LEONCIO KIMPO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. NEMESIO T. TABANAR, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, INTERVENOR AND APPELLEE.

Appeal
from an order of the Court of First Instance of Aklan (Capiz), which is
before us by virtue of a resolution of the Court of Appeals, the issue
raised by appellant being one purely of law.

In his
complaint, plaintiff Leoncio Kimpo alleges that he is the owner of a
parcel of land of about 60 hectares, more particularly described in
said pleading, situated in the barrio of Alibagon, Municipality of
Makato, Province of Capiz, and has been in actual possession of said
land, as such owner, since December 1925, excluding the possession of
his predecessors in interest, who had held it, in the same capacity,
for time immemorial; that sometime in 1946, he granted permission to
defendant Nemesio Tabañar, upon the latter request, to occupy
temporarily a small portion of said land, with an area of about five
(5) hectares, to build thereon a nipa hut and raise chicken and pigs;
that, sometime in January 1953, in betrayal of the trust and confidence
of the plaintiff, Tabanar surreptitiously started to build dikes and
unlawfully converted into a fishpond the Northern portion of
plaintiff’s aforementioned property, with an area of about twenty-five
(25) hectares, more or less, and, in the process of such conversion,
destroyed improvements consisting of coconut trees and nipa plants,
with a market value of P5,000; and that since then Tabanar began to
“claim exclusive right of possession over the premises” and, despite
repeated demands by the plaintiff, failed and refused to vacate the
same and to pay the value of said improvements, to the damage prejudice
of the plaintiff, who, accordingly, prayed that defendant be sentenced
to vacate said land and restore its possession to him (plaintiff), as
well as to pay damages.

Defendant filed an answer denying
most of the material allegations of the complaint, alleging as special
defense that he is “a legitimate applicant for a fishpond permit of a
portion of a communal forest now disestablished for other purposes such
as fishpond”, and setting up a counterclaim for moral damages and
attorney’s fees. Plaintiff filed a reply and an answer to said
counterclaim.

Subsequently, the Director of Forestry
intervened in the case, upon the ground that the land in dispute is
part of a public forest belonging to the Republic of the Philippines
and under the administration of said officer. In his answer to the
complaint of intervention, plaintiff denied the allegations thereof and
alleged, inter alia, that said land is his private property, for which
he had been required by the Government to pay taxes, which he did; that
the Director of Forestry is not a proper party in interest, for this
officer had turned over his jurisdiction over the property in question
to the Director of Fisheries; and that the complaint in intervention
must be dismissed, for the issue therein raised refers to the ultimate
ownership over the disputed land, whereas plaintiff’s complaint refers
to the disturbance of his possession and the damages suffered by him in
consequence thereof and of the destruction of improvements on said land
by the defendant.

Subsequently, defendant Tabanar filed a
motion to dismiss of case upon the ground that there is an
administrative case pending in the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources between the same parties and involving the same
subject matter and cause of action; that, by initiating such
administrative case, plaintiff had voluntarily submitted himself to the
authority and jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, especially the Bureau of Fisheries, and impliedly admitted
that the land in question is public land, for which reason he is now in
estoppel to claim it as his private property; and that since it would
take “an indefinite time to decide” said administrative case, the
pendency of the one at bar would cause injustice and prejudice to the
defendant. Over plaintiff’s objection, this motion was granted, without
prejudice, in an order dated February 22, 1955, upon the ground that:

“The
Court believes that the ends of justice may be better served if the
case before the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources is
first settled. The department has expert investigators at its command
and they are more in the position to ferret the truth In the maze of
the conflicting claims of the different claimants where question of
possession and ownership will be thoroughly threshed in the said
administrative case. The Court is interested to know the findings of
the department before proceeding to the hearing of this case.”

Hence
this appeal by the plaintiff, who maintains that as stated in his
opposition to said motion to dismiss, the parties, the subject matter
and the cause of action involved in the case at bar are not identical
to those involved in the administrative case above referred to; that
the principle requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is
inapplicable to the present case; and that the lower court should not
have dismissed the same.

We find ourselves unable to agree
to the view taken in the order complained of. To begin with, the
records before us do not show clearly the nature of the issues raised
in the administrative case, or the parties therein. Secondly, if, as
stated in defendant’s motion to dismiss, “the question of whether the
property disputed between Kimpo and Tabanar is public land or not has
become primarily an administrative matter”, it follows that plaintiff
must have insisted in the administrative case on his title in fee
simple over the property in litigation herein, and, hence, is not
estopped therein from denying that it is a public land. Thirdly,
plaintiff alleged, in his opposition to said motion to dismiss, and
defendant has not denied it, that Gonzalo Relayson, Juan T. Teza,
Manuel G. Sarabia and Filemon Tutay, who are not parties in this case,
are, also, involved in said administrative case and that the land in
question therein has an area bigger than that disputed in this case.
Fourthly, even in cases admittedly involving public lands, the courts
of justice may decree the restoration of its possession to one who has
been illegally divested thereof or is being unlawfully deprived of his
right to such possession (Lopez vs. Santiago, 107 Phil., 668; 57 Off. Gaz., [31] 5554; Lequigan vs. Katalbas, 105 Phil., 645; Heirs of B. A. Crumb vs. Rodriguez, 105 Phil., 391; Mariano vs., De los Santos, 91 Phil., 191; Pitarque vs. Sorilla, 92 Phil., 5; 48 Off. Gaz., [9] 3849; Bohayang vs.
Maceren, 96 Phil., 390; 53 Off. Gaz., 4105). Fifthly, the rule of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable to a party who
claims the land in dispute as his private property (Balad-Geujay vs.
Castrillo, 111 Phil., 690, 59 Off. Gaz. [36] 6042 Genkeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil., 706; 54 Off. Gaz., [15] 4494; Santiago vs. Cruz, 98 Phil., 168; Marukot vs. Jacinto, 98 Phil, 128).

In
short, the grounds upon which defendant’s motion to dismiss was
predicated are not indubitable, for which reasons the better policy
would have been to deny the motion, without prejudice to taking such
measures as may be proper to assure that the ends of justice be served.

Wherefore,
the order appealed from is reversed and the records of the case hereby
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with the costs of
this instance against defendant Nemesio T. Tabanar. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.