JONNEL D. ESPALDON, PETITIONER, V. PETER L. CALIMAG, RENATO M. GARBO III, MA. LETICIA MALMALATEO, MARLON K. TAULI, FRAYN M. BANAWA, JOHNNY CAGUIAT, ROGELIO M. SABADO, PRUDENCIO …
BARZA, J.:
of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-11-0036-A dated 16 January 2012, dismissing
the administrative complaint against herein respondents, and the Joint
Order[2] dated 12 March 2012 denying reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner, Jonnel D. Espaldon, is the Corporate Secretary of
Metal Exponents, Inc. and retained counsel of Ferrotech Steel
Corporation. He is also the legal counsel of Metalex International, Inc.
Sometime in December 2010, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
applied for Search Warrant with the Regional Trial Court of Manila on
account of Ferrotech Steel Corporation’s alleged illegal activities
involving violations of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC) and other relevant laws. The RTC of Manila, Branch 47,
issued Search Warrants No. 10-17070, 10-17071, 10-17072 and 10-17073
against Ferrotech Steel Corporation and/or Benito Keh for their
different offices and warehouses located in Valenzuela City and Makati
City on 17 December 2010. On even date, the search warrants were served
by agents of the NBI, Philippine National Railways (PNR) personnel and
private individuals, who are the respondents in this case.
The
NBI Agents were also armed with the OSEC Mission Order No. 10-001 issued
by the Secretary of the DOF, Cesar V. Purisima, directing them to
search the offices and warehouses of Metalex International Inc. and
Metal Trade Sales Co., pursuant to Section 79 (c) of the Revised
Administrative Code in relation to Sections 2203 and 2205 of the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines.
Petitioner alleged that
during the implementation of the warrants on 17 December 2010, very
illegal events transpired and were committed by the respondents. These
were witnessed by numerous persons, employees of Ferrotech Steel
Corporation and Metal Exponents, Inc., including members of the media,
both print and broadcast. Unreasonable and excessive searches were
allegedly made.
On 27 January 2011, a Complaint-Affidavit was
filed by petitioner with the Ombudsman against the respondents for
violations of the Revised Penal Code, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (R.A. No. 3019), Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713), National Internal Revenue Code
(R.A. No. 8424), Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (P.D. No.
1464), Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 (R.A. No. 8792) and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
On 16 January 2012, the Ombudsman
resolved the administrative case (Omb. C-A-11-0036-A) for Violation of
R.A. 6713, “Misconduct” against the respondents and dismissed the same
pursuant to Section 20, par. 1 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 providing
that:
“x x x the Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the
necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained
of it it believes that:1. The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body.”
According to the Ombudsman, since the complaint essentially
involves the application and interpretation of the Tariff and Customs
Code, raising the matter with the Commissioner of Customs and/or the
Department of Finance and/or the Court of Tax Appeals could provide
adequate remedy.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[3] which in the assailed Joint Order dated 12 March 2012, was denied by the Ombudsman.
Hence, this recourse to the Court on the sole issue that:
IN ISSUING THAT QUESTIONED ORDER AND JOINT ORDER, WHETHER OR NOT
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED ERRORS OF FACT OR LAW THAT WOULD WARRANT
THEIR REVERSAL OR MODIFICATION CONSIDERING THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT AS
OMBUDSMAN HAS THE OBLIGATION AND MANDATE UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND
THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989 OR R.A. NO. 6770 TO SERVE AS PROTECTOR OF THE
PEOPLE.
The respondents, on the other hand, argue in the main that the
Court may not review the ruling of the Ombudsman in this case, as it is
the consistent policy of courts of justice not to interfere with the
Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory powers without good or
compelling reasons. The assailed Orders are in accordance with law and
applicable rules. It is within the Ombudsman’s full discretion to
determine whether or not to dismiss a criminal complaint outright
without a preliminary investigation, it is with more reason that it is
within the Ombudsman’s full discretion to dismiss an administrative
complaint outright if the Ombudsman finds the same to be without merit.
It is also argued that since some of the respondents impleaded in this
petition are not government employees, they are not covered by the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. The petition must, thus, be
dismissed as against them (Almeda, Quizon, Sarmiento and Begueras).
Respondent Calimag has already resigned from the DOF on or about 30
April 2012. Hence, the administrative complaint against him has become
moot.
In addition, the respondents brought to the attention of the Court the other cases[4]
with different judicial and quasi-judicial bodies filed by herein
petitioner, which contain similar allegations. Another petition[5]
is also filed with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 202784). Said petition
purports to be a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court in connection with OMB-C-C-11-0034-A, but arises from
the same set of facts, and same issues and parties as in the present
petition.
The Comment filed by the Ombudsman advances the argument that
it is not its disciplinary authority which is being assailed in this
case but its discretion to conduct an administrative adjudication over
an administrative act or omission. The ground relied upon by the
Ombudsman is in accord with law. The petitioner cannot compel the
Ombudsman to conduct administrative adjudication as the option to
conduct the same is discretionary on the part of the Ombudsman under
Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 6770 and Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman). The use of the word “may” in
the said law is ordinarily construed as permissive or directory,
indicating that a matter of discretion is involved.[6]
As also argued, the wide latitude of prosecutory and
investigatory powers given to the Ombudsman are not the subject of
interference by the courts, and is not confined to criminal cases but to
administrative complaints as well.
As reiterated, since the
petitioner’s complaint essentially involves the application and
interpretation of the Tariff and Customs Code, or any relevant law, it
would have been more prudent and in keeping with the law if such matters
are raised before the proper judicial or quasi-judicial body for the
latter could very well provide adequate remedy. The actions taken by the
proper body would have a bearing on the investigation of the private
respondents’ possible criminal and administrative liabilities.
The petition lacks merit.
At thrust is Sec. 20, par. 1 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 upon
which the Ombudsman anchored the assailed orders in this case. A
perusal of the above provision clearly reveals that the use of the word
“may” as argued by the respondents, is ordinarily construed as
permissive or directory. The rule in this regard is steady, thus, “The
use of the word “may,” in a statute, denotes that it is directory in
nature and generally permissive only.[7]
The use of the word “may” in the provision is construed as permissive
and operating to confer discretion. Where the words of a statute are
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, they must be given their literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.[8]
As correctly argued by the respondents in this case, “x x x
the option to conduct administrative adjudication is discretionary on
the part of the Office of the Ombudsman” and “in dismissing the
administrative complaint, the Ombudsman merely exercised sound
discretion in full accord with law.”
It is true that the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman
to conduct administrative investigations proceeds from its
constitutional mandate to be an effective protector of the people
against inept and corrupt government officers and employees, and is
subsumed under the broad powers “explicitly conferred” upon it by the
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770.[9]
However, as correctly argued by the respondents in this case, citing the case of Alba vs. Nitorreda,[10]
the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the exercise
by the Ombudsman of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and
prosecutory powers. As held therein, “it is beyond the ambit of this
Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. Such initiative
and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one,
acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the
public service.”
This judicial non-interference is further explained in the case of Soria vs. Desierto[11], as follows:
“This policy is based on constitutional, statutory and practical
considerations. We are mindful that the Constitution and RA 6770
endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutorial powers, virtually free from legislative,
executive or judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from
outside pressure and improper influence. x x x Hence, if the Ombudsman,
using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court
shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of
discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously
hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with
regard to complaints filed before it. x x x”
Thus, in recognition of the Office of the Ombudsman’s independence
and initiative in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before
it, and this being a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court wherein it is provided that findings of fact of the court or
agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence shall be
binding on the Court[12], the petition should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Abdulwahid (Chairperson) and Cruz, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 46-49
[2] Rollo, pp. 94-97
[3] Rollo, pp. 50-62
[4] OMB-C-C-11-0034-A filed with the Ombudsman
CHR NCR Case No. 2011-0095 filed with the Commission of Human Rights
A.C. No. 8906 filed with the Court, but subsequently referred to
the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(docketed as CBD Case No. 12-3388)
[5] Rollo, pp. 342-375
[6] Citing Office of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals, Macabulos, G.R. No. 159395, May 7, 2008
[7] National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 127718, March 2, 2000
[8] Office of the Ombudsman vs. Sahagun, G.R. No. 167982, August 13, 2008
[9] Gonzales III vs.
Office of the President of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196231, September
4, 2012 and Barreras-Sulit vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 196232, September 4,
2012, citing Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 396 (2005)
[10] G.R. No. 120223, March 13, 1996
[11] G.R. Nos. 153524-25, January 31, 2005
[12] Sec. 10, Rule 43