G.R. No. L-25382. April 30, 1970
PASCUAL PACAÑA, DECEASED SUBSTITUTED BY FILOMENA C. PACAÑA, ET AL., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. CEBU AUTOBUS COMPANY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from an order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, as certified to this Court by the Court of
Appeals as involving an issue of jurisdiction.
The facts of the case are thus stated by the appellate Court in
its certification resolution: “‘The plaintiff alleged in his verified
complaint that since 1931 to May 26, 1962, he has been employed as driver of
the defendant Company and he was separated from the service as driver, by the
defendant, due to infirmities which were caused by, and arose from the nature
of his work as driver for said defendant Company which affected his eyesight on
the left eye and permanently disabled him from his work; that during the time
of his employment he was entitled to collect from the defendants the following
money claims which he was entitled to collect and which were not yet paid to’
him, to wit; (1) separation pay of P2,326.50, during the period of his service
from 1931 to May 26, 1962, – for 31 years, 3 months and 15 days; (2) sick leave
pay, P2,326.50; (3) vacation leave pay, P2,326.50; (4) overtime pay, P4,169.00;
(5) permanent disability compensation benefits, P4,000.00; (6) for moral
damages, P6,000.00, and (7) for attorney’s fees of P3,000.00, plus costs. He also asked for such other relief and remedy
consistent with law and equity.
‘”After filing their answer, the defendants moved for the
dismissal of the case.
“‘In support of their motion for dismissal, the defendants
invoked the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, and the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Francisco Pelaez
vs. Luzon Lumber Co. (G. R. No. L-8564, April
23, 1958; Vol. 55, No. 43, pp. 9037-9041, 0. G.).’
“In their motion to dismiss dated October 12, 1963, the defendants
allege, among others, that ‘(1) the lower court had no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the plaintiff’s cause of action because the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission has the jurisdiction to try and decide on the claims;
and (2) that there was pending an action between the same parties for the same
cause of action before the Court of Industrial Relations.”
The lower Court based its dismissal order mainly on its alleged
lack of jurisdiction, which according to it pertained exclusively to the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, thus:
“The Court after a consideration of the grounds of the
defendants’ motion to dismiss, specially the first ground, and, taking into
account the allegation of the complaint describing the nature of the
plaintiff’s principal claim which is compensation for permanent physical
disability, has reached the conclusion and so holds and declares that the Court
lacks jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
In the case just cited,[1]
the claims which were presented to the Court of First Instance of Manila, which
were assailed by the defendant on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of said
Court; consisted of money claims for overtime pay; sick and vacation leave
pays; medical treatment; actual and compensatory damages caused by pulmonary
tuberculosis contracted by him in the course of his employment as defendant’s
driver; and for attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
said Court a quo which declared itself without jurisdiction to
hear and decide the plaintiff’s claims for vacation and sick leave, medical aid
and actual and compensatory damages because they pertained to the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission and, so it dismissed them and, as to the claim for
overtime pay which was heard, it also dismissed the same for lack of sufficient
evidence to sustain it.
“‘While it is true that, according to the allegation of the
complaint parts of said claims had become accrued before June 20, 1952 when
jurisdiction to hear and decide them were transferred from the jurisdiction of
the ordinary courts to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, the same should
pertain to the said Commission when the said claims were only claimed and
asserted after June 20, 1952. Such is
the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Castro vs. Sagales
(G. R. No. L-6359 decided December
29, 1953) which was affirmed and applied with approval in the said
later case of Francisco Pelaez vs. Luzon Lumber
Company[2]
(supra).
x x
x x
“‘While it is true that the plaintiff’s claim for one month
separation pay without asking for reinstatement, may be within the
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, if he is entitled under the law and the
action has not yet prescribed, the Court may reserve the right to the
plaintiff, or his widow to claim it in a separate suit. But as to the rest of money claims of the
plaintiff, the opinion of the Court is that they should be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction.
“‘WHEREFORE, considering the grounds of the defendant’s motion
to dismiss well taken, this case is ordered dismissed, together with the defendants’
counterclaims, for lack of jurisdiction; and that the plaintiff, or her widow
and other legal heirs are reserved the right to claim in another suit the
separation pay in the proper court if and when the plaintiff is entitled to it. The same reservation is made for the
defendants in their counterclaims. “
Plaintiff’s[3]
appeal should be sustained and the lower court’s precipitate dismissal order,
notwithstanding that issues had been joined and plaintiff had raised mostly
issues of fact on his money claims against defendant as his former employer
which entitled him to a trial on the merits[4]
is set aside.
1. It will be noted from the outset that plaintiff’s complaint is
not one for compensation based on and under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act
3428, as amended) such as to pertain to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission under section 46 thereof. Plaintiff’s complaint consists of various
money claims in the total sum of P15,148.50 for (1) separation pay (2) sick
leave pay (3) vacation leave pay (4) overtime pay and (5) permanent disability
compensation, in the specific amounts itemized at the beginning of this
opinion, besides (6) P6,000. 00 for moral damages and (7) P3,000.00 for
attorney’s fees plus costs. Plaintiff’s
demand for disability compensation as ‘provided for by law”[5]
may be deemed predicated on defendant-employer’s liability for the sickness
of, or injury to, plaintiff arising out of and in the course of his over-thirty
one years’ employment, as imposed by Article 1711 of the Civil Code. As held by the Court in the recent case of Valencia
vs. Manila Yacht Club, Inc.,[6]
such claims for compensation based on the Civil Code pertain to the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. The
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, thus held:
“Appellant’s demand for compensation is predicated on the
employer’s liability for the sickness of, or injury to, his employee imposed by
Article 1711 of the Civil Code, which reads:
‘ART. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged
to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen,
mechanics or other employees even though the event may have been purely
accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury
arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation
if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or
as the result of the nature of employment.
If the mishap was due to the employee’s own notorious negligence, or
voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for
compensation. When the employee’s lack
of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably
reduced.’
“We find the abovequoted provision
to be applicable and controlling in this case.
The matter of the amount of compensation and allowable medical expenses
should be properly determined by the Municipal Court after the parties are
heard accordingly.”
2. The Pelaez and Castro cases cited by
the lower Court, supra, were therefore erroneously relied upon by it to
disclaim its jurisdiction in favor of that of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission. These and other cases mainly
settled the conflict of jurisdiction between the regular courts and the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission after the approval on June 20, 1952 of
Republic Act 772 conferring upon the said Commission “exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation cases under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act” (Section 46) and ruled, as in Asuncion vs. De Aquino[7]
that “(W)hile the regular courts had
jurisdiction to try and decide compensation cases under Act No. 3428 as
amended by Act 3812 and Commonwealth Act No. 210 however, upon the
enactment of Republic Act No. 772 the regular courts were divested of such
jurisdiction, because the same was transferred to the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission. Thus, insofar as claims
accruing before June 20, 1952, but formulated thereafter, are concerned, the
proper forum is the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and not the regular’
courts, ” and that as to the particular claims under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act pending with the Court of First Instance at the time of
enactment of Republic Act 772 that “said court had been, divested of its
power to hear and decide it and so it can no longer continue acting on said
claim.” In the Pelaez case itself, it was
specifically held that “the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act
have been specifically invoked in paragraph 16 of appellant’s
complaint” and therefore, his right to seek recourse in the regular
courts was barred by the provisions of section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act.[8]
3. In the analogous case of Esguerra
vs, Muñoz Palma,[9]
involving the application of section 6 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act on
the injured workers’ right to sue third party tortfeasors
in the regular courts, Mr. Justice B. L. Reyes, again speaking for the Court,
pointed out that the injured worker has the choice of remedies but cannot pursue
both courses of action simultaneously and thus balanced the relative advantage
of recourse under the Workmen’s Compensation Act as against an ordinary action;
“As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra
can not maintain his action for damages against the respondents (defendants
below), because he has elected to seek compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation
Law, and his claim (case No. 44549 of the Compensation Commission) was being
processed at the time he filed this action in the Court of First Instance. It is argued for petitioner that as the
damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much more extensive than the
amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, they should
not be deemed incompatible. As already
indicated, the injured laborer was initially free to choose either to recover
from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Compensation Law or else, to
prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor
for higher damages. While perhaps not as
profitable, the smaller indemnity obtainable by the first course is balanced by
the claimant’s being relieved of the burden of proving the causal connection
between the defendant’s negligence and the resulting injury, and of having to
establish the extent of the damage suffered; issues that are apt to be
troublesome to establish satisfactorily.
Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is
precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim
is rejected by the Compensation Commission.
Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted,
if the employer Franklin Baker Company recovers, by derivative action against
the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the
compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner, the excess accrues to the
latter.”
4. Plaintiff, as stated above, had the choice, which he duly
exercised, of instituting action in the lower court for compensation under
Article 1711 of the Civil Code, and not by virtue of Republic Act No. 1171, as
erroneously claimed by him, which merely provides for the venue of action on
claims of employees and laborers at either the residence of the plaintiff or
the defendant, at the plaintiff’s election.
Of course, the plaintiff thus foregoes the far more expeditious procedures
for recovery as provided in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which practically
foreclose the employer from controverting the claim
upon failure to file a report of disability with notice of controversion
(Section 45) and the liberal presumptions in favor of the employee, inter
alia, that the claim comes within the
provision of the Act. (section 44). But
there may be cases where, as in the case at bar, the plaintiff is constrained
to invoke the provisions of Article 1711 of the Civil Code and file his suit in
the regular courts due to his prosecution of various other money claims, such
as separation pay, accrued sick and vacation leave pay, and overtime pay during
his employment, which do not fall under the purview of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act.
5.
The validity of upholding the
lower court’s jurisdiction to hear and decide the various claims of plaintiff
in the single case filed by him may readily be seen from the tenuous
jurisdictional arguments raised by defendant, where it would have the plaintiff
shuttle to four different courts and agencies to prosecute his claims, namely,
Workmen’s Compensation Commission and Social Security Commission for
disability compensation benefits and sick leave pay, the Court of Industrial
Relations for overtime pay and the Municipal Court for separation pay. Courts do not look with favor on split
jurisdiction and piece-meal litigation.
Mr. Justice Sanchez’ pronouncement in Rheem
of the Philippines, Inc. et al. vs. Ferrer[10]
may be aptly quoted: “(A) piecemeal resort to one court and another gives
rise to multiplicity of suits. To force
the employees to shuttle from one court to another to secure full redress is a
situation gravely prejudicial. The time
to be lost, effort wasted, anxiety augmented, additional expense incurred —
these are considerations which weigh heavily against split jurisdiction. Indeed, it is more in keeping with orderly
administration of justice that all the Causes of action here ‘be cognizable and
heard by only one court; x x’”.
6.
Defendant’s contention that
plaintiff’s filing of claims with the Social Security Commission for social
security benefits by way of sick leaves and disability benefits deprives
the lower court of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of plaintiff’s claims for
compensation under Article 1711 of the Civil Code (or the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, in a proper case) has long been held untenable by the Court
in several cases. [11]
As reaffirmed by the Court in Valencia vs. Manila Yacht Club, Inc., supra,
“(I)n several cases decided by this Court, the employee’s right to demand
compensation from the employer, notwithstanding previous receipt of benefits
under the Social Security Law, was already upheld. For, by their nature and purpose, the
sickness or disability benefits to which a member of the System may be entitled
under the Social Security law are not the same as the compensation that may be
claimed against the employer under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the Civil
Code, so that payment to the member employee of social security benefits would
not wipe out or extinguish the employer’s liability for the injury or illness
contracted by his employee in the course of or during the employment. It must be realized that, under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act (or the Civil Code, in a proper case), the employer is
required to compensate the employee for the sickness or injury arising in the
course of the employment because the industry is supposed to be responsible
therefore; whereas, under the Social Security Act, payment is being made because
the hazard specifically covered by the membership, and for which the employee
had put up his own money, had taken place.”
7.
Similarly, defendants contention,
which was not passed upon by the lower Court in its dismissal order, that the pendency of two cases filed against it in the Court of
Industrial Relations by the United Cebu Autobus &
Transit Employees Association for the enforcement of several wage demands
(among them, the payment of overtime pay, including a claim for plaintiff therefor in the amount of P9,516.50) does not bar
plaintiff’s action. It is clear from the
record that plaintiff’s complaint made no averment charging defendant with
unfair labor practice nor seeking reinstatement as driver. Plaintiff denied being a member of the
association union which filed the case with the Industrial
Court nor having authorized the suit. Prescinding then
from defendants’ own allegation that it itself had moved to dismiss the
petition in the Industrial Court “on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction” and “that said association as petitioner therein had no
personality to represent the said employees,”[12]
plaintiff’s claim for accrued overtime pay, since he made no charge of unfair
labor practice or demand for reinstatement and disclaimed membership in the labor
association, was beyond the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court and was an
ordinary claim for money, cognizable in the regular courts of justice. [13]
It may be added that even if plaintiff were prior to the cessation of his
employment a member of the labor association, his filing of the case below and
his disclaimer of membership amounted to a withdrawal of any authorization
previously given impliedly to the association to represent him in the
Industrial Court and left him free to personally seek recourse in the lower
Court. It bears notice that defendant in
its answer admitted that plaintiff actually rendered overtime work, working
nine hours daily, although it claimed prescription as a defense and that any
overtime work rendered by plaintiff in excess of nine hours was without its
authorization and knowledge. [14] It was thus precipitate error for the lower
Court to dismiss the case, having before it the issues of fact joined by the
parties’ pleadings, and having correctly noted at the brief preliminary hearing
held thereon that “There are so many decisions on that point already. This Court has jurisdiction because this is
a money claim and there is no relation between employer and employee.”[15]
ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby
set aside and the case is remanded to the court of origin for due hearing and
determination of plaintiff’s claims on the merits. In view of the time that has been lost and
the nature of the claims, the court of origin’ is directed to give preference
to the case and to hear the plaintiff’s, claims with the utmost promptness and
dispatch. Costs against defendant-appellee.
Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz
Castro, Fernando, and Villamor, JJ., concur.
[1] Pelaez vs. Luzon Lumber Co., 103 Phil., 395 (1958).
[2]
See fn. 1.
[3]
Plaintiff died on April 4, 1967
and was substituted by his widow, Filomena C. Pacaña and children per the Court’s resolution of June 27, 1967.
[4]
De Leon vs. Henson, L-11639, April
29, 1961, (1 SCRA 1171).
[5]
Rec. on Appeal, Annex A, par. 4.
[6] 7
L-27346, June 30, 1969, (28
SCRA, 724).
[7]
L-13704, April 18, 1962 (4
SCRA 917); see also Uy Kiva
vs. Lim, L-9232, May 31, 1957
(Unpub.); De Mallari vs.
NDC, L-17914, Oct. 31, 1962
(16 SCRA 538).
[8]
“SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation. — The rights and
remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury
entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest
of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of
said injury. x x “
[9]
104 Phil. 582 (1958).
[10]
L-22979, Jan. 27, 1967 (19
SCRA 130).
[11]
Rural Transit Employees Asso. vs. Bachrach Trans. Co. , L-21441, 15 Dec. 1967; 21 SCRA 1263; Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. vs. SSS, L-19254, 31 March 1964. See also Taurus Taxi Co. , Inc. vs.
Capital Insurance & Surety Co. , L-23491, 31 July 1968, 24 SCRA 454.
[12]
Defendant-appellee’s brief, p. 28.
[13] Fookien Times Co. Inc. vs. C1R, L-16025, Mar. 27, 1961 (1 SCRA 844) and cases
cited; Southwestern Sugar & Molasses (Far East) Inc.
vs. CIR, L-17259, Aug. 29, 1961
(2 SCRA 1060).
[14]
Rec. on Appeal, Annex B.
[15]
T. S. N., Sept. 25, 1963,
p. 4.