G.R. No. L-25136. April 30, 1970
SEGUNDA MINA, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. TRANQUILINO VALDEZ, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals as
involving purely issues of law, we hold that the Court of First instance which
has pending and unresolved before it a civil case between the parties for the
resolution of their conflicting claims of ownership of a certain parcel of land
by virtue of the same having been sold twice to them by the original owner,
cannot assume jurisdiction as a court of land registration over a subsequent
summary petition filed in the land registration case by petitioner, and order
respondent to surrender the original owner’s duplicate certificate of title in
the latter’s possession for cancellation and registration of the disputed sale
and issuance of a new certificate of title in favor of petitioner.
The appellate court gives the following background facts and
issues: “There was filed in the court below Civil Case No. 2221 which
involves the partition and recovery of a certain parcel of land.
“It appears that the original owner of this land, Cornelio Balbin, had sold the same to several persons, two of whom
were Segunda Mina and Tranquilino
Valdes. The corresponding Torrens
title was delivered to Valdes.
“While said civil case was pending in court, Segunda Mina sought to have her deed of sale registered in
the office of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur. Because Tranquilino
Valdes also sought the registration of his deed of sale of the same land, the
Register of Deeds brought the matter en consulta
to the Land Registration Commission for resolution. The Commission ruled that the deed of sale in
favor of Segunda Mina was registerable
on condition that the owner’s duplicate certificate of title of the land be
produced. On the basis of this ruling by
the Land Registration Commission, Segunda Mina filed
a petition with the court below praying that an order be issued requiring Tranquilino Valdes, who was in possession of the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title of the land, to surrender the same and to have
it cancelled, and a new one, in lieu thereof, issued in favor of Segunda Mina.[1]
“This petition was opposed by Tranquilino
Valdes. Acting on Mina’s petition, the
lower court issued the following order of February 19, 1962 –
‘Considering the resolution of the Honorable Commissioner, Land
Registration Commission in LRC Consulta No. 359 of
the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur
that the deed of sale executed in favor of the spouses Juan Miranda and Segunda Mina may be registered; and it appearing further
that the said land is not delinquent in the payment of real property taxes as
shown by the certificate of the municipal treasurer.
‘WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the respondent Tranquilino
Valdes and his wife Rosalina Gallon are hereby required to surrender within 10
days from receipt of copy of this Order, Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of
Title No. 30 for its cancellation and the issuance of a new Certificate of
Title in favor of the spouses Juan Miranda and Segunda
Mina, after the payment of the proper fees.
‘It appearing from the written and verbal manifestation of counsel
for the respondent that Duplicate Certificate of Title No. 30 is presently in
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur and that he has no objection if said title remain in
that Office pending the resolution of this motion, the Register of Deeds is authorized
to comply with the order of this Court adverted to above if the said
manifestation is correct.
‘SO ORDERED.’
“Assailing the order as against the law, Tranquilino
Valdes interposed the present appeal. No
testimonial evidence in relation to this petition was presented.
“We find the issues raised to be purely of law, namely: (1)
Is the order in question appealable? (2) May the holder of a certificate of title
be compelled to surrender the same for the purposes mentioned and under the
circumstances given?”
1.
The first issue as to the appealability of the questioned order, cited by the
appellate court, is actually a counter-argument of petitioner-appellee. It is
without merit. The Court has long held
that such orders of the land registration court, which resolve important
questions as to the respective rights of the parties and require the surrender
of the Certificate of Title for cancellation and issuance of a new one in favor
of a different owner, are appealable orders.[2]
2.
The second and main issue cited by
the appellate court has likewise been long resolved by the Court to the effect
that where the same property is sold twice, it is precipitate and improper for
the land registration court, under a petition filed under section 111 of the
Land Registration Act[3]
to order the party in possession of the title to surrender it to the Register
of Deeds for cancellation and registration of the disputed sale in favor of the
adverse party, until the conflicting claims of the parties have been
definitely resolved. In the similar case
of Oliveros vs. Catot,[4]
the Court thus held: ‘According to the facts, the controversy arose from the
circumstance that the same lands were sold twice. We do not now decide which of these two sales
is preferred and valid, but we do hold that until this question has been
definitely resolved, it cannot be contended that the appellant holds transfer
certificate of title without, just cause or right thereto, wherefore, it is
not just that she be compelled to part with said document by surrendering it to
the Register of Deeds.”
3.
Here, where the ownership of the
same property was being directly litigated between the same parties and other
adverse claimants to whom the original owner had likewise sold the same, in
Civil Case No. 2221 pending before the same lower court as a regular court of
general jurisdiction, it was jurisdictional error on the lower court’s part to
take cognizance of the summary petition filed by petitioner as a land
registration proceeding and order respondent to be summarily dispossessed of
the owner’s duplicate certificate of title in the latter’s possession. The question of which of the various sales
executed by the original owner in favor of the contending parties here and
various other vendees was certainly a prejudicial question which had to be
finally decided on its merits, and the pendency of
the civil case before the lower court barred it and any other court from assuming
jurisdiction and taking cognizance of any subsequent case or proceeding
involving directly the same question and issue.
Furthermore, as the Court has consistently ruled in numerous cases,
controversial issues, which may not be considered a mere incidental matter in
the land registration case but should be the object of a personal action
between the parties, such as the conflicting claims to the land here in
question of the contending parties and other adverse vendees thereof, should
be adjudicated by the Court of First Instance only in ordinary actions and not
under the summary proceedings provided in the Land Registration Act.[5]
4.
The lower court was obviously
misled into issuing its questioned order by the representation in the land
registration proceeding that the Land Registration Commissioner had ruled in
the consulta elevated to him by the Register
of Deeds as to the conflicting deeds of sale presented for registration by the
parties “that the deed of sale executed in favor of the spouses Juan Miranda
and Segunda Mina may be registered.” This was
not exactly accurate for what the Commissioner had ruled was: ‘With respect
to the first point raised in the first question (1-a) of the Register of Deeds,
the Commission believes that the deed of sale executed in favor of the spouses
Juan Miranda and Segunda Mina, on the assumption that
the clerical defects pointed out by the Register of Deeds have already been
rectified and the evidence of non-delinquency in the payment of realty taxes is
available, may be registered under Act No. 496 under a new entry if the spouses
can present the owner’s duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 30 which
of course poses a problem because said owner’s duplicate Certificate, although
presently in the possession of the Register of Deeds, is actually under the
control and disposition of Tranquilino Valdes. As the latter surrendered it for the specific
purpose of registering the sale made in his favor as well as to allow the
registration of the earlier notice of lis pendens, no other party may take advantage of such
surrender, and the Register of Deeds may not annotate on said owner’s duplicate
certificate any other transaction in favor of some other person. Segunda Mina is not
precluded though from availing herself of any legal recourse she may deem
appropriate. Section 111 of Act No. 496
may be one remedy. [6]
The Commissioner was further careful to caution the Register of Deeds and state
in his conclusion that: “Let it be made plain that the Commission has
merely passed upon the registrability of the
documents subject of this Consulta. Their validity is for a Court of competent
jurisdiction to determine.”[7]
It should be noted that such resolutions of consultas
from registers of deeds “shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers
of Deeds” alone, and not upon other parties, much less upon the lower
court where the validity and effectivity of the conflicting
deeds of sale were being directly litigated, as acknowledged by the
Commissioner himself. As the Court held
in Noblejas vs. Teehankee,[8]
“(I)t will be noted that by specific provision of the section, the
decision of the Land Registration Commissioner ‘shall be conclusive and binding
upon all Registers of Deeds’ alone, and not upon-other parties. This limitation in effect identifies the
resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of any other
bureau director, whose resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. ‘That the Commissioner’s resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative;
any bureau director’s ruling is likewise appealable
to the corresponding department head.”
Respondent was under no constraint to appeal from the Commissioner’s
Resolution, as contended by petitioner, since by its own terms, no document not
submitted by respondent, who had delivered the same to the Register of Deeds,
could be annotated thereon without the corresponding court order. It was from the lower court’s order to
surrender the title that respondent properly appealed from.
5. The supplementary order issued by the lower court on March 27,
1962,[9]
directing the Register of Deeds to refrain from delivering to respondent the
owner’s duplicate certificate of title and ordering respondent not to withdraw
the same from the office of the Register of Deeds must likewise be set aside,
for lack of jurisdiction and authority on the lower court’s part in the summary
land registration proceeding, as held hereinabove. Until the issue of ownership shall have been
finally decided in the pending civil case, respondent is entitled to possession
of said certificate of title, as his possession thereof has not been shown to
have been unlawfully obtained; on the contrary, in accordance with his
averments, said title was delivered to him upon the execution of the deed of
sale in his favor by the original owner.
At any rate, the interests of all the parties, including the other vendees,
impleaded as defendants in the pending civil case,
have been amply protected with the annotation on the title, caused by
petitioner, of the corresponding notice of lis
pendens, giving notice in rem of the pendency of
said civil case.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed orders of February 19, 1962 and March 27, 1962 are hereby annulled and set aside,
with costs against petitioner-appellee.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
[1]
The petition was simply docketed as “For the surrender of Duplicate Title
No. 30 (Bu. of Lands No. 9290, Patent No. 2292.” Record p. 1.
[2]
Haw Pia v. San Jose,
78 Phil 238 (1947); Seton vs. Rodriguez, L-16285, Dec. 29, 1960.
[3]
Act No. 496.
[4] 69
Phil 168 (1939).
[5]
Vicente vs. de los Santos,
L-20351; Feb. 27, 1969 and
cases therein cited.
[6]
Record, p. 60.
[7] Id,
p. 61-62.
[8]
L-28790, April 29, 1968, 23
SCRA 405.
[9]
Record, p. 88.