THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JUAN B. SANTOS AND FrANCISCO GUBALLA, ACCUSED AND APPELLEES.

Two informations for libel were filed for the City Attorney by the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija against Juan B. Santos and Francisco Guballa
(criminal cases Nos. 2503 and 2568 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija). In the information of the first case the love life story of Pastor
Tayao, the offended party, is reproduced, as allegedly written by Juan B.
Santos, and published in “Bulaklak,” a magazine claimed to be edited by
Francisco Guballa. Tayao is called an ingrate and compared to a snake that bites
the hand that feeds it. The article describes a clever scheme conceived by
Pastor Tayao who managed to gain the confidence of a certain Prima’s family and
did again it to such an extent that he was considered as one of the members of
the family and later succeeded in marrying her. In the information of the second
case the life story of. Mercedes Tayao, daughter of city councilor Pastor Tayao,
is reproduced, as allegedly written by Juan B. Santos, and published in
“Bulaklak,” a magazine claimed to be edited by Francisco Guballa. She is
portrayed as a desperate and frustrated woman, because despite her efforts to
win the love of a doctor, going to the extent of spending for his education, she
failed to marry him. He married another girl. The stories are entitled “Anas
Bahay” (House Snake) and “Biniling Pagibig” (Purchased Love).

Upon arraignment, the defendants entered a plea of not guilty; but before
presentation of the evidence, counsel for the defendants moved to quash the
informations on the ground that as the imputation does not constitute a crime
which can be prosecuted de oficio, the court Iflcks jurisdiction to
hear the cases and try defendants charged with the crime. Following the rule in
the case People vs. Jose de Martinez, 76 Phil. 599, the Court dismissed
the informations for want of complaints expressly filed by the offended parties.
The Government has appealed.

A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime that may be
prosecuted de oficio, or of a crime that may not be prosecuted de
oficio, “or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who
is dead.” In libel imputing the commission of a crime that may be prosecuted
de oficio, the complaint of the offended party is not necessary, and
the information filed by the prosecuting officer is enough to confer
jurisdiction upon the court to try the defendant charged with the crime. A libel
imputing the commission of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de
oficio, such as adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts
of lasciviousness, cannot be proseeuted except at the instance of and upon
complaint expressly filed by the offended party. A libel attributing a defect or
vice, real or imaginary, which does not constitute a crime but brings into
disrepute, scorn, or ridicule or tends to cause him dishonor, discredit, or
contempt, does not come under the last paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides that “No criminal action for defamation which consists
in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oflcio shall
be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the
offended party.” This is the only exception provided for by law in which the
instance and complaint of the offended party are required in order to vest or
confer jurisdiction upon ‘the court to take cognizance of the crime of libel and
try the defendant charged with it. If this is the only exception, then it cannot
be extended beyond the import and terms of the law. A libel ascribing a defect
or vice, real or imaginary, which does not constitute a crime but brings or
tends to bring the offended party into disrepute, scorn, or ridicule or tends to
cause him dishonor, discredit, or contempt, is not included in the exception.
Hence the informations filed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Eeija
for the City Attorney charging the defendants with libel which consists of an
imputation of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, ommission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, are sufficient in law to confer
jurisdiction upon the court to try the defendants charged with the crime.

It is intimated that, if the public and malicious imputation of a crime that
cannot be prosecuted de oficio cannot be brought to court by the provincial
fiscal upon an information alone, there is more reason for requiring the
instance and the complaint of the offended party when the public and malicious
imputation is just a defect cr vice which does not amount to a crime that may be
prosecuted de oficio, because the offended party may not want to bring
to the public knowledge such imputation and may prefer to withhold it from
public notice. The apprehension that without the complaint of the offended party
a prosecuting officer may file a libel information for a public and malicious
imputation of a defect or vice which does not amount to a crime is unjustified.
Although possible yet it is quite remote, because a complaint of the offended
party and an investigation by the prosecuting officer precede the filing of such
an information. Without it, in many and most cases the “prosecuting officer
would not know that such public and malicious imputation refers to the offended
party. In these cases the filing of the informations “were the’ outcome of his
(prosecuting officer’s) investigation after he (had) received a written
complaint from the offended parties therein.”

In fairness to the court below that dismissed the Informations, it should be
stated that it just’followed the rule in the case of People vs. Jose de
Martinez, supra. Having come to the conclusion, however, that such an
extension of the exception, as provided for in the last paragraph of Article 360
of the Revised Penal Code, is not authorized by law, we are constrained to
reverse as we do reverse and set aside the order appealed from and remand the
cases to the court below for further proceedings in accordance with law, without
costs.

Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

Reyes, A., and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur in the result.

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CONCURRING OPINION

PARAS, C. J., concurring:

Act No. 1773 has been expressly repealed by the Revised Penal Code.