MARIA ROA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE L. PASICOLAN, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner is the administratrix in Special Proceeding No. 106 of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided by respondent
Honorable Judge L. Pasicolan. The proceeding is for the settlement of
the testate estate of the deceased Potenriana Ducuco. As
administratrix, petitioner filed a complaint on June 5, 1954 against
herein respondents Emilio Santos and Rosenda S. Vda. de Golding for the
annulment of a deed of sale executed by the said Potenciana Ducuco on
March 26, 19S8 in favor of Emilio Santos, covering five (5) lots
situated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga. Golding was included as defendant
because a one-half share in the properties was subsequently sold by
Santos in her favor.

After some preliminary incidents the defendants in said case filed
their answer, denying that the deed of sale in question was fictitious,
as alleged by the plaintiff; denying likewise the other material
allegations in the complaint; and by way of affirmative defense stating
that the action had prescribed, since the deed of sale sought to be
annulled was executed in 1938 and the complaint was filed in 1954.
Judgment was rendered by respondent Judge on November 2, 1980,
dismissing the complaint and upholding the validity of the deed of
sale. The plaintiff, petitioner here, received copy of the decision on
November 18, 1960. The next day, November 19, she filed a notice of
appeal, followed by the record on appeal on November 28, together with
a petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper. This last petition was
denied on December 7, 1960. On December 10, 1960 petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the judgment on the grounds (1) that it
was contrary to law, particularly to Article 776 of the Civil Code; and
(2) that it was also contrary to the evidence.

On February 24, 1961 respondent Judge issued an order stating that
notwithstanding the denial of the petition to appeal as pauper
plaintiff had failed to post the necessary appeal bond; that the motion
for reconsideration dated December 10, 1960 was not in the nature of a
motion for new trial under Rule 37 and did not interrupt the running of
30-day period for the perfection of the appeal; and that, the decision
having already become final and executory, the record on appeal was
disapproved.

Petitioner moved to reconsider the aforesaid order on the ground
that the motion for reconsideration of December 10, 1960 had not been
heard. The latest motion was denied, and the plaintiff filed with this
Court the instant petition for certiorari, praying that respondent
court be ordered to consider and resolve the motion for reconsideration
of December 10, 1960.

We are of the opinion that the writ should issue. It should be
remembered that what was before the trial court was not the question of
whether the appeal should be given due course or not but rather the
motion for reconsideration of the decision. Petitioner was entitled to
a resolution of said motion. Obviously the court believed that the
motion was pro forma in character, and so, without denying it
expressly, proceeded to disapprove the appeal on the ground that the
decision had become final, since the motion for reconsideration did not
interrupt the period for such appeal. With this we do not agree. The
citation of Article 776 of the Civil Code assailed the pronouncement of
respondent Judge in his decision to the effect that the right to file
the action to contest the sale did not appear to have been expressly
transmitted by the deceased Potenciana Ducuco to her heir, or to the
representative of her estate, in this case herein petitioner.
Petitioner’s position is that there need be no express transmission of
such right by will, because under Article 776 “the inheritance includes
all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death.”

With respect to the second ground of the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner, namely, that the decision is contrary to the
evidence, the evidence referred to is a certain portion of the
testimony of the witness Potenciana Piring “as to the cause of her
godmother’s departure from Rosenda de Golding’s house in Arayat,” which
“clearly reveals the woman’s attitude in the matter.” There is also
petitioner’s statement in the motion that the defense of secret payment
raised by defendants, respondents here, “betrays their intention to
commit fraud—to rob the old woman’s prospective heirs.” The foregoing
argument, while not so clear as might be desired, nevertheless deserves
to be ruled upon on the merits and not simply dismissed as of a pro
forma character.

Wherefore, the writ applied for is granted; the order of  respondent
Judge of February 24, 1961 is set aside and he is directed to consider
and resolve petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of December 10,
1960. With costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.