MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. SINFOROSO CAÑETE, RESPONDENT.

On May 8, 1963
Sinforoso Cañete filed a claim for compensation for his sickness of pulmonary tuberculosis
with the regional office no. VII, Bacolod City (WCC Case 1286), against the
Ma-ao Sugar Central, a corpora­tion duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines, with principal offices at Ma-ao, Bago City, Negros
Occidental.  He alleged that he acquired
his sick­ness as a direct result of not only his employment with the
corporation as a locomotive brakeman and later as an operator thereof, but also
other odd jobs that he was required to perform. 
This claim was controverted by the corporation in its Employer’s Report
and Physician’s Re­port.

After due hearing, the acting referee of the said regional office
rendered a decision, holding that the claim is not compensable under the
Workmen’s Compensa­tion Act. Not satisfied with the decision, Cañete ele­vated
the case to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission for review (W.C. Case
R07-1286).

The Commission found that the claim is compensable under section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act
upon the theory of “aggravation of pre-existing illness”.  It likewise found that having controverted
the claim for compensation after the period required under section 45 of the
same Act, inspite of knowledge of the claimant’s illness as early as September 8,
1961, the corporation’ is deemed to have waived its right to contest the claim
for compensation; and that under section 14 likewise of the same Act, the
claimant is entitled to 60% of his average weekly wage for the period he was
disabled for work, from October 3, 1961, “when he stopped working and
became totally disabled, up to the present” (May 24, 1966), or a total of 1,676 days.  The Commission, there­fore, reversed the
decision of the regional office, and ordered the corporation (1) to pay Cañete
in lump sum the amount of P4,000 as compensation; (2) to provide him with such
further medical, surgical and hospital services and supplies as the nature of
his sickness may re­quire, until his tuberculosis shall have been arrested and
cured, pursuant to section 13 of the same Act; and (3) to pay the Workmen’s
Compensation Fund the amount of P41 as fees, pursuant to section 55 of the Act.

The corporation on August 1, 1966 appealed the decision to this Court after its motion for
reconsidera­tion thereof was denied by a resolution of the Commis­sion en
banc.  Before it could file a
petition for certiorari against
the Commission and Cañete,^[1]
the latter on August 20, 1966 moved
for the execution of item (1) above, alleging that because of his prsesent
critical and almost futile physical condition he might die any­time, and, if
compelled to await the final outcome of the appeal, might not be able to
receive, much less enjoy, the said award. 
The petitioner opposed the mo­tion on the grounds (1) that the appealed
decision faces “inevitable reversal”, since the decision itself
“negates causal connection between employment and sickness,” and in
that event the movant will have no way of reimbursing the petitioner for any
payment the latter may make pend­ing the appeal; (2) that the special reason
submitted by the claimant is not supported by competent evidence and exists
only in his imagination; and (3) that counsel for the petitioner is of the
belief that the claimant “will not die yet before the decision of this
Honorable Court * * * be handed down in due time.”

The motion for execution of the judgment pending appeal having
been denied on the ground that it does not contain sufficient verified precise
data on the actual number of days of disability during ring the period of his
regular seasonal work in the Ma-ao Sugar Central corresponding to the period
from October 3, 1961 up to May
24, 1966 when the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission was
promulgated, upon which to base an order of execution,^[2]
the claimant moved to have the resolution reconsidered, attaching to his motion
for reconsideration his affidavit of merit in support of his physical and eco­nomic
conditions, the affidavit of his personal physician, Dr. Napoleon A. Cordova,
and that of Lolina Sison in whose house he has stayed since he stopped working
with the cor­poration up to the present.

By resolution of October 20, 1966 we required Cañete to submit
verified data on the number of days that he ac­tually worked with the
petitioner during the years 1956 thru 1961, “specifying the number of days
of work corres­ponding to each of the years enumerated;” likewise required
him to serve a copy of said verified data to the petitioner, who, in turn, was
required to comment there­on within 15 days from receipt of the verified
data.  The petitioner filed an opposition
to the motion for recon­sideration, contending that the contents thereof are a
mere repetition of the averments of the claimant’s pre­vious motion for
execution which had already been denied. Raised in the same opposition is the
question of “inaccu­rate and erroneous computation of award”,
allegedly made by the Commission, in that the claimant is not entitled to receive compensation for the entire
period from August 31, 1961 to May 24,
1966 because the number of holidays embraced within the said period and the
number of off-milling days,
considering that the claimant worked only intermittently and during the milling
season, should have been deducted from the said period.

Cañete filed the required verified data on December 6, 1966. The petitioner on the
following December 27 asked for a 10-day extension within which to comment thereon, but this was
opposed by Cañete on the ground that such extension cannot be had, since the
15-day pe­riod within which the required comment should have been filed had
already expired,^[3]
and that the motion for ex­tension
is purposely dilatory.  On January 3, 1967 the petitioner filed a motion
with opposition, alleging that the data are “not actually verified”
as required by sec­tion 6, Rule 7, new Rules of Court, and for this
reason the period required in the Resolution of October 20,1966 had not yet lapsed for it “does not
commence to run as a logical consequence;” petitioner, therefore, argues
that it is excused from commenting on the data as re­quired.

Under section 2, Rule 39,
new Rules of Court, the issuance of an order for the execution of a
judgment pending appeal is within the sound discretion of the courts.  Aside from the power conferred on this Court
by section 10, Rule 43, of the
same Rules, governing the effect of an appeal from the Commission to this
Court, which provides that this Court may “direct otherwise upon such
terms as it may deem just,” it is conceded
that this court has authority to order
execu­tion pending appeal. (Velasco & Co. vs. Gochuico & Co., 28
Phil. 39, 43; see also 2 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court [1963 ed.]
p. 243, note 41.)

Said section 2 of Rule 39
provides that before the expiration of the time to appeal, or pending
appeal, exe­cution may issue, in the discretion of the court, on mo­tion of the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order.  Present in this case is the first requisite
that there must be a written motion by the prevailing party, with notice to the
adverse party.  The second requisite,
name­ly, that there exist “good reasons” for the issuance of the
order of execution pending appeal, is in issue, the petitioner contending that
no good reasons exist.

After a careful review of the pleadings, namely, the motion for
execution together with its an­nexes, the opposition thereto as well as the
supple­mental petition filed by the petitioner, the respond­ent Cañete’s motion
for reconsideration of our Reso­lution of September 20, 1966 and the annexes thereof, and of the opposition thereto,
together with the motion with opposition filed by the petitioner, we are more
than satisfied that there are indeed superior reasons and urgent circumstances
calling for the immediate exe­cution of the award of compensation pending appeal,
which far outweigh the
objections interposed by the petitioner.

We find that from October
3, 1961, when Cañete was ordered by the petitioner to stop working, he has been
afflicted with “active pulmonary tuberculosis, moderate­ly advanced;”
that he has been and is under the personal care of Dr. Napoleon A.
Cordova to whose office he has reported three times a week since then up to the
present; that said sickness has prevented him from performing any manner of
work and has left him a destitute; and that be­cause of his critical and
deteriorated physical condition he is in constant danger of death.

We are more than convinced that Cañete’s present phy­sical condition and situation in life
indeed are “compel­ling reasons of urgency or justice”^[4]
which justify imme­diate execution of the award of compensation.

The petitioner of course opposes the Commission’s award as being
“inaccurate and erroneous” allegedly on the ground that the holidays
and the off-milling periods when Cañete did not perform any work for the
company should have been deducted from the total number of days from August 31,
1961 to May 24, 1966.  On this point, we observe that the petitioner has
been rather uncoopera­tive.
Being in the best position to submit competent and trustworthy data on the
matter of the service of Caete, the petitioner has not submitted any,
apparently with intention of obstructing this Court in the per­formance of its
duties under the law.  That is not
all.  When required to comment on the
verified data submitted by Cañete, the petitioner, instead of submitting its
com­ment, merely contented itself in stating that the data submitted by Cañete
at the behest of this Court are not verified.

In this posture, this Court perforce must consider the pleadings
submitted by Cañete to this Court as correct and as providing a sufficient basis for the computation
of the compensation that the law entitles him to receive.  According to his verified data, Cañete worked
for an average of 335 days a year.  From
August 31, 1961 to May 24, 1966, at the rate of 335 working days a year, he
would have worked for more than 1,580 days or more than 220 weeks. Pursuant to
section 14 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, he is therefore
entitled to the maximum com­pensation
equivalent to a period of 208 weeks.

It is thus our view that the computation made by the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, upon the foregoing premises and tested on the basis of
the verified data submitted by Cañete, is not erroneous.  To paraphrase the Commission, sixty percentum
of Cañete’s average weekly wage of P32.30 equals P19.32.  This amount multiplied by 208 weeks equals
P4,018.56.  Cañete is therefore entitled
to the maximum compensation of P4,000 authorized by law.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion of the respondent Sinforoso Cañete
of August 15, 1966, for execution of item (1) of the dispositive portion of the
decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission of May 24, 1966, is hereby
grant­ed, and the petitioner Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. is hereby ordered to
pay the respondent Cañete, without delay, the sum of Four Thousand Pesos
(P4,000).

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

^[1]
The petition for certiorari, filed on August 25, 1966, was given due course under
Resolution dated September 1966.

^[2]
Resolution dated October 20, 1966.

^[3] The petitioner actually received the
verified data on December 5, 1966,
and, under Resolution of October 20, 1966, was required to comment thereon within 15 days from receipt thereof.

^[4]
Caragao, et al. vs. Maceren, et al., 92 Phil. 121, 124-125; see also De
Leon, et al. vs. Soriano, et al., 75 Phil. 806, 812-815.