MANILA TRADING & SUPPLY CO., PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

The issue for adjudication is whether the owner of buildings erected
on premises leased from another person is required to contribute to the
assurance fund when the petitions for annotation of his ownership on
the corresponding certificate of Torrens Title.

The facts are simple: The Manila Trading and Supply Co., a
corporation, is the lessee of three parcels of land in the Port Area,
Manila, belonging to the Philippine Government, such lease having been
recorded on the Government’s certificate of title No. 4938. The
structures built by said company upon the lots were destroyed during
the last war; but after liberation, it erected new buildings that cost
over a million pesos. Thereafter, on April 2, 1951 it requested the
Manila Court of First Instance to require the register of deeds to
enter and annotate, on certificate of title No. 4938, its declaration
of property ownership of such valuable improvements. The court granted
the request.^[1] Then the
register of deeds demanded payment of P1,308 for the assurance fund
pursuant to section 99 of Act No. 496. The company refused to pay, and
applied to the court for relief thru a petition-consultation. The
register of deeds was upheld. Hence this appeal.

Section 99 provides in part:

“Upon the original registration of land under this
Act, and also upon the entry of a certificate showing title as
registered owners in heirs or devisees, there shall be paid to the
register of deeds one-tenth of one per centum of the assessed value of
the real estate on the basis of the last assessment for municipal
taxation, as an assurance fund. * * *”

The Honorable Ramon R. San Jose, Judge, approving the register’s action explained:

“* * * considerando que la anotacion de la citada orden, juntamente
con el expresado affidavit, en el certificado de titulo No. 4938 del
Gobierno de Filipinas, crea un interes en el terreno descrito en el
referido titulo sobre todo en el presente caso en que consta inscrito
un contrato de arrendamiento del terreno entre el Gobierno y la duefia
de los edificios, este juzgado es de opinion gue la cuestion discutida
cae de lleno bajo las disposiciones legates que hablan no solamente de
terreno, sino tambten de ‘real estate’ y de ‘interes’ en el terreno y
dan protection a los que, sin negligencia suya, pierdan
irreivindicablemente su derecho, interes 0 participation, en el terreno
y/o las mejores exiatentes en el mismo. Es injusto que la recurrente
tenga la protection de sus edificios bajo el fondo de aseguro y no haga
su contribucion al mismo. * * *.”

The attorney for appellant insists here that section 99 is
inapplicable, because the matter is not original registration of
“land”, nor entry of a certificate showing title as registered owners
in heirs or devisees. The Legislature knew, he argues, that “buildings”
and “improvements” are not “land”.

Upon examination of the whole Land Registration Act we are satisfied
that “land” as used in section 99 includes buildings. For one thing the
same section uses “real estate” as synonymous with land. And buildings
are “real estate” (section 334, Civil Code, article 415, New Civil
Code; Republica de Filipinas vs. Ceniza, L-4169, Dec. 17, 1951 ).^[2]

For another, although entitled “Land Registration“, the Act
(496) permits the registration of interests therein, improvements, and
buildings. Of course the building may not be registered separately and
independently from the parcel on which it is constructed, as aptly
observed by Chief Justice Arellano in 1909.^[3] But “buildings” are registerable just the same under the Land
Registration System. It seems clear that having expressly permitted in
its initial sections (section 2) the registration of title to “Manila
Building & Loan Association, 13 Phil., 575, land or buildings or an
interest therein” and declared that the proceedings shall be in rem
against the land and the buildings and improvements thereon, the
statute (Act 496) used in subsequent provisions the word “land” as a
short term equivalent “to land or buildings or improvements” to avoid
frequent repetition of “buildings and improvements”.^[4]
Unless, of course, a different ‘interpretation is required by the
intent or the terms of the provision itself, which is not the ease of
section 99. On the contrary, to consider buildings as within its range
would be entirely in line with its purpose because as rightly pointed
out by his honor, it would be unfair for petitioner to enjoy the
protection of the assurance fund^[5] even as it refuses to contribute to its maintenance.

Wherefore, the appealed order will be affirmed, with costs.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

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^[1] The petition is
permissible under section 112 Act 496 and protects the rights of lease
(Atkins Kroll & Co. vs. Domingo, 46 Phil.,362)

^[2] In American Law the term
“land” is sufficiently broad to include buildings of a permanent
character (Chicago, I. & K. R. Co. vs. Knuffke, 13 P. 582, 583, 36
Kan., 367; Lightfoot vs. Grove, 52 Tenn. (5 Heisk) 473, 477; People vs.
Barker, 47 N. E., 46, 47, 153 N. Y., 98; Crawford vs. Hathaway, Neb. 93
N. W., 781, 788, citing McGee Irrigating Ditch Co. vs. Hudson, Tex., 22
S. W., 967; In re City of New York, 76 N. E., 18, 19, 183 N. Y., 245;
Cincinnati College vs. Yeatman, 30 Ohio St., 276, 282).

^[3] Manila Building & Loan Association, 13 phil., 575.

^[4] see for instance sections 37, 38, 39, 46, etc.

^[5] And the Land registration system. Atkins Kroll vs. V. Domingo supra.