A.C. No. 997. September 10, 1979
PILAR ABAIGAR, COMPLAINANT, VS. DAVID D.C. PAZ, RESPONDENT.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
On April 27, 1971, Pilar
Abaigar filed this administrative case for disbarment against David D.C. Paz, a member of the Philippine Bar.
The verified complaint
alleged that sometime in March 1970, the complainant, Pilar Abaigar,
sought the aid of a legal counsel regarding her divorce case filed by her husband in the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, U.S.A.; that she called on the telephone the office of Congressman Bagatsing in Manila; that the respondent David D.C. Paz, answered the telephone call and volunteered his
legal services; that believing that the respondent had the necessary legal experience, the complainant confided her legal
problems to him; that after the termination of the divorce case, the respondent became exceedingly friendly with the complainant and
started to profess his love for her; that at the start, the complainant was hesitant
in continuing the cordial relations between her and the respondent but the
respondent made her believe that although he was living with another woman, his
relations with said woman were no impediment; that the respondent convinced the
complainant that he had been compelled to
contract a civil marriage with the woman and that since it was not a
marriage under the church laws, it was no bar for him to get married under the church laws with the complainant; that
the respondent proposed marriage to the complainant; that believing in his good
faith, the complainant accepted the proposal of the respondent; that sometime
in the latter part of November 1970, an application for the issuance of a
marriage license to the complainant and the respondent was made and executed; that
thereafter, the respondent convinced the complainant that since they were going
to get married anyway, they should act as husband and wife; that because
of the confidence which the complainant reposed upon the respondent, she
reluctantly acceded to said demands; that as a result of their being together,
the complainant became pregnant but due to causes beyond her control, the
pregnancy was lost; that sometime in the third week of April 1971, one Virginia
Paz was introduced to the complainant by the respondent; that said Virginia
Paz was the woman previously referred to by the respondent as his wife with
whom he had contracted a forced civil marriage; that said Virginia Paz, in the
course of the meeting, informed the complainant that there had been actually
two marriages between Virginia Paz and the respondent, one under the civil law
and one under the church law; that upon being confronted by the complainant,
the respondent made no explanation whatsoever
and merely kept silent; that since that time, the respondent had done nothing
to make amends for having deceived the complainant and for having taken
advantage of her; and that the complainant has no other recourse but to ask for
the disbarment of the respondent who is a member of the Philippine Bar and an
officer of the courts of justice.[1]
In his answer filed on
June 10, 1971, the respondent denied having had any illicit relations with the
complainant and alleged that when the complainant called by telephone
Congressman Ramon D. Bagatsing,
the respondent advised
complainant to come to the office; that on the next day when the complainant
came to the office of Congressman Bagatsing, she was at first referred to Atty.
Geronimo Flores of the Legal Assistance Service to handle the case; that two or
three days thereafter, the complainant requested the respondent to personally
handle her case; that on October
30, 1970, the respondent prepared a letter
to complainant’s husband,
Samuel L. Navales, which letter was signed
by Congressman Bagatsing; that sometime in the latter part of October 1970, the
complainant borrowed from the
respondent the sum of P200.00 to complete the payment for the hospitalization
and treatment of her brother, Eric, at the Makati Medical Center; that as an
act of pity, the respondent gave her the loan; that after the election for delegates to the Constitutional Convention in November 1970, the
complainant called at the residence of the respondent and asked help in filing
a case against the assailant of her brother who was stabbed in Olongapo City;
that the wound sustained by complainant’s brother was only superficial and he
could not identify his assailant, hence, no criminal case was filed; that after
the trip to Olongapo, the complainant requested the help of the respondent to
recommend her admission to a hospital because of abdominal and chest pains;
that the respondent recommended complainant to be admitted to the Singian
Clinic located at Goneral Solano Street, San Miguel, Manila; that on December
20, 1970, the complainant called up the respondent at his residence by
telephone and requested him to assist her mother, Mrs. Cecilia
Abaigar, to file a criminal action against her minor sister, Vilma Abaigar, for
disobedience; that the respondent prepared a complaint on the same night and a
sworn statement of her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar; that he accompanied the
complainant to the Fiscal’s Office at Pasig, Rizal and to the Municipal Court
of Mandaluyong, Rizal, where Criminal Case No. 23994 entitled “People of
the Philippines vs. Vilma Abaigar” was filed by her mother; that the
respondent also helped the mother of the complainant to prepare and file a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Rizal;
that by reason of said petition for habeas corpus, the mother of the
complainant was able to take Vilma Abaigar into her custody although the
petition was denied; that the respondent had never informed the complainant
that he was compelled to contract a civil marriage with his wife; that the respondent never
proposed marriage to the
complainant; that the respondent has no recollection of the supposed
application for the issuance of a marriage license in the
latter part of November 1970; that respondent and complainant had never acted
as husband and wife; and that the respondent had not
deceived complainant nor taken advantage of her.[2]
In a resolution dated August 20, 1971, this Court referred this case to
the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.[3]
After hearing the parties, the Solicitor General submitted
on June 30, 1973 his report and recommendation containing the following findings:
“The complaint, seeks the disbarment of respondent Paz on
grounds that may properly fall under the category of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct as found in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
“Assuming for the
moment that there had been sexual intercourse between complainant and
respondent, the first inquiry, we respectfully submit, is whether respondent
Paz practiced deception on complainant by making her believe that
notwithstanding their subsisting marriages to their respective spouses, they
could legally get married to each other and based on his promise of marriage,
she consented to go to bed with him.
“Complainant admitted that during her alleged romantic liaison
with respondent, she was married to a certain Samuel Navales, also a Filipino,
who divorced her in the U.S.A. sometime in the middle of 1970 (par. 2,
Complaint; p. 46, t.s.n., November 18, 1971).
She also admitted that before she submitted herself to his sexual
desires, she was informed by him that he had a wife with whom he was civilly
married but that the marriage was void because it was either ‘fake’ or ‘forced’
(sic).
“Whether there was deceit hinges on whether complainant
actually believed the representation of respondent that they could legally
marry. Highly intelligent that she is
and with the educational background that she has, it is difficult to accept the
proposition that she swallowed hook, line and sinker his supposed assurances
that, notwithstanding full awareness by both of the existence of each other’s
previous marriages, no legal impediment stood in the way of their getting married
ecclesiastically. It is worthwhile
repeating that complainant was a fifth placer in the Board Examinations for
Chemical Engineering. She was licensed
as a chemical engineer in 1964 or 1965, after which she taught at one time or
another in different schools and colleges in Manila. In 1970 or 1971 when she was supposedly
tricked into surrendering her body on a promise of marriage, she was already in
her late twenties. It is improbable that
at this age, she was still ignorant of the law regarding indissolubility of marriage. Before jumping headlong into accepting
respondent’s proposal that they act as husband and wife, she should have pondered
upon the serious legal implications and complications of a second marriage for
both of them. She could have easily
asked a lawyer for advice on the matter.
Complainant’s own neighbor in Mandaluyong, Rizal, is a lawyer by the
name of Atty. Paler whose wife testified on her behalf. According to Mrs. Paler, her husband and complainant
used to converse (p. 18, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). In these conversations, complainant could
have asked, perhaps in a casual manner, Mrs. Paler’s husband as to the legal
effects of a divorce obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen or the effects of a
marriage brought about through the use of force and intimidation in order to
settle whatever doubts she had in her mind.
“The truth, however, of the matter is that complainant did not
even have to consult a lawyer to know that she could not legally marry
respondent. It is of no little significance
that some persons utilized by complainant as witnesses on her behalf because of
their supposed knowledge of her relations with respondent, were themselves
aware that divorce is not recognized in this country. Thus Mrs. Paler categorically stated that
she knew for a fact that divorce obtained abroad is not recognized in the Philippines (p. 19, t.s.n.,
November 23, 1971). The same admission
was elicited from Fr. Troy de los Santos, another witness for the
complainant. Fr. de los Santos who used
to be her spiritual adviser admitted at one point of his testimony that
divorce obtained abroad cannot be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
state laws are concerned and complainant knew about this (pp. 33-34, t.s.n.,
November 23, 1971). Thus, the Jesuit
priest declared under cross-examination:
‘Q Do
you know that complainant’s husband is still alive?
A Yes.
Q Up
to the present?
A Yes.
Q Do
you know that divorce is not recognized in the Philippines?
A I know, but the church does not recognize
divorce.
Q How
about the State, do you know that the State recognize divorce?
A As far as my knowledge, I do not think that
our laws permit divorce.’
Continuing with his
testimony, Fr. de los Santos stated:
‘Q Did not the
fact that complainant’s husband is still alive and that divorce is not
recognized in the Philippines be considered an impediment to complainant’s
marriage to anyone?
A Yes.
Q Did you inform her so?
A She knows about that.’ (pp. 33, 34, t.s.n.,
id.)
“Again, granting that complainant did not actually comprehend the
existence of a legal bar to her remarriage, ‘not being steeped in the
intricacies of the law’, just the mere realization that both respondent’s wife
and her own husband being still alive was enough to stir her mind and to impel
her to make her own investigation. She
could have, for instance, made discreet inquiries as to who was the woman
respondent was married to and verified his claim whether he was forced into
the marriage. Or, perhaps, she could
simply have asked Congressman Bagatsing about respondent’s personal
status. After all, she was competent
enough to prepare, without anyone’s help her own affidavit, Exhibit ‘A’, and
resourceful enough to make research in the Supreme Court’s Library on the
subject of disbarment (pp. 63, 89, t.s.n., November 18, 1971).
“What conclusion then can a reasonable mind draw from the
given premises? Either complainant was
so helplessly naive as to be beguiled by respondent’s blandishments, or,
comprehending fully the legal impossibility of the fulfillment of his marriage
proposals, she unconditionally laid herself prostrate to his charms, too much
enamored of him to care about anything else.
For, as philosopher Blaise Pascal has so pithily stated of the
profundity of human love, ‘love has reasons that reason cannot explain.’ Since
complainant cannot hide behind the camouflage of innocence, considering her
intellectual capacity and educational background, no other conclusion is
possible except that she voluntarily submitted to sexual intimacy with
respondent without entertaining any illusion or hope of sublimating the illicit
relations by legal union.
“The question is intriguing
whether respondent ever made vehement protestations of love and actually made
an offer of marriage to complainant. If
there was, the evidence adduced does not clearly show. Complainant asserted that she had evidence
in the form of love letters and the marriage application form showing
respondent’s sustained courtship and offer of marriage. However, such purported documents were not
presented, complainant making the excuse that respondent tricked her into
giving him the envelope containing the evidence. Such explanation, however, staggers human
credulity considering that the supposed documents were vital to establish the
case. It is simply preposterous that she
would easily part with the documents and give them to no other than the respondent
himself. Be that as it may, if
respondent had made an offer of marriage, it is not clearly established that
complainant’s submission to his sexual desires was not on account of the offer
but for the gratification of her mundane human longings.
“The next question is whether there was sexual intimacy
between complainant and respondent.
Complainant testified that she acceded to his proposal that they live
as husband and wife and as a matter of fact they had three sexual intercourses
that took place in the Tower Hotel and Singian Clinic in Manila and in the Sulo
Hotel in Quezon City. While there is no
proof that sexual intimacy took place in Singian Clinic except her testimony,
her allegation that they had trysts
at the Tower Hotel and Sulo Hotel was supported by the guest cards at said
hotels, Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘B’. Notwithstanding
respondent’s denial that the ‘Mrs.’ stated in the entry in said guest cards was
a ‘good-time’ woman, not the complainant, common sense will tell us that
complainant could not have known that respondent lodged in said hotels on those
particular dates unless she was the woman whom respondent brought there. On this score, we are inclined to believe
that evidence has been sufficiently adduced to establish that intimacy between
complainant and respondent took place once in the Tower Hotel and once in the
Sulo Hotel. As the Honorable Court has
stated, when the lawyer’s integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough
that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issues and overcome
the evidence for the relator and to show proof that he still maintains the
highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times he is expected of
him (Quingwa vs. Puno, Adm. Case No. 389, Feb. 28, 1967; 19 SCRA 439). Insofar as this point is concerned, the
evidence of the complainant as to the trysts they had in the two hotels has not
been met and overthrown by respondent “[4]
Upon considering the report and recommendation
filed by the Solicitor General, this Court, in a resolution dated July 29,
1972, resolved to require the Solicitor General to file the corresponding
complaint against the respondent, David D.C. Paz, pursuant to Section 5 of Rule
139 of the Revised Rules of Court.[5]
On September 4, 1975, the
Solicitor General filed the corresponding, complaint against David D.C. Paz
praying that the respondent be suspended for a period of at least six months
from the practice of law, with a warning that similar transgressions in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
Meanwhile the complainant
sent a verified letter-petition dated March 29, 1974 to the then Chief Justice
Querube C. Makalintal wherein the complainant asked this Court to look into the
suspicious activities of a certain Rodolfo del Prado, who allegedly in
connivance with the respondent, David D.C. Paz, made her sign an affidavit
prejudicial to her interest. Among other
allegations, the complainant stated in her verified complaint the following:
“6. That
there never is an illicit relationship between Atty. Paz and me at
present because I believed all along that he was single and able to marry
me. In fact, our relationship is
above-board just like any engaged couple.
7. That I was made to understand by the Citizens
Legal Assistant Office that the tenor of the affidavit made by Mr. Rudolfo Del
Prado is such that the consideration for the illicit relationship was a
promissory note which to all intents and purposes is immoral and illegal.
8.
That I am only after the collection of the loan which Atty. Paz
got from me and not revenge for his deception.”[6]
The foregoing portions of her letter
militate against the credibility of the complainant.
In her complaint for disbarment, she pictured the respondent as
morally perverse. However, in the aforementioned
letter, she states that there never was an illicit relationship between her and
the respondent, Atty. David D.C. Paz, and that their relationship was above-board
just like any engaged couple. And
finally, she avers that she was only after the collection of the loan which the
respondent got from her and not for revenge for his deception.
It has been held that the power of this Court to disbar a lawyer
should be exercised with caution because of its serious consequences.[7]
The burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the case against a respondent
must be established by convincing proof.[8]
In Arboleda vs. Gatchalian, this Court held:
“The Court has held that in disbarment proceedings, the burden
of proof rests upon the complainant and the charge against the lawyer must be
established by convincing proof (Go vs. Candoy, A.C. No. 736, Oct. 23, 1967, 21
SCRA 439; Toquib vs. Tomol, Jr., A.C. No. 554, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 156; in
re Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman, A.C. No. 838, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA
139). The record must disclose as free
from doubt a case which compels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary
powers. The corrupt character of the act
done must be clearly demonstrated.
Moreover, considering the serious consequences, of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, We have consistently held that clearly
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of either penalty
(De Guzman vs. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554; Lim vs. Antonio, A.C. No. 848, Sept. 30,
1971, 41 SCRA 44). This Court likewise
held that where there is no proof that respondent lawyer was guilty of any
unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice, the disbarment case against him
should be dismissed (Ricafort vs. Baltazar, A.C. No. 661, June 26, 1967, 20
SCRA 418; Delos Santos vs. Bolaños, A.C. No. 483, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 763).[9]
The evidence adduced by
the complainant has failed to establish any cause for disciplinary action
against the respondent. As the Solicitor
General said in his report, “From all indications, there is little room
for doubt that she filed this disbarment case not in redress of a wrong, for
there was no wrong committed. It was a
voluntary act of indiscretion between two consenting adults who were fully
aware of the consequences of their deed and for which they were responsible
only to their own private consciences.”
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for disbarment
is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., reserves his vote.
Makasiar, J., dissents.
Aquino, J., in the result.
Santos, J., is on leave.
Fernando, C.J., and
Teehankee, JJ., took no part.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-3.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 11-16.
[3]
Rollo, p. 31.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 45-51.
[5]
Rollo, p. 59.
[6]
Adm. Case No. 539-SBC (Pilar V. Abaigar
vs. Rodolfo P. del Prado).
[7]
In re MacDougall, 3 Phil. 70, 78.
[8]
Toquib vs. Tomol, Jr., A.C. No. 554, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 156.
[9]
58 SCRA 64, 67-68.