PERLA REYES, PETITIONER, VS. JUSTINA CARRASCO, HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

Although not interrelated – except L-29225 and L-29731 – these
eleven (11) cases are jointly decided, the issue therein being basically the
same.

1.     
L-28783 involves an unlawful detainer case initiated in the municipal court of Parañaque, Rizal.  Its decision, favorable to the plaintiff Justina Carrasco, was appealed by defendant Perla Reyes to the Court of First Instance of Rizal^[1]
with the same result.  Said defendant
having appealed once more, the Court of Appeals, on mo­tion of the plaintiff,
dismissed the appeal for failure of the record on appeal to show on its face
that the appeal had been perfected within the reglementary
period, in that it does not state that defendant had filed the requisite appeal
bond and the date when he did so. 
Thereupon, the aforementioned defendant filed with the Supreme Court a
petition to compel the Court of Appeals to entertain her appeal from the
decision of the Court of First Instance.

2.     
L-28818 refers to another unlawful
detainer case commenced in the municipal court of
Manila.^[2]
Plaintiff Antonio M. Samia having obtained therein a
judgment in his favor, the defendants^[3]
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila^[4]
which, in due course, rendered judgment for the plaintiff.  It would appear that, after filing separate
records on appeal, the defendants deemed it best to file a joint record on
appeal.  Herein petitioners allege that
the court of first instance authorized them to do so and gave them a period of
time therefor, but the order to this effect was
neither set forth nor mentioned in the joint record on appeal, which, moreover,
does not state how much time they were given to file the same.  On motion of the plaintiff, the appeal taken
by the defendants from said decision of the court of first instance was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals, owing to the failure of their record on
appeal:  (1) to state the date when
appellants received notice of the decision appealed from; (2) to mention the
order authorizing them to file a joint Record on Appeal and granting a period
of time therefor; and (3) to show that the original
and the joint record on appeal had been filed on time.  Appellants filed, therefore, with the Supreme
Court a petition for review upon the ground that their joint record on appeal
complied substantially with the pertinent rules.

3.     
L-29225 is a petition for review
on certiorari of a resolu­tion of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal
taken by herein petitioner, Juanita Laperal, as
defendant in case CA-G.R. No. 35634-R of said court, entitled
“Buenaventura Herrera v. Jose T. Reyes and Juanita Laperal
Reyes,” upon the ground that the joint record on appeal therein filed does
not state the date when Laperal received notice of
the appealed decision of the Court of First Instance, thereby failing to show
that her appeal was perfected on time, in vio­lation of Sec. 6 of Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court.

4.     
L-29731 refers to the same case CA-G.R.
No. 35634-R of the Court of Appeals, which is the object of L-29225.  L-29731 deals, however, with the appeal taken
by Buenaventura Herrera as plaintiff in said CA-G.R. No. 35634-R.  Defendant Laperal
moved to dismiss Herrera’s appeal, but the Court of Appeals denied the motion,
des­pite the fact that the aforementioned joint record on appeal does not state
the date when Herrera received notice of the order of the trial court denying
his motion for reconsideration of its decision and granting him an extension of
ten (10) days to submit his Record on Appeal. 
Laperal filed, therefore, the petition in
L-29731 for review of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals denying her
motion to dis­miss Herrera’s appeal and her motion for reconsideration of the
denial of said motion to dismiss.

5.     
L-29753 refers to an action
commenced in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
del Sur1
to recover the possession of a land, as well as damages.  After appropriate proceedings, judgment was
rendered by said court on December 9,
1967 in favor of plaintiff Zoilo de los Reyes.  Copy of
said decision was received by the defendants on January 9, 1968. 
Twenty (20) days later, or on January
29, 1968, the defendants filed a motion for new trial.  This was denied in an order dated February 24, 1968, copy of which was
served on the defendants on March 8,
1968.  Three (3) days later,
or on March 11, 1968, the
defendants filed a notice of appeal, an appeal bond and a motion for extension
of ten (10) days within which to file their record on appeal.  This motion was denied on the same day, March 11, 1968.  On March
14, 1968, or within the reglementary
period to perfect the appeal – without the extension sought by the defendants
and denied by the trial court – the defendants filed their record on
appeal.  On March 18, 1968, plaintiff De los
Reyes filed a motion for the execution of the aforementioned decision upon the
ground that it had become final.  This
motion was granted on March 22, 1968,
and the writ of execution was issued on March
25, 1968.  Five (5) days
later, or on March 30, 1968,
the Record on Appeal was heard.  On July 8, 1968, the trial Judge
disapproved the re­cord on appeal of the defendants1 and dismissed their appeal, upon
the ground that said record on appeal “does not indicate the date when
defendant-appellant received a copy of the order dated February 24, 1968, denying the motion for new
trial.” Soon after, said defendants filed with the Court of Appeals an
original action2
for certiorari and mandamus to annul the orders of March 22 and July 8, 1968,
and the writ of execution issued on March 25, 1968, as well as to compel the
trial Judge to give due course to the appeal taken by said defendants.  After appropriate proceedings, the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision annulling the orders of the court of first
instance, dated March 11 and 22, and July 8, 1968, as well as the writ of
execution issued on March 25, 1968, and commanding the trial Judge to allow the
amendment of the record on appeal so as to indicate therein the date when
appellants received notice of the order denying their motion for new trial.

6.     
L-29970 refers to Civil Case No.
68339 of the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover damages and
attorney’s fees.  It appears that in a
previous case – Civil Case No. 63362 of the Court of First Instance of Manila –
filed by Edward S. Dominguez against Hao Pek Lan, Chua Wa
San and Corazon Roxas, judgment was rendered
sentencing these defendants to pay Dominguez the sum of P3,000 as moral
damages, for malicious prosecution, and P1,000 as attorney’s fees, in addition
to the costs.  A writ for the execution
of said judgment having been issued, a Ford truck valued at P3,000 and “bakawan” worth P36 were levied upon by the Sheriff of
Manila, who subsequently issued a notice to the effect that said properties
would be sold at public auction on November 21, 1966. 
Two (2) days prior thereto, Chua Hong filed with the office of said
Sheriff a third party claim for said properties.  This notwithstanding, the Sheriff, through
his deputy, proceeded with the sale, without requiring Dominguez to post any
indemnity bond.  Hence, Chua Hong
instituted said Civil Case No. 68339 of the same court of first ins­tance of Manila
against Dominguez and the Sheriff for damages and attorney’s fees.

Said court having, in due course, rendered judgment for plain­tiff
Chua Hong, defendants Edward Dominguez and the Sheriff appealed to the Court of
Appeals,1
which, on motion of Chua Hong, dismissed the appeal for failure of the Amended
Record on Appeal to show that the appeal had been perfected on time, inasmuch
as said Amended Record on Appeal does not state the date when said defendants
received copy of the decision appealed from and the date of the filing of the
original record on appeal.  Hence,
Dominguez filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari of
the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal and denying the
motion for reconsideration of the resolution of dismissal of the appeal.

7.     
L-30525 involves another action
initiated2
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal3 for the recovery of damages.4
After appropriate proceedings, said court rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs, in view of which the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals.5 On
motion of the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals, by resolution dated February
25, 1969, dismissed the appeal, upon the ground that the record on appeal shows
that appellant’s motion for reconsideration was filed on February 1, 1969, or
50 days after the rendition of the decision appealed from on December 13, 1968,
and does not state the dates when the defendants received copy of said decision
and notice of the order of July 14, 1967, denying their motion for
reconsideration of said decision, so that “the record on appeal fails to
disclose on its face that the appeal was perfected within the period fixed by the
Rules.” The defendants, accordingly, filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for certiorari to review the resolution of the Court of Appeals
dismissing their aforementioned appeal and to compel said appellate court to
entertain and decide said appeal on the merits.

8.     
L-31054 is an original action for
certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, filed by the Director,
Bureau of Build­ing and Real Property Management – hereinafter referred to as
the Government – to annul a resolution of the Court of Appeals dismiss­ing the
appeal taken by the Government – in CA-G.R. No. 43336-R of said court, entitled
“Consuelo S. Gonzalez, et al. vs. High-Rate Fertilizer of the Philippines,
Inc. and the Director, Bureau of Build­ing and Real Property Management,
Department of General Services” – from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 7678 thereof –
having the same title – upon the ground, inter alia,
that the joint record on appeal filed in said case CA-G.R. No. 43336-R states
neither the date when appellant corporation1
received copy of the order of the court of first instance denying the motion of
said corporation for a reconsideration of the appealed decision of said court
of first instance, favorable to the plaintiffs therein, nor the date when the
Government filed a motion for extension of time to perfect its appeal and the
duration of said extension.  The notice
of appeal filed by the Government, which forms part of the joint record on
appeal, stated, however, the dates on which it received notice of the appealed
decision, filed its motion for reconsideration thereof and received notice of
the order denying said motion.

9.     
L-31510 involves an action for
damages for alleged breach of contract, initiated by Napoleon V. Velasco and Pacita L. Velasco in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.  The same
having rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, the defendant Design Masters, Inc.
appealed.  The Court of Appeals, however,
granted plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that
“nowhere in the record on appeal does the date of its filing appear,”
although said date is stamped on the first page of the original record on
appeal, which was forwarded to the aforementioned appellate court.  Design Mas­ters, Inc. filed, therefore, with
the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dis­missing the appeal of said defendant and denying its
motion for re­consideration of the order of dismissal of the appeal.

10. 
L-31875 refers to an action to
annul certain deeds of sale, as well as for specific performance and damages.2
The Court of First Instance of Rizal having rendered
judgment in favor of the defendants3 and against the plaintiffs,4
the latter appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
For failure to state in the amended record on appeal the dates when the
plaintiffs had filed the original record on appeal and received notice of the
order to amend the record on appeal, the appeal was, on motion of the
defendants, dismissed by the Court of Appeals. 
Plaintiffs filed, therefore, with the Supreme Court, a petition for
mandamus to compel the Court of Appeals to give due course to their appeal.

11. 
L-32395 involves an action,
commenced in the Court of First Instance of Baguio
City, to recover the possession of a land, as well as rentals and damages.1
Plaintiffs therein2 having obtained a judgment in their
favor, the defendants3 appealed to the Court of
Appeals.  The plaintiffs moved therein4 to
dismiss the ap­peal, upon the ground that the record on appeal failed to state
that the corresponding appeal bond had been filed within the reglementary period and that said record on appeal had been
approved by the trial court.  The motion
having been denied, plaintiffs seek in the Supreme Court a review on certiorari
of the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying said motion to dismiss.

In these eleven (11) cases, the main question is whether the
records on appeal therein filed had violated the provision of Sec. 6, Rule 41
of the Rules of Court, for failure to state “x x
such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time,” which is a
ground for dismissal of the appeal under Sec. 1(a) of Rule 50 of said
Rules.  In this connection, it should be
noted that, pursuant to Sec. 3 of said Rule 41, an “(a)ppeal
may be taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court,
within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal,
an appeal bond, and a record on appeal,” and that, “(i)f the notice of appeal, the appeal bond and the record on
appeal have been filed in due time, the appeal is deemed perfected upon the
approval of the record on appeal and of the appeal bond other than a cash bond,
x x x” – in the
language of Sec. 9 of the same Rule. 
Construing these provisions, We held, as early as October 19, 1965:5

“There is no showing, therefore, in any way of the records of
appeal that the notices of appeal, appeal bond and record of appeal were filed
within 30 days from notice of the appealed order, after deducting the period
during which the motions for reconsideration were pending, as required by Rule
41, section 3.

“The deficiencies pointed out are fatal.  For the reason that in ordinary appeals the
original record is not forwarded to the appellate court, and because the dates
when an applicant received the notice of the per­tinent orders or judgment
under appeal, and of the de­nial of his motions for reconsideration or new
trial, are facts within the exclusive knowledge of said appellant, the Revised
Rules of Court place upon the appel­lant the burden of showing that his appeal
is timely, and for that purpose prescribe (Rule 41, sec. 6) that the record of
appeal shall include ‘such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on
time.’ This requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional, for un­less appeal is
perfected on time the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction over the
appealed case, and has power only to dismiss the appeal (Bello vs. Fer­nando, L-16970, Jan. 30, 1962; Caisip
vs. Cabangon, L-14684, August 26, 1960; Espartero vs. Ladaw, 49 Off. Gaz. 1439).  x x x.”

Elucidating on the background of Sec. 6 of Rule 41, this Court
pointed out, in a subsequent case:1

“In this connection, it should be noted that, prior to the
promulgation of the Rules of Court now in force, the first sentence of Section
6 of Rule 41, was as follows:

‘The full names of all the parties to the
pro­ceeding shall be stated in the caption of the record on appeal, and it
shall include the or­der or judgment from which the appeal is taken, and, in
chronological order, copies of all pleadings, petitions, motions and all
interlocutory orders relating to the appealed order or judgment.’

“This Court noticed, however, that issues were often raised in
appellate courts on whether the appeal had been perfected on time or not, owing
to the fact that the data pertinent thereto were not set forth in the record on
appeal.  Inasmuch as the records of trial
courts, in cases appealed by record on appeal, are not forward­ed to appellate
courts, the latter had no means of checking or verifying the conflicting
allegations of fact made, either in the briefs, or in the motion to dismiss the
ap­peal and the opposition thereto, filed by the parties.  As a consequence, appellate courts had to
examine such evi­dence as the parties may have submitted thereto, in sup­port
of their respective contentions.  This
entailed additional work and unnecessary waste of time, that con­tributed to
the delay in the final determination of ap­pealed cases.  To eliminate such obstacles to the speedy
administration of justice, this Court deemed it best, not only to rephrase the
first sentence of said Section 6, so as to read:

‘The full names of all the parties to the
pro­ceedings shall be stated in the caption of the record on appeal and it
shall include the or­der or judgment from which the appeal is taken, and, in
chronological order, copies of only such pleadings, petitions, motions and all
interlocutory orders as are related to the appealed order or judgment and neces­sary
for the proper understanding of the issue involved.’

but, also, to add, at the end thereof, the
clause:

‘together with such data as will show that
the appeal was perfected on time.’

“Obviously, this amendment would become use­less and its
purpose completely defeated, if we gave thereto the interpretation advocated by
the main respondent herein.  In other
words, we would have the same issues and the same waste of time that were
sought to be eliminated by the amendment. 
Hence, our ruling in Government vs. Antonio (supra), which, it
should be noted, was made, not in a decision, but, in a resolution, so that the
public may know imme­diately – instead of waiting for the decision on the
merits, which might require more time – the effect of said amendment, and the
injurious consequences of a failure to grasp its full import could thus be
minimized.”

We have time and again reiterated this stand, and stressed the
mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the requirements con­tained in Sec. 6 of
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.1 What is more, in a recently decided
case,2 We
added:

“It may not be amiss to point out that, in making the
amendment adverted to above, We have not over­looked the fact that oftentimes
the record on appeal is approved without any objection on the part of the appel­lee, who, it has, sometimes, been urged, should be
deemed to be in estoppel, in consequence of his afore­mentioned
failure to question the appeal.  This
notwith­standing, We have deemed and still deem it best to maintain the
aforementioned view, not only because the theory of estoppel
cannot apply when all of the par­ties concerned are aware of the relevant facts
– and the appellant as well as the trial court are supposed to know whether or
not the requisite steps for the per­fection of an appeal have been seasonably
taken – but, also, because, otherwise, the decision or final order complained
of becomes final and executory, so that the trial
court has no jurisdiction to sanction an appeal therefrom
and the appellate court is devoid of juris­diction to entertain the appeal.  Well-settled is the rule that the
jurisdiction over a case or matter may be questioned at any stage of the
proceedings.  In the language of
Government v. Antonio, (supra) ‘the certi­fication of the record on
appeal by the trial court, after expiration of the period to appeal cannot
restore the jurisdiction which has been lost.'”

Applying the foregoing views, from which We find no reason to
depart, We hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismiss­ing the appeal
involved in L-28783, for failure of petitioner’s re­cord on appeal to state
that he had posted an appeal bond and the date on which he had done so, the
filing of said bond within the reglementary period
being one of the essential conditions for the per­fection of an appeal,
pursuant to Secs. 3 and 9, of Rule 41.

Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals “erred, in
failing to apply the provisions of Section 7 of Rule 41,” which al­legedly
“requires both the trial court and the respondent x x
x to direct the amendment of the record on appeal by
the inclusion of any matter omitted therein which are deemed essential to the
de­termination of any issue of fact or law” in the appeal.  Said Sec­tion 7 does not, however,
“require” the trial court to give the aforementioned directive.  The issuance thereof is merely dis­cretionary
for the court.  Moreover, said provision
refers to matters “essential to the determination of the issue of law or
fact involved in the appeal” taken by the appellant.  The appeal bond was not essential to the
issues sought to be raised by petitioner herein, as appellant in the
main case.

Similarly, the Court of Appeals was justified in dismissing the
appeal involved in L-28818 for failure of the record on appeal, filed by
petitioners therein, to state the date of the filing of their original record
on appeal, although such date must have been stamped on said original record on
appeal, which remained in the lower court, the one forwarded to the Court of
Appeals being the joint record on appeal. 
In this connection, We had occasion to state, in Valera v. Court of Appeals, supra,
which is squarely in point:

“The first ground might have a semblance of validity had the
record on appeal approved by the lower court and certified to the Court of
Appeals been the Original Record on Appeal, for the date on which it was
filed would appear stamped thereon.  In
the case at bar, the Court of Appeals had no more than the Amended
Record on Appeal, which was submitted subsequently to the Original Record on
Appeal.  The date of the filing thereof
does not appear in the records of the Court of Appeals.  Moreover, said date could have and should
have been stated in the Amended Re­cord on Appeal.  The certification by the Clerk of the trial
court, to the effect that the original record on appeal had been filed on January 7, 1966, is not suf­ficient to
cure the defect of the amended record on appeal.”

According to petitioners’ joint record on appeal, copy of the
decision of the Court of First Instance, dated June 27, 1966, was received by
them on July 7, 1966; twenty-seven (27) days later, or on August 3, 1966, they
filed their notice of appeal; the next day, or August 4, 1966, they filed their
appeal bond; and on Sep­tember 14, 1966, or two (2) months and seven (7)
days after notice of said decision, the joint record on appeal was filed.  Hence, with­out the dates of the filing of
the original record on appeal, the order of the trial court authorizing the
filing of the joint record and the period therein given, if any, it is not
possible to determine whether the appeal had been perfected on time.

It appears from the record on appeal involved in L-29225 that the
decision of the court of first instance was rendered “under date of July
17, 1964”; that appellant Laperal had filed her
notice of ap­peal “under date of September 19, 1964” or about 62 days
after the rendition of said decision, dated July 17, 1964; and that the appeal
bond had, also, been paid to the Clerk of Court on September 19, 1964, which
is, likewise, the date of the record on appeal. 
Since, the record on appeal does not state the dates when appellant
received copy of said decision and filed her record on appeal, it is not
possible to determine, on the face thereof, whether or not the appeal had been
perfected on time.  Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals was justified in dismissing, in CA-G.R. No. 35634-R, Laperal’s appeal.  In
fact, her counsel impliedly concedes this, except that, he claims, a dif­ferent
norm has been applied by the trial court in connection with the appeal therein
taken by plaintiff Herrera, which is the subject-matter of L-29731.

As regards said appeal of Herrera, the aforementioned record on
appeal shows: that Herrera received copy of the appealed decision on August 21,
1964; that he had, therefore, up to September 20, 1964, to perfect his appeal;
that twenty-eight (28) days later, or on Sep­tember 18, 1964, he filed a motion
for reconsideration of said decision; that, pending resolution of said motion,
or on October 7, 1964, Herrera filed his notice of appeal and cash bond, with a
petition for “an additional period of 15 days from the date of expiry of
the sus­pended period to appeal, the suspension being due to the
non-receipt” of the resolution of his motion for reconsideration; that, on
the same date, October 7, 1964, he filed another motion to suspend the period
within which to perfect his appeal and for “an additional period of 15
days from the expiration of the reglementary period,
as suspended, within which to perfect his appeal”; that on October 24,
1964, the trial court issued an order denying Herrera’s motion for reconsidera­tion
and granting him “an extension of ten (10) days from receipt” of said
order “within which to submit his Record on Appeal”; that on October
26, 1964, said court approved the record on appeal submitted by the defendants;
and that Herrera filed a supplemental record on appeal dated November 9, 1964,
adopting “as his own” the record on appeal filed by the defendants.  Since the date of receipt of the order of
October 24, 1964, granting plaintiff ten (10) days from notice thereof, and the
date of the filing of plaintiff’s supplemental record on appeal, dated November
9, 1964, or 16 days later, are not given in such record on appeal, the data therein
contained are insufficient to show that plain­tiff’s appeal has been perfected
on time.

The main issue in L-29753 differs from that of the other cases
disposed of in this decision, in that the sufficiency of the facts set forth in
the record on appeal involved in L-29753 was assailed in and passed upon by the
trial court.  Moreover, the data lacking
in said record on appeal – date on which petitioners herein received copy of
the order of said court dated February 24, 1968, denying their motion for new trial
– is supposed to be available in the record of Civil Case No. 336 of the same
court which was before respondent Judge. 
There can be no question, therefore, that he could
determine, by examining the whole record before him, what said date was and, consequently,
whether or not the appeal had been perfected on time.  He seems to be, however, under the impression
that – even if said record warranted an affirmative answer – he could not order
the amendment of petitioners’ record on appeal by the insertion therein of the
date on which they had received copy of his order aforementioned.

The reason for this impression of respondent Judge seems to be
that, since the requirements of section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, are
“mandatory and jurisdictional,” a record on appeal that fails to
comply with said requirement is a worthless piece of paper which does not
suspend the running of the period to perfect the appeal, so that, upon the
expiration thereof – as, he claims, in the case at bar – he may no longer order
the amendment of the record on appeal for the completion of the data lacking in
the original record on appeal.

We have held that the provision in section 6 of Rule 41 – to the
effect that the record on appeal should, inter alia,
state “such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time”
– is “mandatory and jurisdictional,” in the sense that, if the appeal
is not so perfected, the decision or final order sought to be reviewed would
have become final and executory, so that the appellate
court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, and
that, accordingly, com­pliance with said requirement is “mandatory,”
in view of which, failure of the appellee to object
to the approval of the record on appeal would not bar him from asking the
appellate court to dismiss the appeal for non-compliance with the
aforementioned requirement.

Then, again, one other reason for the requirement under con­sideration
is that, in cases appealed by record on appeal, the original record of the case
remains in the trial court, so that the appellate court has no means
of determining – if the record on ap­peal does not comply with said Rule –
whether or not the appeal has been duly perfected, unless evidence thereon were
introduced, and this, precisely, is sought to be avoided by section 6 of Rule
41.  Indeed, the reception of such
evidence would consume time which is badly needed by appellate courts for other
cases and more meritorious issues and could be saved by complying with the
provisions of said section.

In the light of the spirit and purpose thereof, We hold,
therefore, that the filing of petitioners’ record on appeal, with the
deficiency adverted to above, suspended the running of the period to perfect
their appeal and that the Court of Appeals has not erred in ordering the trial
court to permit an amendment of said record on appeal so as to state therein
the date when petitioners received notice of the order denying their motion for
new trial.

It should be noted, moreover, that the appeal by certiorari to
the Supreme Court, docketed therein as L-29753, has been taken, not by any of
the parties in the main case,1 but by respondent Judge, who is
merely a nominal party in the present action for certiorari and mandamus.  He has been included as respondent therein in
compliance with section 5 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides that
–

“When the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a
court or judge, the petitioner shall join, as parties defendant with such court
or judge, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the
court; and it shall be the duty of such person or persons to appear and defend,
both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the court or judge affected by
the proceedings, and costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the
petitioner shall be against the person or persons in interest only, and not
against the court or judge.”

It is clear from this provision that respondent Judge is not a
person “in interest”, within the purview thereof, and that, accord­ingly,
he has no standing or authority to appeal from or seek a review on certiorari
of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 41577-R, although, in
taking such step, he was motivated by the best of intentions.

With respect to L-29970, the record on appeal in CA-G.R. No.
41825-R shows that the decision in Civil Case No. 68339 of the court of first
instance of Manila was rendered on January 29, 1968; that, twenty eight (28)
days later, or on February 26, 1968, Dominguez filed his notice of appeal from
said decision, as well as his appeal bond; that, forty six (46) days later, or
on May 14, 1968, said court issued an order directing Dominguez to make in his
record on appeal, within five (5) days from receipt of copy of said order, the
corrections specified in said order; that on May 18, 1968, Dominguez filed a
motion to be allowed to make said corrections, in open court, on the original
record on appeal, the corrections specified in the order of May 14, 1968 being
due to mere typographical errors; that on May 25, 1968, the court issued an
order directing the submission of a corrected record on appeal within five (5)
days from said date; and that Domin­guez filed an amended record on appeal
dated May 29, 1968, which was set for hearing on June 8, 1968, and approved on
June 20, 1968.  Inasmuch as the amended
record on appeal does not state the dates on which Dominguez received copy of
the decision dated January 29, 1968
and filed the original record on appeal, it is not possible to ascertain from
the amended record on appeal whether or not the appeal had been perfected on
time.  The Court of Appeals did not err,
therefore, in dismissing said appeal, pursuant to section 6 of Rule 41 and Sec.
1(a) of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.

Then, again, according to the record on appeal in CA-G.R. No.
42266, which is involved in L-30525, the decision in civil case No. 8613 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal was rendered on December 13, 1966.  Forty eight (48) days later, or on February 1, 1967, the defendants filed
a motion for new trial, which was denied on February 18, 1967. 
Thirteen (13) days later, or on March
3, 1967, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was denied on July 14, 1967.  The defendants filed a record on appeal dated
July 21, 1967, which was
approved in an order dated March 21,
1968, stating that the requisite notice of appeal, appeal bond and
record on appeal had been filed, without specifying the dates on which each act
had been performed.  Considering that
forty eight (48) days had elapsed from the rendition of the decision to the
filing of the motion for new trial; that thirteen (13) days had elapsed from
the date of denial of said motion to that of the filing of the motion for
reconsideration; and that seven (7) days had elapsed from the denial of said
motion for recon­sideration to July 21, 1967, the date of the record on appeal,
which must have been filed still later, for despite the absence of any oppo­sition
thereto, it was not approved until March 21, 1968, it is manifest that the
silence of the record on appeal as regards the dates when the defendants:  (1) received a) copy of the decision of
December 13, 1966, b) notice of the order of February 18, 1967, denying their
motion for new trial, and c) notice of the order denying their motion for recon­sideration;
and (2) filed their record on appeal, renders it impossible to determine, from
an examination of the record on appeal, whether or not the appeal had been
perfected on time.

As regards L-31054, the Government maintains that the state­ment
made by His Honor, the Trial Judge, in his order approving the record on
appeal, to the effect that the joint record on appeal, the notice of appeal and
the appeal bond had been filed “within the period” prescribed therefor, suffices to comply with the require­ments of Sec.
6 of Rule 41.  This pretense is
untenable, said state­ment being a mere conclusion, not a fact
indicative of the seasonable perfection of the appeal.  It is true that the notice of appeal filed by
the Government stated the dates on which it received notice of the decision of
the trial court, filed its motion for reconsideration of said decision and
received notice of the order denying the same. 
Such statement constitutes a substantial compliance with the requirements
of Sec. 6 of Rule 41, as regards the events to which said dates refer, but the
record on appeal is still deficient, insofar as it does not mention the
extension of time given for the filing of the joint record on appeal and the
duration of said exten­sion.

Indeed, said joint record on appeal shows that on October 2,
1968, the Government received copy of the decision of the court of first
instance, dated September 23, 1968; that 26 days later, or on October 28, 1968,
the Government filed its motion for reconsidera­tion of said decision; that
notice of the order denying said motion for reconsideration was received by the
Government on January 13, 1969; that the Government filed its notice of appeal
on January 14, 1969; that the Government had been given an extension of time –
the length of which is not stated – within which to file a record on appeal;
and that the joint record on appeal bears the date, March 4, 1969, or about 49
days after notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration.  In short, without a statement of the date of
the filing of the original record on appeal, of the length of the ex­tension of
time granted for the filing of the joint record on appeal, and of the date of
the filing thereof, it is not possible to establish whether or not the appeal
had been perfected on time.

The printed record on appeal in L-31510 does not show the date on
which it was filed with the trial court, but such date is stamped on the
original record on appeal, which was approved by said court and forwarded to
the Court of Appeals.  Section 6, Rule 41
of the Rules of Court, obviously refers to the record on appeal filed with the
trial court, not to the record on appeal printed in the appellate court.  At any rate, the Court of Appeals is in a
position to determine the date aforementioned, by examining the original record
on appeal thereto forwarded, and, hence, forming part of its own records.  Accordingly, petitioner’s record on appeal
meets the objective of said provision of the Rules of Court, which may be
deemed to have been substantially complied with.

The amended record on appeal in L-31875 does not state either the
date when the original record on appeal was filed or the date when appellant
received notice of the order directing that said record on appeal be
amended.  Consequently, it does not show
that the appeal has been perfected on time. 
Petitioners argue that this deficiency has been offset by the order
approving the record on appeal, which states “that the plaintiffs have
filed an amended record on appeal in compliance with the
order of June 3, 1969,” and that said record on appeal is “in
order,” in view of which it was approved. 
This statement in said order does not suffice to cure the defect of the
record on appeal.  Indeed – apart from
being a mere conclusion, not a fact serving as a premise therefor
– the statement about compliance with the order of June 3, 1969 – the contents
of which are neither reproduced in the record on appeal nor described therein –
simply means that petitioners herein had made in the record on appeal the
amendments directed in said order. 
Accordingly, the aforementioned statement does not supply sufficient
data to enable the appellate court to determine whether or not the appeal had
been perfected on time.  In
other words, said statement did not forestall the issues that were sought to be
avoided by Sec. 6 of Rule 41.

The record on appeal involved in L-32395 does not state the date
on which the requisite appeal bond had been filed, not even whe­ther or not
petitioners therein had filed said appeal bond. 
Thus, it is not possible to determine, upon examination of the record on
appeal, whether or not they had seasonably perfected their appeal, which was
properly dismissed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, judgment should be, as it is hereby ren­dered:

1.     
Dismissing the petition in L-28783
and denying the writ therein prayed for, with costs against petitioner Perla Reyes;

2.     
Affirming in L-28818 the contested
resolution of the Court of Appeals, with costs against petitioners Fernando Atengco and Olimpio Atengco;

3.     
Affirming in L-29225 the
resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated April 19, 1968, in CA-G.R. No. 35364-R, dismissing the
appeal therein taken by Juanita Laperal, the
petitioner herein, with costs against her;

4.     
Reversing in L-29731 the
resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated October 14, 1968, in CA-G.R. No. 35364-R, reinstating the
appeal therein taken by Buenaventura Herrera, with costs against the latter;

5.     
Affirming in L-29753 the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 41577-R, without special pronouncement
as to costs;

6.     
Affirming in L-29970 the appealed
resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 41825-R, with costs against
petitioner herein, Edward Dominguez;

7.     
Affirming in L-30525 the
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 42266-R dismissing the appeal
taken by the defendants therein, with the costs of this instance against said
defendants and petitioners herein;

8.     
Dismissing the petition in L-31054
and denying the writs therein prayed for, without costs;

9.     
Setting aside in L-31510 the
appealed resolutions of the Court of Appeals and directing the same to give due
course to the appeal taken by herein petitioner Design Masters, Inc., as defen­dant-appellant
in case CA-G.R. No. 40463-R of said court, with the costs of this instance
against herein respondents, Napoleon V. Velasco and Pacita
L. Velasco;

10. 
Dismissing the petition in L-31875
and denying the writs therein prayed for, with costs against petitioners Abelardo Bragais and Erlinda Bragais; and

11. 
Setting aside the appealed
resolution in L-32395 and dis­missing the appeal taken by respondents herein,
as appellants in case CA-G.R. No. 43073-R of the Court of Appeals, with costs
against them.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes J. B. L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Fernando, Barredo, and
Villamor, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

Makasiar, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Civil Case No. 625-R thereof.

^[2]
Civil Case No. 65271 of said court.

^[3] Tiburcia Alvarez, Fernando Atengco,
Olimpio Atengco, Paciencia Atengco, Juana Caingat, Fernando de la Cruz, Juana de la Cruz, Pedro
David, Macaria Dizon, Ambrocio Mangsal and Venancio Mendoza.

^[4]
Civil Case No. 59282.

1
Civil Case No. 336 thereof.

1
Zacarias de la Torre and Nemesio de la Torre.

2
CA-G.R. No. 41577-R.

1
CA-G.R. No. 41825-R.

2
By the minor Maria Christina Santiago, represented by her parents Salvador
and Milagros Santiago.

3 Civil Case No. 8613 thereof.

4 From Juana M. Halili, Ermilinda Garcia and their respective spouses John Doe Halili and John Doe Garcia.

5 C.A.-G.R. No. 42266-R.

1 High-Rate Fertilizer of the Philippines, Inc.

2 Civil Case No. 10447 of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal.

3 Fermina del Valle-Delima, Justiniano Delima and Ortigas & Co.,
Limited Partnership.

4 Abelardo Bragais and Erlinda Bragais.

1 Civil Case No. 968 of said Court.

2 Rafael, Demec, David, Tolina, Simo, Abdon,
Elias and Bosong, all surnamed Tello.

3 Zacarias Toquing – alias Toking Zacarias (now deceased) – substituted by his widow,
Rosalina Toquing, and children – Neneng
Toquing, Kideng Toking Pascua, Moning Toking Sanchez, Lourdes T.
Balictan and Peril Toking.

4 CA-G.R. No. 42073-R.

5 Government of the Philippines
v. Luis Antonio, et al., L-23736, October 19, 1965.

1 Araneta v.
Madrigal, L-26227-28, October 25,
1966.

1 DBP v. Santos, L-26387, Sept. 27, 1966; Atlas
Consolidated Mining & Development Corp. v. Progressive Labor Asso., L-27125, Sept. 15, 1967; Jocson
v. Robles, L-23433, Feb. 10, 1968; Cadiz v. Sec. of National
Defense, et al., L-25150, Sept. 30, 1968.

2 Valera
v. Court of Appeals, L-29416, January
28, 1971.

1 Plaintiff Zoilo de los Reyes and defendants Zacarias
and Nemesio de la Torre.

Clean
Clean

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