ownership of herein
appellant is derived from the same source as the claims of the
different parties in those cases, the consistent ruling therein made
being that the plaintiff-appellee’s registered title may now no longer
be collaterally attacked as it has already become incontrovertible
having been issued way back in 1941 (Vengaso vs. Buencamino, 109 Phil.,
206, and cases cited therein.).
Likewise, the question of prescription or laches similarly raised
by defendant in this case has already been settled, as an action to
recover possession of a registered land never prescribes in view of the
provision of Section 46 of Act 496 to the effect that no title to
registered land in derogation to that of a registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Estrella, et al. vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, 106 Phil., 911; see also Legarda Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 and Corporacion, etc. vs. Crisostomo, 32 Phil. 427).
Also, the effect and scope of the so-called compromise agreement
“of March 16, 1953, relied upon, by appellant has been determined in
the various cases referred to, in the sense that its effectivity, if at
all, is limited to the parties thereto and those mentioned in the
exhibits attached to the same agreement. There is no showing that
herein appellant comes within the scope of that agreement as thus
defined.
Inasmuch as the lower court found as a fact that “herein defendant
sometime in October, 1951 without the knowledge and consent of the
plaintiff and through force, strategy and stealth unlawfully entered
into the possession of the lot in question” which finding can not be
reviewed in this instance, the decision of the court ordering the
ejectment of the defendant and payment by him of the reasonable value
of such occupancy of the land is justified.
Wherefore, finding no reversible, error in the decision appealed
from, the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs against appellant so
ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador , Concepcion , Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal JJ., concur.
[1] Deudor, et al. vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., et al., G. R. No. L-13768, May 30, 1961 ; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, G. R. No. L-15398, Dec. 29, 1962