MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. SINFOROSO CAÑETE, RESPONDENT.

Ma-ao Sugar Central versus Cañete

The Case

This is the case of Ma-ao Sugar Central versus Cañete, decided by the Supreme Court in March 1967. Sinforoso Cañete, a locomotive brakeman and later operator of the sugar central, claimed compensation for pulmonary tuberculosis which he said arose from, or was at least aggravated by, his employment. The Workmen's Compensation Commission ruled in his favor, and the company brought the matter to the Supreme Court. What makes this case worth remembering is not the merits of the illness itself but the narrow, urgent question the Court had to resolve: may a compensation award be executed pending appeal, while the employer's petition is still undecided, because the claimant is dying? The Court's answer, and its treatment of an uncooperative employer, are the lessons of the case.

Procedural History

Cañete filed his claim for compensation with the regional office of the Workmen's Compensation Commission in Bacolod City. After hearing, the acting referee held that the claim was not compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Cañete elevated the case to the Workmen's Compensation Commission en banc for review. The Commission reversed the referee. It found the claim compensable under section 3 of the Act on the theory of aggravation of a pre-existing illness. It also found that the company, having controverted the claim after the period fixed by section 45 of the Act despite knowing of the illness as early as September 1961, had waived its right to contest. Under section 14, it awarded sixty percent of the average weekly wage for the period of disability, and it ordered the company to pay a lump sum of four thousand pesos, to furnish further medical, surgical and hospital services until the tuberculosis should be arrested and cured under section 13, and to pay forty-one pesos in fees to the Workmen's Compensation Fund under section 55.

The company appealed to the Supreme Court and its motion for reconsideration was denied by the Commission en banc. While the appeal was pending, Cañete moved for execution of the four thousand peso award, pleading his critical and almost hopeless physical condition. The motion was initially denied for lack of verified precise data on the actual number of days of disability. Cañete sought reconsideration, attaching his own affidavit of merit, the affidavit of his physician, and that of the woman in whose house he had stayed since he stopped working. The Court required verified data on the days he actually worked from 1956 through 1961, and required the company to comment. Cañete submitted the data; the company asked for extensions and ultimately refused to comment, claiming the data were not verified. It is in this posture, on the motion for execution pending appeal, that the Court ruled.

Facts

Sinforoso Cañete worked for Ma-ao Sugar Central, a corporation based in Ma-ao, Bago City, Negros Occidental, as a locomotive brakeman and later as an operator, performing other odd jobs as required. On the eighth of May, 1963, he filed a claim for compensation for pulmonary tuberculosis, alleging that he acquired the sickness as a direct result of his employment. The company controverted the claim.

The Commission found that the company had known of Cañete's illness as early as the eighth of September, 1961, yet controverted the claim only after the period required by section 45 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It also found that Cañete had been totally disabled from the third of October, 1961, when he stopped working, up to the twenty-fourth of May, 1966, a total of one thousand six hundred seventy-six days.

By the time of the Supreme Court proceedings, Cañete was afflicted with active pulmonary tuberculosis, moderately advanced. He was under the personal care of his physician, reporting three times a week, and the sickness had prevented him from performing any manner of work and left him a destitute, in constant danger of death. The company, for its part, was in the best position to supply trustworthy data on his service but supplied none, and when required to comment on his verified data, merely asserted that they were not verified.

Issues

• Whether or not execution of the compensation award may issue pending appeal, upon motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, where good reasons are stated in a special order.
• Whether or not the claimant's critical physical condition and destitution constitute good reasons of urgency and justice justifying immediate execution of the award.
• Whether or not the computation of the award by the Workmen's Compensation Commission is erroneous for failing to deduct holidays and off-milling days from the period of disability.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

Before the expiration of the time to appeal, or pending appeal, execution may issue, in the discretion of the court, on motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order.

This is the provision under which the motion for execution pending appeal was resolved, and it fixes the two requisites the Court applied.

Section 10 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, on the effect of an appeal from the Commission, provides that this Court may:

direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.

This confirms that the Court may order execution pending appeal notwithstanding the appeal.

Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, is the basis for the amount awarded, and the Court applied it to compute the maximum compensation equivalent to two hundred eight weeks.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the issuance of an order for execution of a judgment pending appeal is within the sound discretion of the courts. Both requisites of section 2 of Rule 39 were present: there was a written motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, and the only matter in dispute was whether good reasons existed.

On the second issue, the Court answered in the affirmative. After reviewing the pleadings and annexes, it was more than satisfied that there were superior reasons and urgent circumstances calling for immediate execution, which far outweighed the company's objections. Cañete had active pulmonary tuberculosis, moderately advanced; he was under his physician's care three times a week; the sickness prevented him from any work and left him a destitute; and his critical and deteriorated condition placed him in constant danger of death. These were compelling reasons of urgency or justice.

On the third issue, the Court found the computation not erroneous. The company, being in the best position to submit competent and trustworthy data, submitted none, apparently to obstruct the Court, and refused to comment on Cañete's data. The Court therefore considered Cañete's verified data correct. At an average of three hundred thirty-five working days a year, he would have worked more than one thousand five hundred eighty days, or more than two hundred twenty weeks, entitling him to the maximum of two hundred eight weeks. Sixty percent of his average weekly wage of thirty-two pesos and thirty centavos equals nineteen pesos and thirty-two centavos; multiplied by two hundred eight weeks, this equals four thousand eighteen pesos and fifty-six centavos, so he was entitled to the maximum of four thousand pesos.

Doctrine

Execution pending appeal lies in the sound discretion of the court. It issues upon motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, upon good reasons stated in a special order. A claimant's critical, deteriorating physical condition and destitution, placing him in constant danger of death, are compelling reasons of urgency or justice that justify immediate execution of a compensation award pending appeal. A party who withholds data within its control, and refuses to comment on the opposing party's verified data, cannot later complain that the computation is inaccurate; the court may treat the submitted data as correct.

Disposition

The Court granted Cañete's motion for execution pending appeal and ordered Ma-ao Sugar Central to pay him, without delay, the sum of four thousand pesos.

Remember This

Memorize this line: execution pending appeal requires a motion by the prevailing party with notice, and good reasons stated in a special order, and a dying claimant's urgent condition is such a good reason. Examiners use this case on execution pending appeal under Rule 39 and on the consequences of an employer's refusal to submit or comment on verified data in workmen's compensation proceedings.