G.R. No. L-22007. March 28, 1969
NATIONAL MIRROR FACTORY, PETITIONER, VS. ISIDRA SUNGA VDA. DE ANURE, ET AL., AND WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.
RUIZ CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission dated July 31,
1963.
Juan Anure, the deceased husband of the
claimant Isidra Sunga vda. de Anure, was employed as
driver-laborer of the petitioner company since 1948 up to and until his death
on February 14, 1958. Before the start of office hours on that
hapless day, the deceased was ordered by the petitioner’s manager to remove and
change the flat tire a delivery truck belonging to the petitioner. After the flat tire was removed, the deceased
was seen panting and gasping for breath, and immediately thereafter was brought
to the Mary Johnston
Hospital where he eventually
died. The record states the cause of
death as “acute cardiac failure with slight hypertrophy and congestion
edema of both lungs and other visceral organs.”
The claimant subsequently received from the petitioner the sum of
P700 which she acknowledged, in an affidavit, wherein she stated, inter alia, that her husband “died of natural cause
not connected with work” and that she had “no claim and will not entertain
any claim of whatever nature against the petitioner.”
However, on October 23,
1961,the claimant, in her own behalf and in behalf of her six
minor children, filed a complaint with the Department of Labor, docketed as WC
Case 1590, for recovery of death benefits under Act 3428 for the death of her
husband. On November 15, 1962 the hearing officer dismissed
the case for lack of merit and insufficiency of evidence. A petition for review was filed by the
claimant on January 21, 1963;
the hearing officer affirmed his decision and elevated the case to the Commission
on February 4, 1963.
On July 31, 1963
Associate Commissioner Cesareo Perez reversed the
decision of the hearing officer, and ordered the petitioner to pay to the
claimant the sum of P3,300 as death benefits, P176 as burial expenses; P300 as
attorney’s fees, and to the Commission P 41 as costs.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
Commission en banc, the petitioner brought this appeal, praying for the
reversal of the decision rendered by the Commission on the following grounds:
1. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission did not have jurisdiction
to try the case because the claim was filed over three years and eight months
beyond the three-month period provided by sec. 24 of Act 3428;
2. The claimant is estopped from
asserting that the death of her husband was compensable and from claiming
compensation benefits from the petitioner;
3. There was no clear, sufficient and convincing evidence to
prove the elements of compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
We shall first dispose of the motion to dismiss filed by the
claimant, assisted by counsel and with the conformity of the petitioner. The ground for dismissal is that the
petitioner had completely paid, to the satisfaction of the claimant, the full
amount of death benefits and burial expenses awarded to her by the respondent
Commission and that she was waiving her right to collect attorney’s fees and
costs.
The effect of the agreement between the claimant and the
petitioner whereby the former waived collection of attorney’s fees and costs is
to modify the decision of the respondent Commission. Such modification places
the agreement on the same footing as an agreement concerning compensation
embraced within the purview of sec. 29 of Act 3428 which reads:
“Agreement on Compensation. – In case the employer and
the injured laborer or the dependents entitled to compensation arrive at an
agreement concerning the compensation provided for by this Act, such agreement
in order to be valid, shall provide at least, the same amount of
compensation as that prescribed by this Act and must be approved by the
Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner or any of his duly authorized
representative.” (emphasis supplied)
Under the aforecited section two
requisites must be fulfilled for any agreement concerning compensation to be
valid, namely, the amount agreed upon must be at least equal to that provided
by the Act, and the agreement must be approved by the Workmen’s
Compensation Commissioner or his authorized representative. These limitations
imposed by law on the right of the parties to settle amicably should be viewed
in the light of the avowed policy of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of securing
the employee and his dependents from becoming objects of charity.[1]
The law frowns upon any agreement, scheme or device which seeks to exempt the
employer from any liability under the Act either partially or totally and
condemns such schemes as nullities.[2]
From the same perspective should any agreement of settlement
modifying the award of the Commission be viewed, and with more reason should
this Court, charged with vigilance over the rights of the ignorant, indigent
and underprivileged, proceed with caution in appraising such agreements, in order
to ensure protection of the party at a disadvantage and effect fulfillment of
its sacred duty imposed by law. The
insistence of this Court on the prior approval of the Commissioner of any
agreement modifying the award of the Commission before it may be considered
valid, has for its basis, not only the basic policy of the law and the express
provision of sec. 29 of the Act but as well sec. 47 which expressly provides:
“Generale power and
duties. – The Commissioner shall
have full power and authority:
x x x
“(b) …to approve agreements, make, modify or rescind awards
and make findings of facts and rulings of law. … to assess penalties, compute
awards and compromise actions for the collection of awards. …”
The agreement in the case at bar must bear the Commissioner’s
imprimatur for the further reason that a waiver of costs as obtaining here must
be made, not by the claimant but by the respondent Commission to which body the
amount is payable.
Were this an ordinary civil action, the admission by the
prevailing party of satisfaction of the judgment of the court a quo
would be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the appeal. The same result will obtain where the parties
arrive at an agreement modifying the judgment, for in such event there would be
a novation of the obligation. The rule is however different in workmen’s
compensation cases, for the law protects the workingman, his family and his
dependents by providing safeguards with respect to dubious agreements of this
sort. The provisions of sec. 7 of the
Act which condemns as a nullity any scheme to exempt, partially or totally, the
employer from his liability under the Act, and the aforecited
provision of sec. 29 are clear and unmistakable expressions of public policy.
The prior approval of the Commissioner not having been secured,
the agreement is invalid and cannot be invoked for the dismissal of either the
case or the appeal. Where the matter in
dispute is settled only as to one or more appellants or appellees
the appeal cannot be dismissed.[3]
It is a salutary practice to overrule a motion to dismiss an appeal where, as
in the case at bar, the facts on which the motion is based are controverted.[4]
Since the law favors appeals and a hearing or review on the merits, motions to
dismiss are not looked upon with favor, and, in a doubtful case, the appeal
will be maintained.[5]
The motion to dismiss must therefore be as it is hereby denied.
We now proceed to the issues posed by the petitioner.
1.
It is undisputed that the claim
for compensation was filed over three years and eight months beyond the
three-month period prescribed by sec. 24 of the Act., Equally undisputed however
is the fact that the petitioner did not controvert the claim within the ten-day
period prescribed by sec. 47 notwithstanding its knowledge of the death of its
deceased employee. Failure on the part
of the petitioner to controvert the claim within the period prescribed by law
bars it from asserting that the claim for compensation was filed out of time.[6]
Time and again, this Court has held that the filing of the claim beyond the
three-month period is a non-jurisdictional defect,[7]
so that the Commission, even if a claim is filed out of time, can still
entertain the same, where, as in the instant case, the employer did not file its
notice of controversion in time.[8]
Assuming arguendo that the petitioner controverted the claim on time, the respondent Commission
found, and we agree, that the sum of P700 given by the petitioner to the
claimant was a partial payment of compensation and thus excuses the late,
filing of the claim, pursuant to sec. 25 of the Act.
2.
The affidavit executed by the
widow will not estop her from claiming compensation
for the reason that such affidavit had the effect of releasing the employer
from his liability under the Act and is consequently, a nullity, pursuant to
sec. 7 of the Act which provides:
“Contract prohibited.
– Any contract, regulation or device of any sort intended to exempt the
employer from all or part of the liability created by this Act shall be null
and void.”
We agree with the respondent Commission that the affidavit in
question should be voided because its object or purpose is clearly to exempt
the petitioner from the obligation of paying compensation under the Act. Being
null and void, the affidavit is inefficacious to prove estoppel
on the part of the claimant.
3. We are satisfied that the finding of compensability and the
award of compensation by the respondent Commission are supported by substantial
evidence on record, and we see no reason for disturbing the same.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed in
toto with costs against the petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
[1]
Murillo v. Mendoza, 66 Phil.
689.
[2]
Section 7, Act 3428.
[3] 5
CJS 1354 (5) p. 424.
[4]
45 CJS 1377 p. 463.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Nadeco v. WCC, L-I9863, April 29, 1964; MRE Co. v.
Manalang, L-20845, Nov. 29, 1965; A. de
Santos, Inc. v. Sapon, L22220, April 29,
1966.
[7] Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Villanueva, et al.,
L-10533, May 13, 1957;
Century Insurance Co., Inc. v. Fuentes, et al., L-16039, August 31, 1961; MRR Co. v.
WCC, L-21902, August 10, 1967.
[8]
Martha Lumber Mill, Inc. v. WCC, L-7599, June 27, 1956; Iloilo D k and
Engineering Co. v. WCC, L-17283, July 31, 1962