SOLEDAD PROVIDO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. OCTAVIO ACENAS, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CO. AND DOLE (PHILIPPINES) INC., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

This case was certified
to Us by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution promulgated February 20, 1978 in CA-G.R. No. 50069-R^[1] as the
issues raised therein are purely legal.

Plaintiff-appellant
Soledad Provido was granted a homestead patent over Lot No. 58, Pls-247-D, at Silway
7, Polomolok, South Cotabato, consisting of 79,986 sq. m. which is
covered by OCT No. V-19264 issued by the Register of Deeds of Cotabato on October 1, 1954 under the Public Land Act.

On October
15, 1963, Soledad Provido sold said land to Octavio
Acenas for the sum of P6,000.00
by means of a public document.  In 1966, Acenas sold it to the National Development Company (NDC for
short) which entity in turn leased it to Dole (Philippines), Inc., (Dole for short) under a Grower
Agreement.

On September
19, 1968, Soledad Provido filed an action against Octavio
Acenas docketed as Civil Case No. 140 (1008)
in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Cotabato, wherein she sought to exercise her right of
repurchase under Sec. 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act as amended.

Octavio Acenas filed his
answer on November 28, 1968, admitting some and denying other material
allegations and by way of special and/or affirmative defenses alleging among
other things that the complaint states no cause of action and that he no longer
owns or holds the property in question, “he having already sold and ceded
same by absolute sale to the NDC sometime in the year 1966, which in turn Ieased it to Dole
Philippines which now holds the same,
which absolute sale and cession was contained in a deed of sale, but that
defendant lost his copy thereof and inspite diligent
efforts, he is unable to procure other copies thereof, hence his inability to
attached a copy of same hereto.”^[2]

Soledad Provido filed her answer to the counter­claim on December
6, 1968 and on December
24, 1968, a Motion
for Leave to Amend Complaint in order to implead
NDC and Dole Philippines, attaching thereto her amended complaint.

Both parties who were impleaded in the amended com­plaint filed their separate
Motions to Dismiss on the grounds that the claim therein set
forth had already been extinguished or was barred by
the Statute of Limitations and that the Complaint
stated no cause of action.

The court a quo
dismissed the case insofar as Dole and NDC are concerned in its
Orders dated September 5, 1970 and September 19, 1970 respectively.

A Motion for
Reconsideration of the Orders of Dismissal was filed by plaintiff Soledad Provido which was denied
by the trial court for lack of merit.

Hence this appeal with
this lone assignment of error:

“The lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on ground
of prescription of action.”

The main crux on appeal
is whether plaintiff-appellant has lost her right to repurchase the homestead
in question as provided for under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act as amended
which reads as follows:

“Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or his legal heirs, within a period of five
years from the date of conveyance.”

 It
is appellant’s contention that she did not lose her right to repurchase since
the action to repurchase filed on September 19, 1968 against defendant-appellee
Octavio Acenas, was well
within the five (5) years period stated in the law.  She avers that the filing of the original
complaint suspended the running of the pres­criptive period pursuant to Article 1155 of the New Civil Code and although the
action against defendants-appellees NDC & DOLE
was actually brought on December 24, 1968, or more than five years after
October 15, 1963, the action is still timely because prescription had ceased to
run on September 19, 1968.

Defendants-appellees NDC and DOLE contend otherwise alleging that the
Amended Complaint which had im­pleaded them was filed
only on December 24, 1968, and therefore, already beyond the five-year
period.  In other words, appellees aver that the filing of the Amended Complaint
should be construed as the beginning of a new action as of the date of
filing of the amendment.

Plaintiff-appellant
maintains that NDC is subject to the same conditions that the original buyer
had, thus when NDC bought the land from the original buyer it (NDC) was
likewise bound to honor the right of repurchase of the appellant.  She argues that the right of repurchase
cannot be avoided by the vendee through the simple expe­dient of conveying it
to the Government or any of its branches, units or instrumentalities.  This right is a part of public policy.  It is the benevolent intention of the State
to give the homesteader every chance to preserve for himself and his family
the land that the State granted him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating it.^[3] Appellant claims that appellee
NDC, which succeeded Acenas, cannot be in a better
position than the source of its rights and that the action against Acenas also interrupts the running of the prescription
period against NDC just as well – to maintain otherwise would enable a
succession of vendees to successively put up the defense of prescription to
defeat the right of the vendor, who is not aware of any subsequent sale by the
original purchaser.

In controversion,
defendants-appellees declare that it is not correct
for appellant to say that she had no knowledge that the lot was already sold to
defendant NDC because the sale
on December 23, 1963 was registered and a Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-13803, T-2078
was issued in favor of the NDC on July
9, 1965^[4]
and knowledge of such sale is presumed from the registration.  Plaintiff-appellant therefore had legal or
constructive knowledge that the subject lot was already sold to and owned by
the NDC.

The contentions of
plaintiff-appellant Provido merit Our
consideration.

Firstly, the original
complaint clearly states a cause of action against Acenas,
namely, the right given by the
law to the appellant Provido to repurchase the
property from the buyer within five (5) years from the date of the sale.  The allegation
in the Answer that the NDC had already purchased the same from Acenas is of no consequence, for it is not the
allegations in the answer, but those in the complaint which determine whether
or not the complaint itself states a cause of action.

Secondly, even if We concede that the registration of the sale in
favor of the NDC was on July 9, 1965 and that therefore should have been
constructively known by appellant – the fact is – if an original complaint
already states a cause of action in favor of a plaintiff, the subsequent filing
of an amended complaint makes the filing retroact to the time the
original complaint was filed.  (Pangasinan Transportation Co. vs. Philippine Farming Co.,
Ltd., 81 Phil. 273) Thus, insofar as the NDC and Dole are concerned, the filing
of the amended com­plaint against them (even if they were not the original
defendants) was legally effectuated upon the filing of the original complaint
(and therefore within the prescribed prescriptive period of five years), they
having merely stepped into the shoes of their predecessor-in-interest, Acenas.

Be it noted that
the appellees NDC and Dole cannot invoke their rights
under their relationship with their predecessor-in-interest (Acenas) and yet disclaim the effects of said relationship
on exactly the same subject matter when it is to their disadvantage.  This is less than fair, eminently less than
just.

It is also averred by appellees that appellant cannot now question the validity
of the title of the NDC because an action to repurchase is inconsistent with a
denial of defendant’s title to the subject matter thereof.  It is not paradoxically so because NDC and
Dole were impleaded by plaintiff not necessarily as
an admission of the validity of their titles but because they are indispensable
parties to the final disposition of the lot in question, if during the trial on
the merits, appellant’s claim will be proven to be valid.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Orders
dated September 5, 1970, September 19, 1970 and December 2, 1970 of the trial court are hereby SET
ASIDE.  Let this case be REMANDED to the
court a quo for trial on the merits.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr.,
Padilla, Bidin, and
Cortes, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, concurred in by Justices Lorenzo Relova and Simeon Gopengco.

^[2]
Printed Record
on Appeal, p. 7.

^[3]
Appellant’s Brief, p. 6 citing Barcelon vs. Arambulo, et
al. (C.A.) 48 O.G. 3976, citing also Pascual vs.
Talens, 45 O.G. No. 9, p. 413).

^[4]
p. 4, Brief for Appellee.