INTESTATE ESTATE OF CLARO BUSTAMANTE, DECEASED. JOSEFA MENDOZA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. TEODORA CAYAS, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLEE.

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the
petition of Josefa Mendoza to be declared the acknowledged natural daughter of
the late Claro Bustamante and seeking the appointment of an administrator of his
estate.

Born in 1893, allegedly begotten out of wedlock by Claro Bustamante, widower,
and Paula Mendoza, single, the claimant Josefa Mendoza was supported and reared
by said Claro Bustamante and was openly introduced as his daughter to his
acquaintances. Shortly before his death in March 1929, Claro delivered to Josefa
a private document (Exhibit G) signed by him and attesting that she was his
natural daughter. This document Josefa kept until the outbreak of the second
world war in 1941; then, in the confusion caused by the hostilities, she lost
the paper, and did not find it again until 1953. In the meantime, Claro
Bustamante’s widow by a second marriage, Teodora Cayas, and his legitimate son,
Nicasio Bustamante, had extrajudicially partitioned his estate, composed of lots
1776, 1777, 1778 and 1806 of the Naic Friai Lands.

On May 6, 1953, the natural child, Josefa Mendoza, instituted these
proceedings against Teodora Cayas and Monica Nazareno (heir of the late Nicasio
Bustamante), for the judicial administration and settlement of the estate of her
natural father, Claro Bustamante, and for the recovery of her corresponding
share therein as his acknowledged natural child; but the defendants-oppositors
resisted her claims, alleging that she was never duly acknowledged, and that her
action for acknowledgment was instituted too late. The court below having
sustained the defense, Josefa Mendoza appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
latter certified the case to us because only questions of law are involved.

The first question to be decided is whether appellant Josefa Mendoza was
properly recognized by Claro Bustamante as his natural daughter. The Court below
correctly ruled that she was not. Having been borjn 1893, her recognition had to
be governed by the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, which abolished the, implied
recognizations permitted by the Law XI of Toro.^[1] Under the Code of 1889 (Arts. 131, 135,
136), an acknowledgment or recognition, in order to confer any rights to the
natural child, must indispensably appear either in a record of birth, in a will
(testament), in a public document, or in a final judgment rendered in an action
brought to compel recognition. Appellant Josefa has none of these in her favor;
all that she was able to show was a private (not public) document (Exhibit G)
and evidence of acts indicating possession of status of a natural child of Claro
Bustamante. These document and acts do not per se constitute a legal and
operative acknowledgment, and do not confer upon appellant any of the rights (to
paternal surname, support and succession) granted by Article 134 of the Code. At
most, they constituted grounds upon which Josefa might have based an action to
ask the Court to compel her father (or his heirs) to grant her recognition.^[1]

But, and here lies the second issue in this appeal, the action to compel
recognition is expressly conditioned by law upon its being commenced during the
lifetime of the natural parent, unless the latter dies while the claimant was a
minor, or unless a document of recognition, previously unknown, is discovered
after the” parent’s death (Art. 137).

“Articulo 137. Las acciones para el reconocimiento de hijos naturales solo
podran ejercitarse en vida de los presuntos padres, salvo en los casos
siguientes:

1.” Si el padre o la madre hubiesen fallecido durante la menor edad del hijo,
en cuyo caso este podra deducir la accion antes de que transcurran los primeros
cuatro años de su mayor edad.

2.” Si despues de la muerte del padre o de la madre apareciere algun
documento de que antes no se hubiese tenido noticia, en el que’ reconozcan
expresamente al hijo.

En este caso, la accion dobera deducirse dentro de los seis meses siguientes
al hallazgo del documento.”

Has appellant brought herself within the rule thus expressed? The trial Court
decided that she has not, and the record amply sustains the ruling.

In the first place, there is no doubt that appellant Josefa Mendoza never
brought action against the late Claro Bus-tamante to compel her recognition as
his natural child. Hence, she now is debarred from instituting such proceedings
against his successors in interest, unless she comes under any of the two
exceptions declared in Article 137 of the Civil Code of 1889. Josefa Mendoza
does not “come under the first exception, because she was already 36 years old
when her father died in 1929 (she was admittedly born in 1893). She avers coming
under the second exception, because the lost document of recognition was only
rediscovered in 1953. Even so, she had full knowledge of its existence for 12
years, from 1929, when her father delivered it to her, down to 1941, when she
first mislaid it. The second exception of Article 137 requires, that the
document of recognition should be previously unknown (“de que antes no
se hubiese tenido noticia”); and such terms do not include documents that the
claimant once possessed and subsequently lost or mislaid.

Assuming that the limitation of actions set by the last paragraph of Article
137 was repealed by the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) in force in 1929,
still, ten years being the maximum period of limitation of actions fixed by said
Act, Josefa Mendoza’s time limit to institute proceedings for her recognition
expired in 1939, at the latest. During all these ten years she had the document
(Exhibit G) in her hands, but she made no move to sue upon it. Her
laches and delay can lead to only one conclusion: her action is. now
barred. It has been barred at least since 1939; and the new Civil Code of 1950
cannot be retroactively applied to disturb the vested rights of jfche appellees
who have held the property as owners for the’fast fifteen years (Art. 2253).
Once mdre, vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura subveniunt: the laws
aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant.
So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista
Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ.. concur.

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^[1] Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42
Phil., 885; Larena vs. Kubio, 48 Phil., 101T; . Allarde vs.
Abaya,”57 Phil., 909.

^[2] Gitt vs. Gitt, 68 Phil.,
385, 389-890; Celis vs. Crisostomo (C. App,), 46 Off. Gaz., Civil Code
of 1889, Article 135.