LORENZO FORMOSO, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. FRANCISCO ANTE, MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF VIGAN ILOCOS SUR, RESPONDENT.

Administrative complaint, filed by Lorenzo Formoso,
Jr., dated December 7, 1972, charging respondent Municipal Judge Francisco Ante
with:  (1) knowingly consenting to the
use, and acceptance of falsified documents as bail bonds, and/or knowingly and
actively participating in the falsification of said documents; (2) evident and
notorious partiality and leniency in his treatment of the accused in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3692 and 3695, and in other cases against the same accused; and (3)
usurping the powers of the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.  Required to comment on the charges by the
Secretary of Justice, respondent
Judge submitted his answer on December
26, 1972, alleging that:

On the first charge, bail bonds of the accused, Lucio Fabillaran, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3692 and 3695 of the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur
had been prepared by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First
Instance, as the Clerk of Court himself, his deputy, or any of their
subordinate employees “accomplished those bail bonds in question, by
verifying all the supporting papers, such as the tax declaration, tax receipts,
and the residence certificates of the bondsmen”; that he carefully
examined the said bail bonds when it was presented to him, as well as the
supporting papers thereof, like the tax declarations, tax receipts, and residence certificates of the bondsmen,
and found everything in order.  He
admitted, however, that the tax declarations and tax receipts submitted and
attached to the bail bonds in question “were not duly certified copies of
the same, but simple copies”.  He,
however, contends that the actual verification of the genuineness of a
supporting paper to the bail bond is “a clerical job, and not that of the
judge who qualifies or approves the same” and any error or defect of the
bail bond must be attributed to the clerk who processed them.

On the second charge, respondent claims that in Criminal Cases
Nos. 3910 and 3922, entitled “People vs. Eleuterio
Peralta, et al.”, the accused moved
for the reduction of the amount of the bail P10,000.00 for each accused and
Asst. Fiscal Jose Tabanda gave his conformity
thereto; that in Criminal Cases Nos. 3743 and 3810 (People vs. Emeterio Asistin and Mario Agtutubo) both accused petitioned for the reduction of
their bail bond to P20,000.00, to which Asst. Fiscal Jose Tabanda
likewise gave his conformity; that in Criminal Cases Nos. 3910 and 3922, the
evidence presented was very weak as “Pfc. de la Cruz, one of the supposed
victims, refused to testify therein, alleging he could not pinpoint any of the
supposed authors of the crime”, while in Criminal Cases Nos. 3810 and
3743, “the evidence was strong, especially the latter”; that he had
to “respect the recommendation of the Fiscal * * * in the light of the
evidence on record.”

On the third charge, respondent denied that he usurped the powers
of the Executive Judge; that he acted in Criminal Case No. 44-V only after the
Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur had affixed his signature on the bail bond and
assured him that the Executive Judge was then ab­sent; that the bail bond of
the accused in the afore-cited Criminal Case No. 44-V was submitted to him for
approval as the “Municipal Judge of the Capital, for and in the absence of
the Executive Judge” late in the afternoon of June 10, 1970 by the Clerk
of Court himself; that although Executive Judge Arciaga
of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur was present and held sessions in his branch up to 12:00
o’clock noon on June 10, 1970, said judge was already out of his territorial
juris­diction in the afternoon of the above-mentioned date when the bail bond
in question was submitted to respondent.

Under 3rd Indorsement dated January 25, 1973 by then
Undersecretary of Justice Efren I. Plana, this case was forwarded to this Court pursuant to Section 7, Article X of the
Constitution.  By Resolution of
this Court on August 28, 1974,
the records of this administrative case were transmitted to the Executive Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur for investigation, report and recommendation.

On January 20, 1977,
the Investigating Judge, Hon. Natividad G. Adduru—Santillan, submitted her
report recommending dismissal of the case.  According to said report, the investigation
was set on various dates during the
period from September 27, 1974 until September 29, 1976, but the hearing was not held because of the
motions for postponement submitted by either the complainant or the
respondent.  In the meantime, on January
30, 1975,
complainant manifested to the Court that he was submitting the case without the
presentation of any testimonial evidence. 
This notwithstanding, the Investigating Judge re-set the hearing for February
7, 1975, but the
hearing on said date was postponed. 
Thereafter, on March 5, 1975, respondent filed a motion to dismiss.  The Investigating Judge again re-set the case
for hearing on June 21, 1976 and July 9, 1976.  No
hearing was held on said dates, but on September 29, 1976, both the complainant and the respondent
appeared and submitted the case on the basis of the documentary evidence
attached to the complaint.  (Finding that
the charges were not proven “beyond reasonable doubt”, the
Investigating Judge recommends the dismissal of the charges.  We find that the charges of falsification,
partiality and usurpation are not substantiated by the documents submitted.)

In her report, however, the Investigating Judge made the
following significant observations:

“Firstly, respondent Judge’s defense that the preparation of bailbonds and verification of supporting papers thereof are
clerical in nature and not his job as judge. 
True it is not properly a judicial duty. 
However, while a judge need not personally perform this work, it is the
better part of prudence to inquire into the correctness and veracity of the
bonds he is approving.  This latter is
his duty and responsibility.  He may not
blindly sign any paper placed before him by anybody without satisfying himself
that everything is in order. 
Furthermore, clerks are supervised by
judges in their work and this duty may not be shirked without opening the door
to anomalies which may impinge on a judge’s integrity and honor.

“Respondent judge also alleged that he has many cases to attend
to.  This is not a valid excuse for
sloppy work nor haphazard performance. 
Even the fact that the approval of the particular bail bonds under discussion was not
regular work truly belonging to his ‘sala‘ should
have alerted him and made him more circumspect in his actuations for the papers
brought to him for approval and signature were not prepared by his own staff on
whom he could have relied.

“Respondent judge’s presumption that because the use of simple
and not duly certified copies of tax declarations and tax receipts in support
of bail bonds is acceptable procedure in his own (municipal) court and
therefore should be likewise acceptable in courts of first instance, is arrogance
beyond our understanding.  Law and regulations
have required that only certified true copies or the owner’s own copy of these
documents are the only ones acceptable in these matters.  Yet, respondent judge adopts a wrong practice
and expects that his adoption of it makes the practice right.  Nothing could be farther from the truth.  A wrong act does not become right because a
judge does it.”

[To prevent the commission of frauds in connection with the
posting of personal bail bonds and protect the interest of the government,
judges are required by Circular No. 44, dated July 30, 1958, of the Department of Justice, to exercise
utmost care in the scrutiny of the qualifications of sureties and in the
approval of bail bonds.  To eliminate or
minimize anomalies on the matter, in doubtful cases, it is suggested therein
that judges should examine the sureties under oath concerning their sufficiency
as provided for in Section 10, Rule 110, of the Old Rules of Court (now Section
10, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Court), and that bail bonds consisting of real
properties which are not covered by certificates of title should not be
accepted unless they have been declared for taxation purposes in favor of the
person offering the property as bond for a period of at least five (5) years.^[1]
These suggestions were reiterated in Circular No. 2, dated January 23, 1964, of the Department of Justice,
which circular was addressed to Judges of the Court of First Instance, City
Fiscals, City and Municipal Judges.] [It should be noted also that Section 9 of
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the qualifications of
sureties.^[2]
Section 10 of Rule 114 provides that the “sureties must in all cases
justify by affidavit taken before the judge, that they each possess the
qualifications named in the preceding section, and each may be required to
describe in the affidavit the property by which he proposes to justify and the
encumbrances thereon, the number and the amount of other bonds and undertaking
for bail entered into by him and remaining undischarged,
and all his other liabilities.”] [It also states that the “court may
further examine the sureties upon oath concerning their sufficiency in such
manner as it may deem proper.” Contrary, therefore, to the pretensions of
the respondent, the responsibility for ascertaining the sufficiency of the sureties is lodged exclusively upon the
judge.  This responsibility he cannot
abdicate.  In the present case,
respondent judge failed to discharge faithfully such duty and responsibility
when he accepted and approved the bail bonds in question, solely
on the basis of plain and simple copies of tax declarations and tax receipts as
supporting papers, which were not certified by any competent authority and
without examining under oath the sureties pursuant to Section 10 of the
Rules.  Had respondent Judge been more
circumspect in ascertaining the qualifications of the bondsmen, he would have
been able to ascertain that the assessed value of the real properties submitted
as bond in Criminal Cases Nos. 3692 and 3695 were unduly inflated when compared
with the genuine tax declarations.]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge
Francisco Ante is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to comply with the
provisions of the afore-cited Circular No. 44, dated July 30, 1958, and
Circular No. 2, dated January 23, 1964, of the Department of Justice and he is
hereby directed to be thorough and careful in the processing, approval and
acceptance of bail bonds and warned that failure to comply faithfully with such
requirements will be more several dealt with.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Villaseñor v. Abaño, 21 SCRA 312.

^[2]
Sec. 9, Rule 114, of the Revised
Rules of Court, provides:

“SEC. 9. Qualifications of
sureties. – The necessary qualifications of sureties to a bail bond shall be as
follows:

(a) Each of them must be a resident
householder or freeholder within the Philippines;

(b) In case there are only two sureties, each must be worth the amount
specified in the undertaking over and above all just debts,
obligations and property ex­empt from execution; but the court may allow two or
more sureties to justify severally in amounts less than that expressed in the
undertaking, if the entire sum justified to is equivalent to the whole amount of bail demanded.”