ANTONIO DELUMEN ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLEES, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

On October 9, 1951, Antonio, Juan and Julito, surnamed Delumen,
filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Samar, alleging that
they are legitimate children of Paciencia Pua, a Filipino woman, and
Mariano Delumen who was declared a Filipino citizen by the same court
in an order dated August 7, 1950, and praying said court to determine
whether they are Filipino citizens and to declare their corresponding
rights and duties. It is further alleged in the petition that the
petitioners have continuously resided in the Philippines since their
birth, have considered themselves as Filipinos, had exercised the right
to vote in the general elections of 1946 and 1947, and were registered
voters for the elections in 1951. The Solicitor General, in behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines, filed an answer alleging that the
petition states no cause of action, there being no adverse party
against whom the petitioners have an actual or justiciable controversy.
After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a decision
declaring the appellees to be Filipinos by birth and blood. From this
decision the Solicitor General has appealed.

Under the first assignment of error, the appellant cites our
decision in Hilarion C. Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al.^[*]
G. R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951, wherein we held that: “A
petition for declaratory relief must be predicated on the following
requisites: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3)
the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial
determination.”

While the Solicitor General contends that a justiciable controversy
is one involving “an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on
one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real, and not a
mere theoretical question or issue (1 C. J. S., p. 1026),” and that in
the present case “no specific person was mentioned in the petition as
having or claiming an adverse interest in the matter and with whom the
appellees have an actual controversy,” the appellees argue that, by
virtue of the answer filed by the Solicitor General opposing the
petition for declaratory relief, a justiciable controversy thereby
arose. We are of the opinion that appellant’s contention is tenable,
since there is nothing in the petition which even intimates that the
alleged status of the appellees as Filipino citizens had in any
instance been questioned or denied by any specific person or authority.
Indeed, the petition alleges that the appellees have considered
themselves and were considered by their friends and neighbors as
Filipino citizens, voted in the general elections of 1946 and 1947, and
were registered voters for the elections of 1951, and it is not
pretended that on any of said occasions their citizenship was
controverted. It is not accurate to say, as appellees do, that an
actual controversy arose after the filing by the Solicitor General of
an opposition to the petition, for the reason that the cause of action
must be made out by the allegations of the complaint or petition,
without the aid of the answer. As a matter of fact, the answer herein
alleges that the petition states no cause of action. In essence, the
appellees merely wanted to remove all doubts in their minds as to their
citizenship, but an action for declaratory judgment cannot be invoked
solely to determine or try issues or to determine a moot, abstract or
theoretical question, or to decide claims which are uncertain or
hypothetical. (1 C. J. S., p. 1024.) And the fact that appellees’
desires are thwarted by their “own doubts, or by fears of others * * *
does not confer a cause of action.” (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1952 ed., Vol. II, p. 148, citing Willing vs. Chicago Auditorium
Assn., 277 U.S., 274, 289, 48 Sup. Ct, 507, 509.)

In view of what has been said, it becomes unnecessary to discuss
either the second contention of the Solicitor General that the trial
court erred in holding that the petition for declaratory relief may be
utilized to obtain a judicial pronouncement as to appellees’
citizenship, or his third contention that the evidence does not support
the conclusion in the appealed decision that the appellees are Filipino
citizens.

Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed and the petition dismissed without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.

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^[*] 90 Phil., 83.