REV. FATHER LUCIO V. GARCIA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, RESPONDENT.
Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.
Garcia versus Vasquez
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari brought by Reverend Father Lucio V. Garcia against Judge Conrado M. Vasquez. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to annul an order of the respondent Judge requiring him to pay docket fees for his petition for the allowance of a will and the issuance of letters of administration with the will annexed. The case matters because it settles a recurring question in remedial law and special proceedings: whether the payment of docket fees may be avoided on the ground that another will of the same decedent had already been filed for probate, with the corresponding fee already paid. The Court's answer is a firm no, and it reminds the Bar candidate that the docket fee is the price of the court's jurisdiction to act at all.
Procedural History
The petitioner filed with the trial court a petition for the allowance of a will and the issuance of letters of administration with the will annexed. The respondent Judge issued an order directing him to pay the corresponding docket fees within fifteen days from notice, failing which his petition would be considered dismissed. The petitioner paid under protest, reserving the right to seek a definite ruling from the Supreme Court. He then filed this petition for certiorari, raising the sole question of whether the respondent Judge erred in ordering payment of the docket fee when a fee had already been collected in connection with an earlier petition for probate of another alleged will of the same decedent. The respondent Judge did not even file an answer. The case reached the Supreme Court as an original petition for certiorari, and the Court denied it.
Facts
Gliceria A. del Rosario died leaving an estate. An earlier petition for the probate of an alleged will of the same decedent had been filed by another party, Consuelo Gonzales, and the corresponding docket fee for that petition had been paid.
The petitioner, Reverend Father Lucio V. Garcia, later filed his own petition for the allowance of a will of the same decedent and for the issuance of letters of administration with the will annexed. He took the position that no separate docket fee should be collected from him, since all the petitions referred to the settlement of only one estate, that of Gliceria A. del Rosario.
The respondent Judge was not persuaded. By order of November 6, 1965, he directed the petitioner to pay the corresponding fees within fifteen days from notice, failing which the petition would be considered dismissed. The petitioner paid on December 2, 1965, but coupled the payment with a reservation that he would seek a definite ruling from the Supreme Court. He then filed this petition for certiorari, insisting that the order amounted to a grave abuse of discretion.
Issues
- Whether or not the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in ordering the petitioner to pay the docket fees for his petition for the allowance of a will, despite the earlier payment of a docket fee in connection with another will of the same decedent.
- Whether or not the payment of a docket fee may be excused simply because there is only one decedent whose estate is to be disposed of by a will that must first be probated.
Applicable Provisions
Rule 141, Section 5, paragraph (e) of the Rules of Court, as quoted in the decision, provides:
The fees payable out of the estate shall be collected in accordance with the value of the property involved.
This provision is the controlling legal norm. It makes clear that it is the clerical service in the allowance of the will that must be paid for, and that the docket fees exist for that purpose and must be collected at the outset, without exception.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the petition is obviously without merit. Having filed a petition for the probate of a will, the petitioner could not escape the payment of the corresponding docket fee. The argument that a fee had already been paid in connection with another will of the same decedent was bereft of any persuasive force. The Court stressed that there is no escape from the payment of the corresponding docket fee, for otherwise the Court is not called upon to act on a complaint or petition.
On the second issue, the Court held that the rule is not varied simply because there is only one decedent whose estate is to be disposed of by a will that must first be probated. It is not farfetched or implausible that a decedent could have left various wills. Under such circumstances, there is nothing inherently objectionable in exacting the payment of a docket fee every time a will is sought to be probated. The petitioner could have sought the probate of the will he presented in the same proceeding, but he did not; he filed a separate action instead.
Turning to the governing provision, the Court held that the specific legal provision is clear and unmistakable. It is the clerical service in the allowance of the will that has to be paid for, and the docket fees exist for that purpose and must be collected at the outset. There is no exception according to the provision. It needs no interpretation and must be applied in accordance with the specific language employed. The respondent Judge acted in accordance with the clear tenor of the controlling legal norm. As the Court put it, on this point the respondent Judge had no discretion to abuse, for the docket fees had to be paid.
Doctrine
Every petition for the probate of a will requires the payment of the corresponding docket fee, and the payment of a docket fee in an earlier petition for the probate of another will of the same decedent does not excuse the petitioner from paying the fee for his own separate petition. The docket fee is not a mere incident of the estate but the consideration for the clerical service in the allowance of the will, and under Rule 141, Section 5, paragraph (e), it must be collected at the outset. The provision admits of no exception and needs no interpretation; it must be applied according to its plain language. A party who wishes to avoid a second fee should seek the probate of his will in the same proceeding rather than filing a separate action. Where the rule imposes a mandatory fee, the judge has no discretion to waive it, and no grave abuse of discretion can arise from obeying the clear command of the law.
Disposition
The petition for certiorari was denied, with costs against the petitioner.
Remember This
Memorize the line that there is no escape from the payment of the corresponding docket fee, for otherwise the Court is not called upon to act on a complaint or petition. Examiners use this case to test the mandatory nature of docket fees under Rule 141, Section 5, paragraph (e), and the rule that a judge who merely complies with a clear legal command cannot be said to have abused his discretion.