ROBERT TABIL AND AURORITA SIMBAJON, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE CEFERINO T. ONG, JUDGE OF THE CITY COURT, BRANCH III, OZAMIZ CITY AND ADOLFO PONCE, RESPONDENTS.

This is a special civil
action for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction
filed on August 29, 1977, to compel the respondent Judge, Hon. Ceferino T. Ong, to dismiss
Criminal Case No. B-0112, entitled “People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus
Robert Tabil, et al., accused,” pending before
Branch III of the City Court of Ozamiz City, presided
by respondent Judge.^[1]

On September 2, 1977, We required the respondents to comment on
the petition^[2]
and, at the same time, issued a temporary restraining order restraining the
respondent Judge from further proceeding with the aforesaid Criminal Case.^[3]
Respondent Judge filed his comment on October 25, 1977^[4]
while private respondent failed to do so within the reglementary
period which expired on September 24, 1977. 
Whereupon, in the resolution of January
16, 1978, We required private respondent to file an answer.^[5]
Again, private respondent failed to do so for which reason We considered this
case submitted for decision without the aforesaid answer.^[6]

The following are the material facts which spawned the present
controversy.

Petitioners are the
owners-operators of a tailoring shop under the tradename
and style “Zah-Zeel Stylaire”
at the Public Market in Jimenez, Misamis
Occidental.  Private respondent Adolfo
Ponce was the cutter thereat from May 1, 1975 until April 20, 1976 when he
stopped reporting for work because of petitioners’ refusal to further
give him cash advances after he had received a total amount in cash of
P300.00.  As such cutter, he was given
P1.00 per piece he cut, either trousers or polo shirts, P3.00 for ordinary
clothes and P5.00 for hard or rugged textiles he sewed.  As cutter, he was assigned a sewing machine
for his use.^[7]

A few days after April
20, 1976 – the day respondent Ponce
stopped working – petitioners discovered that all the pattern papers, including
textiles, were missing and two cones of thread were cut at the base and top so
that the same cannot be used for any purpose. 
Likewise, orders of customers were cut not in accordance with the
measurements taken, with the result that seven customers did not redeem their
orders as the same did not fit them. 
Petitioners also discovered that the sewing machine assigned to
respondent Ponce was out of order, with two main parts missing.  The matter was reported to the Station
Commander in Jimenez to whom private respondent admitted all the infractions
and promised to return the parts of the sewing machine.^[8]
Respondent Ponce, however, failed
to make good his promise.  Hence, petitioners
were constrained to file in the
Municipal Court of Jimenez, Misamis Occidental two
criminal cases against respondent Ponce,
to wit:  (1) malicious mischief with damages; and (2)
violations of Pres. Decree No. 133.^[9]  Both
cases were still pending in said Municipal Court at the time the instant
petition was filed.^[10]

In the meanwhile, or on
February 15, 1977, respondent Ponce filed in the Labor Office in Ozamiz City a complaint against petitioner Robert Tabil for “Illegal Termination, Violation of PD 851
& 525, non-payment of overtime, Sundays and holidays”, docketed as STF
Case No. 177-77.  This case was set for
hearing and on February 22, 1977 the parties met before Atty. Bartolome Domingo who conducted conciliatory
proceedings.  Petitioner Tabil explained that in the eyes of God he had no more
obligation to respondent Ponce to which the latter “blurted out not to bring God in the proceedings.”
Petitioner Tabil retorted that that was the reason
why Ponce stole the sewing machine parts. 
The conciliatory proceedings failed.^[11]

On March 14, 1977,
respondent Ponce filed in the City Court of Ozamiz
City, respondent Judge Ong presiding, a complaint
against petitioners for Grave Oral Defamation, by virtue of which the latter
were arrested.  The complaint^[12] is worded as follows:

“The undersigned Complainant under oath accuses Robert Tabil and Aurorita Simbajon, both of Jimenez, Misamis
Occidental, of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation, committed as follows:

That at or about 9:20 o’clock in the morning of February 22, 1977,
at the Labor Office, Ozamiz City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
confederating and helping one another, with intent to defame, ridicule and
dishonor the offended party, did, then and there wilfully,
feloniously and unlawfully utter the following defamatory and defamatory words
in the presence of several persons addressed to the herein complainant, Adolfo
Ponce, stating that the herein complainant is a thief and a robber, which words
constitute offensive and scurrilous epithets tending to cast discredit and
dishonor to the herein offended party.

Contrary to Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ozamiz City, Philippines, March 14, 1977.

SGD. ADOLFO V.
PONCE

Complainant”

Petitioners herein,
accused below, moved to dismiss the aforesaid complaint on two grounds, to wit: 
(1) That there was no preliminary investigation conducted under Pres. Decree No. 77, as amended by Pres. Decree No. 911;
and (2) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense because the same
are privileged under Article 232 of the Pres. Decree No. 442
which reads:

“Art. 232.  Privileged
communication.  – Information and
statements made at conciliation proceedings shall be treated as privileged
communication and shall not be used as evidence in the Commission.  Conciliators and similar officials shall not
testify in any court or body regarding any matters taken up at conciliation
proceedings conducted by them.”

On April 19, 1977, the
respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss.^[13] Thus –

“The accused filed a motion to dismiss based on two grounds,
namely, 1.  that there was no preliminary
investigation conducted under P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911; 2.  that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense . . .

“As to the first ground, the Court finds that P.D. No. 77 as
amended by P.D. No. 911 is not applicable in the present case.  The accused are charged with Grave Oral
Defamation under Art. 358 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of which
ranges from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, and therefore, the same crime falls under the concurrent
jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of First Instance.  Inasmuch as the case was filed in the City
Court, our Supreme Court has held in several cases that preliminary investigation
is not required when such cases are filed directly with lower courts, more so,
that P.D. No. 77 refers only to preliminary investigation to be conducted by
city fiscals and state prosecutors and does not deprive City Courts or Courts
of First Instance to conduct their own preliminary investigations.  As to the applicability of Republic Act 3828,
the judge who issued the warrant, Hon. Judge Alfonso Penaco,
has complied with the said provisions of the law, although he adopted only the
investigation made by the police in accordance with the case of Luna vs. Plaza.

“As to the second ground, privileged communications are
matters of evidence and must be proved during trial and therefore, this cannot
be a ground for a motion to dismiss.  Presidential
Decree No. 442 speaks of conciliation proceedings but the incident which
occurred on February 22, 1977
was only a conciliatory talk conducted by Atty. Bartolome
Domingo.  From the testimony of witness Bartolome Domingo, the conciliatory proceedings was
conducted by conciliator Casiano T. Laguitao as per his certification dated February 28, 1977 (Exhibit
“2”).  The case, STF Case No.
077-77, was handled by conciliator Laguitao and any
proceedings conducted by him would be the one referred to by P.D. No. 442 and
considers the same as privileged.

“WHEREFORE, finding the motion to dismiss to be without merit,
the same is hereby denied.  Meanwhile,
the hearing of this case is hereby reset to May 11, 1977, at 8:30
o’clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED.

Ozamiz City, Philippines, April 19, 1977.

SGD. CEFERINO T.
ONG

City Judge”

Not satisfied with the
aforesaid order, petitioners made the instant recourse imputing to the
respondent Judge the following alleged errors:

1.  The Respondent City Judge erred in not
appreciating the fact that the right to preliminary investigation could not be
waived by the petitioners as accused in Criminal Case No. B3-0112 because under
PD 77 as amended by PD 911 they are entitled to file their counter-affidavits.^[14]

2.  The Respondent City Judge erred in not
granting the motion to dismiss Criminal Case No. B3-0112 entitled People versus
Robert Tabil and Aurorita Simbajon anchored under Article 232 of Presidential Decree
No. 442 otherwise known as The Labor Code which took effect on November 1, 1974
that any conciliatory proceedings in the Labor Office is privileged communication.^[15]

Petitioners argue under
the first assigned error that respondent City Judge violated RA 3828 and Pres.
Decree No. 77, as amended by Pres. Decree No. 911, because instead
of issuing a subpoena after complainant’s evidence had shown a prima facie
case, he issued a warrant for their arrest,^[16] and under the second assigned error, they contend
that the defamatory statements alleged in the complaint do not constitute a
criminal offense because they were not uttered in public but in the course of
an investigation in the “Labor Office, Ozamiz
City,” and the matters spoken “in the course of conciliatory
proceedings, administrative at that, were privileged,” per Article 232 of
Pres. Decree 442.^[17]

Anent the first assigned
error, respondent Judge ruled that Pres. Decree No. 77, as amended by Pres.
Decree No. 911, refers to preliminary investigations conducted by fiscals and
state prosecutors, not to those conducted by judges under Rule 112, Sec. 10 of
the Revised Rules of Court, citing People vs. Abejuela,
L-29715, March 31, 1971, People vs. Endan,
L-29833, 38 SCRA 324, and Banzon vs. Cabato, L-31447, June 27, 1975.^[18]

With respect to the
second assigned error, respondent Judge is of the opinion that whether or not
the subject utterances are privileged com­munications, is a matter of evidence
which must be established during the trial. 
He also maintains that
Pres. Decree No. 442 does not apply because said law refers to
conciliatory proceedings and what transpired on February 22, 1977 was only a “conciliatory talk”,
not the “conciliatory proceedings” contemplated under said
decree.  In other words, the utterances
subject of the instant case occurred during the “informal talk”
between the parties before Atty. Bartolome Domingo
while the conciliatory proceedings were conducted by Conciliator Casiano T. Laguitao to whom the
case was assigned for conciliation.^[19]

Since petitioners came to Us on a petition for certiorari
and mandamus under Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court, it is incumbent upon them to show that the respondent Judge “acted
without or in excess of x x x his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion”^[20] and/or unlawfully neglected “the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station,” or unlawfully excluded another
“from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled,”^[21] and there is no appeal, nor any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, when he denied their
motion to dismiss.

We hold that petitioners
failed to show that they are entitled to the issuance of the twin writs (1) of certiorari
annulling the proceedings^[22] of the respondent Judge and (2) of mandamus
commanding the latter to dismiss the case,^[23] respectively.

I

The contention of
petitioners that the pro­cedure that should be followed by city and municipal
courts in conducting preliminary investigations of cases cognizable by them in
the exercise of their original jurisdiction or concurrently with the Courts of
First Instance is that prescribed by Pres. Decree No. 77,^[24] amended by Pres. Decree No. 911,^[25] finds no legal support.  The very law itself – Pres. Decree No. 77, as amended by
Pres. Decree No. 911 – that it
applies only to preliminary investigations conducted by fiscals and state
prosecutors.  This is clearly discernible
from its title, to wit:  “AMENDING
SECTION 1 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5180
PRESCRIBING A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BY PROVINCIAL AND
CITY FISCALS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, AND BY STATE ATTORNEYS OR THEIR
ASSISTANTS.” And any doubt on the matter is dispelled by its Section 1, as
amended, which provides:

“SECTION 1. 
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary and except when an
investigation has been conducted by a judge of first instance, city or
municipal judge or other officer in accordance with law and the Rules of Court
of the Philippines, no information for an offense cognizable by the Court of
First Instance shall be filed by the provincial or city fiscal or his
assistants or by a state prosecutor, without first conducting a preliminary investigation
in the following manner:

“a.  All complaints shall be accompanied by
statements of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting
documents.  The statements of the
complainant and his witnesses shall be sworn to before any fiscal or state
prosecutor or before any government official authorized to administer
oath.  The officer administering the oath
must certify that he has personally examined the affiants and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

“b.  If on the basis of the complainant’s sworn
statements and documents submitted, the investigating fiscal or state
prosecutor finds no probable cause to conduct a preliminary investigation, he
shall dismiss the case.  If
probable cause is established by complainant’s evidence, he shall notify the
respondent by issuing a subpoena requiring him to submit his counter-affidavit
and the affidavits of his witnesses, if any, and other supporting
documents, within ten (10) days from receipt of such subpoena.  If respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if
subpoenaed he does not appear before the investigating fiscal or state
prosecutor, the preliminary investigation shall proceed without him.  To such subpoena shall be attached a copy of
the complaint, the sworn statements and other documents submitted.  Other evidence submitted shall be made
available for examination of the respondent or his counsel.  The statements of the respondent and his
witnesses shall also be sworn to before any fiscal or state prosecutor or
before any government official authorized to administer oath and with the same
certification as above-mentioned.  The
respondent shall furnish the complainant copies of his counter-affidavits and
other supporting documents.

“c.  If a prima facie case is
established by the evidence, the
investigating fiscal or state prosecutor shall immediately file the corresponding information in court.  If he finds that there is no prima facie
case, he shall dismiss the case unless he believes there are matters to be clarified
in which case he may propound clarificatory questions
to the parties or their witnesses affording both parties opportunity to be
present but without right to examine or cross-examine.  If the parties or their counsel so desire,
they may submit questions to the fiscal which the latter may in his discretion
propound to the parties concerned.

“d.  The preliminary investigation shall proceed
without need of requiring the parties and their witnesses to reaffirm their
respective statements before the investigating fiscal or state prosecutor.  Thereafter, he shall resolve the case within
ten (10) days from its termination, furnishing the parties copies of his
resolution stating briefly the findings of facts and the law supporting his
action.

“The fiscal or state prosecutor shall certify under oath in
the information to be filed by him that he has examined the complainant and his
witnesses, that on the basis of the sworn statements and other evidence
submitted before him there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, that the
accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him
and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting
evidence:  Provided, That no assistant
fiscal or state prosecutor may file an information or dismiss a case except
with the prior authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or Chief
State Prosecutor, Provided, Further, That where an assistant fiscal or state
prosecutor who has investigated the case 
recommends the dismissal of the case but his findings are reversed by the Provincial or City Fiscal
or by the Chief State Prosecutor, as the case may be, on the ground that a prima
facie  case exists, the Provincial or
City Fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor 
may, by himself, and on the basis of the same sworn statements and
evidence submitted, file the information against  the respondent, or direct any other assistant
fiscal or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary
investigation; Provided, Finally, That where the resolution of the Provincial
or City Fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor is, upon review, reversed by the
Secretary of Justice, the latter may, where he finds that no prima facie case
exists, authorize  and direct the
investigating fiscal concerned or any other fiscal or state  prosecutor to cause or move for the dismissal
of the case, or where he finds a prima facie case, to cause
the filing of an information in court against the respondent, based on the same
sworn statements or evidence submitted, with­out the necessity of conducting
another preliminary investigation.” (Underscoring supplied.)

From the foregoing, there
is no doubt that — the aforesaid decree does not apply to cases filed with and
triable/cognizable by city and municipal courts, the
law applicable thereto being Sec. 10, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides:

“Section 10.  Right of accused to preliminary investigation
after arrest.  – After the arrest of the accused and
his delivery to the Court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information
filed against him.  He shall be given
access to the testimony and evidence presented against him at the preliminary
examination, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence
in his favor, he shall be allowed to do so. 
The testimony of the witnesses presented at the investigation need not
be reduced to writing but that of the accused shall be taken in writing and
subscribed by him.

In cases triable in the justice of the
peace or municipal courts, the accused shall not be entitled as a matter of
right to a preliminary investigation in accordance with this section.” (Emphasis supplied).

Construing the aforesaid
provision, We have held that the accused in a criminal case filed directly
with, and within the jurisdiction of the city or municipal courts is not
entitled to a preliminary investigation, the conduct of the preliminary
examination prior to the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, as shown by the
examination and sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses, being
sufficient to establish whether “there is a reasonable ground to believe
that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof,
so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial.”^[26] The reason is that the ensuing trial on the merits takes the place of the preliminary investigation, thus doing away with waste and/or duplication of time and
effort.  Thus, in Banzon vs. Hon. Cabato,
etc., et al.,^[27] reiterating
the ruling laid down in People
vs. Abejuela and People vs. Endan,^[28] We
held:

“This issue has been definitely resolved in the cases of People v. Abejuela and People v. Endan.  This
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Tee­hankee, held
that the accused in an offense falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of
the city courts and courts of first instance is not entitled to be heard in a
preliminary investigation.  By way of
explanation, this Court said:

“1.  It is settled dogma that the right to a
preliminary investigation is of statutory character and the right thereto may
be invoked only when specifically granted by the statute.  In promulgating the present Revised Rules of
Court effective January 1, 1964, the Court’s intention to withhold the right of
preliminary investigation from the accused in cases triable
by municipal and city courts was made manifest and of record in the proceedings
of the U.P. Law Center’s Institute of the Revised Rules of Court conducted on
December 12-14, 1963, by Mr. Justice Alejo Labrador
(now retired), chairman, with Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, as member, of the
Court’s Committee on Rules, thus:

‘Now, Section 11 of Rule 108 of the old rules has been amended.  Please turn to Section 10 of Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Court on the right of the accused to preliminary
investigation.  After the arrest of
the accused and his delivery to the court, he shall be informed of the
complaint or information filed against him. 
He shall be given access to the testimony and evidence presented against
him at the preliminary examination, and, if he desires to testify or to present
witnesses or evidence in his favor, he shall be allowed to do.  The testimony of the witnesses presented at
this investigation need not be reduced in writing but the testimony of the
accused shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.  x x x

‘Now look at the second paragraph. 
We inserted that provision.  It
provides that in cases triable by the justice of
the peace or municipal courts, the accused shall not be entitled as a matter of
right to a preliminary investigation in accordance with this Section.  He is not entitled to it because the case
goes to trial already.  That is
the rule; the practice, rather.  This
is a new provision.’ (Underscoring ours).

x x
x                          x
x x                             x x x

“Indeed, balancing the consideration, the withholding of the
right of the preliminary investigation from the accused in cases triable by the inferior courts involving offenses with lower
penalties than those exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance, could
not be termed an unjust or unfair distinction. 
The loss of time entailed in the conduct of preli­minary investigations,
with the consequent extension of deprivation of the accused’s
liberty, in case he fails to post bail, which at times outlasts the period of
the penalty provided by law for the offense, besides the mental anguish
suffered in protracted litigations, are eliminated with the assurance of a
speedy and expeditious trial for the accused, upon his arraignment (without
having to undergo the second stage of the preliminary investigation), and of a
prompt verdict on his guilt or innocence. 
On the other hand, the so-called first stage of preliminary investigation
or the preliminary examination, conducted by the duly authorized officer, as
borne out by the examination and sworn written statement of the complainants
and their witnesses, generally suffices to establish the existence of
reasonable ground to charge the accused with having committed the offense
complained of.

“2.  The lower court’s construction of the
provision in question is difficult to sustain, furthermore, because it would
insert double qualifications in the Rules, where none has been provided.  Thus, it would qualify section 14 of the Rule
by taking the rule to mean that ‘no information for an offense cognizable by
the Court of First Instance concurrently
with the inferior courts shall
be filed’ without the accused having been given a chance to be heard in a
preliminary investigation – when the rule is clearly expressed and intended to
apply only when the case is cognizable
by the Court of First Instance,
be it one of its exclusive jurisdiction, or of concurrent jurisdiction filed with it.  In addition, the lower court would further
qualify section 10 of the Rule by straining its clear and unambiguous provision
to mean that the withholding of the right of preliminary investigation applies
only in cases which are triable by the inferior
courts under their ex­clusive
original jurisdiction – when
the rule plainly provides that there shall be no right of preliminary inves­tigation
in cases triable by the inferior courts, without distinction as to whether such cases be of their
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.

x x
x                          x
x x                             xxx

“5.  The lower court’s contention whereby it would
qualify the application of section 10 of the Rule providing for no preliminary
investigation in cases which are triable by the
inferior courts only to cases falling under their exclusive original
jurisdiction, – because the trial in such cases is ‘more of summary in nature
since the proceedings are not recorded and judgment thereof is appealable to the court of first instance and it is tried de
novo before the appellate court’ – is untenable, in the light of the
rule’s rationale, as expounded by
Mr. Justice Labrador, supra, that the ensuing trial on the merits
take the place of preliminary investigation, without needless waste or
duplication of time and effort, and a final verdict on the innocence (or guilt)
of the accused is thereupon rendered, rather than an inconclusive dismissal of
the charge by the fiscal in a preliminary investigation which would not constitute
jeopardy.”

Accordingly, We, therefore, hold that the respondent Judge is without
authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 22610
involving an offense falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the City
Court of Baguio and the Court of First
Instance.”

Verily, respondent Judge
did not commit a grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess
of his jurisdiction when he refused to dismiss the case.

II

In connection with the
second assigned error, petitioners insist that the utterances subject of the
criminal action below, constitute privileged communication under PD 442.  The posture of petitioners is not
tenable.  For one thing, there is a
factual issue on the nature of the proceedings held before the Labor Office on
February 22, 1977.  Respondents maintain
that “Presidential Decree No. 442 speaks of conciliation proceedings but
the incident which occurred on February 22, 1977 was only a conciliatory talk
conducted by Atty. Bartolome Domingo” and that
the conciliatory proceedings were “conducted by Conciliator Casiano T. Laguitao as per his
certification dated February 28, 1977 (Exhibit ‘2’).”^[29] Petitioners entertain the contrary view – that is, the proceedings held before Atty.
Domingo were those contemplated by PD 442. 
For another thing, the subject complaint^[30] does not allege that the petitioners’
statements “robber” and “thief” were uttered during the
conciliatory proceedings at the Labor Office. 
Hence, petitioners claim that the aforesaid statements constitute privileged
communication is a matter of defense to be ventilated at the trial where the
parties may introduce their evidence to support their respective stands.

In fine, it cannot be
said that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion, much less
exceeded his jurisdiction, in denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition and LIFTING the temporary restraining order heretofore issued, with costs against
petitioners.  This decision is
immediately final and executory, in order that the
respondent Judge may be able to dispose of criminal case without further delay.

SO ORDERED.

Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Abad Santos,
JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., (Acting Chairman), concurs with a separate opinion.

Aquino, J., see concurring opinion.

---

^[1]
Rollo, p. 2.

^[2]
Id., p. 18.

^[3]
Id., p. 19.

^[4]
Id., p. 26.

^[5]
Id., p. 36.

^[6]
Id., p. 42.

^[7]
Id., pp. 1-2.

^[8]
Id., p. 4.

^[9]
Criminal Case No. 4909 and Criminal Case No. 4908, respectively.

^[10]
Rollo, p. 5.

^[11]
Id., p. 6.

^[12]
Id., p. 6.

^[13]
Id., pp. 7-8.

^[14]
Id., p. 9.

^[15]
Id., p. 10.

^[16]
Id., p. 10.

^[17]
Id., pp. 10-11.

^[18]
Id., pp. 26-27.

^[19]
Id., pp. 27-28.

^[20]
Sec. 1, Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court.

^[21]
Sec. 3, Rule 65, Id.

^[22]
Sec. 1, Rule 65, Id.

^[23]
Sec. 3, Rule 65, Id.

^[24]
Effective December 6, 1972.

^[25]
Effective March 23, 1976.

^[26]
Rule 112, Sec. 1, Revised Rules of Court.

^[27]
L-31447, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 419.

^[28]
L-29715 and L-29833, respectively, both decided March 31, 1971, 38 SCRA 324;
425.

^[29]
Rollo, p. 8.  Order denying motion to dismiss.

^[30]
Id., p. 6.

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