LORENZO HERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND PEDRO DAGLI, RESPONDENTS.

This is a Petition for certiorari to review a
Decision of the Court of Appeals.

The case involves a coconut plantation located at San
Isidro, Candelaria, Quezon with an area of about five
(5) hectares, owned by petitioner Lorenzo Hernandez.  Private respondent Pedro Dagli
works on the said landholding and an old copra kiln converted into a modest house served as his living quarters in the
plantation.

Sometime in 1971, the petitioner sought to evict the private respondent from the premises in a
letter asking him to vacate the house on the plantation so that the same may be reconverted into a copra kiln.

Private respondent then
instituted an action in the now-defunct Court of Agrarian Relations in Lucena City for the
enforcement of his alleged right of security of tenure on the ground that he is a tenant on the coconut plantation. 
Petitioner denied the existence of a tenancy relationship between them. 
He contented that the private respondent was a mere hired laborer who was just permitted to work and live on the plantation.  In the meantime,
the proceeds of the harvest were deposited with the Clerk of Court of
the agrarian court.

After due trial, the
agrarian court rendered a Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows —

“In the light of all the foregoing, the Court in judgment
hereby:

“x x x.

“3.  Declares
that Pedro Dagli is not a tenant on the coconut land, and orders him to vacate
the structure utilized by him as a
dwelling on the coconut plantation;

“4.  Orders
defendant to pay plaintiff the
amount of P500.00 as compensation for the trees planted by the latter;

“5.  Orders
the Clerk of Court to release the deposit, in the amount of Four Hundred Ninety
Two Pesos and Ninety Centavos (P492.90), in favor of defendant, after the
corresponding charges shall have been deducted.

“All other claims are dismissed for want of evidence.”

Finding the above-quoted portion of the Decision unsatisfactory,
the private respondent elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals assigning the following errors on the part of
the agrarian court —

(1)      
The agrarian court erred in declaring that the appellant (the herein private
respondent) is not a tenant on the
coconut plantation;

(2)      
The agrarian court erred in ordering the ejectment of the appellant from the coconut plantation; and

(3)      
The agrarian court erred in authorizing the
release of the proceeds of the harvest in the amount of P492.90 to the appellee, without giving the appellant a share of the same.

In its Decision
promulgated on October 10, 1974,^[1] the Sixth Division of the Court of
Appeals^[2]
ruled in favor of private respondent. 
The pertinent portions of the Decision are as follows —

“The main question involved in this appeal is with regard to
the real status of the plaintiff-appellant who worked (on) the coconut
landholding in question.  Is he a tenant
or a hired farm laborer?

“There are facts and cir­cumstances on record which clearly
indicate, contrary to the findings of the Court a quo, that the
plain­tiff-appellant x x x is x x x a tenant
on the coconut landholding.  The
plaintiff-appellant was taken in by the defendant-appellee
to work on the coconut landholding in question x x x. 
He performed all stages of coconut cultivation, namely, clearing the
landholding, picking, husking, gathering and piling of nuts.  He also stayed in the coconut landholding by
uti­lizing the remodelled copra kiln as a dwelling place.

“As between the claim of the plaintiff-appellant that his
sharing agreement with the defendant-appellee with
regard to the harvests of coconuts was on a 1/3–2/3 basis in
favor of the defendant-appellee, and the claim of the latter, which the Court a
quo upheld, that the
plaintiff-appellant was paid P17.00 wage per thousand coconuts, the
choice should have been on the first claim. 
Indeed, it is contrary to human experience that a family man like the plaintiff-appellant, who undertook
all stages of work in coconut farming, as noted above, would consent to be paid with a measly sum of P17.00 per thousand nuts harvested when
he could get more by sharing therein.

“The
plaintiff-appellant having been
shown to be a tenant on the
coconut landholding in question,
he is entitled to security of
tenure (Sotacio vs. Soloveres,
et al., CA-G.R. No. 39448-R, September 14, 1968).

“x x x.

“WHEREFORE, the appealed portion
of the decision is hereby set
aside and a new one rendered in lieu thereof:

“1.  Declaring
the plaintiff­-appellent x x
x a tenant over the coconut landholding;

“2.  Ordering
the defendant-appellee to maintain the
plaintiff-appellant in the peaceful possession of said coconut landholding;

“3.  Disallowing
the compensation of P500.00 to the plaintiff-appellant for the coconuts he
himself planted on the coconut landholding;

“4.  Ordering
the defendant-appellee to reimburse x x x the plaintiff-appellant x x x (his) 1/3 share x x x;

“5.  Ordering the defendant?appellee to render an accounting of the proceeds of the
succeeding harvests and to deliver to the plaintiff-appellant his correspond­ing
share beginning February 3-7, 1973; x x x

” x x x. “

Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the Decision, anchored
mainly on the ground that the said Decision is not supported by the evidence.^[3]

In its Resolution promulgated on November 29, 1974,^[4]
the Court of Appeals denied the petitioner’s plea.  The pertinent portions of the said Resolution
are as follows —

“The circumstances surrounding the stay of the
Plaintiff-Appellant on the land in question such as the kind of work that he
performed and the fact that the land in question was formerly a subject of
tenancy relationship between his parents and the Defendant-Appellee
show indubitably that the Plaintiff-Appellant is a tenant on the land and not a
mere laborer.  The x x
x motion has quoted the testimony of the carpenter
who constructed the house where the Plaintiff-Appellant lives x x x.

“According to the testimony of the carpenter, it was the
Plaintiff-Appellant who ordered the construction of the house and was the one
who paid him at P4.00 a day.  If the
Plaintiff-Appellant was a mere hired laborer, it would be illogical for him to
build a house x x x (on)
the said property and spend for the building (thereof) at his own expense for
as a hired laborer he can be dismissed at any time.  He will be risking therefore his investment
on the house.

“This Court takes judicial notice that in most instances x x x (where) the worker, say in a
hacienda, has to live on the land, the landowner usually is the one who
provides the housing facilities and not
the worker himself.  Bunkhouses are
always built by the landowners for their hired hands.

“FOR ALL OF THE FOREGOING, this Court is more convinced that
the Plaintiff-Appellant is a tenant of the Defendant-Appellee
x x x.

“ x x x. ”

On December 21, 1974,
the petitioner elevated the case to this Court by way of the instant Petition
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.  In
the Resolution of this Court dated March
12, 1975, We gave due course to the same.^[5]
Thereafter, the parties filed their respective briefs and the case was
submitted for decision.

After a careful examination of the record of the case, We find the instant Petition devoid of merit.

At the time this litigation was initiated, the defunct Court of
Agrarian Relations had the exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian relations
cases.  Upon the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981, the Court of Agrarian
Relations was abolished and the exclusive original jurisdiction over agrarian
relations cases was transferred to the Regional Trial Court.^[6]

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court may be appealed to the
Court of Appeals.^[7]
Thereafter, the Decision of the Court of Appeals may be brought to this Court
by way of a Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.  Only questions of law may be
raised in the Petition.^[8]
The review of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion,
and will be granted only when there
are special and important reasons therefor.^[9]

The petitioner maintains that the question of whether or not the
challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals is supported by the evidence, is a question of law.  The private respondent claims otherwise.

We agree with the private respondent.

Contrary to the claim of the petitioner that the Court of Appeals
arrived at erroneous conclusions based on the findings of facts of the agrarian
court, the Court of Appeals made
its own findings of facts apart
from that of the agrarian court, so that its conclusions were based on its own factual findings.

In Santa Ana, Jr. v. Hernandez,^[10]
this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.
B. L. Reyes, made the following pronouncement —

“The credibility of witnesses and the weighing of conflicting
evidence are matters within the exclusive authority of the Court of Appeals,
and it is not necessarily bound
by the conclusions of the trial court. 
Both the Judiciary Act… and the Rules of Court (Rule 45, section 2) only
allow a review of decisions of the Court of Appeals on questions of law; and
numerous decisions of this Court have invariably and re­peatedly held that
findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are conclusive and not reviewable by the Supreme Court … Barring, therefore, a
showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the
record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse
of discretion, such findings must stand, for this Court is not expected or
required to examine and contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.  As pointed out by former Chief Justice Moran
in his Comments on the Rules of Court …, the law creating the Court of Appeals
was intended mainly to take away from the Supreme Court the work of examining
the evidence, and confine its task for the determination of questions which do
not call for the reading and study of transcripts containing the testimony of witnesses.”

In sum, therefore, this Court does not re-examine the facts of
the case in a Petition for certiorari under Rule 45, except for
unusual reasons which would justify otherwise.^[11]

The review sought by the petitioner is not justified under any of
the grounds provided in Section 4, Rule 45 which would allow such review, to
wit —

“(a)  When the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or
with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;

“(b)  When
the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise
of the power of supervision.”

Moreover, this observation notwithstanding, We
are convinced that the challenged Decision upholding the existence of a tenancy
relationship, and the Order denying a reconsideration of the same appear to be
justified on the basis of the findings of facts and reasons relied upon by the Court of Appeals.  They are not based on mere speculation,
surmises or conjecture as petitioner represents.

In support of his contention, the petitioner cites the
pronouncements of this Court in Dauan v.
Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources^[12] and Silverio v. Castro,^[13] to wit —

“… it is a rule now settled that the
conclusion drawn from the facts is a conclusion of law which the courts may
review.” (Dauan v. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, 19 SCRA 223, 227 [1967],
citing Vda. de Alfafara
v. Mapa, 95 Phil. 125, 133 [1954].

“… Said error, involving as it does a conclusion drawn
from undisputed facts x x x, is one of law and thus reversible herein.” (Silverio v. Castro, 19 SCRA 520, 531
[1967].

We have gone through these two cases relied upon by the
petitioner and We are convinced that they do not
support his stand.

The Dauan case involves a
homestead application filed as early as February 1935 relating to a sizeable parcel of land in Nueva Vizcaya. 
Unfortunately, the records of the application had been lost
during the last world war.  Years later,
a dispute arose between the original homestead applicant and some third parties
over the homestead application.  The main
issue in the controversy was whether or not the homestead application had been
approved by the Government before the outbreak of World War II.

The Director of the Bureau of Lands held that the homestead
application had not been approved.  His
Decision was subsequently affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.  Thereafter, the homestead
applicant challenged the Decision of the Secretary before the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Vizcaya
and prevailed.  The case eventually
reached this Court.

One of the issues raised in the controversy was whether or not
the trial court could review the Decision of the Secretary even if the same was
not elevated to the President of the Philippines
for consideration.  This Court ruled that
it was un­necessary to exhaust the available administrative remedy inasmuch as
the conclusion of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was
“drawn from the facts” of the case and is, therefore, “a
conclusion of law which the courts may review”.

The conclusion of the Secretary was based on the available
evidence which did not appear to be controverted by
the parties.  In the case at bar, there
is a conflict between the material allegations of both parties.  Moreover, the assailed conclusion in Dauan is that of an officer of the executive
department of the Government.  In the
instant controversy, the questioned conclusion is that of the Court of Appeals
— a court of law.  The inapplicabi­lity
of the Dauan ruling to the case at bar is,
therefore, patent.

The Silverio ruling refers to an
election case where the issue was the proper appreciation of a number of
ballots cast in the 1963 election for local governments.  The assailed conclusion was that of the Court
of First Instance of Davao, a conclusion drawn from undisputed facts, i.e., the appearance of the ballots.  In the case at bar, the facts are not undisputed.  The inapplicability of
the Silverio ruling to the case at bar is, therefore, likewise potent.

For the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, the distinction
between a question of law and a question of fact is explained in Our pronouncement in Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.,^[14] to wit —

“For a question to be one of law it must involve no exami­nation
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them.  And the distinction is
well-known:  There is a question of law
in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to
the truth or the false­hood of alleged facts.”

Applying this principle to the case at bar, a conclusion of the
Court of Appeals drawn from
undisputed facts raises a question of law. 
Otherwise, there is a question of fact.

Accordingly, We find no reason to
disturb the findings on the conclusions of the Court of appeals.  It is, therefore, Our
considered opinion, and We so hold, that the instant Petition should be denied
for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition
is DENIED for lack of merit.  No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Narvasa,
Cruz, Feliciano, and Sarmiento,
JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., on leave.

^[1]
Pages 28 to 38, Rollo.

^[2]
At the time of the promulgation of the Decision, the Sixth Division of the
Court of Appeals was composed of Mr. Justice Andres Reyes as Chairman and
Justices Crisolito Pascual and
Francisco Ma. Chanco as Members.  Justice Chanco penned the Decision.

^[3]
Pages 46 to 61, Rollo.

^[4]
Pages 63 to 65, Rollo.

^[5]
Page 101, Rollo.

^[6]
Section 19 (7), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

^[7]
Section 20, Interim Rules and Guidelines of the Supreme Court.

^[8]
Section 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court; Santa Ana, Jr. v.
Hernandez, 18 SCRA 973, 978 (1966).

^[9]
Section 4, Rule 45.

^[10]
18 SCRA 973, 978-979 (1966).

^[11]
Teruñez v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 134 SCRA 414 (1985).

^[12]
19 SCRA 223 (1967).

^[13]
19 SCRA 520 (1967).

^[14]
19 SCRA 289, 292 (1967).