JOSE S. RICO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS P. MORFE, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA AND ALCANTARA & SONS, INC., RESPONDENTS.

The present controversy is the direct offshoot of several orders
of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. XIII, Hon. Jesus P. Morfe, presiding) in its Civil Case No. 59000, as virtually
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its CA-G. R. No. 36722-R when it denied the
petition for a writ of certiorari to annul the questioned orders of the court a
quo, which orders would, in the meantime, prevent petitioner Jose S.
Rico from conducting logging operations within a 529-ha. tract of forest land
located in Kidapawan, Cotabato
and would also have the effect of temporarily setting aside the decision of
petitioning public officials adjusting the common boundary of the adjoining
license areas of private petitioner Rico and private respondent Alcantara & Sons, Inc. (ALSONS for short), the
contending timberland concessionaires. 
Owing to the fact that G. R. No L-25757 and G. R. No. L-25780 – although
separately brought before this Court by different parties – treat of the same
subject-matter, raise identical issues and pursue similar arguments,
petitioning public officials in G.R. No. L-25780, by resolution of this Court
adopted in said case on July 13 1964,
were allowed to adopt the brief and argument filed by private petitioner Jose
S. Rico in G.R. No. L-25757, as their own “except as to the issue on the
nullity of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 36722-R.”
For the same reason, this joint decision is rendered in both cases.

On November 13, 1964 ALSONS, holder of ordinary timber license
No. 1412 -‘63 for a tract of about 44,998 hectares of forest land and Kidapawan, Cotabato, filed before
the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 59000) against Salvador
Mariño, Jose Y. Feliciano, Apolonio
Rivera and Jose S. Rico as party respondents, the first three in their official
capa­cities as the then Executive Secretary, Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and Acting Director of Forestry, respectively, and the last
as the forest con­cessionaire directly benefited by the assailed decision of
the aforementioned public officials.

Primarily claiming that the decision of the Acting Director of
Forestry as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
by the Executive Secretary – establishing a new common boundary line be­tween
the adjacent forest concessions of ALSONS and Rico was rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction because it was arrived at
without prior investigation as required by section 6, of Forestry
Administrative Order No. 6-2, series of 1951,^[1]
ALSONS sought in the court below (a) to set aside the decision of the Director
of Forestry as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and by the Executive Secretary; (b) to restrain by writ of preliminary
injunction the enforcement of said decision and to prohibit Rico from entering
into and occupying the 529-ha. tract of forest land in question for the purpose
of conducting logging operations therein during the pendency
of the case; and (c) to allow ALSONS to exercise and enjoy its rights as the
licensee of the area in dispute by maintaining the common boundary line
reflected and specified in Rico’s ordinary timber license (No. 194-‘62) as the
true and permanent common boundary between the adjacent concessions.

On November 14, 1964, a day after ALSON S petition was filed,
respondent Judge issued an order – actually the first of his seven (7)
different orders now questioned before this Court – temporarily restraining
respondent public officials in said case from enforcing and executing assailed
decision, and at the same time setting the hearing of ALSONS’ application for a
writ of preliminary injunction on November 28 following.  By agreement of the parties the November 28
hearing was postponed to December 12,
1964 to enable them to prepare a consolidated sketch of the
timberlands concerned and thus facilitate gent consideration of the
matter.  On December 12 respond­ent judge
again issued an order emphasizing that:

“x x x
pending resolution of the application for preliminary injunction, the status
quo be maintained in the sense that both parties, through their repre­sentatives,
may be allowed to inspect from time to time the area in conflict, without
performing logging operations over the area in controversy.

Upon agreement of the parties, the Court clarifies, for the
information of the government offices concerned, that the temporary restraining
order issued in the instant case does not prohibit the renewal or modification
of the licenses already at present enjoyed by either or both of the parties,
provided that future renewals or modi­fications of the licenses shall not
affect the area in controversy.”

After several protracted hearings designed to give the main
contending parties sufficient time to finalize a partial stipulation of facts
with respect to ALSONS’ application for preliminary injunction, respond­ent
Judge issued the writ asked for on April 5, 1964, restraining the respondent
government officials from enforcing and executing the decision of the Director
of Forestry as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources;
and (b) restraining private respondent (now private petitioner) Rico, his
agents or representa­tives, from conducting logging operations within the
disputed area until further orders of said court.  Rico and the government officials concerned
jointly moved for reconsideration of the order granting the writ of pre­liminary
injunction, but the motion was denied on June 25, 1965.  A
second motion for reconsideration met the same fate on August 16, 1965. 
Rico then moved for the lifting or dissolution of the preliminary
injunction, reasoning that its continued maintenance may compel him to stop
logging operations.  This was also denied
on September 28, 1965, the
court pointing out that the disputed 529-hectare area could hardly affect
Rico’s over-all operations since the remaining total operable area covered by
his timber license was 4,279 hectares.

On November 16, 1965 ALSONS filed a “motion for ground
verification” of the areas involved in the con­troversy, specifically the
areas originally granted Rico under O.T. No. 74-’61 and the additional area
granted him as incorporated in O.T. No. 194-’62, to ascertain or verify the
accuracy of the descriptions stated in said licenses.  But before the trial court could resolve the
aforementioned motion Rico and the government officials enjoined by the court
below instituted in the Court of Appeals on November 22, 1965 a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with writ of preliminary injunc­tion.  The grounds relied upon in support of their
petition, as stated therein, are as follows:

“5.  The aforementioned orders of respondent Judge
in Civil Case No. 59000 were promulgated by him without or in excess of his
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion, hence unlawful and void ab initio from
which there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law; causing great and irreparable damages to respond­ent Jose S. Rico
(petitioner herein).  The absence of
jurisdiction and/or pre­sence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge could be gleaned from his refusal to dismiss the petition and
giving due course to the same and issuing a writ of preliminary injunction (in
spite of repeated moves on the part of respondents in Civil Case No. 59000
showing said Judge has no juris­diction and that the petition therein does not
state a cause of action) when there is no legal justification for said Judge to
entertain Civil Case No. 59000 because –

a –   what is involved there­in is the issuance of
timber licenses and the determination of the boundaries of the areas covered by
such timber licenses, functions that are purely administrative and highly
discretionary in charac­ter, hence beyond the pale of judicial review;

b –   the determination made by the administrative
authorities respecting the boundary of timber conces­sions they have granted in­volving
as it does questions of fact, is final in nature, unappealable
to the courts; and

c. –  the petition in said case obviously does not
state a cause of action because the acts of the administrative officials in
issuing the timber licenses of C. Alcantara &
Sons, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as RICO for brevity) and, in subsequently
defining the boundary between the two con­cessions were official actions
performed in accordance with law and sound discretion so that therefore
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus as prayed for in that case will not lie,
there being no lack of jurisdiction nor abuse of discretion in the performance
of those administrative actions.”

On November 24, 1965
the Court of Appeals issued a resolution granting the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for in the petition. 
Two days thereafter, or on November
26, 1965, the writ itself was issued; the pertinent portion of
which reads:

“AND, it is hereby ordered that you, respondent Judge, refrain
from proceeding with Civil Case No. 59000 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, entitled C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc. vs.
Jose S. Rico et al. and from enforcing your orders dated November
14, 1964, April 5, 1965, June 25, 1965 and August 16, 1965, in said civil case,
x x x UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS
FROM THIS COURT.”

On the strength of this writ Rico filed in the trial court an
opposition to ALSONS motion for ground verifica­tion and the trial court, on December 17, 1965, issued an order
understandably holding in abeyance action on said motion and opposition during
the affectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of
Appeals.

On January 26, 1966
the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G. R. No. 36722-R, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of certiorari is hereby
denied for lack of merit, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this
Court on November 26,1965,
is ordered lifted and dissolved, with costs against petitioner Jose S.
Rico.”

Three days thereafter, or on January 29, 1966, upon learning that
Rico was about to export the logs that he had cut and removed from the disputed
area during the pendency of the case in the Court of
Appeals, ALSONS filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila an “urgent ex–parte motion for the issuance of an order to compel
the Director of Forestry to recall his telegram allowing the exportation of
logs cut from the disputed forestry area and to send another directive stopping
the exportation of said logs.” It later turned out that upon the issuance
by the Court of Appeals of the writ of preliminary injunction on November 26, 1965 Rico immediately
commenced logging operations in the disputed area upon the theory that the writ
of pre­liminary injunction issued by the appellate court operated to prohibit
the enforcement of the writ issued by the trial court.  Said theory appears to have been shared by
the Director of Forestry as evident from the text of the tele­gram he sent to
the Forestry Regional Director in Davao
City on January 27, 1966 upon being notified of the Court
of Appeals’ decision.  Said telegram
reads:

“FORESTRY REGIONALDIRECTOR

DISTRICT FORESTER

DAVAO
CITY

Court of Appeals lifted its injunction
making Court of First Instance Injunction operative so that you immediately
stop Rico from further cutting inside the conflicted area with Alsons Period Logs already cut therefrom
be allowed exportation provided same are duly paid of all forest and government
charges properly accounted for record and considera­tion in disposing Civil Case.”

On January 31, 1966 the trial court – reasoning that the Court of
Appeals’ injunction merely restrained it from enforcing its orders but did not
suspend, much less lift, the trial court’s writ of preliminary injunction –
ordered the Director of Forestry to recall his telegram of January 27, 1966 and
in its stead send another telegram to the Regional Director to prevent Rico
from exporting the logs cut from the disputed area and instead take possession
and custody of the same.  The next day
the Director of Forestry moved to reconsider this order and at the same time,
together with the other petitioners, filed a motion for clarification with the
Court of Appeals, which ALSONS opposed. 
But before the motion for clarification could be resolved, Rico submitted
to the Court of Appeals, on February 4,
1966 an “ex–parte
motion for authority to ship cut logs for export and for issuance of restrain­ing
order,” advancing the following reasons in support thereof.

“5.  That sometime in November 1965 and after this
Honorable Court has issued its Resolution on November 26, petitioner Jose S.
Rico cut logs in the appropriate quantity of 3,000 to 3,500 cu. m. (this
representing corrected estimate quantity submitted in previous pleading) which
has an estimated market gross value of P250,000.00 to P300,000.00 and that
the said logs are now ready for shipment and for ex­portation and which is
covered by firm commitments with foreign buyers; that out of this gross
market value of the said cut logs, there is reasonable and ordinary expectation
of realized net profit of from P50,000.00 to P70,000.00;

 6.   That
under the aforesaid ship­ment commitment with the shipping company for the
carriage of these cut logs, petitioner Jose S. Rico is subject to a liability
for demurrage of $800.00 (U.S.) per day and which constitutes a con­tinuing
liability of said petitioner in favor of the shipping company arising from
delay; that under the said ship­ping commitment, petitioner Jose S. Rico will
also incur other and additional liability for dead freight in the event that
shipment cannot and will not be effected;

 7.  That
government revenue in the form of forest charges and other fees from and out of
this estimated quantity of cut logs should shipment be accom­plished is
approximately P17,000.00 to P20,000.00 exclusive of income taxes; that aside
from this probable loss of government revenue, the cut logs, if not shipped,
will rot and suffer other damages affecting adversely its market value;

On the same day the Court of Appeals
issued a resolution granting Rico’s motion for authority to export the already
cut logs upon filing of a P200,000.00 bond. 
A date of hearing was set to entertain objections, if any, to the formal
approval of the bond filed.

On February 8, 1966
ALSONS filed with the trial court a motion to declare Rico in contempt for his
alleged disobedience to that court’s injunction to refrain from conducting
logging operations in the disputed area. 
The next day ALSONS formally informed the Court of Appeals that Rico had
already exported logs aboard the M/S ENOURA MARU although the bond required of
him had not yet been approved; and in a separate motion ALSONS prayed for a
separate order direct­ing the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to
cancel Rico’s O.T. No. 4-44-63069 for violating the administrative injunction
contained therein which cautioned the licensee (Rico) not to operate
“within the area in conflict with C. Alcantara
& Sons, Inc. until the final disposition of said case and that failure to
comply herewith shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation or non-renewal
of this license.” On the same date, February
9, 1966, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution denying both
the motion for clarification and the motion for authority to export the logs
which had been provisionally granted on February
4, 1966.  Rico’s urgent
motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied on February 22, 1966.

Meanwhile, respondent Judge issued an order on February 11, 1966
(a) citing Rico to appear before the trial court on February 28, 1966 to show
cause and produce evidence why he should not be punished for con­tempt; (b)
ordering his arrest and detention unless he filed a bond of P600.00 to assure
his appearance in the hearing for contempt; and (c) ordering him to return within
7 days the 925 lauan logs he had shipped to
Japan or in lieu thereof to deposit the proceeds of the sale thereof with the
court.  On February 18 and 24, 1966
ALSONS separately moved to declare counsel of the Director of Forestry and the
Director of Forestry himself in contempt; the former for his alleged
unwarranted partiality towards Rico, which movant
claimed had morally helped Rico succeed in shipping the illegally cut logs, and
the latter for his failure to take posses­sion of the logs in question pursuant
to the January 31, 1966 order of the trial court.

At the hearing on February 28 of ALSONS’ motions to declare the
above-mentioned parties in contempt, the trial court deemed it proper to
suspend consideration of the same until its receipt of a written report from
the commission it created to make an inventory of the number of trees felled in
the disputed area.  Thereafter the trial
court did not have the chance anymore to proceed with the case below because petitioner
Jose S. Rico, in a twin move on March
2, 1966, submitted to the trial court his explanation with respect
to the shipment of logs and at the same time instituted G. R. No. L-25757
before this Court.  Less than a week
later, petitioning public off­icials commenced a similar suit of their own on March 6, 1966, docketed as G. R. No.
L-25780.  Although both peti­tions are
peculiarly styled as an “appeal by certiorari and/or petition for
certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction,” thus
prompting respondents to express doubt as to their regularity, we find it
unnecessary to discuss extensively the procedural point raised inasmuch as
whether we deal with the proceeding before us as one for review on certiorari
of the deci­sion of the Court of Appeals or as an original petition for
certiorari and prohibition against the orders of the trial court the result
would be the same:  we have to rule on
the propriety of the assailed orders and on the jurisdiction of respondent
Judge to issue them.

Both petitions contain similar prayers for relief:  (a) that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining respondent Judge and respondent Court of Appeals “from
continuing with any of the abovementioned incidents relative to the case at bar;
and (b) that, after hearing, the writ of preliminary injunc­tion sought be made
permanent and the orders of respondent Judge dated November 14, 1964 (issuing
the temporary restraining order); April 5, 1965 (issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction); June 25, 1965 (denying the motion for reconsideration
are the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction); August 16, 1965
(denying the second motion for reconsideration); September 28,1965 (denying the
motion to lift or dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction); January 31,
1966 (requiring the Director of Forestry to recall his telegram allowing
exportation of the logs already cut from the disputed area); and February 24,
1966 (setting the date of hear­ing re the contempt charge against counsel of
the Director of Forestry and re ALSONS’ motion for the detention of Rico) be
set aside and declared null and void.” With respect to the case filed earlier,
G. R. No. L-25757, we issued on March 3, 1966 a temporary restrain­ing order
effective up to the 9th of that month to stop: 
“(1) the Court of Appeals from executing or enforcing the decision
dated January 26, 1466 in CA-G. R. No. 36722-R (Acting Executive Secretary, et
al. vs. Hon Jesus P. Morfe, etc., et al.); (2)
respondent Judge Jesus P. Morfe from further
proceeding, and from enforcing any and all orders as well as the writ of
preliminary injunction issued on April 5, 1965,in Civil Case No. 59000 (C. Alcantata & Sons, Inc. vs. Jose S. Rico, et al.) of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII; and (3) respondent C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc. and other respondents, their
agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons or person acting upon
the orders of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila from en­forcing
said writ of preliminary injunction dated April 5, 1965, as well as any other
orders in said Civil Case No. 59000; provided the herein petitioner makes no
other exportation of logs, subject matter of Civil Case No. 59000 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, until further notice.” The restraining order
was of course effective also with respect to the other case, (G. R. No.
L-25780) although it was filed later, since the same acts and orders are
involved in both cases.

On March 8, 1966, the date set for the hearing of the application
for a writ of preliminary injunction, this Court resolved “x x x to ratify the temporary
restraining order hereinbefore issued and convert it into a writ of preliminary
injunction, with the addition that petitioner (Rico) may export logs already
cut upon the filing of a bond of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00);
provided, however, that in the meantime, petitioner shall refrain from cutting
logs in the place, until further orders from this Court.” On March 16, 1966 ALSONS moved to
reconsider that portion of the resolution which authorized Rico to export the
logs he had cut from the disputed area upon the filing of a bond.  On April
20, 1966 this Court denied the motion for reconsideration.

The primary issue here is whether respondent Judge acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance of Civil Case No. 59000 and in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunc­tion therein.  This issue would be
better understood in the light of the events that transpired prior to the ins­titution
of the petition below.

On June 6, 1960
Rico was awarded a forest con­cession in Kidapawan, Cotabato, with an approximate area of about 4,270
hectares.  This concession was ini­tially
covered by Ordinary Timber License No. 74-61. 
A subsequent metric check of the area awarded subsequent­ly showed that
only 2,625 hectares constituted the forested portion; hence on November 8 of
the same year Rico applied for an additional area of about 500 hectares.  Since under existing administrative
regulations immediate grant of the additional area applied for was not feasible
because at the time of the application Rico’s original license was barely ten
days old, it was not until August 23, 1961, when his license was renewed under
O.T. No. 194-’62, that the technical description of the original area was
amended in order to include an adjacent vacant area (of about 710 hectares) to
the north and northeast of the area previously granted.  On January 3, 1962 O.T. No. 194-’62 was
further amended so as to incorporate an additional area, this time located
south.

Meanwhile, as early as March 14, 1961 O.T. No. 1412-’63 (new) was
issued in favor of ALSONS, covering an area of 44,998 hectares.  According to the technical description of
said license area, it had a common corner with Rico’s O.T. No. 194-’62 issued
on August 23, 1961.  The ensuing conflict as to the exact location
of the common corner from which a boundary line between the adjacent
concessions may be established was the prin­cipal cause of the instant
controversy.

Petitioner Rico’s version of the events leading to the boundary
controversy culminating in the filing of the case below is as follows:

“On August 23, 1961,
Rico’s License O.T. License No. 74-’61 was renewed under O.T. No. 194-’62, but
the technical des­cription of the area covered by the first license was amended
in the latter in order to include the additional 529 hectares applied for and
approved.  x x x

Prior thereto, Alsons had asked for a
ground verification of the technical description of its license.  Said veri­fication was undertaken by Forester
Artemio Genio, who used
timber inventory Map No. 569/4, x x x According to Genio, FZ Corner
135, mentioned in the license of Alsons and Rico,
corresponds to a Narrig tree 70 centimeters in
diameter with chiselled mark L.C. 569/4.  This Narrig tree
was mentioned for the first time by Forester Genio in
his report dated July 26, 1961,
and is a natural monument pursuant to the timber in­ventory map used by
him.  On the other hand, Forester Bacena, who used the compilation map of L.C. Project 42
A-3, made no reference to any existing natural monument corresponding to FZ
Corner 135 x x x.  Genio’s findings
which did not dovetail with that of Bacena had the
effect of creating a buffer area of some 529 hectares, which is the one in dispute.

With a view to resolving the same, the Director of Forestry
designated Scaler Romulo R.
Valerio to conduct an ‘on-the-spot’ investigation in
the presence of the representatives of Alsons and
Rico.  After making a ground
verification, Scaler Valerio
established a line and laid down a common boundary of the two adjacent
concessions.  Ac­cording to this report
dated October 15, 1961,
the representatives of both parties, who were then present, had agreed on the
line thus established and on the corner laid out on the ground, as well as on
making it the basis of the re-amendment of the technical description of the
adjacent areas.

However, in a letter to the Director of Forestry dated November 21, 1961, Alsons rejected the common boundary thus agreed upon.

Despite Alsons‘ aforementioned letter,
the technical description of Rico’s License O.T. No. 194-’62 was altered on
January 3, 1962, in accordance with Valerio’s report
to conform with said common boundary line. 
However, Alsons‘ O.T. License No. 1412-’63 was
not amended in accordance there­with.

When Rico discovered that the technical description of his license
had thus been altered, on July 19, 1962, he filed with the Director of Forestry
a protest against such alteration.  On
October 9, 1962, Alsons, in turn, complained to said
officer against an alleged encroachment on his (Alsons‘)
concession by Rico.  Hence, the Director
of Forestry instructed Forester Juan to make a thorough study of the surveys
and investiga­tions conducted by several foresters.  Later Forester Juan submitted a memorandum on
the result of said study.  On the basis
there­of, the Director of Forestry rendered a deci­sion, dated October 18,
1962, declaring that the true boundary line between Alsons
and Rico is that indicated by the bearing and distances given in the technical
description of the licenses of Alsons and Rico x x x

The foregoing decision, in effect, sustained the ground location of
FZ Corner 135 made by Foresters Bacena and Bandala in the sketch map attached to said decision, as
against the ground location made by Forester Genio.”
(Petitioner Rico’s brief, pp. 8-17)

Respondent ALSONS’ presentation of the same events varies from
that of Rico and alleges several items of note which are entirely absent in
Rico’s version.  Thus ALSONS stated:

“The boundary controversy between ALSONS and Rico first
occurred in 1961.  It was brought about
by their disagreement as to the true location of FZ Corner 135.  Scaler Valerio, as directed, con­ducted a ground survey of the controverted boundary in the presence of the duly
authorized representatives of ALSONS and Rico. 
A proposed common boundary line for the conflicting concessions was es­tablished
and laid on the ground by Valerio together with the
duly authorized representatives of the parties who agreed to adopt and make
said line as the common boundary of the conflicting conces­sion.  Valerio recommended
the approval of that agreement.  His
recommendation was approved, not only by the Bureau of Forestry, but also by
the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Implementation of Valerio’s
recommendation was made in Rico’s O.T. No. 194-’62, which was amended on
January 3, 1962, whereby not only was his area increased from 3,335 to 4,008
hectares, or an addition of 673 hectares, but that the common boundary line for
the conflict­ing concessions recommended by Valerio
was clearly reflected and indicated therein. 
Rico accepted his O.T. No. 194-’62, as amended, and peace settled
between him and ALSONS.  All went well
until after the lapse of more than six months. 
On July 19, 1962, Rico, in a letter to the Director of Forestry, sought
a resurrec­tion of the controversy by asking a re-amendment of his area.  He did not even furnish ALSONS with a copy of
that letter.

Because Rico went beyond the common boundary established by Valerio, ALSONS in a letter dated October 8, 1962, to the
Bureau of Forestry presented a formal protest against Rico’s encroachment.  Without giving ALSONS a chance to be heard on
its protest, the Bureau on October 18, 1962, or only ten (10) days after the
date of ALSONS’ protest, rendered a decision, x x x which if given effect will do away with the common
boundary line es­tablished and laid on the ground by Valerio
and deprive ALSONS of a 529-hectare portion of his licensed area.

To repeat, the original boundary con­troversy was already settled
by the Valerio ground survey.  Had Rico not asked for the further amendment
of his O.T. No. 194-’62 on July 19, 1962, the present controversy would not
have come to life.  The original boundary
controversy therefore should not be confused with the present controversy.  While it is true that an investigation of the
boundary conflict between ALSONS and Rico was conducted by Scaler
Valerio, where the parties were given the opportunity
to be heard, that investigation was about the original con­troversy which has
settled and decided by the approval and implementation of the investigator’s
recommendation.  Of the present
controversy, which was brought about by Rico’s act to resurrect the original
controversy that was settled by Valerio’s
investigation, no investigation where the parties were given the opportunity to
be heard was made.

It is precisely because the Bureau’s decision of October 18, 1962,
failed to take into consideration the fact that Valerio
already made a ground survey of the con­flicted boundary, which was caused by
the disagreement of the disputants as to the true location of FZ Corner 135,
and that the recommendation, establishing a common boundary line of the
conflicting con­cessions, was earlier approved and implemented by the Bureau of
Forestry and the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources on January 3,
1962, that this representation contends that the Bureau’s decision of October
18, 1962, is illegal.  If this decision
will be enforced, the common boundary line recommended by Valerio
as already ap­proved, and implemented, will necessarily be modified and ALSONS,
as a consequence, will be deprived of a 529-hectare por­tion of its licensed
area.” (Respondent ALSONS’ brief, pp. 67-70)

Plainly, the conflicting versions by the private contending
parties are matters which can and ought to be finally resolved only after a
hearing on the merits.  It is true that
as a general rule findings of fact by ad­ministrative officers in matters
falling within their competence will not be reviewed by the courts, except in
cases of clear, manifest and grave abuse of discre­tion, amounting to want or
excess of jurisdiction.  This point,
however, is not relevant to the question of jurisdiction of the courts in
petitions for review or for certiorari and/or prohibition properly brought
before them, but only to the correctness of their actuations should they set
aside the administrative findings upon grounds other than that above
stated.  A proper hear­ing on the merits
to test the correctness of the ad­ministrative decision within the limits thus
laid down for judicial inquiry can hardly be considered fatal to such
jurisdiction.  That courts will not
ordinarily review and overturn the facts found by the administrative authority
does not mean that they cannot take cognizance of the case at all.

In the present case the merits of the basic con­troversy have not
yet been fully ventilated before respondent Judge.  He has merely issued a writ of pre­liminary
injunction, after hearing the parties on that specific question of whether or
not it should issue.  And respondent
Judge ordered the issuance of the injunction on the ground that there was a prima
facie showing that respondent ALSONS had been denied due process in
connection with the administrative decision assailed before him.  His Honor said:

“It was, therefore, necessary that actual investigation
pursuant to FAO No. 6-2 of July 1, 1962 be made for the settlement of their
original dispute so as to determine, after investigation of the location of the
disputed Forest Zone Corner 135 mentioned in the descriptions of the licensed
areas of the dis­putants, the correct boundary line be­tween the two licensed
areas.  This would have settled
definitely this dispute, as the parties are agree on how to determine Forest
Zone Corner 135 which, according to RICO, is ‘identical to a tree belonging to
the mili????? family, 70 centimeters in diameters
along a cutline with an (X) mark and the figure chiselled in it 569/4′ (par. (a), supra.) and which,
according to a description cited with approval by ALSONS is ‘cor. 12, identical to Forest Zone 135 or T.I. 569/4 chi­selled on a Narig tree 70 cms. in diameter (see 3d par. of Annex ‘P’, Partial Stipula­tion
of Facts).  No investigation pursuant to
FAO No. 6-2 vas made.  On the contrary,
the Office of the President ignored ALSON’S motion (Annex E to petition) for
ground veri­fication.

Under the due process clause of the Constitution of our Republic,
the boundary dispute between RICO and ALSONS may law­fully be decided only
after investigation pursuant to the duly prescribed procedure, that in, in the
instant ease, pursuant to FAO No. 6-2 of July-1, 1962.  To decide said dispute in any other way, oven
in the best of intentions, unless by agreement of both parties to the dispute,
would be contrary to law end therefore would amount to an abuse of discretion reviewable by this Court.

In the light of the undisputed facts set out above, in relation to
petitioner’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction, this Court finds
prima facie that FAO No. 6-2 of July 1, 1962 was violated and the
decisions of the respondent off­icials are prima facie null and
void because apparently rendered without due process of law.”

The reasons for the issuance of the preliminary injunction were
further clarified by respondent Judge in his subsequent order of June 25, 1965,
denying herein petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.  Thus:

“Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6 of FAO No. 6-2,
and in spite of the fact that a ground investigation after notice to the
parties affected is not only feasible but would have con­clusively settled the
boundary dispute between ALSONS AND RICO, the respondent officials rendered the
decisions now under review without the ground verification or investigation
required by Section 6 of FAO No. 6-2. 
The respondents claim ex­ception from the requirement of a ground
investigation because previous investigations were allegedly made and thus
rendered unnecessary a ground investiga­tion; but there does not appear to have
ever been made any previous ground inves­tigation with prior notice to the
parties as required in Section 6 of FAO No. 6-2, for the only tine when
representatives of the parties were called regarding this matter was on October
9, 1961 and October 11 and 12, 1961 when Bureau of Forestry Scaler
Romulo B. Valerio fixed the
boundary line between the licensed areas of the parties by their agreement and
not as a result of ground investigation and hearing of the parties pursuant to
Section 6 of FAO No. 6-2 (Annex K, Partial Stipulation of Facts); but said
agreement, implemented by the respondent Director of Forestry in his letter of
January 3, 1962 to respondent RICO (Annex N., Partial Stipulation of Facts),
was repudiated by respondent RICO in his letter of July 19, 1962 to respondent
Director of Forestry (Annex O, Partial Stipulation of Facts), prompt­ing
petitioner ALSONS to protest against fixing any new boundary line affecting his
licensed area (Annex P. Partial Stipulation of Facts).  The administrative decisions under review
fixes the disputed boundary line be­tween the rival licensed areas without
ground investigation provided in Section 6 of FAO No. 6-2, and apparently
without the report called for in Section 7 of FAO No. 6-2.”

We are not prepared to find at this stage that respondent trial
court is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case at all, or that it
gravely abused its discretion in ordering the issuance of the writ of
injunction complained of.  Rico’s
opposition to the injunction, mainly on the ground that the matters involved
are purely administrative and discretionary in nature, is at best not
indubitable, and the court’s ac­tuation does not constitute undue interference
with administrative proceedings.  The
injunction has not overturned the administrative decision, it has merely
ordered the disputed area to be off-limits to either of the contending license
holders during the pendency of the case.  In other words, what has been enjoined is
only the use and exploitation of the contested area until the boundary dispute
can be decided.

The foregoing considerations remove this case from the ambit of
our decision in Suarez vs. Hon. Andres Reyes (G. R. No. L-19828, Feb. 28,
1963).  In that case the preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court tended to disturb the status quo
between the contending timber licensees and, indeed, even to maintain in effect
the temporary timber license of respondent therein after it had already expired
and after the logging operations thereunder had been
ordered stopped by the Director of Forestry pursuant to a directive of the
President.  In the present case, however,
the injunction of respondent Judge was precisely for the maintenance of the status
quo while the case is pending.  In
our view, therefore, the injunction was not improvidently issued.

The next question is whether Rico may be held to, answer a charge
of contempt of the trial court in conduct­ing logging operations within the
disputed area during the pendency of the case in the
Court of Appeals.  Both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals were of the opinion that the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the latter court on November 28, 1965 did not have the
effect of suspending the effectivity of the writ
issued by the trial court.  The clear
terms of the said appellate court’s injunction, however, was for respondent
Judge to refrain from enforcing, among others, his order of April 5, 1965.  Since it was this particular order which
directed the issuance of the writ that was actually issued on the following
April 8, Rico had good reason to believe that by enjoining the enforcement of
the basic order the Court of Appeals likewise enjoined the enforcement of the
writ itself.  For as Rico points
out:  “Of what use would it be to
pro­hibit the enforcement and execution of the order of April 5, 1965, if the
writ issued pursuant thereto would be en­forced and carried into effect?  To construe that the in­junction of the Court
of Appeals restrained the enforcement of said order of April 5, but not that of
the writ of April would render said injunction meaningless. . .”

We find, therefore, that when Rico conducted logging operations
in the disputed area after the issuance of the appellate court’s injunction he
did not do so in contempt of the trial court, and further proceedings therein
in this respect should be stopped.

Petitioner Rico questions the validity of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 36722-R on the ground that the Special Fifth
Division which rendered it, composed of Justices Antonio Cañizares,
Francisco Capis­trano and Jose Rodriguez, was not the Division to which the
case properly belonged, and that it was Justice Nicasio
Yatco, instead of Justice Rodriguez who should have
taken part in deciding the case, together with the other two Justices.  We do not consider this point of any vital im­portance,
considering that essentially what is before us for review is not the decision
of the Court of Appeals but the different orders of respondent Judge of First
Instance in the case pending before him (Civil Case No. 59000).  And whatever may be said of the said decision
would not affect, one way or the other, the findings and conclusions we have arrived
at.

On October 7, 1970, respondent ALSONS filed a motion to declare
petitioner Rico in contempt of this Court for having allegedly cut at least 34
logs inside the disputed area, in violation of the preliminary injunction we
issued on March 8, 1966, according to a report of Forest Guard Gregorio L. Canlas dated August 30, 1970.  Rico answered the motion on October 20, 1970,
attaching a subsequent report of the sane Gregorio L. Canlas
to the effect that upon verification made by him and by a number of Constabulary
officers on September 10, 1970 it was found that no logging operations had been
conducted by the petitioner in the disputed area.  The motion for contempt is therefore without
basis.

Wherefore, the petitions in these two cases are denied,
and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is dissolved,
except as to the part thereof relating to the charge of contempt in the lower
court against petitioner Rico and against counsel for the Director of Forestry,
as to which the said injunction is hereby made final.  Costs against petitioner Rico.

Reyes, J.B.L., Acting C.J., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Fernando and Barredo, JJ., did not take
part.

Concepcion, C.J., on leave.

^[1]
Section 6 of Forestry Administrative Order No. 6-2, series of 1941 reads:

“6.  Investigation conflicts.  – Adverse claims when properly asserted and
reports of conflicts received within the time specified in the next preceding
section, shall be caused to be investigated, if this has not yet been done, by
the Director of Forestry.  The
investigation shall be made whenever possible on the very ground and after both
parties have been advised of the hour and date when the place where it will be
held, and of the nature of the case.  The
notice of the investigation shall be served upon them at least one week before
the date set for the investiga­tion.