AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (GASTON GROUP), PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND AIR LINES PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (GOMEZ GROUP…

These are two petitions for certiorari (L-33705 and
L-35206), consolidated for purposes of decision because they involve more or
less the same parties and interlocking issues.

In L-33705 the petitioner Air Line Pilots Association of
the Philippines (Gaston group) maintains that the Court of Industrial Relations
acted without jurisdiction in passing upon (1) the question of which, in a
certification proceeding, between the set of officers elected by the group of
Philippine Air Lines pilots headed by Captain Felix Gaston, on the one hand,
and the set of officers elected by the group headed by Captain Ben Hur Gomez, on the other, is the duly elected set of
officers of the Air Line Pilots Association of the Philippines, and (2) the
question of which, between the two groups, is entitled to the name, office and
funds of the said Association.

In L-35206 the individual petitioners (numbering 127) and
the Air Line Pilots Association of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as ALPAP) (Gaston) maintain that the industrial court acted
without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating its
resolution dated June 19, 1972 which suspended the hearing of the said
petitioners’ plea below for reinstatement and/or return to work in the
Philippine Air Lines (hereinafter referred to as PAL) or, alternatively, the
payment of their retirement and/or separation pay, as the case may be, until
this Court shall have decided L-33705.

L-33705

On January 2, 1971, the Air Line Pilots Association of the
Philippines, represented by Ben Hur Gomez who claimed
to be its President, filed a petition with the Court of Indus­trial Relations
praying for certification as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining
representative of “all the pilots now under employment by the Philippine
Air Lines, Inc. and are on active flight and/or operational assignments.”
The petition which was docketed in the sala of Judge
Joaquin M. Salvador as Case 2939-MC was opposed in the name of the same
association by Felix C. Gaston (who also claimed to be its President) on the
ground that the industrial court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the petition “because a certification proceeding in the Court of
Industrial Relations is not the proper forum for the adjudication of the
question as to who is the lawful president of a legitimate labor
organization.”

On May 29, 1971,
after hearing the petition, Judge Salvador rendered a decision certifying the
—

” . . ALPAP composed only of pilots
employed by PAL with Capt. Ben Hur Gomez as its
president, as the sole and exclu­sive bargaining representative of all the
pilots employed by PAL and are on active flights and/or operational
assignments, and as such is entitled to all the rights and privileges of a
legitimate labor organization, including the right to its office and its union
funds.”

The following circumstances were cited by Judge Salvador to
justify the conclusions reached by him in his decision, namely:

(a) that there has been no certification election within the
period of 12 months prior to the date the petition for certification was filed;

(b) that the PAL entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with ALPAP for “pilots in the employ of the
Company” only for the duration of the period from February 1, 1969 to
January 31, 1972;

(c) that PAL pilots belonging to the Gaston group, in defiance of
court orders issued in Case 101-IPA(B) (see L-35206, infra)
retired/resigned en masse from the PAL and accompanied this with
actual acts of not reporting for work;

(d) that the pilots affiliated with the Gaston group tried to
retrieve their deposits and other funds from the ALPAP
Cooperative Credit Union on the ground that they have already retired/resigned
from PAL;

(e) that some of the members of the Gaston group joined another
airline after their retirement/resignation;

(f) that the Gaston group claimed before the industrial court that
the order enjoining them from retiring or resigning constituted a violation of
the prohibition against involuntary servitude (see L-35206, infra); and

(g) that the contention that the mass retirement or resignation
was merely an involuntary protest by those
affiliated with the Gaston group is not borne out by the evidence as, aside from their aforementioned acts, the
said group of pilots even filed a civil complaint against the PAL in which the cessation of their
employment with PAL was strongly stressed by them.

It appears that prior to the filing of the certification petition
below, a general ALPAP membership meeting was held on
October 30, 1970, at which 221 out of 270 members adopted a resolution amending
ALPAP’s constitution and by-laws by providing in a
new section thereof that -?

“Any active member who shall be forced to retire or forced to
resign or otherwise terminated for union activities as solely determined by the
Association shall have the option to either continue to be and remain as an
active member in good stand­ing or to resign in writing his active membership
with the Association…”

According to ALPAP (Gaston), the
foregoing amendment was adopted “In anticipation of the fact that they may
be forced to resign or retire because of their ‘union activities.'” At
this period of time, PAL and ALPAP were locked in a
labor dispute certified by the President to the industrial court and docketed
as Case 101-IPA(B) (see L-35206, infra).

On December 12, 1970,
despite a no-work-stoppage order of the industrial court, a substantial
majority of ALPAP members filed letters of
retirement/resignation from the PAL.

Thereafter, on December
18-22, 1970, an election of ALPAP officers
was held, resulting in the election of Felix C. Gaston as President by 180
votes.  Upon the other hand, on December 23, 1970, about 45 pilots
who did not tender their retirement or resignation with PAL gathered at the
house of Atty. Morabe and elected Ben Hur Gomez as ALPAP President.

On June 3, 1971,
ALPAP (Gaston) filed an opposition in Case 101-IPA(B)
to an urgent ex parte motion of the PAL
to enjoin the members of ALPAP from retiring or
resigning en masse.  It was
claimed by ALPAP (Gaston) that -?

“1.  Insofar as herein oppositors
are concerned, the allegations of respondent that their ‘resignations’ and
‘retirements’ are sham resignations and retirements and that ‘There is no
honest or genuine desire to terminate the employee relationship with PAL’ are
completely false.  Their bona fide
intention to terminate their employer-employee relationship with PAL is
conclusively shown by the fact that they have not sought reinstatement in or
re-employment by PAL and also by the fact that they are either seeking
employment in another airline company;

“2.  Respondent in effect recognized such bona
fide intention of the herein oppositors as shown by
the fact that it accepted said resignations and retirements and did not
initiate any contempt proceedings against them; and

“3.  The action of herein oppositors
in filing their resignations and retire­ments was a legitimate exercise of
their legal and constitutional rights and the same, therefore, cannot be
considered as a valid ground to deprive them of benefits which they had already
earned including, among others, retirement benefits to which they are entitled
under the pro­visions of an existing contract between petitioner and
respondent.  Such deprivation would
constitute impairment of the obligations of contract.”

On June 15, 1971,
the industrial court en banc, acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by ALPAP (Gaston) in Case
2939-MC against the decision of Judge Salvador, denied the same.  The said court’s resolution was then appealed
to this Court (L-33705).

L-35206

On October 3, 1970,
the President of the Philippines
certified a labor dispute between members of ALPAP and the PAL to the Court of Industrial Relations.  The dispute which had to do with union
economic demands was docketed as Case No.
101-IPA(B) and was assigned to Judge Ansberto
P. Paredes.

On October 7, 1970,
after conferring with both parties for two days, Judge Paredes
issued a return-to-work order, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:

“PALEA
and ALPAP, their officers and members, and all
employees who have joined the present strikes which resulted from the labor
disputes certified by the President to the Court, or who have not reported for
work as a result of the strikes, are hereby ordered forthwith to call off the
strikes and lift the picket lines … and return to work not later than Friday,
October 9, 1970, and management to admit them back to work under the same terms
and conditions of employment existing before the strikes, including what has
been earlier granted herein.

“PAL is ordered
not to suspend, dismiss or lay-off any employee as a result of these
strikes.  Read into this order is the
provision of Section 19, C.A. 103, as amended, for the guidance of the parties.

“x x x

“Failure to comply with any provision of this Order shall
constitute contempt of court, and the employee failing or refusing to work by October 9, 1970, without justifiable
cause, shall immediately be replaced by PAL,
and may not be reinstated without prior Court order and on justifiable
grounds.”

On October 10, 1970, Judge Paredes,
having been informed that the strikes had not been called off, issued another
order directing the strikers to lift their pickets and return to work and
explaining that his order of October 7, 1970 partook of the nature of a mandatory
injunction under the doctrine laid down in Philippine Association of Free
Labor Unions (PAFLU) vs.  Hon. Joaquin M. Salvador, et al.,
(L-29471 and L-29487, September 28, 1968).

The strike, however, continued until the industrial court en
banc denied, on October 19,
1970, ALPAP’s motion for reconsideration of the said orders.

On October 22, 1970,
the strikers returned to work, except (according to the PAL) two pilots, one of them being Felix C. Gaston who allegedly
refused to take the flights assigned to him. 
Due to his refusal, among other reasons, PAL terminated Gaston’s services on October 27, 1970.  His dismissal was reported to the industrial
court on October 29, 1970.  Thereafter, the court a quo set
the validity of Gaston’s dismissal for hearing, but, on several occasions, he
refused to submit his side before the hearing examiner, claiming that his case
would be prosecuted through the proper forum at the proper time.

On November 24, 1970,
the PAL filed an urgent ex parte motion
with the industrial court to enjoin the members of ALPAP from proceeding with their intention to retire or resign en
masse.  On November 26, 1970, Judge Paredes
issued an order commanding ALPAP members
—

“… not to strike or in any way cause any stoppage in the operation
and service of PAL, under pain
of dismissal and forfeiture of rights and privileges accruing to their
respective employments should they disregard this Order; and PAL is also ordered not to lockout any
of such members and officers of ALPAP under
pain of contempt and cancellation of its franchise.”

ALPAP filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the foregoing order claiming, among others,
that it subjected them to invo­luntary servitude:

“It is crystal-clear that the disputed Order in effect compels
the members of peti­tioner to work against their will.  Stated differently, the members of petitioner
association are being coerced or forced by the Trial Court to be in a state of
slavery for the benefit of respondent corporation. In this regard, therefore,
the Trial Court grossly violated a constitutional mandate which states:

‘No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.’
(Article III, Section 1(13)).

“The constitutional provision does not provide any condition
as to the cause or causes of the unwillingness to work.  Suffice it to say that an employee for
whatever reason of his own, cannot be compelled and forced to work against his
will.”

The court a quo, however,
denied the foregoing motion for reconsideration on December 11, 1970.

Just the same, on December
12, 1970, a substantial majority of the members of ALPAP staged a mass resignation and/or retirement from PAL:

“In vigorous protest to your provo­cative harassment, unfair
labor tactics, the contemptuous lockout of our co-members and your vicious and
vindictive attitude towards labor most exemplified by the illegal termination
of the services of our President, Capt. Felix C. Gaston . .”

The mentioned individual letters of
retirement/resignation were accepted by PAL on December 14, 1970, with the
caveat that the pilots concerned will not be entitled to any benefit or
privilege to which they may otherwise be entitled by reason of their em­ployment
with the PAL, as the pilots’ acts constituted a violation of the November 26,
1970 order of the industrial court.

On December 28, 1970, Ben Hur Gomez,
alleging that he was elected President of ALPAP by
its members who did not join the mass resignation and retirement, filed a motion
in Case 101-IPA (B) praying that he be allowed to represent the ALPAP (which was theretofore represented by Capt. Felix
Gaston) because the pilots who retired or resigned from PAL ceased to be
employees thereof and no longer have any interest in the subject-matter of the
said case.  This was later converted into
a motion to intervene on February 9,
1971.

On September 1, 1971,
Felix Gaston filed a motion for contempt against PAL stating that his dismissal
from PAL on October 27, 1970
was without just cause and in violation of the Order of the industrial court
dated October 7, 1970 as
well as section 19 of C.A.  103. 
He prayed that he be reinstated.

On October 23, 1971, twenty-one pilots who filed their retirement
from PAL filed a petition in the industrial court praying also that they be
readmitted to PAL or, failing so, that they be allowed to retire with the
benefits provided for under the PAL Retirement Plan or, if they are not yet
eligible to retire under said Plan, that they be given separation pay.  In their petition for reinstatement, said
pilots (who were later joined by other pilots similarly situated) alleged, inter
alia —

“1.  That they are some of the employees of the respondent company and members
of the petitioner union who resigned en masse or retired en
masse from the respondent after having been led to believe in good faith
by Capt.  Felix Gaston who was then the
uncontested president of the petitioner union and their counsel that such a
mass resignation or mass retirement was a valid exercise of their right to
protest the dismissal of Capt.  Gaston in
connection with the certified dispute that was pending before the Court.

“2.  That later on they came to know that such a
mass resignation or mass retire­ment was enjoined by this Honorable Court
‘under the pain of dismissal and forfeiting of rights and privileges accruing
to their respective employment if they disregarded such order’ of injunction.

“3.  That they did not deliberately disregard such
injunction order and if they failed to comply with it within a reasonable time,
it was because they were made to believe and assured by their leader that such
resignation or retirement was a lawful exercise of concerted action; that the
full consequences of such act was not explained to them by counsel; and, in
addition, they were told that those who returned to the com­pany would be
expelled from the union, and suffer the corresponding penalty.

“x x x.”

ALPAP (Gomez) opposed the foregoing
petitions.  In this connection, the
records disclose that on August 20, 1971, 89 of the pilots who retired en
masse from PAL filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of
Manila in Case 15084 for the recovery of retirement benefits due them under the
PAL Retire­ment Plan.  The complaint was
dismissed by the trial court on PAL’s motion.  The records, however, do not disclose the
reason for the said dismissal.

On December 23, 1971,
Judge Paredes issued an order deferring action on the
motion to dismiss the petitions for reinstatement on the ground that the
matters alleged in the said petitions would require the submission of
proof.  ALPAP
(Gomez) filed a motion for reconsideration of this order but the same was
denied by the industrial court en banc for being pro forma.

On February 1, 1972,
ALPAP (Gaston) joined and consoli­dated the mentioned
petitions for reinstatement.  The same
was opposed by both PAL and ALPAP (Gomez).

On March 24, 1972,
ALPAP (Gomez) filed a motion to sus­pend the
proceedings in Case 101-IPA(B) until the prejudicial question of who should
prosecute the main case (Case 101-IPA) is resolved.  On April
18, 1972, Judge Paredes issued an order
deferring the hearing of the main case until this Court shall have decided
L-33705, but allowing other matters, including the consolidated petition for
reinstatement, to be heard.

On May 5, 1972,
ALPAP (Gomez) filed another motion to suspend the
hearing on the mentioned petition for reinstatement on the ground that this
Court’s decision in L-33705 should be awaited. 
ALPAP (Gaston) opposed that motion on the
ground that the matter had already been denied twice and the order setting the
case for hearing was merely interlocutory. 
On May 15, 1972,
Judge Paredes denied the said motion to suspend the
hearing on the petition for reinstatement “unless a counter­manding Order
is issued by a higher Court.”

On May 18, 1972, ALPAP (Gomez)
filed a motion for reconsideration of Judge Paredes‘
order, alleging that the employee status of those who resigned or retired en
masse was an issue in the mentioned Case 2939-MC the decision on which
is still pending consideration before this Court in L-33705.

On June 19, 1972, the industrial court en banc
passed a resolution reversing Judge Paredes‘ order on
the ground that the question of
the employee status of the pilots who were seeking reinstatement with PAL has
already been raised squarely in Case 2939-MC and resolved by the said tribunal
which found that the said pilots have already lost their employee status as a
consequence of their resignations and/or retirements from PAL which had been duly accepted by
the latter.

D I S C U S S I O N

L-33705

In its brief before this Court, ALPAP (Gaston) states that it does not question the recognition
extended by PAL to ALPAP (Gomez) as the collective bargaining
agent of all PAL pilots on
active flight duty.  Neither does it
dispute the assumption by ALPAP (Gomez)
of the authority to manage and administer the collective bargaining agreement
between ALPAP and PAL (which at any rate had expired on January 31, 1972) nor the right of ALPAP (Gomez) to negotiate and conclude any
other collective bargaining agreement with PAL. What it disputes, however, is the authorization given by
the industrial court to ALPAP (Gomez),
in a certification pro­ceeding to take over the corporate name, office and
funds of ALPAP.

This Court has always stressed that a certification proceeding is
not a litigation, in the sense in which this term is ordinarily understood, but
an investigation of a non-adversary, fact-finding character in which the Court of
Industrial Relations plays the part of a disinterested invest­igator seeking
merely to ascertain the desires of employees as to the matter of their
representation (National Labor Union vs. 
Go Soc and Sons, 23 SCRA 436; Benguet Consolidated, Inc. vs. Bobok
Lumber Jack Ass’n., L-11029, May 23, 1958; Bulakeña Restaurant and Caterer vs. C.I.R.,
45 SCRA 95; LVN Pictures,
Inc. vs. Philippine Musicians Guild (FFW) and C.I.R., 1 SCRA 132).  Such being the nature of a certification
proceeding, we find no cogent reason that should prevent the industrial court,
in such a proceeding, from inquiring into and satisfying itself about matters
which may be relevant and crucial, though seemingly beyond the purview of such
a proceeding, to the com­plete realization of the well-known purposes of a
certification case.

Such a situation may arise, as it did in the case at bar, where a
group of pilots of a particular airline, allegedly anticipating their forced
retirement or resignation on account of strained relations with the airline
arising from unfulfilled economic demands, decided to adopt an amendment to
their organization’s constitution and by-laws in order to enable them to retain
their membership standing therein even after the term­ination of their
employment with the employer concerned. 
The industrial court definitely should be allowed ample discretion to
secure a disclosure of circumstances which will enable it to act fairly in a
certification case.

This Court nonetheless finds, after a close and dis­passionate
study of the facts on record, that the industrial court’s conclusion, that the
mentioned amendment to the ALPAP constitution and
by-laws is illegal (a) because it was not adopted in accordance with the
procedure prescribed and (b) because members of a labor organization cannot
adopt an amendment to their fundamental charter so as to include non-employees
(of PAL) as members, is erroneous.

We have made a careful examination of the records of L-33705 and
we find the adoption of the resolution introducing the questioned amendment to
be in substantial compliance with the ALPAP
constitution and by-laws.  Indeed, there
is no refu­tation of the fact that 221 out of the 270 members of ALPAP did cast their votes favor of the said amendment on October 30, 1970 at the ALPAP general membership meeting.

This Court cannot likewise subscribe to the restrictive
interpretation made by the court below of the term “labor
organization,” which Section 2(e) of R.A. 875
defines as “any union or association of employees which exists, in whole
or in part, for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and
conditions of employment.” The absence of the condition which the court
below would attach to the statutory concept of a labor organization, as being
limited to the employees of a particular employer, is quite evident from the
law.  The emphasis of the Industrial
Peace Act is clearly on the purposes for which a union or association of
employees is established rather than that membership therein should be limited
only to the employees of a particular
employer.  Trite to say, under Section
2(h) of R.A. 875 “representative” is
defined as including “a legitimate labor organization or any officer or
agent of such organization, whether or not employed by the employer or employee
whom he represents.” It cannot be overemphasized likewise that a labor
dispute can exist “regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee.” (Section 2(j), R.A. 875).

There is, furthermore, nothing in the constitution and by-laws of
ALPAP which indubitably restricts membership therein
to PAL pilots alone.^[1]
Although according to ALPAP (Gomez) there has never
been an instance when a non-PAL pilot became a member of ALPAP,
the complete lack of any such pre-condition for ALPAP
membership cannot but be interpreted as an unmistakable authority for the
association to accept pilots into its fold though they may not be under PAL’s employ.

The fundamental assumptions relied upon by the industrial court
as bases for authorizing ALPAP (Gomez) to take over
the office and funds of ALPAP being, in this Court’s
opinion, erroneous, and, in the absence of any serious dispute that on December
18-22, 1970 Felix C.  Gaston, and four
other pilots, were elected by the required majority of ALPAP
members as officers of their association, this Court hereby rules that the
mentioned authorization to ALPAP (Gomez) to take over
the office, funds and name of ALPAP was done with
grave abuse of discretion.

Moreover, this Court cannot hold as valid and binding the
election of Ben Hur Gomez as President of ALPAP.  He was
elected at a meeting of only 45 ALPAP members called
just one day after the election of Felix C. Gaston as President of ALPAP who, as
shown, received a majority of 180 votes out of a total membership of 270.  Under the provisions of section 4, article
III of the Constitution and By-Laws of ALPAP, duly
elected officers of that association shall remain in office for at least one year:

“The term of office of the officers of the Association shall
start on the first day of the fiscal year of the Association.  It shall continue for one year or until they
are reelected or until their successors have been elected or appointed and takes
office in accordance with the Constitution and by-laws.”

While this Court considers the ruling of the court below, on the
matter of who has the exclusive rights to the office, funds and name of ALPAP, as having been erroneously made, we cannot hold,
however, that those belonging to the group of ALPAP
(Gomez) do not possess any right at all over the office, funds and name of ALPAP of which they are also members.

In our opinion, it is perfectly within the powers and
prerogatives of a labor organization, through its duly elected officers, to authorize
a segment of that organization to bargain collectively with a particular
employer, particularly where those constituting the segment share a common and
dis­tinguishable interest, apart from the rest of their fellow union members,
on matters that directly affect the terms and
conditions of their particular employment.  As the circums­tances pertinent to the case
at bar presently stand, ALPAP (Gaston) has extended
recognition to ALPAP (Gomez) to enter and conclude
collective bargaining contracts with PAL. 
Having given ALPAP (Gomez) this authority, it
would be clearly unreasonable on the part of ALPAP
(Gaston) to disallow the former a certain use of the office, funds and name of ALPAP when such use is necessary or would be required to
enable ALPAP (Gomez) to exercise, in a proper manner,
its delegated authority to bargain collectively with PAL.  Clearly, an intelligently considered
adjustment of grievances and integration of the diverse and varying interests
that not infrequently and, often, unavoidably permeate the membership of a
labor organi­zation, will go a long way, in achieving peace and harmony within
the ranks of ALPAP. 
Of course, in the eventuality that the
pilots presently employed by PAL and who subscribe to the leadership of
Ben Hur Gomez should consider it to their better
interest to have their own separate office, name and union funds, nothing can
prevent them from setting up a separate labor union.  In that eventuality, whatever vested rights,
interest or participation they may have in the assets, includ­ing cash funds,
of ALPAP as a result of their membership therein
should properly be liquidated in favor of such with­drawing members of the
association.

On the matter of whether the industrial court also abused its
authority for allowing ALPAP (Gomez) to appro­priate
the ALPAP name, it does not appear that the herein
petitioner has shown below any exclusive franchise or right to the use of that
name.  Hence, there is no proper basis
for correcting the action taken by the court below on this regard.

L-35206

The threshold issue posed in L-35206 is whether the Court of
Industrial Relations acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the reso­lution
dated June 19, 1972
suspending hearings on the mentioned petition for reinstatement until this
Court shall have decided L-33705.

We find no merit to the
charge made.

While it is correct, as submitted by ALPAP
(Gaston), that in the 1971 case of Philippine Federation of Petroleum  Workers (PFPW) vs.
CIR (37 SCRA 716) this Court held that in a
certified labor dispute all issues involved in the same should be determined in
the case where the certified dispute was docketed and that the parties should
not be permitted to isolate other germane issues or demands and reserve them
for determination in the other cases pending before other branches of the industrial court, non-compliance with
this rule is at best an error in procedure, rather than of jurisdiction, which
is not beyond the power of this Court to review where sufficient reasons exist,
a situation not obtaining in the case at bar.

After a thoroughgoing study of the records of these two
consolidated petitions, this Court finds that the matter of the reinstatement
of the pilots who retired or resigned from PAL was ventilated fully and
adequately in the certification case in all its substantive aspects, including
the allegation of the herein petitioners that they were merely led to believe
in good faith that in retiring or resigning from PAL they were simply
exercising their rights to engage in concerted activity.  In the light of the circumstances thus found
below, it can be safely concluded that the mass retirement and resignation
action of the herein petitioners was intentionally planned to abort the effects
of the October 7, 10 and 19, 1970 return-to-work orders of the industrial court
(which they, in fact, ignored for more than a week) by placing themselves
beyond the jurisdictional control of the said court through the umbrella of the
constitutional pro­hibition against involuntary servitude, thereby enabling
them to pursue their main pressure objective of grounding most, if not all, PAL
flight operations.  Clearly, the powers
given to the industrial court in a certified labor dispute will be meaningless
and useless to pursue where its jurisdiction cannot operate.

We cannot consequently disagree with the court a quo
when it concluded that the actuations of the herein petitioners after they
retired and resigned en masse — their retrieval of deposits and
other funds from the ALPAP Cooperative Credit Union
on the ground that they have already retired or resigned, their employment with
another airline, the filing of a civil suit for the recovery of their
retirement pay where they invoked the provision against involuntary servitude
to obtain payment thereof, and their repeated manifestations before the
industrial court that their retirement and resignation were not sham, but
voluntary and intentional — are, in the aggregate, indubitable indications
that the said pilots did retire/resign from PAL with full awareness of the
likely con­sequences of their acts. 
Their protestations of good faith, after nearly a year of underscoring
the fact that they were no longer employed with PAL, cannot but appear to a
reason­able mind as a late and regrettable ratiocination.

Parenthetically, contrary to ALPAP
(Gaston)’s argument that the pilots’ retirement/resignation was a legitimate
concerted activity, citing Section 2(1) of the Industrial Peace Act which
defines “strike” as “any temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an indus­trial dispute,” it
is worthwhile to observe that as the law defines it, a strike means only a “temporary stoppage of
work.” What the mentioned pilots did, however, cannot be considered, in
the opinion of this Court, as mere “temporary stoppage of work.” What
they contemplated was evidently a permanent cut­off of employment relationship
with their erstwhile employer, the Philippine Air Lines.  In any event, the dispute below having been
certified as existing in an industry indispensable to the national interest,
the said pilots’ rank disregard for the compulsory orders of the industrial
court and their daring and calculating venture to disengage themselves from
that court’s jurisdiction, for the obvious purpose of satis­fying their narrow
economic demands to the prejudice of the public interest, are evident badges of
bad faith.

A legitimate concerted activity is a matter that cannot be used
to circumvent judicial orders or be tossed around like a plaything.  Definitely, neither employers nor employees
should be allowed to make of judicial authority a
now-you’ve-got-it-now-you-don’t affair. 
The courts cannot hopefully effectuate and vindicate the sound policies
of the Industrial Peace Act and all our labor laws if employees, particularly
those who on account of their highly advanced technical background and
relatively better life status are far above the general working class spectrum,
will be per­mitted to defy and invoke the jurisdiction of the courts whenever
the alternative chosen will serve to feather their pure and simple economic
demands.

ACCORDINGLY, in L-33705 the resolution of the Court of
Industrial Relations dated June 15,
1971 upholding the deci­sion of Judge Joaquin M. Salvador dated May 29, 1971 is hereby modified in
accordance with the foregoing opinion. 
Felix C. Gaston or whoever may be the incumbent President of ALPAP is hereby ordered to give to any member withdrawing
his membership from ALPAP whatever right, interest or
participation such member may have in the assets, including cash funds, of ALPAP as a result of his membership in that association.

In L-35206, the petition assailing the resolution of the Court of
Industrial Relations dated June 19,
1972, is hereby dismissed for lack of merit insofar as the
petitioners’ allegations of their right to reinstatement with PAL is
concerned.  With reference to the
alternative action, re: payment of their claims for retirement or separation
pay, the Secretary of Labor, in
accordance with the applicable pro­cedure prescribed by law, is hereby ordered
to determine whether such claim is in order, particularly in view of the caveat
made by PAL, in accepting the petitioners’ individual letters of
retirement/resignation, that said petitioners shall not be entitled to any
benefit or privilege to which they may otherwise be entitled by reason of their
employment with PAL as the former’s acts constituted
a violation of the order of the industrial court dated November 26, 1970.

Without costs in both instances.

Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Concepcion,
Jr., and Martin, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., concurs in the
opinion of the Chief Justice in L-33705 and in the opinion of Justice Teehankee in L-35206.

Teehankee, J., files
a separate opinion.

Aquino, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Section 2(a), Article II of the ALPAP Constitution
and By-Laws provides: “Any person of lawful age and good moral character
who serves as an air line pilot, i.e., first pilot or captain, co-pilot or
first officer, reserve pilot or reserve captain, or has served in these
capacities in an air line transportation company, shall be eligible for
membership in the Association in accordance with the stipulations in this
Section and elsewhere in the Constitution and by-laws.”

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