CONCEPCION MOSCOSO AND GAUDIOSO CABRILLOS, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. LORENZO M. QUITCO, MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF VALLADOLID, NEG­ROS OCCIDENTAL, HON. JOSE F. FER­NANDEZ, JUDGE OF FIRST IN…

These two cases are inextricably related to each other, hence are
being resolved jointly.

On April 5, 1966, a
complaint was filed by Maria Luisa I. Vda. de Donato with the Court of Agrarian
Relations, Ba­colod Branch (CAR Case No. 3236) against five of her agri­cultural
share-tenants, two of whom are herein petitioners Concepcion Moscoso and Gaudioso Cabrillos.  In her complaint the plaintiff averred that
the defendants disobeyed her law­ful orders in connection with the stacking of
the palay harvests and exhibited
lack of loyalty and cooperation, and, with respect to defendants Moscoso and
Cabrillos, that they owed her 111 cavans and 90 cavans and 18 gantas of palay, respectively. 
It was accordingly prayed that all five de­fendants be ordered ejected
from their landholdings, and that the two above-mentioned defendants be ordered
to de­liver to the plaintiff the quantities of palay that they owed her.

A few months after the filing of the complaint, the parties
arrived at an amicable settlement, which was re­duced to writing and submitted
to the court for approval.  Under the
terms of the settlement, such matters relative to the sharing basis in the
produce; the system of trans­planting to be adopted, and the parties’
respective con­tributions in the expenses, were agreed upon.  The last paragraph of the agreement reads:

“8.  That
by virtue of this amicable settlement, we hereby renounce and waive all our
claims and counterclaims against the other in connection with this case, having
reference to our existing tenancy relationship.”

On November 24, 1966, the
court rendered judgment ap­proving the compromise agreement and adopting the
same as its decision.

Subsequently, the same plaintiff in the CAR case (Mrs. Donato)
filed with the Municipal Court of Valladolid, Neg­ros Occidental, two actions
against two of the defendants in the case, to wit:  on February 2, 1967, Civil Case No.102 against Concepcion Moscoso for the
collection of an indebt­edness of 94 cavans
and 20-1/2 gantas of palay, or their al­leged equivalent worth in cash of
P1,517.00; and on December 14, 1967, Civil Case No. 107 against
Gaudioso Cabrillos for the collection of an indebtedness of 97 cavans and 14-1/2 gantas of palay,
or their alleged equivalent worth in cash of
P2,146.76.  In each case the
plaintiff prayed for a writ of preliminary attachment, which writ was issued in
Civil Case No. 102 on November 2, 1967,
upon the plaintiff’s post­ing of a bond. 
In the meantime, or on February 25, 1967, the CAR issued a resolution in Case No. 3238, in
connection with certain motions filed by the plaintiff therein, stating that
paragraph 8 of the compromise
agreement quoted above was understood by the parties to mean that “[t]he
waiver of the claims and counterclaims of the parties, do not refer to any
indebtedness that anyone may have contracted with the other;” consequently, the
claims in relation to the al­leged indebtedness should be prosecuted in
separate actions for collection in the proper court, and not in the CAR, which
has no jurisdiction thereof.

The defendants in Civil Cases Nos. 102 and 107 then filed motions
to dismiss on the grounds that
in each case (a)
the cause of action is barred by
the judgment in CAR Case No. 3238,
and/or the claim has been
waived, aban­doned or otherwise extinguished; and (b) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject because the alleged loans or advances
arose from agrarian relations, hence, juris­diction is vested in the CAR.  The motions to dismiss were denied on
September 13, 1967 and January 9,
1968, respec­tively; so were the
defendants’ motions for reconsidera­tion in an order dated
January 12, 1968.  On
January 29, 1968, the defendants filed separate answers
with counter­claims; defendant Moscoso (in Civil Case No. 102) denied being
indebted to the plaintiff, and defendant Cabrillos (in Civil Case No. 107)
likewise denied that he was in­debted to the plaintiff, and stating that even
on the as­sumption that he was indebted, only the CAR has jurisdic­tion to try
the case in view of the tenancy relationship between him and the plaintiff.

Defendants Moscoso and Cabrillos then filed, on January 31, 1968, a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 8450) with the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental, asking that court to declare that the Municipal Court of
Valladolid, pre­sided over by respondent Judge Lorenzo M. Quitco, is without
jurisdiction to try and decide Civil Cases Nos. 102 and 107, and/or that the causes of action are barred by a prior judg­ment,
or that the claims or demands set forth in the com­plaints have been waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished.  On
February 14, 1968, Presiding
Judge Jose F. Fernandez of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
issued an order restraining the municipal judge from acting on the cases.  On February 26, 1968, on motion filed by the private respondent in the
special civil action, Judge Fernandez issued an order directing the petitioners
Moscoso and Cabrillos to deposit in a bonded warehouse their palsy shares of
the produce from private respondent’s land not otherwise exempt from execu­tion.  The petitioners moved for a reconsideration
of that order, but on March 3, 1968, the
motion was denied, the court explaining that it had to issue the order in the
interest of justice and in order to preserve the ownership of the land­lord’s
share, considering that the Municipal Court of Valla­dolid could not legally
take action on the case in view of the restraining
order previously issued against it.

For the first time in relation to Civil Cases Nos. 102 and 107, Moscoso and Cabrillos came to
this Court on March 21, 1968, on
a petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction (G.R. Nos.
L-28851-52), asking this Court to restrain the respondents therein, Judge
Fernandez and Maria Luisa I.
Vda. de Donato, from proceeding with the enforcement of the February 28, 1968
order directing the petitioners to deposit their palay shares, and to nullify
the said Order for want of jurisdiction on the
part of the suing
court.  On March 28, 1968, this Court denied
the pe­tition for lack of merit.  The
petitioners moved to recon­sider, but their motion was denied on May 7, 1968.

On July 31, 1968, the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental rendered judgment in its Civil Case No. 8450 dis­missing the petition for certiorari and prohibition on the
ground that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlo­cutory in nature,
hence, appeal in due time, not certiorari and prohibition, is the proper
remedy.  A motion for the reconsideration
of the decision was filed by the
petitioners, but the same was denied in the court’s order of August 15, 1968.

For the second time, Moscoso and Cabrillos came to this
Court.  On September 6, 1968, they filed the present
special civil action of certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. L-29486) alleging that Judge Fernandez exceeded his
jurisdiction when in his July 31, 1968 decision
he allowed respondent Municipal Judge Quitco to proceed with the trial and
determination of Civil Cases Nos. 102 and 107. 
According to the petitioners, this will only result in waste of judicial
time and prejudice to them, considering that the causes of action are barred by
a prior judgment, etc., and that the Municipal Court of Valla­dolid has no
jurisdiction over the subject of the actions. 
The petitioners prayed this Court for a writ of preliminary injunction,
and, on the merits, to set aside the decision of respondent Judge Fernandez and
declare the inferior court without jurisdiction to try the cases.  On October 11, 1968, this Court required the respondents to file an answer,
and, upon the posting of a bond by the petitioners, issued a writ of
preliminary injunction.  In due time
respondent Donato filed her answer claiming that respondent Judge Fernandez was
correct in holding that certiorari
is not the proper remedy to nullify an order denying a motion to dismiss, be­cause
such an order being interlocutory in character, an appeal from the decision on
the merits at the proper time is the correct remedy.  Both parties filed their respective
memoranda.

Subsequently, the record of Civil Case No. 8450 of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental was forwarded to this Court due to the notice of appeal filed
by petitioners Moscoso and Cabrillos on September 3, 1968.  For this reason,
this Court, in a resolution
dated February 17, 1969, directed that the same be given a separate folder and
number and re­quired the petitioners-appellants, who are litigating as paupers,
to file their briefs within the shortened period of twenty days and
respondents-appellees to file theirs within a like period, counted from their
receipt of copies of appellants’ briefs. 
This case was docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-30248.  The parties have
submitted their respective briefs. 
Actually, therefore, while G.R. Nos.
L-29486 and L-30248 have
been brought to this Court, on different modes, both of them refer to the same
subject matter.

The principal issues before this Court are whether the Municipal
Court of Valladolid has jurisdiction to try and decide Civil Cases Nos. 102 and
107, and, assuming that it has, whether the actions are barred by the prior
judgment in CAR Case No. 3238.

Petitioners Moscoso and Cabrillos naturally take the negative
view on the first issue, and the affirmative view on the second.  They claim that (a) under paragraph 8 of the compromise agreement which
was approved by the CAR and incorporated in its decision, the parties agreed to
re­nounce and waive their respective claims and counterclaims against each
other, which necessarily include respondent Donato’s claims for collection; and
(b) assuming that the petitioners are indebted to the said respondent, the
causes of action in Civil Cases Nos. 102 and 107 arose out of the special
relationship of landlord and tenant.

To resolve the issues, it is necessary to quote again the
ultimate paragraph of the compromise agreement, to wit:

“8.  That
by virtue of this amicable settlement, we hereby renounce and waive all our
claims and counterclaims against the other in connection with this case, having
reference to our existing tenancy relationship.”

Note the qualifying phrase “having
reference to our exist­ing tenancy relationship.” The parties having used
the phrase in the paragraph in question, they must be under­stood to have
attached thereto a specific meaning and pur­pose.  Article 2036
of the Civil Code provides that a com­promise “comprises only those
objects which are definitely stated therein, or which by necessary implication
from its terms should be deemed to have been included in the same.”

Our first duty, therefore, is, insofar as it is pos­sible, to ascertain
the objects comprised in the compro­mise agreement submitted to, and
subsequently approved by, the CAR.  The
complaint in the CAR case is for both the ejectment of the defendants and the
collection of certain palay advances allegedly made by the plaintiff to some
of’ them, particularly’ to petitioners Moscoso and Cabrillos.  There is no allegation therein that the
alleged advances were made in connection with the cultivation of the land­holdings.  On the other hand, the defendants’
counterclaims are for a change in the sharing basis, for a re-liquidation of
the harvests for the six immediately preceding agricultu­ral
years, and,
with specific reference to petitioner Cab­rillos, for the accounting of
harvests for two agricultural years.  The
plaintiff’s demand for ejectment and the defendants’ aforesaid counterclaims unquestionably stem from the agrarian
relations between the parties.  As we
have previously said, it does not appear from the complaint – neither does it
appear from the answer – whether the plaintiff’s claims for indebtedness have
any relation to the cultivation of the land­holdings.  Consequently, the phrase “having
reference to our existing tenancy relationship” clearly applies to the
plain­tiff’s demand for ejectment and to the defendants’ counter­claims.  The same, however, cannot be said of the
plaintiff’s claims for collection of loan advances, because, we repeat, the
pleadings, particularly the complaint, furnish no suffi­cient and helpful clue
on the matter.  It could be that the
claims for collection arose from agrarian relations, for which reason they were
included by the plaintiff in her complaint with the CAR, in which case the
Municipal Court of Valladolid would have no jurisdiction over Civil Cases Nos.
102 and 107.  The opposite, however,
could be true, and this precisely may have
been the object of the parties in including the above-quoted phrase in paragraph 8 of the compromise agreement.  In such event the inferior court would
have jurisdiction over the cases.

It thus becomes
imperative to determine whether the plain­tiff
in Civil Cases Nos. 102 and 107
really made loan advances to the defendants, as alleged by the plaintiff in her
complaints, and, if she did, whether
the extension
thereof was made in connection with the agrarian relations between the
parties.  These matters can only become known after the presentation of the evi­dence
during the trial on the merits.  If the
Municipal Court of Valladolid becomes satisfied,
after evaluating the evidence that will
be adduced before it, that loan advances were made by the plaintiff to the defendants in
connection with their agrarian relations,
then it should decide the cases by dismissing them for lack of jurisdiction.  Whatever action that court makes on the cases on their merits will, after
all, be appealable.  It would be advisable, therefore, should
the municipal court take pains to make of record in its judgment the pertinent facts on the basis of which it has assumed jurisdiction, so that if the matter is
elevated to the court of first instance on appeal, the latter court, on the
basis thereof, can conduct the neces­sary preliminary hearing on the
question-of jurisdiction, which will thereby be considerably expedited.  That, in effect, was our ruling in Derecho
vs. Abiera, et al., L-26697, July 31,
1970, where we said that when the factual question of existence of a
leasehold tenancy relation between the parties is raised, which if true, would
vest original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case in the court of agrarian
relations and not in the municipal court, it is essential for the court of
first instance to hold a preliminary hearing and receive evidence solely on the
facts that would show or disprove the existence
of the alleged lease­hold tenancy, so
that said court could determine whether or not it has jurisdiction.

Incidentally, the Municipal Court of Valladolid denied the
motions to dismiss merely on the basis of
the opinion expressed in the February 25, 1967
resolution of the CAR to the effect that the waiver of the claims and counterclaims did not refer to
any indebtedness that the parties might have contracted with each other.  The November 24, 1966 decision of the CAR was
based on a compromise agreement, hence,
it immediately became final and executory. 
The February 25, 1967 resolution could not, consequently, operate as a
modification or as an amendment of the judgment, and, for that reason,
could not be controlling on the issues raised before the municipal court.  The latter court should have deferred action
on the motions to dismiss, considering that on the basis of the complaint alone
it could not reasonably de­termine the question of jurisdiction.

On the other hand, the
petitioners appear to have taken certain erroneous procedural
steps.  In the first place, when the
municipal court denied their motions to dismiss, they filed a pe­tition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental.  As correctly held by
respondent Judge Fernandez, the order of denial is interlocutory in
character.  An order denying a motion to
dismiss may only be the subject of certiorari and prohibition where it clearly appears that the trial court is proceeding in excess or outside
of its jurisdiction (University of Santo Tomas vs. Villanueva, etc., et al.,
106 Phil., 439), which is not so in the present case.  In the second place, when respondent Judge
Fernandez dismissed the petition, the petitioners came to this Court on
certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No.
L-29486).  The proper remedy is appeal,
because, if at all, error in judgment, not abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, was committed by Judge Fernandez.  In the circumstances the petition must
fail.  As it turned out, however,
petitioners Moscoso and Cabrillos seasonably appealed from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, which is the reason why the
record of the case was forwarded to this Court (G.R. No. L-302481 For the
reason that the decision appealed from is correct, the appeal must likewise
fail.

Pending before this Court is a motion filed on April 7, 1970, by the
petitioners.  It will be recalled that
during the pendency of the certiorari and prohibition case in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, respondent Judge Fernandez, acting on a
motion filed by respondent Donato, issued an order on February 26, 1968,
directing the petitioners to deposit their palay shares in a bonded
warehouse.  The petitioners moved to re­consider,
but their motion was denied; so the palay shares were deposited as
ordered.  In their present motion the
petitioners question the legality of the order, and allege that “this is
now the second year that the said palay has been deposited and the possibility
cannot be escaped that the palay has rotted or in the process of rotting x x
x.” They pray this Court to declare the said order illegal and void, and
to order the release of 70% of the net produce as their shares for the crop
year 1967-68 now depo­sited with the Guadalupe Rice Mill – 71 cavans and 20
gantas for petitioner Moscoso, and 102 cavans for petitioner Cab­rillos.  Required to comment, the respondents allege
that the matter alluded to in the present motion was the subject of the
petition for certiorari filed with this Court on March 21, 1968 (G.R. Nos.
L-28851-52) which was dismissed for lack of merit.  This allegation of
respondents is true.  We are, however,
prone to grant the motion for the release of the petitioners’ shares on account
of the time element which now deserves primary consideration.  We feel that the risk of destruction of the
palay in question will become much greater because it will take some, more time
– the duration of which is wholly uncertain and indeterminable -before
the cases in the Municipal Court of Valladolid are finally decided and the
decision therein becomes final and executory, what with the appeals which the
losing party may reasonably be expected to interpose.  Anyhow, assuming that the petition­ers
eventually lose in the cases, the corresponding writs of execution will be
issued against them.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition in
G.R. No. L-29486 is denied, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
this Court is ordered dissolved.  The
judgment appealed from in G.R. No. L-30248 is affirmed, with the modification –
insofar as the February 26, 1968 Order is concerned – that the palay shares of
the petitioners-appellants now deposited with the Guadalupe Rice Mill are
hereby ordered released to them upon filing of a bond in the amount of P100.00
for petitioner Moscoso and P150.00 for
petitioner Cabrillos.  No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., on leave, did
not take part.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Castro, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., on official leave.

Zaldivar and Teehankee,
JJ., in the result.

Fernando, J., did not take
part.