THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ALBEBTO M. SABBUN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This is an appeal prosecuted by the Republic against an order of the
Court of First Instance of Cagayan, Hon. Roberto Zurbano, presiding,
sustaining a motion of the accused-appellee in the above-entitled case
to quash the information with respect to collections made by
accused-appellee four years prior to January 19, 1959, the date of
filing of the information.

On January 19, 1959, the fiscal filed an information accusing the
accused-appellee of violation of Republic Act No. 145, as follows:

“The undersigned accuses Alberto M. Sabbun for Violation of Republic Act No. 145, committed as follows:

“That
in the month of December, 1949, and subsequent thereafter, in the
municipality of Abulog, province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Alberto M.
Sabbun, being the one who helped and assisted the spouses Benito
Dacquioag, (now deceased) and Juana Acluba Vda. de Dacquioag’, in
the preparation, presentation and prosecution of their CLAIMS for
benefits under the laws of the United States administered by the United
States Veterans Administration, Manila Philippines, in connection with
the death of their son Veteran Federico Dacquioag, during the last
World War, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
directly solicit, charge and receive as his fee and compensation for
his services as follows, to wit: the amount of P600.00 sometime in
December, 1949, from the two checks received by the said spouses; the
total amount of Pl,480.00 as deductions taken from the monthly pensions
of said spouses beginning January, 1950, to February, 1956, inclusive;
and the amount of P170.00 as deduction taken from the monthly pensions
of the surviving spouse Juana Acluba Vda. de Dacquioag, beginning
March, 1956, to September, 1957, inclusive; which total amount of
P2.,250.00, exceeded the amount of P20.00 each for every claim as
authorised by Republic Act No. 145, to the damage and prejudice of the
said spouses Benito Dacquioag and Juana Acluba Vda. de Dacquioag in the
total amount of P2,210.00, representing the balance thereof after
deducting the sum of P40.00 as total fees for the two claims of the
said spouses.”

Upon the filing of the above information, counsel for the accused
moved to quash it, alleging that the criminal action, charged has been
extinguished and that such information charges more than one offense.
The court sustained the motion as to collections made 4 years prior to
the filing of the information but denied it as to those made within the
four-year period. Against this order the Republic has appealed,
contending that the offense charged in the information is a continuing
offense and the prescriptive period for the offense began only from
September, 1957 when the crime was first discovered, and that in any
case the prescriptive period is 8 years and not 4 years as found by the
trial court.

Without considering the other legal issues raised in the appeal, We
hold that the offense charged is a continuing offense. The first
collection of P600 made in 1949 is an integral part of the offense
committed, and so are the collections thereafter up to September, 1957.
The collections made on different dates, i.e., P600 in
December, 1949, P1,480 from January, 1950 to February, 1956, the amount
of P170 from March, 1956 to September, 1957, are all part of the fees
agreed upon in compensation for the service rendered in filing the
claim, and collecting the pensions received by the offended party from
time to time. The periodical collections form part of a single criminal
offense of collecting a fee which is more than the prescribed amount
fixed by the law. The collections were impelled by the same motive,
that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts’ of
collection were made under the same criminal impulse (People vs.
Lawas, G.R. No. L-7618, June 30, 1956). Only one offense was,
therefore, committed and since the last act of collection was made
within the period of prescription, the offense has not prescribed as
yet at the time of the filing of the information. The offense may not
be considered divided into different acts, each act subject to
prescription independently of the others.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the court
below is hereby ordered to proceed with the case in accordance
herewith. Without costs. So ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.