REV. FATHER LUCIO V. GARCIA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, RESPONDENT.

Petitioner in this certiorari proceeding was averse to paying the
docket fees in the amount of P940.00 for the probate of a will of the decedent,
Gliceria A. del
Rosario.  He was of the belief that no
such fee should be collected as previously another alleged will of the same
deceased was filed for probate by another party with the corresponding docket
fee for having been paid.  He would
assert, as set forth in the petition, “that after [such payment] by the
original petitioner, Consuelo Gonzales, there is no more need for [him] to pay
additional or separate docket fees for their peti­tions, since they all refer
to the settlement of only one estate, the Estate of Gliceria
A. del Rosario.”^[1]

Petitioner had to pay just the same, his belief that he would be
thus exempted having failed to command the assent of re­spondent Judge, the
Honorable Conrado M. Vasquez, who issued the
following order of November 6, 1965: 
“‘Oppositor, Father Lucia Garcia is
hereby ordered to pay the corresponding fees of the filing of his petition for
allowance of will and issuance of letters of administration with the will
annexed, dated September 30, 1965 within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof,
failure of which the said petition will be considered dismissed.'”^[2]  Payment was made by him on December 2, 1965, coupled with a
reservation that he would seek a definite ruling from us.

Hence this petition for certiorari filed on November 9, 1966, the
sole question raised being the alleged error of the respondent Judge in
ordering the payment of the aforesaid docket fee consider­ing that previously,
with reference to an alleged will of the same estate of the decedent in
connection with the petition for probate filed, such a fee had been
collected.  It is petitioner’s contention
that the challenged order of respondent Judge amounted to a grave abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari.

Respondent Judge did not even bother to answer the petition.  It is understandable why.  On its face, it is obviously without
merit.  A petition for probate of a will
having been filed by petitioner, he could not escape the payment of the
corresponding docket fee.  The argument
based on the allegation that there was such a previous
payment in connection with another will of the same decedent sought to be
probated does not carry the day.  It is
bereft of any persuasive force.

Petitioner should have been aware that there is no escape from
the payment of the corresponding docket fee,
otherwise, the Court is not called upon to act on a complaint or petition.  Nor does it suffice to vary the rule simply
because there is only one decedent whose estate is thus to be disposed of by
will that must first be probated.  It is
not farfetched or implausible that a decedent could have left various
wills.  Under such circumstances, there
is nothing inherently objectionable in thus exacting the payment of a docket
fee, every time a will is sought to be probated.  Petitioner here could have sought the probate
of the will presented by him in the same proceeding.  He did not; he filed instead a separate
action.

One last point.  The Rules of Court require that for all
clerical services in the allowance of will, the “fees payable out of the
estate shall be collected in accordance with the value of the property involved
* * *.”^[3]
The specific legal provision is thus clear and unmistakable.  It is the clerical service in the allowance
of the will that has to be paid for.  The
docket fees exist for that purpose and must be collected at the outset.  There is no exception according to the above
legal provision.  It needs no
interpretation.  It must be applied in
accordance with the specific language thus employed.^[4]  Respondent Judge acted in accordance with the
clear tenor of the controlling legal norm. 
The alleged grievance of petitioner that there was a grave abuse of
discretion does not merit any attention. 
As a matter of fact, on this point, respondent Judge had no discretion
to abuse.  The docket fees had to be
paid.  There is no escape for petitioner.

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is denied, with
costs against petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Capistrano, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., reserves his vote.

^[1]
Petition, p. 3.

^[2] Ibid, p. 3.

^[3]
Rule 141, Section 5, par. (e).

^[4]
Cf. Lizarraga Hermanos v.Yap Tico, 24 Phil.504
(1913); People v. Mapa, L-22301, August 30, 1967; Pacific Oxygen &
Acetylene Co. v. Central bank, L-21881, March 1, 1968, Dequito v.
Lopez, L-27757, March 28, 1968;
Padilla v. City of Pasay,
L-24039, June
29, 1968.