JONNEL D. ESPALDON, PETITIONER, V. PETER L. CALIMAG, RENATO M. GARBO III, MA. LETICIA MALMALATEO, MARLON K. TAULI, FRAYN M. BANAWA, JOHNNY CAGUIAT, ROGELIO M. SABADO, PRUDENCIO …

Espaldon versus Calimag

The Case

This is a petition for review filed by Jonnel D. Espaldon against Peter L. Calimag and several other respondents, arising from the dismissal by the Office of the Ombudsman of an administrative complaint for misconduct. Espaldon had charged the respondents with violations of several laws in connection with the implementation of search warrants against Ferrotech Steel Corporation and related companies. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint outright, invoking its discretion under the Ombudsman Act of 1989. The case matters because it tests the outer limits of judicial review over the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutory powers, and because it turns on the reading of a single word in the statute: the word "may."

Procedural History

Espaldon filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the Ombudsman against the respondents, alleging violations of the Revised Penal Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the National Internal Revenue Code, the Tariff and Customs Code, the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Ombudsman resolved the administrative case for violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards, denominated as misconduct, and dismissed it pursuant to Section 20, paragraph 1 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Espaldon moved for reconsideration, which the Ombudsman denied in a joint order. Espaldon then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

Facts

Espaldon is the Corporate Secretary of Metal Exponents, Inc. and retained counsel of Ferrotech Steel Corporation, and also legal counsel of Metalex International, Inc. In December 2010, the National Bureau of Investigation applied for search warrants before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on account of Ferrotech Steel Corporation's alleged illegal activities involving violations of the National Internal Revenue Code and other relevant laws. The trial court issued four search warrants against Ferrotech Steel Corporation and Benito Keh for their different offices and warehouses in Valenzuela City and Makati City. On the same date, the warrants were served by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation, personnel of the Philippine National Railways, and private individuals, who are the respondents in this case. The agents were also armed with a mission order issued by the Secretary of Finance directing them to search the offices and warehouses of Metalex International, Inc. and Metal Trade Sales Company.

Espaldon alleged that during the implementation of the warrants, very illegal events transpired and were committed by the respondents, witnessed by numerous employees and members of the media. He claimed that unreasonable and excessive searches were made. He then filed a complaint-affidavit with the Ombudsman against the respondents.

The Ombudsman dismissed the administrative complaint, reasoning that since the complaint essentially involved the application and interpretation of the Tariff and Customs Code, raising the matter with the Commissioner of Customs, the Department of Finance, or the Court of Tax Appeals could provide an adequate remedy. The respondents argued that the Ombudsman's discretion to dismiss an administrative complaint outright is beyond judicial interference, that some respondents are not government employees and thus outside the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, and that one respondent had resigned, rendering the complaint moot. They also pointed to other cases filed by Espaldon containing similar allegations.

Issues

• Whether or not the Ombudsman committed errors of fact or law warranting reversal or modification of its orders dismissing the administrative complaint, considering its constitutional and statutory mandate to serve as protector of the people.
• Whether or not the courts may review the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in dismissing a complaint filed before it.

Applicable Provisions

Section 20, paragraph 1 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides:

the Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that: 1. The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body.

This provision is the very ground on which the Ombudsman anchored its dismissal, and the Court construes the word "may" within it as permissive and directory.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition lacks merit. The thrust of the case is Section 20, paragraph 1 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989, and a perusal of that provision reveals that the use of the word "may" is ordinarily construed as permissive or directory. The Court stated the rule steadily:

The use of the word "may," in a statute, denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only.

The Court added that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, they must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Thus, the option to conduct administrative adjudication is discretionary on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman, and in dismissing the administrative complaint, the Ombudsman merely exercised sound discretion in full accord with law.

On the second issue, the Court acknowledged that the Ombudsman's authority to conduct administrative investigations proceeds from its constitutional mandate to be an effective protector of the people against inept and corrupt government officers and employees. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the exercise by the Ombudsman of its constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers. As held in Alba versus Nitorreda, it is beyond the ambit of the Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it, for such initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the public service. The Court further explained this judicial non-interference in Soria versus Desierto:

This policy is based on constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. We are mindful that the Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers, virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it.

Finally, the Court noted that this is a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, wherein findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court.

Doctrine

The word "may" in a statute denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only; where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, they must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Under Section 20, paragraph 1 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman may decline to conduct an investigation where the complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body, and that choice is discretionary. Courts will not interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers, whether in criminal or administrative complaints, absent grave abuse of discretion. In a petition for review under Rule 43, findings of fact of the agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, are binding on the Court.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, and the Ombudsman's dismissal of the administrative complaint against the respondents was sustained.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the word "may" in Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act is permissive, so the Ombudsman's choice to dismiss is discretionary and shielded from judicial review absent grave abuse of discretion. Examiners use this case to test the limits of judicial non-interference with the Ombudsman and the statutory construction of "may" as directory.