TERESITA C. YAPTINCHAY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, PASIG BRANCH; VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY, IN HER OWN BEHALF AND IN H…

The problem posed in this, an original petition for certiorari,
is whether or not this Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers should
strike down as having been issued in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion, the respondent judge’s order of June 15, 1966 in Civil Case 8873
(Court of First Instance of Rizal) directing
petitioner to deliver to Special Administratrix
Virginia Y. Yaptinchay of the estate of the deceased
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay the North Forbes Park property
hereinafter described, and to refrain from disturbing or interfering in any
manner whatsoever with the latter’s possession thereof, such order having been
amended by said respondent judge’s subsequent order of June 28, 1966 in turn
enjoining defendants in said case (private respondents herein) and/or their
duly authorized agents or representatives from selling, disposing, or otherwise
encumbering said property in any manner whatsoever pending the termination of
said case.  We granted the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for and directed respondents to return
the possession of the North Forbes
Park property to petitioner upon a
P50,000-bond.

The controlling facts are the following:

On July 13, 1965,
herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay
sought in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, her appointment first as Special Administratrix and then as regular administratrix
of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in Hongkong on July 7,
1965.  This is known in the
record as Special Proceedings 1944-P. 
Petitioner there alleged that the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay
had lived with her continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for
nineteen (19) years:  from 1946 to 1964
at 1951 Taft Avenue, Pasay City, and from 1964 to
July 1965 at 60 Russel Avenue, Pasay
City; that the deceased who died without a will left an estate consisting of
personal and real properties situate in­ the Philippines, Hongkong
and other places with an estimated value of about P500,000; that to
petitioner’s knowledge and information, the deceased left three daughters,
Virginia Yaptinchay, Mary Yap­tinchay
Eligir and Asuncion Yaptinchay,
all of age; that on July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted away from
the residences aforesaid personal properties belonging to the deceased together
with others exclusively owned by petitioner. 
It was averred that in these circumstances the appointment of a special
administrator to take custody and care of the interests of the deceased pending
appointment of a regular administrator became an urgent necessity.

Upon the foregoing allegations, the court issued on July 17, 1965
an order appointing herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay special administratrix
of the estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yap­tinchay
upon a P25,000-bond.

To the petition of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, an opposition was registered by Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, and Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children, of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay, upon the ground that said Teresita
C. Yap­tinchay, not being an heir of the decedent,
had no right to institute the proceeding for the settlement of the latter’s
estate, much less to procure appointment as administratrix
thereof; and that having admittedly cohabited with the deceased for a number of
years said petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix
for went of integrity.  At the same time,
oppositors counter-petitioned for the appointment of
Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, daughter of the deceased, as
special administratrix and of Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged surviving spouse, as regular administratrix.

To give oppositors an opportunity to be
heard, the probate court, on July 19,
1965, set aside its order of July 17, 1965 appointing petitioner Teresita
C. Yaptinchay special administratrix.

On July 30, 1965,
after the parties were heard, the probate court granted counter-petitioners’
prayer and named Virginia Y. Yaptinchay special administratrix upon a P50,000-bond.

On August 18, 1965,
the special administratrix submitted a preliminary
inventory of the assets of the estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay.  Included
amongst these was “[a] bungalow residential house with swimming pool,
situated at Park corner Talisay
Road, North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal”
adverted to at the start of this opinion.

It was after respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay
had been appointed special administratrix that herein
petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay
made her second move.  That was on August 14, 1965.  This time, petitioner filed in another branch
(Pasig Branch) of the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for replevin and
for liquidation of the partnership supposedly formed during the period of her
cohabitation with Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and for
damages.  This case was docketed as Civil
Case 8873.^[1]
Pending hearing on the question of the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary injunction prayed for, respondent
judge Guillermo E. Torres issued an order of August 17, 1965 temporarily
restraining defendants therein (private respondents here) and their agents from
disposing any of the properties listed in the complaint and from interfering
with plaintiff’s (herein petitioner’s) rights to, and possession over, amongst
others, “the house now standing at North Forbes Park, Makati,
Rizal.”

On August 25, 1965, defendants (private respondents herein)
resisted the action, opposed the issuance of the writs of replevin
and preliminary injunction, mainly upon these propositions; (1) that exclusive
jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay was already vested in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasay
City Branch in the special proceedings heretofore mentioned (Special
Proceedings No. 1944-P); (2) that the present liquidation case was filed to
oust said probate court of jurisdiction over the properties enumerated in this,
the second case (Civil Case 8873); and (3) that plaintiff was not entitled to
the remedy of injunc­tion prayed for, her alleged right sought to be protected
thereby being doubtful and still in dispute.

Said defendants (private respondents before this Court) in turn
prayed the court for a writ of preliminary injunction to direct plaintiff
(petitioner here) and all others in her behalf to cease and desist from
disturbing in any manner whatsoever defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay’s
possession amongst others of the North Forbes Park house and to order the
removal from the premises of said North Forbes Park house of the guards, agents
and employees installed therein by plaintiff; to enjoin plaintiff and her
agents from entering the aforesaid house and any other real property registered
in the name of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and from
interfering with or from disturbing the exercise by Virginia Y. Yaptinchay of her rights and powers of administration over
the assets registered in the name of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay
and/or in the latter’s possession at the time of his death.

Came the herein disputed order of June 15, 1966 issued in said Civil
Case 8873, the pertinent portion of which reads:

“From the pleadings as well as the evidence already submitted
and representations made to the court during the arguments, it appears that one
of the properties in dispute is the property located at the corner of Park Road
and Talisay Street, North Forbes Park, Makati, Risal which at the time
of the death of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay was
still under construction and it also appears that after his death said property
was among the properties of the deceased placed under the administration of the
special administratrix, the defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay. 
Information has been given that in the evening of August 14, 1965, the plaintiff was able to
dispossess the special ad­ministratrix from the
premises in question and that since then she had been in custody of said house.

While the Court is still considering the merits of the application
and counter application for provi­sional relief, the Court believes that for
the pro­tection of the properties and considering that the Forbes Park property
is really under the respon­sibility of defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, by virtue of her being appointed Special Administratrix of the estate of the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay, the Court denies the petition for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction of the plaintiff with respect to the Forbes
Park property and the restraining order issued by this Court is lifted.  The Court also orders the plaintiff to cease and
desist from disturbing in any manner whatsoever the defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay in the possession of said property.

WHEREFORE, upon defendant’s filing a bond in the amount of
P10,000.00, let a writ of prelim­inary injunction issue requiring the
plaintiff, her representatives and agents or other persons acting in her behalf
to deliver the possession of the prop­erty located at the corner of Park Road
and Talisay Street, North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal to the Special Administratrix Virginia Y. Yaptinchay,
and to refrain from disturbing or interfering in any manner whatsoever
defendant’s possession thereof.”

     Which, as aforestated, was amended by the court order of June 28, 1966, which in part recites:

“Considering that the present case treats principally with the
liquidation of an alleged partnership between the plaintiff and the deceased
Isidro Yaptinchay and considering further that said
house in North Forbes Park is included among the properties in dispute, the
Court hereby clarifies its Order of June 15, 1966 by enjoining the defendants
and/or their duly authorized agents or representatives from selling, disposing
or otherwise encumbering said property in any manner whatsoever pending the
termination of this case.”

Petitioner’s motion to reconsider the June 15, 1966 order was overturned by respondent judge’s
order of August 8, 1966,
which recites that:

“Considering that defendants, principally Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, took actual or physical possession
of the said properties which were formerly held by the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay and the plaintiff, by virtue of her
appointment and under her authority, as Special Adminis­tratrix
of the estate of the deceased Isidro Yap­tinchay, the
plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied.”^[2]

The orders of June 15 and August
8, 1966 triggered the present proceedings in this Court.

1.  Petitioner’s stance
before us is this:  As she was occupying
the Forbes Park
property at the time of the death of Isidro Yaptinchay,
grave abuse of discretion attended respondent judge’s order issuing an injunctive
writ transferring possession of said property to respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay.

A rule of long standing echoed and reechoed in jurisprudence is
that injunction is not to be granted for the purpose of taking prop­erty out of
possession and/or control of a party and placing it in that of another whose
title thereto has not been clearly established.^[3]
With this as guidepost, petitioner would have been correct if she were lawfully
in possession of the house in controversy when Civil Case 8873 (where the injunctive
writ was issued) was commenced in the Pasig court, and
if respondent special administratrix, to whom the
possession thereof was transferred, were without right thereto.  But the situation here is not as petitioner
pictures it to be.

It is beyond debate that with the institution on July 13, 1965 of
Special Proceedings 1944-P, properties belonging not only to the deceased
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay but also to the conjugal partner­ship
of said deceased and his legitimate wife, Josefina Y. Yaptinchay,^[4]
were brought under the jurisdiction of the probate court, properly to be placed
under administration.^[5]
One such property is the lot at North
Forbes Park.^[6]

With respect to the Forbes
Park house, petitioner offers
varying versions.  In the verified
petition before this Court, peti­tioner avers “that the construction of
said North Forbes
Park prop­erty was undertaken
jointly by petitioner and the deceased, peti­tioner even contributing
her own exclusive funds therefor.”^[7]
This is a reproduction of an allegation in petitioner’s June 27, 1966 alternative motion for
reconsideration or for clarification/amend­ment of the herein controverted order of June 15, 1966 in Civil Case 8873.^[8]
And again, in the affidavit of Teresita C. Yaptinchay dated August 3, 1965, she spoke of the
acquisition of properties, real and personal, in her own words, “through
our joint efforts and capital, among which
properties are those situated” in “North Forbes Park.”^[9]
All of which contradict her averment in the amended complaint dated October 25,
1965 – also verified – in said Case 8873 to the effect that she “acquired
through her own personal funds and efforts real properties such as x x x the house now standing at
North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal.”^[10]

But herein private respondents vehemently dispute petitioner’s
claim of complete or even partial ownership of the house.  They maintain that the construction of that
house was undertaken by the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay
without her (petitioner’s) intervention and that the deceased paid with his own
personal funds all expenses incurred in connection with the construction
thereof.^[11]

It was only after hearing and considering the evidence adduced
and the fact that after the death of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay
the Forbes Park
house “was among the properties of the deceased placed under the
administration of” respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay,
that re­spondent judge issued the injunction order of June 15, 1966 herein complained of.  Worth repeating at this point is that
respondent judge, in his order of August
8, 1966, declared that defendants (private respondents herein),
“principally Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, took actual
or physical possession”, amongst others, of the North Forbes Park
house – “by virtue of her appointment and under her authority,
as Special Administratrix.”

On this score, petitioner herein is not entitled to the injunc­tion
she prayed for below.

2.  As well established is
the rule that the grant or denial of an injunction rests upon the sound
discretion of the court, in the exercise of which appellate courts will not
interfere except in a clear case of abuse.^[12]

A considerate and circumspect view of the facts and circumstances
in this case obtaining will not permit us to tag the disputed order of June 15, 1966 with the vice of grave
abuse of discretion.  It is quite true
that, in support of the allegation that the house in North
Forbes Park
was her exclusive property, peti­tioner presented proof in the form of loans
that she had contracted during the period when said house was under
construction.  But evidence is wanting
which would correlate such loans to the cons­truction work.  On the contrary, there is much to the
documentary proof presented by petitioner herself which would tend to indicate
that the loans she obtained from the Republic Bank were for pur­poses other
than the construction of the North Forbes
Park home.  And this, we gather from pages 17 to 18 of
petitioner’s memorandum before this Court; and the affidavit of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, Annex A
thereof, which states in its paragraph 4 that she obtained various loans from
the Republic Bank “for her own exclusive account” and that the
proceeds thereof “were also used by affiant both for her business and for
the construction, completion and furnishing of the said house at North Forbes
Park”, and which cites her seven promissory notes in favor of Republic
Bank, Appendices 1 to 7 of said affidavit. 
Not one of the promissory notes mentioned reveals use of the proceeds
for the construction of the North Forbes
Park house.  On the contrary, there is Appendix 2, the
promissory note for P54,000 which says that the purpose of the loan is for
“Fishpond development”; Appendix 3 for P100,000 for the same purpose;
Appendix 5 for P50,000, “To augment working capital in buying & selling
of appliances & gift items”; and Appendix 7 for P1,090,000, “For
Agricultural Development”.  In plain
terms, the fact alone of petitioner’s indebtedness to the Republic Bank does
not establish that said house was built with her own funds.

It is in the context just recited that the unsupported assertion
that the North Forbes Park house is petitioner’s exclusive property may not be
permitted to override the prima facie presumption that that
house, having been constructed on the lot of Isidro Y. Yaptin­chay
(or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during the existence of
his marriage with respondent Josefina Y. Yaptinchay,
is part of the estate that should be under the control of the special administratrix.

3.  Nor can petitioner’s
claim of ownership presumably based on the provisions of Article 144 of the
Civil Code be decisive.  Said Article 144
says that:  “When a man and a woman
live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage
is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.”

But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the
civil relationship envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the
existence of which must first be shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue.^[13]
One such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the
petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of
the property involved.  Until such right
to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner’s interests in the property in
controversy cannot be considered the “present right” or title that
would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction.^[14]
For, the existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial
protection is wanting.  Injunction,
indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights;^[15]
nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right.^[16]

At any rate, it would seem to us that the interests of the
parties would be better safeguarded if the controverted
North Forbes Park property be in the hands of the bonded administratrix
in the intestate proceedings.  For then,
her acts would be subject to the control of the probate court.

Finding no error in the disputed orders of respondent judge, the
herein petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed, and the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction^[17]
issued by this Court is hereby dissolved and set aside.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, Acting C.J., Dizon, Zaldivar, Fernando, and
Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., on
official leave.

Makalintal, Teehankee,
and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

^[1]
Entitled “Teresita C. Yaptinchay,
Plaintiff, versus Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, in
her own behalf and in her capacity as Special Administratrix
in the Intestate Estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay;
and Jesus Monzon, Mary Yaptinchay
Eligir, Antonio Yaptinchay,
Ernesto Yaptinchay, Asuncion Yaptinchay,
Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, Rosa Y. Monzon,
Isabel Y. Valeriano, Remedios
Y. Yaptinchay, Felicidad Y.
Arguelles, Mary Doe and John Doe, Defendants.” This complaint was amended
on October 25, 1965 to
include a claim over some other properties.

^[2] Emphasis
supplied.

^[3] Devesa vs. Arbes, 13 Phil.
273, 278; Evangelista vs. Pedrenos, 27 Phil.
648, 650-651; Asombra vs. Dorado, 36 Phil.
883, 885-­886; Kabankalan Sugar Co. vs. Rubin,
54 Phil. 645, 654; Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76
Phil. 225, 231; Calo vs. Roldan,
76 Phil. 445, 452; Iman Sahim
vs. Montejo (June 29, 1963), 8 SCRA 333, 335;
Emilio vs. Bado (April 25, 1968), 23 SCRA 183,
188-190.

^[4] See
Certificado de Matrimonio
dated September 6, 1920, Annex 1 of the Answer herein filed by respondents.

^[5] Picardal vs.
Lladas (December 29, 1967), 21 SCRA 1483, 1491, citing
Roxas vs. Pecson, 82
Phil. 407 and Fernandez vs. Maravilla,
L-18799, March
31, 1964.

^[6]
In a pleading filed in Special Proceedings 1944-P, petitioner her­self alleged
that this Forbes Park lot was acquired by her and the deceased during
the period of their cohabitation (Rollo
p. 155), although she also states that title thereto is in the name of one Jose
(or Erlinda) Oledan (Rollo,
p. 15).

^[7]
Emphasis supplied.

^[8] See
Rollo, pp. 16, 79.

^[9] Rollo, p. 160; emphasis
supplied.

^[10] See
Rollo, pp. 26, 31.

^[11] See
Verified Opposition, Motion to Dismiss, and Counter Petition for the Issuance
of Preliminary Injunction dated August 25, 1965 filed by defendants in Civil
Case 8873.  Rollo,
pp. 38-67.

^[12] Rodulfa vs.
Alfonso, supra at p. 232; Gregorio vs. Mencias
(September 29, 1962), 6 SCRA 114, 119.

^[13]
See Lesaca vs. Lesaca,
91 Phil. 135, 140; Aznar vs. Garcia, 102 Phil.
1055, 1068.

^[14] Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co, Inc. vs. Capitol
Subdivision, Inc. (July 26, 1966), 17 SCRA 731, 736-737; Angela Estate, Inc. vs.
CFI of Negros Occidental (July 31, 1968), 24 SCRA
500, 509.

^[15] Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., Inc. vs. Capitol Subdivision, Inc., supra at
p. 736.

^[16] Id at p. 737; North Negros
Sugar Co. vs. Hidalgo, 63 Phil. 664, 671.

^[17] Rollo, pp. 176-177.