ROBERT TABIL AND AURORITA SIMBAJON, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE CEFERINO T. ONG, JUDGE OF THE CITY COURT, BRANCH III, OZAMIZ CITY AND ADOLFO PONCE, RESPONDENTS.

Tabil versus Ong

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus brought by Robert Tabil and Aurorita Simbajon against Judge Ceferino T. Ong of the City Court of Ozamiz City and against Adolfo Ponce. The petitioners, owners of a tailoring shop, were charged with grave oral defamation after words spoken during a labor conciliation meeting. They asked the Supreme Court to annul the criminal proceedings and to compel the respondent Judge to dismiss the case. The case matters because it settles two recurring questions: who is entitled to a preliminary investigation, and whether words spoken at a labor conciliation proceeding are privileged.

Procedural History

Adolfo Ponce filed a complaint for grave oral defamation against the petitioners in the City Court of Ozamiz City, presided over by Judge Ong. The petitioners moved to dismiss on two grounds: that no preliminary investigation had been conducted under Presidential Decree Number 77, as amended by Presidential Decree Number 911, and that the facts charged did not constitute an offense because the statements were privileged under Article 232 of Presidential Decree Number 442, the Labor Code. Judge Ong denied the motion to dismiss. The petitioners then came directly to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari and mandamus, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the respondent Judge. The Court issued a temporary restraining order and, after the private respondent failed to file his comment and answer, submitted the case for decision.

Facts

The petitioners owned and operated a tailoring shop in the public market of Jimenez, Misamis Occidental. Adolfo Ponce worked there as a cutter from May 1975 until April 1976, when he stopped reporting for work after the petitioners refused to give him further cash advances. A few days after he stopped working, the petitioners discovered that pattern papers and textiles were missing, that two cones of thread had been cut so they could no longer be used, that several customers' orders had been cut to the wrong measurements, and that the sewing machine assigned to Ponce was out of order with two main parts missing. Ponce admitted the infractions to the station commander and promised to return the machine parts, but he did not. The petitioners filed two criminal cases against him in the Municipal Court of Jimenez, one for malicious mischief with damages and one for violations of Presidential Decree Number 133.

Meanwhile, Ponce filed a labor complaint against Robert Tabil for illegal termination and related money claims. The parties met before Atty. Bartolome Domingo for conciliatory proceedings. There, Tabil said that in the eyes of God he had no further obligation to Ponce, and when Ponce told him not to bring God into the proceedings, Tabil retorted that this was the reason Ponce stole the sewing machine parts. The conciliation failed.

Ponce then filed a complaint for grave oral defamation against the petitioners in the City Court of Ozamiz City, alleging that they had called him a thief and a robber at the Labor Office. The petitioners moved to dismiss, but Judge Ong denied the motion, ruling that Presidential Decree Number 77 applies only to fiscals and state prosecutors, and that whether the utterances were privileged was a matter of evidence to be proved at trial.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioners, as accused in a case filed directly with and cognizable by the city court, are entitled as a matter of right to a preliminary investigation under Presidential Decree Number 77, as amended by Presidential Decree Number 911.
• Whether or not the words spoken during the conciliation proceedings are privileged under Article 232 of the Labor Code, such that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and the complaint should be dismissed.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Presidential Decree Number 77, as amended by Presidential Decree Number 911, provides:

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary and except when an investigation has been conducted by a judge of first instance, city or municipal judge or other officer in accordance with law and the Rules of Court of the Philippines, no information for an offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be filed by the provincial or city fiscal or his assistants or by a state prosecutor, without first conducting a preliminary investigation in the following manner.

This provision governs preliminary investigations conducted by fiscals and state prosecutors, and by its terms it does not reach cases filed directly with city and municipal courts.

Section 10 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

In cases triable in the justice of the peace or municipal courts, the accused shall not be entitled as a matter of right to a preliminary investigation in accordance with this section.

This is the rule that actually governs the petitioners' case, and it withholds the right of preliminary investigation from accused in cases triable by the inferior courts.

Article 232 of Presidential Decree Number 442, the Labor Code, provides:

Article 232. Privileged communication. Information and statements made at conciliation proceedings shall be treated as privileged communication and shall not be used as evidence in the Commission. Conciliators and similar officials shall not testify in any court or body regarding any matters taken up at conciliation proceedings conducted by them.

This provision is the basis of the petitioners' claim that the alleged defamatory words cannot be the subject of a criminal prosecution.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioners are not entitled to a preliminary investigation. The very title of Presidential Decree Number 77, as amended, shows that it prescribes a uniform system of preliminary investigation by provincial and city fiscals and their assistants, and by state attorneys or their assistants. Its Section 1 speaks only of an information filed by a fiscal or state prosecutor for an offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance. The law applicable to cases filed with and triable by city and municipal courts is Section 10 of Rule 112, which expressly states that the accused shall not be entitled as a matter of right to a preliminary investigation. The Court explained that the preliminary examination conducted before the warrant of arrest was issued is sufficient to establish reasonable ground, and that the ensuing trial on the merits takes the place of the preliminary investigation, thus avoiding waste and duplication of time and effort.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the privileged character of the utterances is a matter of evidence to be proved during trial. The denial of the motion to dismiss was therefore not tainted with grave abuse of discretion, and the petitioners failed to show that they were entitled to the writs of certiorari and mandamus.

Doctrine

The right to a preliminary investigation is of statutory character and may be invoked only when specifically granted by statute. Presidential Decree Number 77, as amended by Presidential Decree Number 911, applies only to preliminary investigations conducted by fiscals and state prosecutors for offenses cognizable by the Court of First Instance. An accused in a criminal case filed directly with, and within the jurisdiction of, a city or municipal court is not entitled as a matter of right to a preliminary investigation, because Section 10 of Rule 112 expressly withholds that right. The preliminary examination before the issuance of the warrant of arrest suffices, and the trial on the merits takes the place of the preliminary investigation. Whether statements made at a labor conciliation proceeding are privileged under Article 232 of the Labor Code is a matter of evidence to be established at trial, not a ground for a motion to dismiss.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, and the writs of certiorari and mandamus were denied, leaving the criminal case for grave oral defamation to proceed before the City Court of Ozamiz City.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the right to a preliminary investigation is statutory, and an accused in a case filed directly with a city or municipal court is not entitled to it as a matter of right. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between Presidential Decree Number 77 and Section 10 of Rule 112, and to test whether privilege under the Labor Code is a defense that must be proved at trial rather than raised in a motion to dismiss.