G.R. No. L-30317. June 09, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE FRANCISCO RO. CUPIN, JUDGE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT, XIV JUDICIAL DISTRICT, HON. CITY FISCAL, CEBU CITY, JOSE P. AM…
DIZON, J.:
Original petition for
certiorari and/or prohibition filed on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines by Narciso D. Salcedo,
Provincial Fiscal of Cavite, pursuant to authority
granted to him in Administrative Order No. 336 of December 26, 1968, against the Hon. Francisco Ro. Cupin, Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, 14th Judicial District,
Jose P. Amadora, in his capacity as Fiscal of Cebu city, and Ernesto Dakay,
praying that judgment be rendered as follows:
“1) all the acts, proceedings and orders of the
respondent Hon. Judge Francisco Ro. Cupin, Circuit
Criminal Court, Cebu City be declared NULL and VOID;
“2) the records of the
said Crim. Case No. V-10839 be
ordered returned to the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Br. I;
“3) all documentary
evidence and exhibits which respondent Hon. Judge Cupin
directed deposited in the lower court, be IMMEDIATELY ordered returned to the
NBI, the said evidences, documents and/or exhibits having been lawfully seized
pursuant to valid search warrants, and the legality thereof had been upheld by the Hon. Judge
Guillermo P. Villasor, but which legality, the
respondent Dakay might yet question, as in fact the
legality of the search warrants and seizures is still under consideration by the
Honorable Supreme Court in G. R. Nos. L-26828 and 26957;
“4) and after the acts, proceedings, and orders of
the respondent Circuit Criminal Court Judge Francisco Ro. Cupin
are declared NULL and VOID, an order issue restraining, enjoining and
prohibiting the respondent Hon. City Fiscal Jose P. Amadora,
from interfering or intervening in any manner whatsoever, in the investigation,
reinvestigation or prosecution of Crim. Case V-10839
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and
thereafter, making the injunction and prohibition permanent; and
“5) such other reliefs and remedies as are proper and
equitable under the premises, be likewise granted.”
On March 28, 1969,
upon motion of petitioner, We issued a resolution
allowing the inclusion, as respondent, of District Judge Santiago O. Tañada, and restraining both respondent judges from taking
action in, or cognizance of Criminal Case No. V-10839 entitled “People of
the Philippines
vs. Ernesto Dakay“, and particularly from acting
on the motion for dismissal filed by the respondent City Fiscal of Cebu.
Stripped of unnecessary details, the antecedent facts are the
following:
On January 18, 1966, by Administrative Order No. 5 of the
Department of Justice, senior state prosecutor Vicente G. Ericta
was designated to assist the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu
and the Fiscal of Cebu city in the investigation and
prosecution of all cases involving the violation of the National Internal
Revenue Code and Tariff and Customs Code and of all such other crimes committed in
relation thereto and which may be penalized by the Revised Penal Code or by any
special law. On the 27th of the sane
month he filed in the Court of First Instance of said province an information against Ernesto Dakay
(Criminal Case No. V-10839) for violation of Section 355 in
relation to Section 336 of the Internal Revenue Code. This information was superseded by an amended
pleading charging the same offense filed three days later.
On February 1, 1966, Dakay filed a
motion to quash the information alleging firstly, that Prosecutor Ericta had no authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the case and to file the corresponding information against
him; secondly, that he was denied the right to a preliminary investigation and, lastly, that the information
was void because it charged more than one offense. After hearing both parties, the court, on April 14, 1966, denied the motion but
at the same time ordered that the case be reinvestigated to give the defendant
an opportunity to be heard, cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and to
present evidence in his favor. When the
motions for the reconsideration of this order filed by both parties were denied
by the court, then presided by the Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor,
on June 15, 1966, Dakay brought up the case
to Us by way of appeal (G.R. L26380), but We dismissed the appeal on December 1 of
the same year.
Thereafter Dakay, thru counsel,
addressed a letter to the Fiscal of the city of Cebu requesting him to conduct the
preliminary investigation of Criminal Case V-10839 as ordered by Judge Villasor.
It appears that on May 24, 1966, the Secretary of Justice, thru
the then Undersecretary, issued Administrative Order No. 154 designating Narciso D. Salcedo, at the time
second Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Sulu, to assist
the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu and the Fiscal of Cebu city in the prosecution of all cases mentioned in the
previous administrative order designating Fiscal Ericta
for the same purpose. Salcedo’s designation thus superseded that of the latter.
After the dismissal of Dakay’s appeal by Us, Special Counsel Llenos set the case against the former for
reinvestigation. When Prosecutor Salcedo appeared thereat and claimed authority to handle
the prosecution, his right to do so was contested by City Fiscal Amadora and special counsels Llenos
and Salazar, who claimed that Salcedo’s only
authority in the premises was to assist them in the presentation of
evidence against the accused. In fact,
on May 2, 1967, special
counsel Salazar had issued a subpoena duces tecum, requiring him to produce all the evidence presented
during the previous investigation conducted by state prosecutor Ericta on May 17-18 of the same year. Result of this controversy was an agreement
between the parties that the City Fiscal of Cebu
would move the court to clarify the order for the reinvestigation of the case
and rule squarely on who should
make such reinvestigation. The City
Fiscal having done so, the court, thru Judge Villasor,
issued the following order:
“Considering the provision of Section 39 of the Revised City
Charter of Cebu (Republic Act No. 3857) that ‘the
fiscal of the City shall cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,’ as
well as the pertinent administrative order designating a State Prosecutor to
‘assist the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu Province and
the City Fiscal of Cebu City’ in this case, it is
believed that action on the motion filed by the City Fiscal of Cebu dated May 18,
1967 is unnecessary for the reason that both prosecutors, in the conduct of
the reinvestigation as ordered by this Court, shall have to comply with the
tenor of the above mentioned laws.”
As the above order did not seem to decide the issue clearly,
Fiscal Salcedo, thru the Chief Prosecutor, submitted
a memorandum
to the Department of Justice
suggesting that court action be taken against City Fiscal Amadora. Days and weeks thereafter elapsed apparently
without any action on the case, but suddenly Fiscal Salcedo
received notice to the effect that Criminal Case No. V-10839 would be tried before
the Circuit Criminal Court of the 14th Judicial District of Cebu
city on December 7, 9 and 10, 1968. On
the first day, Salcedo appeared and asked that the
trial be postponed alleging that due to the suddenness of the notice he was not
prepared to go to trial. This was
granted only after the City Fiscal of Cebu – patently to serve a definite but undisclosed purpose
– submitted a
manifestation to the effect that the case had not passed through his
office; that no complaint had been filed with his office by the complainant for
the purpose of a preliminary investigation; that neither he nor anyone of his
assistants had signed or verified the information; that he did not have in his
possession the documentary evidence to prove the case nor did he have knowledge
of the nature of the case (Annex “P” attached to the petition). As was to be expected, invoking the facts set forth in the written
statement aforesaid, defendant Dakay’s counsel filed
a motion for dismissal, which, however, was not decided forthwith. Thereafter the case was again called for
trial on January 15-17, 1969
on which occasion Dakay’s counsel reiterated his
motion for dismissal. On the same
occasion, however, Fiscal Salcedo informed the Court
that, under a later administrative order, Secretary of Justice Juan Ponce Enrile had designated him anew to handle the investigation
and prosecution of the case of People vs. Ernesto Dakay,
(Criminal Case No. V-10839) and other related cases independently of the
City Fiscal of Cebu
city effective immediately and to continue until further orders and that
this last administrative order superseded the other Numbered 259 of October 9, 1968. The statement to this effect appears not to
have been contested. Thereupon the
court, then presided by herein respondent Hon. Francisco Ro. Cupin, manifested that a resolution would be issued the
next day resolving the motion to dismiss filed by the defense, but instead of
one such resolution, he issued one (Annex “Q” attached to the
petition) in which he ordered that the case be reinvestigated by the City Fiscal’s office of Cebu, assisted
by the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite pursuant to Administrative
Order No. 336 dated December
26, 1968.
On January 22, 1969, after the office of the City Fiscal of Cebu and Fiscal Salcedo had
apparently arrived at an understanding that the latter would only assist in the
reinvestigation of the case, respondent City Fiscal Amadora
filed a motion for the dismissal of the case (Annex “R” attached to
the petition), thereby concurring with the recommendation made by special
counsel Salazar of the city of Cebu in his report
dated January 21, 1969, concerning the reinvestigation of the case conducted by
him by designation of the city fiscal of said city. In relation to this motion to dismiss the
case, Fiscal Salcedo was given time to submit a
written opposition – which pleading he filed.
Thereafter the respondent judge issued on February 1, 1969 an order (Annex “U”
attached to the petition) approving the report submitted by the City Fiscal of Cebu covering the reinvestigation of the case and, as a consequence, dismissed
the case. As a result the present
petition for certiorari and/or prohibition was filed on March 20, 1969 mainly for the annulment of all the proceedings held before the respondent
Judge Francisco Ro. Cupin.
On March
10, 1969 respondent
Ernesto Dakay filed a motion for the dismissal of the
present case upon the ground that Administrative Order No. 336 of December
28, 1968 issued by
the Secretary of Justice designating Narciso D. Salcedo, Provincial Fiscal of Cavite,
to handle the investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case No. V-10839, among
others, independently of the City Fiscal of Cebu,
effective immediately and until further orders, had been cancelled and
superseded by Administrative Order No. 136 issued by the same Department Head
on April 8, 1969,
expressly revoking Administrative Order No. 336. On April 17, 1969, We required Fiscal
Salcedo to comment within ten (10) days from notice
upon this motion to dismiss. On May 13
of the same year he submitted his comment saying, among other things, the
following:
“1. That he is not in a position to give an
intelligent comment on respondent Dakay’s ex-parte motion to recall restraining order issued on March 31, 1969, because he has not
been furnished a copy of the same. Be
this as it may, it is respectfully submitted that the recall of the restraining
order, copy of which has not also been received by the undersigned, must be
based on the merits and not merely on the ground that the authority of the
undersigned to prosecute the Dacay cases has been revoked by
Administrative Order No. 136 dated April 8, 1969.
“2. That by way of comment on the urgent motion to
dismiss the herein petition on the ground that the authority of the undersigned
to handle the Dakay cases has been revoked by
Administrative Order No. 136 dated April 8,
1969, it is submitted that the said revocation of authority is not a
valid ground for dismissal and that if ever the instant petition should be
dismissed, it should be dismissed on the merits and on valid grounds other than
mere revocation of the authority of the undersigned.
“3. That in view of the revocation of the
authority of the undersigned to handle the Dakay
cases by virtue of Administrative Order No. 136 dated April 8, 1969, the
undersigned can only state by way of
final comment that during the existence of his authority to handle the Dakay cases, the undersigned handled the Dakay cases to the best of his limited ability in
accordance with the facts, the law, and jurisprudence applicable, and in
accordance with the conscience of fair-minded men. But, inasmuch as the authority of the
undersigned has been revoked, it is but prudent and just that the undersigned
should refrain from making any other comment, else the same might be
misunderstood as defiance of the authority and prerogative of the Secretary of
Justice in the exercise of his power to designate prosecutors to handle cases
and to revoke such designation in accordance with what the Secretary believes
is right. To comment any further might
be misconstrued as questioning the wisdom and discretion of the Secretary of
Justice.
“WHEREFORE, with the submission of the herein comments, it is most respectfully prayed that the
undersigned be spared the painful duty of making any further comments.”
The motion for dismissal
before Us could be resolved with a simple minute resolution granting or denying
it, but We have chosen instead to issue this extended resolution because of the
need to point out a situation – in our opinion anomalous and unedifying –
clearly disclosed by the facts of the case:
that of two groups of public prosecutors with different ideas about the same case and working at cross purposes in connection
therewith; on the one hand, special prosecutors designated by the Department of
Justice who, after due investigation, had found that there was a prima facie
case against Ernesto Dakay and, therefore, acted
accordingly, and on the other, the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu, at first persistently trying to limit the activities
of the special prosecutors to merely giving it assistance in the investigation
and prosecution of the case, and ultimately arriving at its own conclusion
that there was no sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case against Dakay and accordingly asking for the dismissal of the
criminal case filed against him – which the court granted in its order of
February 1, 1969. On
top of this, after Fiscal Salcedo had been authorized
in the second to the last
administrative order of the Department of Justice to continue the prosecution
of Criminal Case No. V-10839 of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu against Ernesto Dakay,
independently of the City Fiscal of Cebu, such
authority was suddenly withdrawn, thus in effect pulling the rug from under his
feet. It is not strange, therefore, that
he was noncommittal in his remarks in relation to Dakay’s
motion to dismiss the present case precisely upon the ground that Fiscal Salcedo’s authority to prosecute the criminal case against
him and, as a consequence, to prosecute the present case, had been cancelled
by the Department of Justice.
The motion for dismissal,
if resolved on the merits, should be denied because the petitioner in the
present special civil action is the Republic of the Philippines and not Fiscal Salcedo. The fact that the latter who
commenced it with the filing of the proper petition is no longer authorized to prosecute it, is not a
legal ground upon which to dismiss the case.
The Solicitor General could, if he is so minded, go on with it. We are, however, constrained to order its dismissal because,
according to the record, respondent Judge Francisco Ro. Cupin, in an order dated March 4, 1969, had held that under
the provisions of Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts,
the violation of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code charged in
Criminal Case V-10839 does not come within the limited jurisdiction of the
court by him presided and, as a consequence, declared “as without any force and effect its order dated February
1, 1969 dismissing the case and hereby returns the case to the Honorable Executive Judge for raffle”. This, in effect, set aside the proceedings
complained of – a circumstance that renders the present case moot and academic.
FOR THE REASONS ABOVE
STATED, the present case is
dismissed, without costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Acting C.J., Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Ruiz Castro, J., on official leave.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
took no part.