Adm. Case No. 598. March 28, 1969
AURORA SORIANO DELES, COMPLAINANT, VS. VICENTE E. ARAGONA, JR., RESPONDENT.
RUIZ CASTRO, J.:
This is a disbarment proceeding
against Vicente R. Aragona, Jr.[1] upon a verified letter-complaint of Aurora Soriano
Deles filed with this Court on November 6, 1963, charging the former with having
made under oath, false and unfounded allegations against her in a motion filed
in Court of Agrarian Relations cases 1254 and 1255 Iloilo, which allegedly
caused her great mental torture and moral suffering.
On November 13, 1963 this Court required the respondent to answer the
complaint. On December 10,
1963 the respondent filed his
answer, affirming the truth of the allegations in the questioned motion, but
claiming in his defense that in preparing it, he relied not only upon
information received but also upon other matters of public record. He also averred that the complainant had made
a similar charge against him in a counter-motion to declare him in contempt of
court filed in the same C.A.R cases, which was however dismissed together with
the complainant’s counterclaims when the main cases were dismissed; that the
complainant failed to move for the reconsideration of the said dismissal or to
appeal therefrom; and that during the few years that he has been a member of
the bar, he has always comported himself correctly, and has adhered
steadfastly to his conviction that the practice of law is a sacred trust in
the interest of truth.
This Court, on December 14,
1963, referred the case to
the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation. Because
both parties reside in Iloilo City, the Solicitor General in turn referred the case to
the City Fiscal of Iloilo for investigation and reception of (evidence. Both the petitioner and the respondent
adduced evidence in the investigation which was conducted. Thereafter, the
City Fiscal forwarded to the Solicitor General the record of the
investigation, including the recommendation of the assistant city fiscal who
personally conducted the investigation that the petition for disbarment be
dismissed. The Solicitor General
thereafter filed with this Court his report, concurring in the recommendation
of the assistant city fiscal.
Aurora Soriano Deles (hereinafter
referred to as the complainant) is the administratrix of the intestate estate
of the late Joaquina Ganzon (the deceased mother of Aurora and Enrique Soriano,
Sr. who are heirs of the estate concurrently with other forced heirs) in
special proceeding 128 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
On July 26, 1961, upon motion of Enrique Soriano, Sr. and over and
above the opposition of the complainant, the intestate court issued an order
denying a proposed lease of ten hectares of the estate by the complainant to
one Carlos Fuentes and sustaining the possession of Enrique as lessee of the
said land. In effect, the order likewise
sustained the possession by the brothers Federico and Carlos Aglinao of a
portion of the said land being tenanted by them upon authority of the lessee,
Enrique Soriano, Sr.
In disregard of the abovementioned
order, the complainant attempted to take possession of the landholdings by
placing thereon her own tenants. Predictably, the Aglinao brothers, to protect
their rights, countered by filing against the complainant two petitions with
the Court of Agrarian Relations in Iloilo (hereinafter referred to as the
agrarian court), docketed therein as C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 (hereinafter
referred to as the C.A.R. cases). They
alleged in their respective petitions that they have been tenants of Enrique
Soriano, Sr. since 1960 on a parcel of riceland located barrio Malapoc,
Balasan, Iloilo, held by the complainant as administratrix of the intestate
estate of the deceased Joaquina Ganzon; and that they had started to plow
their leaseholds consisting of two hectares each at the start of the
agricultural year 1962-63 when “on March 7, 1962, the respondent
[complainant herein] ordered one Bonifacio Margarejo to harrow the plowed land
without the knowledge and consent” of the petitioners. Consequently, they prayed for the issuance of
an interlocutory order enjoining the complainant and her representatives from
interfering with their peaceful cultivation of the lands in question pending determination
of the merits of their petitions.
However, consideration of the petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of an
interlocutory order of in-junction pendente lite was considerably
delayed not only by reason of several postponements granted at the behest of
the complainant but also because of the assurance made by her through counsel
in open court at the hearing of June 16, 1962, that neither she nor any of her
men would disturb or interfere with the petitioners’ possession of their
leaseholds until their petitions shall have been finally resolved.
But on June 18, 1962, barely two days after the abovementioned hearing,
the complainant’s men again entered the land in question and planted rice
thereon. This unauthorized entry prompted
the Aglinao brothers, through their counsel, the herein respondent Atty.
Vicente Aragona, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as the respondent), to file on June 20, 1962 an “Urgent Motion for Issuance of Interlocutory
Order.” There being no objection by the complainant against the said
motion, and finding the same meritorious, the agrarian court issued on June
21, 1962 the interlocutory order prayed for, directing “the respondent,
her agent, or any person acting for and in her behalf to refrain from molesting
or in any way interfering with the work of the petitioners in their respective
landholdings.”
On June 24, 1962, upon the agrarian court’s direction, the PC
detachment stationed in Sara, Iloilo, served copies of the order on the complainant’s
men, Bonifacio Margarejo and Carlos Fuentes, and restored the Aglinao brothers
to the possession of their landholdings.
On the same day, Margarejo and Fuentes informed their landlord, the
complainant, about the said order.
For several months thereafter
nothing of significance happened in the C.A.R. cases until the palay planted
on the land in question became ripe and ready for harvest.
Then on October 2, 1962 Enrique Soriano, Sr. showed to the respondent in Iloilo City a telegram[2] which reads as follows:
“BALASAN
OCT
2 62
GILDA
ACOLADO
ILOILO AMERICAN SCHOOL MARIA CLARA AVENUE
ILOILO CITY
TELL DADDY COMMUNICATE ARAGONA IMMEDIATELY
ALBERT HARVEST TODAY ….
MAMANG”
The sender
of the telegram was Mrs. Isabel Soriano, wife of Enrique, the addressee Gilda
Acolado, their daughter.
After reading the telegram, the
respondent asked Soriano whether his wife (Mrs. Soriano) was coming to Iloilo City; when informed that she was arriving, he decided to
wait for her. Mrs. Soriano arrived from Balasan in the afternoon of that same
day, October
2, 1962. She went to see the respondent, and informed
the latter that it was she who had sent the telegram upon request of the
Aglinao brothers; that she was personally present when one Albert, a tenant of
the complainant, accompanied by many armed men, went to the land in question
and harvested the palay thereon over the protests of the Aglinao brothers; that
upon inquiring why the said Albert and his armed companions harvested the
palay, she was told that they were acting upon orders of the complainant; and that
instead of filing a complaint with the chief of police as she originally
planned, she decided instead to see the respondent without delay.
Possessed of the above
information, the respondent promptly prepared and filed with the agrarian
court, on October 3, 1962, a verified “Urgent Motion to Declare Respondent
in. Contempt of Court” (hereinafter
referred to as motion for contempt), praying that the complainant and “her
armed goons” be declared in, and punished for, contempt of court for
violating the interlocutory order of June 21, 1962. This motion for contempt elicited, on the very
same day it was filed, an instant reply from the complainant who moved to
strike it out from the records, claiming that the allegations therein libelled
her, and that it was the respondent who should be punished for contempt for
deliberately misleading the agrarian court. Moreover, not content with this
reply and counter-motion for contempt, the complainant also lodged on October
4, 1962 a criminal complaint for libel against the respondent with the City
Fiscal of Iloilo, based on the same allegedly libelous allegations made
against her by the respondent in the latter’s motion for, contempt filed in the
C.A.R. cases. However, after
preliminarily investigating the said complaint, the assistant city fiscal to
whom it was assigned dismissed the same on the ground that the allegations of
the motion for contempt were privileged communications. The complainant did not appeal from the said
dismissal to the city fiscal; neither did she elevate the same for review to
the Department of Justice.
Meanwhile, no action was taken by
the agrarian court in the C.A.R. cases on the motion for contempt filed by the
respondent against the complainant, as well as on the latter’s counter-motion,
also for contempt, against the former.
Instead, by order dated October 24, 1963, the agrarian court dismissed C.A.R. cases 1254 and
1255, including the complainant’s counterclaims therein, for lack of interest
to prosecute on the part of the petitioners, the Aglinao brothers. As a matter of course, the dismissal of the
main cases carried with it the dismissal of all incidents therein, including
the motion for contempt and counter-motion for contempt. Again, the complainant did not ask for reconsideration
of the order of dismissal, nor did she appeal therefrom. She filed instead the present administrative
complaint against the respondent.
The only issue raised in the
present disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent, Atty. Vicente E.
Aragona, Jr., should be disciplined or disbarred for having prepared and filed
under oath the “Urgent Motion to Declare Respondent in Contempt of
Court” in C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255-Iloilo, which allegedly contains
false and libelous imputations injurious to the honor of the complainant.
For easy reference, the motion for
contempt is hereunder reproduced in toto.
“COMES NOW the undersigned, in
behalf of the petitioners in each of the above-entitled cases, and to this
Honorable Court respectfully states that:’
“1. Upon urgent and
verified motion of the undersigned dated June 20, 1962, this Honorable Court
issued an interlocutory order dated June 21, 1962, the dispositive part of
which is as follows:
‘WHEREFORE, finding the motion
meritorious, an interlocutory order is here by issued ordering the respondent,
her agent, or any person acting for and in her behalf, to refrain from
molesting or in any way interfering with the work of the petitioners in their
respective landholdings, situated at Barrio Malapoc, Balasan, Iloilo, with an
area of 2 hectares for each of them, in these two cases, pending the hearing
of these cases on the merits.
‘The Commanding Officer of the
Constabulary Detachment of the 56th PC Company stationed at Sara, Iloilo, or
his duly authorized representative, is hereby ordered to implement this order
and to report to this Court his proceedings in this particular within a week
from the date of his implementation of this order.
‘SO ORDERED.
‘Iloilo City, June 21, 1962.
‘(SGD.)
JUAN C. TERUEL
Commissioner’
“2. Pursuant to the
above-quoted order, the Commanding Officer of the 56th PC Company stationed at
Sara, Iloilo, ordered the respondent and her men not to enter the landholdings
in question and to refrain from molesting or in any way interfering with the
work of petitioners in their respective landholdings; the report of said Commanding
Officer is now on file with the records of the above-entitled cases;
“3. On this date, the
undersigned was just surprised when he received a telegram from the petitioners,
through Mrs. Isabel Soriano, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex ‘A’ and
made part hereof, informing the undersigned that respondent, thru a certain
Albert, with the aid of armed goons, harvested the palay of the petitioners yesterday
despite the vehement opposition of the petitioners not to enter their
landholdings
“4. The said acts of
respondents and her men in harvesting the palay of the petitioners, knowing
fully well the existence and implementation of the interlocutory order of this
Court dated June 21, 1962, is a gross and open defiance and disobedience of
said order and a challenge to the legal processes and authority of this Court
in the peaceful administration of justice;
“5. This rebellious and
seditious conduct of the respondent and her men against the authority of this
Court constitutes wanton resistance and contumacious contempt of court;
“6. Unless the respondent
and her armed goons are declared in contempt of Court and duly punished, the
lawful orders, processes and authority of this Court would be a mockery and
rendered useless by the stubborn resistance and defiance of the respondent.
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it
respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that respondent and her armed goons
be declared and punished for contempt of Court until such time that she turns
over the produce of the landholdings in question which she harvested illegally
and until such time that she fully complies with the interlocutory order of
this Court.
“Petitioners pray for such
other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises.
“Iloilo City, October 3, 1962.
“E.I.
Soriano Jr. and V.E. Aragon
Counsel
for the Petitioners
Lopez Bros. Bldg., Iznart Street Iloilo City
By:
(sgd.) VICENTE E. ARAGONA JR.”
The complainant’s testimony is to
the effect that (1) on October 2, 1962 she was not in Balasan but in Iloilo
City where she testified at the trial of C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255, after,
which she left for her home which is situated also in Iloilo City; (2) the
distance between Balasan and Iloilo City is 135 kilometers, and to reach
Balasan from Iloilo City one has to travel four hours by car or six hours by
bus; (3) although she knows that the person Albert, mentioned in the motion, is
Alberto Boneta, a helper of Carlos Fuentes, one of the tenants she had placed
on the lands involved in the C.A.R. cases, she never met or saw Boneta or Fuentes
from the time she was informed of the interlocutory order dated June 21, 1962
in the aforesaid cases, until October 2, 1962 when the said Alberto Boneta and
several armed men allegedly harvested the crops on the lands in question; (4)
she did not order Boneta to harvest the said crops; and (5) she never visited
the aforesaid lands in 1962. Her uncontradicted testimony lends credence to
her claim that she did not order Alberto Boneta to harvest, with the aid of
armed men, the crops on the Aglinao brothers’ landholdings.
Nonetheless, this Court is loath
to uphold the view that the preparation and the filing of the questioned motion
for contempt, furnish sufficient basis for disciplinary action against the
respondent.
In People vs. Aquino[3] this Court laid down the decisional authority that
“[S]tatements made in the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely that is, privileged – that
regardless of defamatory tenor and of the presence of malice – if the same
are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of the
inquiry. And that; in view of this, the person who makes them – such
as a judge, lawyer, or witness – does not thereby incur the risk
of being found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for
the recovery of damages.” (emphasis supplied)
Since
there is no doubt that the allegations made by the respondent in the questioned
motion for contempt are statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding
– i. e., in C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 – besides being relevant, pertinent or
material to the subject-matter of the said cases, they are absolutely
privileged, thereby precluding any liability on the part of the respondent.
To be sure, the charges levelled
by the respondent against the complainant in the questioned pleading lack
sufficient factual basis. But even this circumstance will not strengthen the
complainant’s position. “The privilege is not affected by factual or
legal inaccuracies in the utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings.”[4] In fact, “Even when the statements are found to
be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the
charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the
mistake of the individual. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that
the communication is made in intemperate terms… A privileged communication
should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of
malice or falsity. Such excessive
scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged
communications. The ultimate test is
that of bona fides.”[5]
Indeed, the actuations of the
respondent were motivated by the legitimate desire to serve the interests of
his clients. For, contrary to the
complainant’s claim, the respondent did not rely merely on Mrs. Soriano’s
telegram (exh. 5) when he prepared the motion for contempt. According to his unrebutted testimony, when
Mr. Soriano brought to him the said telegram on October 2, 1962, he asked the former whether his wife, the sender of
the telegram, was coming to Iloilo City, and, when informed that she was arriving, he waited
for her. True enough, Mrs. Soriano saw
the respondent in the afternoon of that same day and informed him that she was
personally present when one Albert, a tenant of the complainant, accompanied by
several armed men, went to the landholdings of the Aglinao brothers and, against
the objections of the latter, harvested the palay crop thereon, and that upon
her inquiry, she was informed that they were acting upon orders of the
complainant.
Considering that the foregoing
information which impelled the respondent to file the questioned motion for
contempt, was obtained by him first-hand from someone who claimed to have
actually witnessed the incident in question, coupled with the complainant’s
own admission that the Albert referred to by Mrs. Soriano was indeed a helper
of Carlos Fuentes, one of the tenants whom she had illegally placed once on the
landholdings of the Aglinao brothers, it was not unseemly for the respondent
to assume that Albert did act at the behest of the complainant. After all, the complainant had, in the past,
committed the same forcible act of entering the said landholdings on June 18, 1963, only two days after she had assured the agrarian
court that she would not disturb or interfere with the Aglinao brothers’
possession, pending final resolution of the petitions filed by them against
her. In truth, it is precisely such
forcible entry into the said lands that precipitated the issuance of the very
interlocutory order dated June 21, 1962 which the respondent accused her of disobeying in his
motion for contempt. Unquestionably, the
aforenarrated circumstances provided the respondent a probable cause for belief
in the truthfulness of the allegations which he couched in rather intemperate
language in his motion for contempt. He had merely acted in righteous
indignation over the wrong supposedly done to his aggrieved clients – believing
as he did in the truth of his charges – without deliberate intention whatsoever
to malign and villify the complainant.
The doctrine of privileged
communication is not an idle and empty principle. It has been distilled from
wisdom and experience. “The privilege is not intended so much for the
protection of those engaged in the public service and in the enactment and
administration of law, as for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose
being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers,
and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective
functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action
for the recovery of damages.”[6] Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great
latitude of pertinent comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold, and
for the felicity of their clients they may be pardoned some infelicities of
language.[7]
The object of a disbarment
proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to
safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public
from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession
of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit
to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.[8] Thus, the power to disbar attorneys ought always to
be exercised with great caution, and only in clear cases of misconduct which
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the bar.[9]
In this case, there is no evidence
whatsoever tending to prove unfitness of the respondent to continue in the
practice of law and remain an officer of the court.
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative complaint against the respondent
is hereby dismissed.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL,
Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo,
JJ., concur.
[1]
Admitted to the Bar in 1960.
[2]
Exhibit 5.
[3]
L-23908, Oct. 29, 1966, 18
SCRA 555, 558.
[4]
Sison vs. David, L-11268, Jan.
28, 1961, 1 SCRA 60.
[5] U.
S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 743.
[6]
People vs. Aquino, supra; Sison vs. David, supra,
quoting 33 Am. Jur. 123-124.
[7] Dorado
vs. Filar, 104 Phil. 743, 748.
[8]
In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577; In re McDougall, 3 Phil. 70; 5 Am.
Jur 411; see also Re Caughan, 24 ALR 858, 189 Cal. 491, 209 P 353; Re
Rotchrock, 131 ALR 226, 16 Cal. 2d 449, 106 P2d 907; Re Keenan, 96 ALR 679, 287
Mass. 577, 192 NE 65; Re Kerl, 8 ALR 1259, 32 Idaho 737, 188 P 40.
[9]
Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S.
265, 2 S Ct 569; 27 Led 552.