CORNELIA MATABUENA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. PETRONILA CERVANTES, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

A question of first impression is before this Court in this
litigation.  We are called upon to decide
whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to
a common-law relationship.^[1]
The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a
sister of the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains
that a donation made while he was living maritally
without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee
Petronila Cervantes, was void.  Defendant would uphold its validity.  The lower court, after noting that it was
made at a time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latter’s
stand.  Hence this
appeal.  The question, as noted,
is novel in character, this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of
ruling on it.  A 1954 decision of the
Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v.
Bautista,^[2]
by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that
year, is indicative of the appropriate response that should be given.  The conclusion reached therein is that a
donation between common-law spouses falls within the prohibition and is “null
and void as contrary to public policy.”^[3]
Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this Court.  The decision must be reversed.

In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after
stating that in plaintiff’s complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel
of land in question, she specifically raised the question that the donation
made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid
article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did assert
ownership precisely because such a donation was made in 1956 and her marriage
to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that when the case was
called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was a stipulation of facts which
it quoted.^[4]
Thus:  “The plaintiff and the
defendant assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree and
stipulate:  1.  That the deceased Felix Matabuena
owned the property in question; 2.  That
said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation
inter vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on
February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by defendant; 3.  That the donation of the land to the
defendant which took effect immediately was made during the common-law
relationship as husband and wife between the defendant-donee
and the now deceased donor and later said donor and donee
were married on March 28, 1962;
4.  That the deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962; 5.  That the plaintiff claims the property by
reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased
by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had
the land declared in her name and paid the estate and
inheritance taxes thereon.”^[5]

The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to
plaintiff.  It reasoned out thus:  “A donation under the terms of Article
133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage.  When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956, Petronila
Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet
married.  At that time they were not
spouses.  They became spouses only when
they married on March 28, 1962,
six years after the deed of donation had been executed.”^[6]

We reach a different conclusion. 
While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as
void a “donation between the spouses during the marriage”, policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship.  We reverse.

1.  As announced at the
outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura
v. Bautista,^[7]
interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code^[8]
speaks unequivocally.  If the policy of
the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes
of that Court, “to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and
his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor
que han de consuno,’ [according to] the Partidas
(Part. IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne
mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur‘ of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every
reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. 
For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for
thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that
the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased.  Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum,
fr. 1), ‘it would not be just that such donations should
subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be
better.’ So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason
and morality alike demand that the dis­abilities
attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.”^[9]

2.  It is hardly necessary to
add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement,
any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny.  It would be to indict the framers of the
Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its
essentials cannot be distinguished. 
Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law
which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right would
be nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with
disabilities would be attended with benefits. 
Certainly a legal norm should not be susceptible to such a
reproach.  If there is ever any occasion
where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of
the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it.  Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in
such codal provision would not be attained.  Whatever omission may be apparent in an
interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an
adherence to its avowed objective.  In
the language of Justice Pablo:  “El espiritu que informa
la ley debe ser la luz que
ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacion de sus disposiciones.”^[10]

3.  The lack of validity of
the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila
Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to
the disputed property.  Prior to the
death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between
him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. 
She is therefore his widow.  As
provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half.^[11]

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the
complaint with costs is reversed.  The
questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plain­tiff and
defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the
property in question recognized.  The
case is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in
accordance with the above opinion.  Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., took no part.

^[1]
Art. 133 of the Civil Code provides: 
“Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be
void.  This prohibition does not apply
when the donation takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this
prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on
the occasion of any family rejoicing.”

^[2] 50 O.G. 3679 (1954).

^[3] Ibid, p. 3686.

^[4]
Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 17-19.

^[5] Ibid,
pp. 19-20.

^[6] Ibid, p. 21.

^[7] 50 O.G. 3679.

^[8]
Art. 1334 of the former Civil Code was similarly worded:  “All donations between the spouses made
during the marriage shall be void.”

^[9] Buenaventura v.
Bautista, 50 O.G. 3679, 3686 (1954).

^[10]
The excerpt from Yellow Taxi and Pasay Trans. Workers
Union v. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., 80 Phil. 833, 838 (1948) reads in
full:  “Esta
interpretacion de la ley es insostenible. El espiritu que informa
la ley debe ser la luz que
ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacion de sus disposiciones.  No deben atenerse a la letra de la ley cuando la interpretacion
literal se separa de la intencion
de la legislatura y especialmente
cuando lleva a conclusiones incompatibles con el objeto
manifesto de la ley. Cuando
hay conflicto entre la interpretacion literal y la inter­pretacion
fundada en el proposito de
la ley, la ultima debe prevalecer.” Cf. Tañada v. Cuenco,
103 Phil. 1051 (1957); Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, L-25326-27, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105; Casela v. Court of Appeals, L-26754, Oct. 16, 1970, 35 SCRA 279.

^[11] According to Art. 1001 of the Civil Code:  “Should brothers and sisters or their
children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to
one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to
the other half. (953, 837a).”