GREGORIO CO AND HERCULANO CO, PETITIONERS-APPELLEES, VS. THE DEPORTATION BOARD, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

The basic question before us is whether the judiciary may entertain
an action for prohibition and habeas corpus filed against the Deportation
Board, now appellant, during the pendency of an
inquiry against petitioners, now appellees, that may
possibly lead to their expulsion from the country.  The then Judge Jesus de Veyra
of the Manila Court of First Instance, in a well-written decision, sustained his
jurisdiction, granted the relief sought on the ground that they were Filipinos,
and restrained appellant Board from taking further cognizance of the
proceeding.  Hence this appeal by the
Deportation Board.  On the basis of the
finding of facts of the lower court, tested by the standards prescribed in Chua
Hiong v. 
Deportation Board,^[1]
there was justification for the decision
it rendered.  While Vivo v. Montesa^[2] and Calacday v.
Vivo^[3] stand for the proposition that under the
well-settled administrative law doctrine of primary jurisdiction, an
administrative agency, such as appellant, must be given the opportunity to
decide the matter before it before the courts could intervene, the latter case
pointed out that there are appropriate cases where the right to immediate
judicial review should be recognized.  As
the lower court found, this is one of them. 
We cannot see any valid ground for reversal.

The facts set forth in the brief for appellant, which to its
credit did manifest objectivity do not, upon careful scrutiny, warrant the
reversal sought.  Right at the start, it
made mention of the petitioners Gregorio Co and Herculano
Co being born in Aparri, Cagayan,
on April 24, 1920 and September
25, 1922.  Their father, a
certain Co Pengco, was a Chinese merchant residing in
Aparri, Cagayan and their mother was Maria Tan Comin, whose nationality was disputed.^[4]
The parties were, however, agreed that she had lived maritally
with Co Pengco, out of which seven children were
born, among them petitioners.  Such
relationship continued until the death of Co Pengco
sometime in 1926 in China.  The mother died in 1946, also in China.^[5]
Then on July 12, 1957, a
Special Prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed charges against petitioners
with such Board alleging that as Chinese subjects residing in the Philippines,
who failed, neglected and refused to register as Chinese nationals with the
Bureau of Immigration, they violated the law, compounded by the fact that they
represented themselves as Filipinos.^[6]
They were thus enabled to enjoy certain rights and privileges which are
accorded only to Filipino citizens, such as suffrage, ownership of real
property, Herculano’s ownership of a coastwise
vessel, Gregorio Co’s loan from the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation.^[7]
First, they sought and were granted liberty upon the filing of cash and surety
bonds, subject to other terms and conditions.^[8]
Then they filed with the Deportation Board a motion to dismiss based on the
plea that it lacked jurisdiction for the reason that they are citizens of the Philippines.^[9]
Such motion was denied as was a
subsequent motion seeking reconsideration.^[10] They did exhaust their administrative
remedy, an appeal to the President being fruitless.^[11] Thereafter, they filed the special civil
action of prohibition and habeas corpus, with the decision as noted being in
their favor on the ground of their being Filipinos.^[12] The exhaustive brief of petitioners as appellees denied the claim that there was a dispute
concerning Maria Tan Comin’s citizenship.^[13] They pointed out that both the appellee Deportation Board and the lower court maintained
the contrary view, her citizenship being admitted.^[14] Moreover, they called attention to the
“overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence”
as to their citizenship based on their having been born in the Philippines of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother, the recognition of such status by several
government agencies, and the exercise by them of the right to suffrage, not to
mention the fact that their birth certificates showed that they are Filipinos.^[15]

On the above facts, it is understandable why judicial
intervention even prior to the final decision of appellant Deportation Board
was justified.  The plea for reversal
cannot be granted.

1. Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board^[16]
stands for this principle: “When the evidence submitted by a respondent is
conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be
recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation
proceedings.”^[17]
Nor is it required that such standard
be rigidly adhered to, as pointed out in the opinion of Justice Labrador:
“The difficulty arises when the evidence is not conclusive on either side,
as in the case at bar.  Should the
deportation proceedings be allowed to continue till the end, or should the question
of alienage or citizenship of respondent be allowed
to be decided first in a judicial proceeding, suspending the administrative
proceedings in the meantime that the alienage or
citizenship is being finally determined in the courts?  The highest judicial authority in the United States has answered the second question in the
affirmative.”^[18] It was likewise stressed that judicial
determination is allowable “in cases when the courts themselves believe
that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is
correct.  In other words, the remedy
should be allowed only in the sound discretion of a competent court in a proper
proceeding.”^[19] That sound discretion was properly exercised
by the then Judge de Veyra in the judgment now on
appeal.

2. Calacday v. Vivo^[20]
reiterated the principle announced in Vivo v. Montesa
as to the applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in deportation
proceedings, thus precluding judicial intervention until completed.  Nonetheless, the opinion made express mention
of the exception to the rule set forth in the Chua Hiong
decision.  Thus: “A clarification
announced in Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board is not
to be lost sight of however.”^[21]
Petitioners could thus very well rely on the pronouncements set forth with such
clarity by Justice Labrador in the aforesaid case.  The only question that remains is whether on
the test prescribed as to the quantum of evidence required to justify judicial
intervention before the termination of the deportation proceedings, the
judgment reached by the lower court may be termed as suffering from the
corrosion of substantial legal error.

3. No such infirmity has been shown.  The facts were fairly appraised and the law
based on judicial precedents.  It is to
be noted that even the brief for appellant could not assert categorically that
the mother of petitioners, Maria Tan Comin, was an
alien.  All that it did say was that her
nationality “is disputed.”^[22]
Again, with candor, there was an
admission that she was born in Iguig, Cagayan in 1892, the father being a Chinese and the mother
being a Filipino.  It was on the basis of
such fact that the lower court, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, also in
the light of applicable authorities, reached the conclusion that her
illegitimate children were entitled to Filipino citizenship.  The restraint apparent in the claim of appellant
Deportation Board that its prosecutor at most “is possessed with evidence
to show that Maria Tan Comin was a Chinese”^[23] certainly militates against its persuasive
force.  The finding of the lower court as
to her being a Filipina had not been shown to be without basis.  Likewise, as was made mention at the outset,
the trial court, on the basis of the evidence before it, reached the conclusion
that deportation would not lie as the status of petitioners as Filipino
citizens, “being the illegitimate children of an unwed Filipino
mother,”^[24] was duly established.  Nor was that the only basis for reaching such
a conclusion.  It did take into
consideration the birth certificates showing that they are Filipinos.^[25] Then there was proof from at least two
government agencies recognizing such status as Filipino citizens.  The Commissioner of Immigration did so as
well as the City Fiscal of Quezon City when he
sustained the legality of petitioner Co’s applying
for a loan from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation mortgaging his real
property therein located.^[26] Moreover, it was likewise proven that they
exercised as Filipinos the right of suffrage as set forth in their brief.^[27] There is warrant for the conclusion reached by
the lower court as to their citizenship following the doctrine announced in Talaroc v. Uy.^[28] Justice Tuason,
speaking for this Court, specifically made mention of respondent Uy having been allowed to exercise the right of suffrage,
to hold public office and to take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.  It
is thus clear that to impute error to the lower court for sustaining the
prohibition proceedings against the Deportation Board in view of the status of
petitioners having been duly established, finds no support from the
authoritative doctrines of this Court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Judge Jesus de Veyra, holding that petitioners are Filipino citizens and
that the Deportation Board was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
deportation proceedings filed against them, is affirmed.  No costs.

Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion,
Jr., and Santos,
JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., took no part.

^[1]
96 Phil. 665 (1955).

^[2]
L-24576, July 29, 1967, 24
SCRA 155.

^[3]
L-26681, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA
413.

^[4]
Brief for Appellant, 3.

^[5]
Ibid.

^[6]
Ibid, 4.

^[7]
Ibid.

^[8]
Ibid.

^[9]
Ibid, 4-5.

^[10]
Ibid.

^[11]
Ibid, 5.

^[12]
Ibid, 6.

^[13] Cf. Brief for Appellees, 2-3.  The
counsel for appellants was the Lopez-De Joya, Dimaguila and Hermoso Law Firm
and Attorneys Manuel V. Romillo, Jr. and Isabelo Azurin.

^[14]
Ibid, 8-9.

^[15]
Ibid, 24-30.

^[16]
96 Phil. 665 (1955).

^[17]
Ibid, 671.

^[18]
Ibid.

^[19]
Ibid, 672.

^[20]
33 SCRA 413.

^[21]
Ibid, 416.

^[22]
Brief for Appellant, 3.

^[23]
Ibid, 10.

^[24]
Brief for Appellees, 24.

^[25]
Ibid, 29-30.

^[26]
Ibid, 26, 28-29.

^[27]
Ibid, 27-28.

^[28]
92 Phil. 52 (1952).