PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOSE OMEGA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

About 10:00 o’clock in
the morning of February 20, 1957,
the lifeless body of Juanita Lingad was discovered
near a bamboo grove beside a creek in Sitio Maite, Tenejero, Balanga, Bataan.^[1]
Immediately thereafter, a combined group of policemen, PC soldiers, the
municipal judge of Balanga, Bataan, Judge Vicente Estanislao,
the municipal health officer of Pilar, Bataan, Dr. Abelardo
Magat, and a photographer, Conrado
Aguas, repaired to the scene of the crime to conduct
an investigation.^[2]
Arriving thereat, the group found the dead woman with her skirt raised up
exposing her private part, her torn panty, a loop of rope tied around her neck,
and a gaping contused wound on her forehead exposing a portion of her skull.^[3]
Surrounding the corpse were foot prints, and shoe prints leading to and around
the corpse of the deceased.^[4]
After examining the body of the deceased, Dr. Magat
issued a medical certificate^[5]
to the effect that the victim died of asphyxiation by strangulation.

Around 4:00 o’clock in
the afternoon of that same day, the police authorities of Balanga,
Bataan noted the presence of
Guillermo Ilaya and Jose Omega, particularly the fact
that the former was wearing rubber shoes. 
Suspecting that they might have something to do with the crime, they
were picked up for investigation. 
Guillermo Ilaya denied that he had been in Sitio Maite in the early morning
of February 19, 1957.  The police then asked him to remove his
rubber shoes, which he did.  Thereafter,
Guillermo Ilaya and Jose Omega were taken to the
scene of the crime.  A comparison of the
rubber soles of Guillermo Ilaya’s rubber shoes with
the shoe prints found^[6]
around the dead woman’s body showed that they tallied.

Thereafter, Lt. (now Captain) Luis Sacramento of the PC took over
the investigation of the case.^[7]
In the course of the investigation, Guillermo Ilaya
pointed to Jose Omega as the author of the crime,^[8]
and executed an affidavit^[9]
wherein he narrated how Jose Omega allegedly raped and killed the deceased.

Hence, Jose Omega was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bataan with the complex crime of rape with murder, docketed therein as Criminal
Case No. 5083.^[10]
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.^[11]
After due trial, the court a quo convicted the accused of two sepa­rate
and distinct crimes of rape and murder, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused JOSE OMEGA, guilty
beyond peradventure of doubt of two separate and distinct crimes of rape, as
defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, and of murder, as defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the same
Code, and accordingly renders judgment as follows:

“For the crime of rape, there being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances, and applying the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences said accused to suffer an imprisonment
of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as MINIMUM to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as MAXIMUM:

“For the crime of murder, the Court hereby sentences the accused
to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Juanita Lingad in
the amount of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs in both instances.

“Considering that the accused has to serve more than one
penalty imposed in these two cases of rape and murder, the rules prescribed in
Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 217, on
successive service of sentence must be observed, and pursuant thereto the order
of their respective severity shall be followed. 
The accused should not serve a penalty of imprisonment for more than threefold of the length of time corresponding to the
severest of the penalties imposed upon him in both of the two cases, and
the maximum period of the penalty to be served by him shall in no case exceed
forty years.  The penalty of reclusion perpetua is computed for 30 years.”^[12]

Dissatisfied with the
above judgment, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals,^[13] but the said appellate court certified the
case to this Court in view of the
penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed upon the
accused.^[14]

The case for the
prosecution is built mainly on the testimony of Guillermo Ilaya,
allegedly the only eyewitness to the crime. 
He testified that at about 6:00 o’clock in the morning of February 19, 1957, while he and his compadre Jose Omega were conversing on the street in front of his house at barrio Tenejero, Balanga, Bataan, they saw Juanita Lingad going down from her house with
a rope in her hand, and thereafter, walking towards the corral.  Thereupon, Jose Omega invited him to go to
the field to gather whatever foodstuff they could get therein.  When they saw
Juanita Lingad in the field, Jose Omega told him,
“She is Juaning,
Birahan natin siya.” He then inquired of Jose Omega what he meant by “birahan“,
and the latter replied, ”Ako’ng bahala (I will be
responsible).”^[15]

When they caught up with Juanita Lingad,
Jose Omega asked her where she was going. 
The latter answered that she was looking for her carabao.  Jose Omega then pointed to the direction
where the carabao could be found which Juanita Lingad followed. 
Shortly thereafter, Juanita Lingad returned
and upon reaching the place where Jose Omega was standing, the latter held and
embraced her, prompting her to shout and cry: 
“Tiyo Jose, Tiyo
Jose, you are my uncle.  Why are you
doing this to me?  I will report you to Tiya Auring.” Thereupon,
Jose Omega pinned her to the ground, tied a rope around her neck, tore her
panty and raped her.  As Juanita Lingad was complaining of pain, Jose Omega picked up a
stone and struck her on the forehead.^[16]

Believing that the girl was already dead, Jose Omega invited him
to go home.  On their way, they passed by
Jose Minta picking up camote.  He (Guillermo Ilaya)
saw also Pedro Sedano cutting bamboos.  Somewhere along the way, Jose Omega told him,
“Padre, on this thing I have done nobody knows except you,” and he
replied, “Padre, as far as I am concerned, you have nothing to
worry.” Then Jose Omega warned him, “You be
careful.  If this thing
that I have done leaks out, I will kill you.” Then he assured his compadre, “Compadre, you do
not have to worry about it.  If it is on
my part, you cannot be sold down the river.”^[17]

Upon their arrival at barrio Tenejero,
they went directly to the store of Erlinda Tuason and took a glass each of “halo-halo”.  Thereafter they went to the next store, and
after taking again a glass each of “halo-halo”, they went home.^[18]
On the following day, February 20,
1957, he and Jose Omega were arrested by the police.^[19]

On the other hand, the appellant interposed an alibi,
corroborated by Mariano Manlapaz.  He claims that at about 7:30 o’clock in the morning of February 19, 1957, he and his compadre
Mariano Manlapaz went to the house of Abelardo Santos at Balanga, Bataan, to look for work.  However, they were not able to talk to him
because the latter was in Morong.  After lingering for about an hour in the town
plaza, they went to the market place where Mariano Manlapaz
met his acquaintances.  Thereafter, at about 10:00 o’clock
they walked home towards Tenejero, arriving thereat at about 10:30 o’clock in the morning of that day.^[20]

The appellant now mainly
assails the trial court in giving weight and credence to the testimony of prosecution witness
Guillermo Ilaya, and in disbelieving his alibi, thus,
putting in issue the question of credibility.

Ordinarily, this Court
will not interfere with the trial court’s findings and conclusions on the credibility of witnesses, in deference
to the rule that the latter tribunal, having had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the
witnesses while testifying, is in a better position to properly gauge their
credibility.  This rule, however, is
inapplicable to the present case, because while it was the late Judge Ambrosio T. Dollete who heard the
testimony of Guillermo llaya it was Judge Tito V. Tizon who subsequently penned the decision, when he took over the case and
terminated the proceedings.^[21]
The reason for the rule does not exist
in this case.

Guillermo Ilaya is supposedly the only eyewitness to the
crime.  For this reason, We examined the entire record, and after a careful and thoughtful review, We
find OurseIves unprepared to give weight and credence to his testimony.

To begin with, his
testimony is highly incredible
and improbable.  As correctly observed by the trial court, Guillermo llaya is the uncle of Herminio
Mata,^[22]
husband of the deceased, yet he merely stood like a mannequin watching the
appellant rape and kill the wife of his nephew. 
He never attempted to prevent nor convince the appellant from committing
the crime.^[23]
Besides, it is highly unbelievable that the appellant would rape and kill the
deceased in the presence of Guillermo Ilaya, uncle of
the deceased by affinity.

Moreover, the natural reaction of one who witnesses a crime is to
reveal it to the authorities, unless, of course, he is the author thereof.^[24]
If Guillermo llaya had really seen the appellant
commit the crimes in question, he could have informed the authorities
immediately thereafter.  But he did
not.  His claim that he was afraid^[25]
is too flimsy to be believed.  When he
was picked up by the police for investigation together with the appellant,^[26]
it would have been very easy for him to inform, or at least, whisper to the
police that the culprit was the appellant so that the latter could safely be
held in prison and thus prevented from taking vengeance.  The second alleged threat of the appellant to
kill Guillermo Ilaya was made on October 29, 1957,^[27]
that is, eight (8) months after the commission of the crime.  On these two occasions, the threats were
allegedly uttered, but aside from the spoken words, there was no act or
circumstance whatsoever to believe that Ilaya could
be intimidated.

Again, when Guillermo Ilaya was
investigated by Lt. Luis Sacramento of the PC, he disclaimed any knowledge of
the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. 
It was only when Lt. Sacramento had bluffed Guillermo Ilaya by telling him that the appellant had already
squealed against him that he denounced the appellant as the culprit.^[28]
This circumstance engenders doubt and suspicion as to the motive of Guillermo Ilaya in implicating the appellant, considering that he was
arrested by the police and the PC as the principal suspect.  Apparently, his denunciation of the appellant
came as a mere afterthought, and sprang from his desire to save his own skin
rather than from a sincere desire to tell the truth.

On top of that, why would the deceased say to the appellant,
“Tiyo Jose, Tiyo Jose,
you are my uncle.  Why
are you doing this to me?  I will report
you to Tiya Auring“,
when the appellant is not her uncle but rather Guillermo Ilaya?

Aside from the foregoing, there are facts and circumstances
extant in the record which tend to show that the crimes at bar could have been
committed by someone else other than the appellant.  Thus, as correctly observed by the Solicitor
General,^[29]
the presence of Guillermo Ilaya at the scene of the
crime cannot be doubted.  The shoe prints
found around the dead woman’s body tallied with the rubber shoes worn by Guillermo
Ilaya.^[30]
Remedios Mendoza saw Guillermo Ilaya
going to Sitio Maite at
about 6:00 o’clock in the morning of February 19, 1957 passing the trail taken
earlier by the deceased Juanita Lingad in going
thereto.^[31]
Perfecto Sedaño, likewise, saw his nephew Guillermo Ilaya at Sitio Maite at about 6:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, holding the
deceased by the hand and pulling her.^[32]
Thereafter, Remedios Mendoza and Perfecto Sedaño again saw Guillermo Ilaya
at about 8:00 o’clock that morning soaked in perspiration, his khaki
pants were wet up to the knee, and his rubber shoes were also wet.^[33]
These facts which are not disputed cast a reasonable doubt on the question as to whether or not the herein
appellant committed the crimes in question. 
It should be recalled that Guillermo Ilaya
testified that he and the appellant Jose Omega went together to Sitio Maite at about 6:00 o’clock in the morning of February
19, 1957.  It is rather strange,
however, that Remedios Mendoza and Perfecto Sedaño did not see the appellant Jose Omega but only
Guillermo Ilaya.

In the light of the
foregoing, it is clearly discernible that the evidence for the prosecution is
weak, unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a finding of guilt as against
the appellant.

Although alibi is known
to be the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove, nevertheless, where the evidence for the prosecution is weak and
betrays lack of concreteness on the question of whether or not the accused
committed the crime charged, the defense of alibi assumes importance.^[34]
Thus, in the case of People vs. Fraga, et al.,^[35]
this Court held that:

“x x x an
accused cannot be convicted on the basis of evidence which, independently of
his alibi, is weak, uncorroborated, and in­conclusive.  The rule that alibi must be satisfactorily
proven was never intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases;
otherwise, we will see the absurdity of an accused being put in a more
difficult position where the prosecution’s evidence is vague and weak than
where it is strong.”

In other words, the prosecution has the
burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt and the weakness of the defense does not relieve it of this
responsibility.  The accused does not
have to prove his innocence because that is presumed.  In the case at bar, the prosecution’s
evidence falls short of that quantum of evidence which will justify
conviction of the appellant.  His guilt
has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, and, therefore, he is entitled to
an acquittal.

Apparently, this case – as correctly observed by the court a
quo – was filed by the prosecution and the PC investigators without
conducting a thorough and discreet investigation to determine the real culprit
or culprits.  The case should, therefore,
be brought to the attention of the National
Bureau of Investigation for it to conduct a new investigation and to
bring to trial those responsible for the heinous crimes at bar.  In
this connection, it may not be inappropriate to restate what this Court has
said in the case of People vs. Roa, et al.^[36]

“x x x.  It is the
duty of both police and prosecution agencies to ascertain what did in fact
transpire and to bring to trial the person or persons against whom evidence
exists.  Necessarily, the discretion
vested in a provincial fiscal is ample. 
On him rests in the first instance the determination of who should be
indicted.  Where the
crime is rather serious, as in this case, haste is to be deplored.  Should the finger of suspicion point to one
or more possible culprits, the most meticulous efforts should be exerted to
assure that a miscarriage of justice does not thereafter occur.  x x x Nor is the burden solely on the
prosecuting arm.  The trial court must be
equally alert to the possibility that the fiscal could
be in error.  It is imperative then that
the utmost caution be exercised lest a guilty party may escape his just
deserts.  In the event that another
individual would thereafter be accused, the same degree of care in the analysis
of the proof submitted is of the essence. 
The primordial consideration is that the mandate of the Constitution be
obeyed.  The person at the dock is presumed
to be innocent.  His guilt must be shown
by competent and credible evidence that removes every vestige of reasonable
doubt.  Moral certainty is of the
essence.  It is not enough that there be
diligence on the part of the trial court as well as acquaintance with applicable
decisions from this Tribunal.  What is
indispensable is a painstaking analysis of the proof submitted.  A ready acceptance of the testimony for the
prosecution is far from advisable. 
Always, the thought uppermost should be the ascertainment of truth in
ways allowed by the Constitution.  A desirable end cannot be achieved by
less than full compliance with the requisites of the law.  So should it be.”

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the herein appellant
JOSE OMEGA is hereby acquitted, with costs de oficio.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation in order that the case be
investigated anew, and the guilty party
or parties be brought to the bar of justice.

Fernando, (Chairman), J., concurs
in both opinions.

Aquino, J., concurs.

Barredo, J., concurs
also in the separate opinion of Justice Antonio.

Antonio, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

^[1]
pp. 25, 27, Vol. III, t.s.n.

^[2]
p. 25, Vol. III, t.s.n.; p. 81, Vol I, t.s.n.

^[3]
pp. 5, 6, Vol. I, t.s.n.; p. 26, Vol. III, t.s.n.

^[4]
p. 26, Vol. III, t.s.n.

^[5]
Exhibit “A”, p. 2, Vol. I, Record.

^[6]
pp. 27, 28, 29,
30, Vol. III, t.s.n.

^[7]
p. 32, Vol. III, t.s.n.

^[8]
pp. 97–99, Vol. I, t.s.n.

^[9]
Exhibit 1, p.
3, Vol. I, Record.

^[10]
The original information was filed on February
21, 1957 but the same was amended several
times, until the fifth amended information under which the accused was tried,
was filed on November 7, 1957.  (pp. 1, 16, 33, 52, 53,
Vol. I.  Record.)

^[11]
p. 109, Vol. I, Record.

^[12]
pp. 373-374, Vol. II, Record.

^[13]
p. 379, Vol. II, Record.

^[14]
p. 1, Rollo.

^[15]
pp. 1-2, Vol. III, t.s.n.

^[16]
pp. 2-3, Vol. III, t.s.n.

^[17]
pp. 3-4, Vol. III, t.s.n.

^[18]
pp. 4-5, Vol. III, t.s.n.

^[19]
p. 14, Vol. III, t.s.n.

^[20]
pp. 72–74, Vol. III, t.s.n.

^[21]
People vs. Salas, L-35946, Aug. 7, 1975, 66, SCRA 126, 132.

^[22]
p. 9, Vol. III, t.s.n.

^[23]
p. 366, Vol. II, Record.

^[24]
People vs. Cunanan, L-17559,
April 24,
1967, 19 SCRA
769, 783; See also People vs. Baquiran,
L-20153, June
29, 1967, 20 SCRA
769; People vs. Gallora, L-21740, Oct. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 780.

^[25]
p. 23, Vol. III, t.s.n.

^[26]
p. 14, Vol. III, t.s.n.

^[27]
p. 5, Vol.
III, t.s.n.

^[28]
pp. 97-99, Vol. I, t.s.n.

^[29]
p. 6, Appellee’s Brief.

^[30]
pp. 27, 31, Vol. III, t.s.n.

^[31]
p. 56, Vol. III, t.s.n.

^[32]
pp. 117,
120-130, Vol. I, t.s.n.

^[33]
p. 57, Vol. III, t.s.n.; pp. 129,
130, Vol. I, t.s.n.

^[34]
People vs. Bulawin, L-30069, Sept. 30, 1969
29 SCRA 710; See also People vs. Cunanan, supra; and People vs. Baquiran, supra.

^[35]
109 Phil. 241, 250.

^[36]
L-35284, Jan. 17, 1975, 62 SCRA 51, 66-67.

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