RAMCAR, INCORPORATED, PETITIONER, VS. DIONISIO DE LEON, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

On December 26, 1946, petitioner initiated a civil action against Daniel
Francisco, Ulysses S. Tread, Jr., and Antonio Lloret, by filing a complaint for
damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying that defendants be
sentenced to pay the sum of P5,000, value of a stolen taxicab, P500, a price
offered through the newspapers to anyone who could point the whereabouts of said
taxicab, plus P50 per day as the average minimum daily income of the car and the
costs of the suit, and that, pending all proceedings, attachment of the
properties of defendants be ordered, upon such bond and in the amount that the
court may deem proper to fix.

Plaintiff alleged that he owns, among other taxicabs, a Renault car with
motor No. 36428, painted black and white and provided with a taximeter, the
total value of which is P5,000, and that about December 2, 1946, it was stolen
from the parking place in front of the premises of plaintiff at 1049 R. Hidalgo,
Manila, and after many days of fruitless search, an offer of P500 through the
newspapers was made to anyone who could point to its whereabouts, and that said
car, already in dismantled condition, was found in and recovered from the
possession of defendants, who confessed to the representative of plaintiff and,
the police authorities as being the authors of the theft of said car and of
dismantling it to pieces, making it completely unserviceable and a total loss.
In support of the petition for the issuance of a writ of attachment, plaintiff
alleged that defendants were concealing their properties and were about to
dispose of them with intent of defrauding their creditors, including
plaintiff.

Two days later, on December 28, an information for the theft of the above
described taxicab and based on the same facts alleged in the complaint, was
filed with the court of first instance against the said three defendants.

On January 2, 1947, after petitioner had filed a bond in the amount of
P5,000, a writ of attachment was issued against the properties of defendants. On
January 14, 1947, defendant Daniel Francisco filed a petition praying for the
dismissal of the complaint and for the setting aside of the writ of attachment.
On January 27, 1947, defendant Ulysses S. Tread, Jr., moved for the suspension
of the time within which to file a responsive pleading to the complaint and to
dissolve the writ of attachment. On January 30, 1947, respondent judge issued an
order denying the dismissal of the complaint prayed for by Daniel Francisco, but
granted its petition to set aside the writ of attachment against him. On
February 3, the same judge granted the petition of defendant Ulysses S. Tread,
Jr., dated January 27, 1947. On February 20, 1947, respondent judge denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiff who, consequently, filed with this
Supreme Court the petition which is now under our consideration, praying that
the orders of respondent judge of January 30 and February 3 and 20, 1947, be
declared null and void and that the writ of attachment of January 2, 1947, be
declared valid and in force.

Respondent judge set aside the writ of attachment of January 2, 1947, upon
the theory that it was improperly issued because at the time of its issuance the
information in the criminal case had already been filed, the theory being based
on the lower court’s interpretation of Section 1 of Rule 107 in which it is
read:

“(b) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the
civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action;

“(c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action
arising from the same offense can be prosecuted; and the same shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the
criminal proceeding has been rendered.”

From the provisions of Rule 107 it is clear that, unless there is a waiver of
civil action or reserve of the right to initiate it expressly, criminal action
always carries the civil action for recovery of liability arising from the
offense charged; that when criminal action has been commenced before the civil
action, the latter cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered
in the former; that when the civil action has been commenced before the criminal
action, the former shall be suspended upon the institution of the latter and
until final judgment is rendered in the same; that, generally, extinction of the
criminal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil; and that final
judgment rendered in a civil action in absolving defendant from civil liability
is no bar to a criminal action.

The above-quoted subsection (c) is the one directly applicable to the
facts in this case, although it should not be interpreted as an isolated
provision, but in conjunction with the rest of Rule 107. Said subsection enjoins
that no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted after a
criminal action has been commenced, and if the civil action has been instituted
before the criminal, it “shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found,
until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.” The question
is whether, under such injunctions, the lower court was, after the filing of the
information in the criminal case, ipso facto deprived of the power to
issue preliminary and auxiliary writs, such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, appointment of receiver, fixing amounts of bonds to be filed, and
other processes of similar nature, none of which goes into the merits of the
case.

Under the subsection in question, the civil action undergoes a procedural
freezing. But, in the same way that in physical congelation not all
manifestations of life are wiped out, the procedural freezing in question does
not have the effect of wiping out all manifestations of the existence of the
suspended civil action. Marmots and certain species of bats, including
pipistrels, when hibernating in burrows and caves during winter, offer the
appearance of immobile corpses or simple lumps of ice. But within the lifeless
appearance that deceives human perception, because metabolism, heart-beat rate,
breathing and body temperature drop so low, there lies the mysteriously latent
vitality that, when hibernation is over, will permit those animals to run with
surprising agility and to soar high in cross-country flying. Suspension is not
termination. Suspension is not final ending, is not destruction, is not death.
The suspended civil action continues to be alive. Only its evolution to maturity
is temporarily stopped. Only it has to bide time. In the meantime, while it is
waiting to be tried and decided on the merits, it may avail itself of the
ancillary processes which, expressly authorized by law, will permit it to
accomplish its purposes efficaciously, and may defend itself against bad faith,
fraud and other evil practices, intended to make nugatory the relief sought by
it and to defeat the ends of the administration of justice. If those ancillary
processes cannot be resorted to during the suspension, there is no sense in the
rule providing only for suspension, when its effect is to kill the action. We
cannot subscribe to the idea that the authors of the subsection in question, in
providing for the suspension of the civil action during the life of the criminal
action, had the purpose of crippling to death the civil action, but lacked the
honesty of saying so in an outright manner, seeking rather the hypocritical
method of concealing their purpose under a deceitful word.

No one should forget that civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from an offense has always deserved the concern of the law. The Revised
Penal Code, although it is supposed to deal only on criminal offenses, contain
an express provision reserving to offended parties such civil action. To make
effective that right of recovery of civil liability, Section 2 of Rule 106
grants to the offended party the right to commence a criminal action through a
complaint, and Section 16 of the same rule guarantees to the offended party the
right of intervention in criminal action, either personally or by attorney. Rule
107 has been drafted to further guarantee to the offended party the right of
recovery above-mentioned.

When no civil action is expressly instituted, according to subsection
(a) of Section 1 of Rule 107, it shall be impliedly jointly “instituted
with the criminal action.” That means as if two actions are joined in one as
twins, each one complete with the same completeness as any of the two normal
persons composing a twin. It means that the civil action may be tried and
prosecuted, with all the ancillary processes provided by law. Such was the idea
of the Supreme Court in United States vs. Heery (25 Phil., 600) where,
besides affirming the criminal judgment rendered therein, it ordered the record
returned to the lower court “for the further purpose of completing the civil
branch of the case.” Therefore, within the criminal action, with which the civil
action is “impliedly instituted,” the offended party may obtain the preliminary
writ of attachment. There is no logic in denying that right to the plaintiff,
when the civil action is separately instituted.

The orders of the respondent judge dated January 30 and February 3, 1947,
having been issued upon a wrong interpretation of subsection (c) of
Section 1 of Rule 107, and no intimation to the contrary having been made, we
should assume that, without said wrong interpretation, the writ of attachment
was issued because the plaintiff was, under the facts and the law, entitled to
its issuance, and that there was the duty of the lower court to issue it.

For all the foregoing, the orders of the respondent judge of January 30 and
February 3, 1947, are set aside, and the writ of attachment of January 2, 1947,
is maintained, unless and until lifted through a proper counter-bond that the
defendants may file or for any other reason recognized by law. Costs shall be
taxed against respondents.

Paras, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
Tuason, J., concurs
in the result.

PARAS, J.:

I certify that Mr. Justice Padilla voted with
the majority.

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PABLO, M.:

El recurrente en esta causa original de certiorari y mandamus presento
dos acciones en el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila: Primera, la accion
civil No. 1429, reclamando de los demandados Daniel Francisco, Ulysses S. Tread,
Jr. y Antonio Lloret el pago del importe del taxicab Renault hurtado, segun la
demanda, por ellos, y la presento en 26 de diciembre de 1946. Segunda, una
querella por hurto (causa criminal No. 1849) contra los mismos individuos el 28
del mismo mes. El 2 de enero de 1947 el Honorable Juez recurrido, a peticion del
recurrente, expidio una orden de embargo preventivo contra los bienes de los
demandados; el 30 de enero de 1947 denego la mocion de sobreseimiento presentada
por Daniel Francisco y revoco la orden de embargo preventivo contra sus bienes;
en 3 de febrero revoco la orden de embargo preventivo expedida contra los bienes
de Ulysses S. Tread, Jr. y el 20 de febrero denego la mocion de reconsideracion
presentada por el demandante. Por tales motivos, el recurrente (que es el
demandante en la causa civil y ofendido en la causa criminal) acudio a este
Tribunal pidiendo que las ordenes del Hon. Juez recurrido, dictadas en la causa
civil el 30 de enero y de 3 y 20 de febrero de 1947, sean declaradas nulas y de
ningun valor y que la orden de embargo preventivo de 2 de enero de 1947 sea
declarada valida y en vigor.

Fundandose en el articulo 1.° de la Regla 107, la mayoria revoca las ordenes
del Juez recurrido de 30 de enero y de 3 de febrero y declara valida la orden de
2 de enero de 1947 (la de embargo preventivo contra los bienes de los demandados
en la causa civil y acusados en la causa criminal).

No puedo concurrir con esta opinion.

El articulo citado dice lo siguiente:

“(c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action
arising from the same offense can be prosecuted; and the same shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the
criminal proceeding has been rendered;”

La disposicion del parrafo (c) es clara. No permite la presentacion de
una causa civil despues de presentada ya la causa criminal, disposicion parecida
a la del articulo 114 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal Española. (Orbeta
contra Sotto, 58 Jur. Fil., 548.) Pero si, como en el caso presente, se
ha presentado ya con anterioridad una causa civil, tal causa debe ser suspendida
en el estado en que se encontraba al presentarse la causa criminal y no se
actuara sobre ella hasta que recaiga sentencia final en la causa criminal. De
acuerdo con esta disposicion, el Juzgado no debio haber dictado la orden de
embargo preventivo contra las propiedades de los demandados en 2 de enero: ya no
podia actuar en la causa civil despues de presentada la querella en 28 de
diciembre de 1946. Tal actuacion, que es contraria a la disposicion expresa del
Reglamento, carece de fuerza y efecto. Si el Juez recurrido, reconociendo el
error en que incurrio, revoco su orden de 2 de enero, no ha hecho mas que
restablecer la causa civil en el estado en que se encontraba al presentarse la
accion criminal. No abuso de su discrecion, ni obro en exceso de su
jurisdiccion.

En el asunto de Eraña contra Vera y Josephine Panzani (74 Phil., 272),
este Tribunal ha declarado ya que ha abandonado la doctrina sentada en los
asuntos de Estados Unidos contra Namit (38 Jur. Fil., 984), y Pueblo
contra Moreno (60 Jur. Fil., 729)—que en causas criminales no es
procedente expedir embargo preventivo,—y categoricamente concluyo: “But this
ruling is predicated fundamentally upon the theory that preliminary attachment
is a purely statutory remedy and there was then no clear legal provision making
it applicable in criminal proceedings. All doubts on this question have,
however, disappeared upon the promulgation of the new Rules of Court wherein, by
clear authority of Rule 124, section 6, above quoted, a criminal court having
jurisdiction over the civil action arising from the offense charged, is now
permitted to issue all the auxiliary writs necessary to carry such jurisdiction
into effect. A similar legal principle was recognized before in scattered
provisions of law or decisions (see Act No. 136, section 19; Revised
Administrative Code, section 145-G; Act No. 190, section 610; Shioji vs.
Harvey, 43 Phil., 333, 344), applicable only in some courts and in certain
cases, and does not seem to cover the question now before us. Now, it is made
general and applicable in all cases and in all courts provided the requirements
therein specified are present.” Lo que hubiera hecho el recurrente fue pedir que
el Fiscal presentase una mocion en la causa criminal pidiendo la expedicion del
embargo preventivo correspondiente.

Si la causa civil estaba suspendida por disposicion expresa del Reglamento de
los Tribunales, como podia el Juzgado dictar en ella una orden de embargo
preventivo? Expedir tal orden es actuar: no es suspender, no es dejar el
expediente en el estado en que se encontraba al presentarse la querella. Es
infringir abiertamente la letra y el espiritu de la disposicion procesal.

El articulo 1.° de la Regla 107 dispone que “(a) when a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his
right to institute it separately.” El recurrente no pidio el sobreseimiento de
la causa civil; se puede suponer que reservo el derecho de continuar con la
causa civil, en cuanto se haya dictado sentencia final en el expediente criminal
de acuerdo con el reglamento. Sin embargo, en vez de respetar el status
quo del expediente civil al tiempo de presentarse la querella urgio, al
prestar la fianza correspondiente, la expedicion del mandamiento de embargo
preventivo Este Tribunal no puede dar fuerza y vigor a la orden de embargo
preventivo, expedida en contravencion de la expresa disposicion del articulo
1.°, parrafo (c) de la Regla 107, que era per se nula y de ningun
valor. En Orbeta contra Sotto, supra, este Tribunal dijo: “* * *
las actuaciones civiles incoadas en contravencion de las disposiciones de la Ley
de Enjuiciamiento Criminal Española antes citadas carecen de fuerza y
efecto.”

Se debe denegar la peticion.