G.R. No. L-33015. September 10, 1979
GOP-CCP WORKERS UNION, GERONIMO TRINIDAD, ROMULO FERNANDEZ, JOSE MEDENILLA, BENJAMIN DEL ROSARIO, LEONILA DE LEON, PEDRO MARCELINO, ISABEL ENRIQUEZ, DIOSDADO MARZAN, FERNANDO …
AQUINO, J.:
These three related labor cases between the same union and
employers and with the same factual background will be decided jointly.
L-33015. – This case involves the legality of a strike. The GOP-CCP Workers Union and its officers
appealed from the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
affirming the order of Judge Emiliano C. Tabigne dated August 19, 1970. In that order, Judge Tabigne declared illegal
the strike staged by the union on October 27, 1967, held that the officers of
the union had lost their employee status, and authorized their employers,
General Offset Press, Inc. and Container Corporation of the Philippines, to
hire their replacements as the exigencies of their businesses may require (Case
No. 4881-ULP).
The record discloses that on April 20, 1964 the union and the two
above-named corporations, with plants in the same compound located at 62 Old
Samson Road, Balintawak, Quezon City and alleged to be owned by one family,
entered into collective bargaining agreements which would be effective for
three years. By means of a supplementary
agreement, the three-year term was extended to July 31, 1968.
The agreements contained arbitration clauses which outlined the
grievance procedure for processing disputes regarding the terms of
employment. They also included the
following no-strike and no-lockout provisions:
“ARTICLE XXII – STRIKES, STOPPAGE
OF WORK AND SETTLEMENT
CLAUSE
“Section 1. The Union
agrees that during the whole period of this agreement, there shall be no
strike, walkouts, stoppage or slowdown of work, boycotts, secondary boycotts,
refusals to handle any merchandise, picketing, sit down strikes of any kind,
sympathetic or general strikes, and any other interference with any of the
operation of the Company.
“Section 2. The Company
agrees that there shall be no lockout either during the period of this
agreement.
“Section 3. In case of
any alleged unfair labor practice on the part of either party, there will be
no strikes, lockouts, or any prejudicial action contemplated under the preceding
Sections 1 and 2 until the question or grievance is resolved by the proper
court if not settled through a grievance procedure therein outlined. x x x” (Exh. A- 2 and B-2).
On October 26, 1967, two CIR prosecutors filed in behalf of the
union and three dismissed employees named Remus Honofre, Anastacio Sanchez and
Andres Tuatis a complaint for unfair labor practice against the two firms and
their three officers named Benito Pascual, Robert Hwang and Romeo Monteyro.
It was alleged in the complaint that the two firms failed to
comply with their commitment to readjust the pay scales of the union members
and that the three employees, Honofre, Sanchez and Tuatis, were dismissed
because of their union membership and activities. The case was docketed as Case No. 4873-ULP
and was assigned to Judge Ansberto Paredes.
On the following day, October 27, the union, without any notice,
staged a strike and established picket lines at the plants of the two firms so
as to implement their protest against the unfair labor practices complained of
in Case No. 4873-ULP.
By way of retaliation, a countercharge for unfair labor practice
was filed on November 7, 1967 by another CIR prosecutor in behalf of the two
corporations against the union for having staged a strike in violation of the
“no strike, no lockout” provisions and the grievance procedure
outlined in the collective bargaining agreements. That case, docketed as Case No. 4881-ULP, was
assigned to Judge Tabigne.
The union on December 20, 1967 sought the consolidation of the
two cases due to identity of parties and close interweaving of issues but Judge
Tabigne denied the consolidation.
In January, 1968, the union received a letter from the counsel of
the two corporations, manifesting a desire for the formalization of a
“return to work” agreement and requesting that the union should
finalize its demands for the renewal of the collective bargaining agreements so
that the negotiations might be started.
The union signified its unqualified acceptance of that offer. It lifted its picket lines. The strikers held themselves in readiness to
work immediately.
However, the two corporations allegedly refused to readmit the
strikers with the exception of four of them.
In view of that intransigent attitude of the employers, the union
amended its complaint in Case No. 4873-ULP so as to charge such refusal
as an additional unfair labor practice.
Believing that the amendment of the complaint in Case No.
4873-ULP constituted a prejudicial question in Case No. 4881-ULP, the
union moved for a suspension of the proceedings in the latter case. Judge Tabigne denied the motion. The denial was affirmed by the CIR en banc.
After the two firms had presented their evidence in Case No.
4881-ULP in June, 1969, the union was required to present its
evidence. It failed to do so. Hence, Judge Tabigne in his order of April
27, 1970 considered the case submitted for decision without the union’s
evidence. That order was affirmed by the
CIR en banc. The union appealed
from that order but it later withdrew its appeal.
As already stated, Judge Tabigne decided the case adversely to
the union. His decision was affirmed by
the court en banc. Judge Tabigne
found (1) that when the strike was declared, there was no grievance pending
between the union and the two employers and that, if there was such a
grievance, the union did not avail itself of the procedure delineated in the
collective bargaining agreements; (2) that there was no notice of the intention
to go on strike and no such notice was filed with the Department of Labor; (3)
that the strike, which contravened the said agreements, was characterized by
coercion, intimidation and threats, and (4) that by means of picketing, the
strikers, with their wooden placards prevented the nonstriking employees from
working.
Thus, Jesus C. Lopez, the plant manager of the Container
Corporation of the Philippines, was threatened by the strikers that something
would happen to him if he reported for work.
On another occasion, the car of Lopez, who, with other employees, was
reporting for work, was surrounded by the strikers and he was threatened with
harm and insulted in this wise:
“Putang ina mo, para kang hindi Pilipino, salabusab.” One of
the strikers blocked the car of Lopez by placing a placard against the
windshield. It was only through the
intervention of a police lieutenant that Lopez was able to enter the premises
of his employer. As a consequence of
that incident, the strikers were charged in court with grave coercion.
On the same occasion, Rodolfo Ganzon, the driver of the General
Offset Press, Inc., while approaching the gate to report for work, was stopped
by Geronimo Trinidad, the president of the union. Trinidad sat on the hood of the truck driven
by Ganzon and told him to stop; otherwise, something might happen to him and he
might not be alive the next day. That incident
also provoked the filing of a charge for grave coercion in the city court of
Quezon City.
The CIR concluded that the strike was illegal, that it was in
violation of the collective bargaining agreements and that the union did not
bargain in good faith with the employers.
The union and its seventeen officers and agents, who were
respondents in the unfair labor practice case, contend in this appeal in Case
No. 4881-ULP that they were denied due process of law because the case was
decided solely on the basis of complainants’ evidence.
That contention is erroneous and unreasonable because the
petitioners were given the opportunity to present their evidence but, to suit
their purpose, they refused to do so.
Their baseless pretext was that a prejudicial question was involved in
the unfair labor practice case filed by them.
It is incontestable that they were not denied due process at all.
Their argument that the CIR should have considered matters
favorable to them although not presented in evidence is untenable. That procedure would not be fair to the
employers who are also entitled to due process.
The petitioners argue that the CIR erred in deciding the unfair
labor practice case filed by the employers without awaiting the outcome of the
prior unfair labor practice case filed by the union. That argument appears to be preposterous in
the light of subsequent events because the first unfair labor practice case was
submitted for decision in the CIR in 1974 and was decided by a Labor
Arbiter in 1975 and later passed upon by the National Labor Relations
Commission and the Secretary of Labor and eventually decided by the Office of
the President on November 18, 1977 (See pp. 38-40, Rollo of L-47776).
On the other hand, the instant case was decided by the CIR in 1970. Had it been made to await the outcome of Case
No. 4873-ULP, it might still be undecided up to this time. The wheels of justice grind slowly. Delay is the bane of litigation.
The CIR did not gravely abuse its discretion when in its order of
February 26, 1968 it denied the union’s motion for the consolidation of the two
unfair labor practice cases because “the facts, circumstances and remedies
or reliefs prayed for” in the two cases “are at variance and entirely
different” (pp. 78-81, Rollo).
The union brands as illegal the stipulation in the collective
bargaining agreements that “in case of any alleged unfair labor practice
on the part of either party, there will be no strikes, lockouts, or any
prejudicial action x x x until the question or grievance is resolved by the
proper court if not settled through a grievance procedure therein outlined”.
The union’s argument in support of that contention is vague and
unconvincing. No specific statutory
enactment was cited to show the illegality of that stipulation. The union merely avers that that stipulation
contravenes article 1701 of the Civil Code because it would permit capital to
act oppressively against labor.
The legality of that kind of stipulation was inferentially upheld
in Liberal Labor Union vs. Philippine Can Company, 91 Phil. 72, 78, where it
was ruled: “The authorities are
numerous which hold that strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a
collective bargaining agreement are illegal, specially when they provide for
conclusive arbitration clauses. These
agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be
achieved”. See article 264 of the
Labor Code regarding prohibition against strikes and lockouts.
In the Liberal Labor Union case, it appears that on
February 26, 1949 the union and the company entered into a collective
bargaining agreement. It was stipulated
therein that if a laborer had a complaint, the same would first be resolved by
a grievance committee. Then, if the
decision was not satisfactory, the same would be referred to the top officials
of the union and the company. And if
still no settlement was reached, the matter would be submitted to the CIR.
On March 14, 1949, the union declared a strike as a protest
against the reduction of the wages of seven laborers. Later, the union filed in the CIR a petition
wherein it prayed that the strike be declared legal. It was held that the strike was illegal
because the union did not adhere to the procedure agreed upon for the
settlement of disputes.
A strike or walkout on the basis of grievances which have not
been submitted to the grievance committee, as stipulated in the agreement of
the parties sanctioned by the CIR, is premature and illegal (Insurefco Paper
Pulp & Project Workers’ Union vs. Insular Sugar Refining Corporation, 95
Phil. 761. See 51 C.J.S. 1088 and 48 Am
Jur 2nd 795).
The union in its fourth assignment of error argues that there is
a total lack of evidence proving that the other members of the union had any
complicity in the acts of coercion, intimidation and threats committed by some
strikers like Geronimo Trinidad and Antonio Valenzuela who were both charged
with grave coercion in the city court.
Trinidad was the union president.
The intimidatory acts were committed in the presence of the other union
members. They did not try to restrain
the commission of those acts. Their
presence and inaction were tantamount to assent to the commission of those
acts.
Petitioners’ last assignment of error is that the CIR erred in
not granting their motion of July 27, 1970 to reopen the case. It will be recalled that Judge Tabigne in his
order of April 27, 1970 considered the case submitted for decision
without petitioners’ evidence. He
decided the case on August 19, 1970. In
his decision he stated that the motion for reopening was devoid of merit
because the petitioners had been accorded sufficient opportunity to present
their evidence and, therefore, the petitioners had not been denied due process.
Petitioners invoked section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103,
regarding “limit of effectiveness of award”, to support their
contention that the denial of their motion to reopen the case was
erroneous. It should be noted that under
section 17, it is not mandatory or ministerial for the CIR to reopen any
question involved in its award, order or decision. The reopening is discretionary with the CIR.
It is doubtful whether section 17 sustains petitioners’
contention that the CIR should have reopened the case three months after it had
ordered that the case was submitted for decision. The truth was that the CIR was fed up with
petitioners’ dilatory tactics. Hence, it
was disinclined to grant petitioners’ motion to reopen the case.
The pervasive issue in this case is the legality of the
strike. To be lawful, a strike must be
preceded by the requisite notice of intention to strike. It should have a lawful purpose and it should
be executed through lawful means (Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant Employees
Association vs. Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation, L-33935, May 11, 1978,
83 SCRA 56, 66).
In this case, the strike was not preceded by any notice. It was not peacefully conducted. It was in contravention of the “no
strike, no lockout” stipulations of the collective bargaining agreements. The CIR correctly concluded that it was an
illegal strike.
Since there is no merit in petitioners’ appeal, Judge Tabigne’s
order of August 19, 1970 and the CIR’s resolution of October 9, 1970 in Case
No. 4881-ULP should be affirmed.
L-47776. – This is a special civil action of certiorari
to set aside the decision of the Office of the President dated November 18,
1977 which affirmed the dismissal of the charges of unfair labor practice filed
by the petitioners (the union and its one hundred eleven members) against
General Offset Press, Inc. and Container Corporation of the Philippines,
repeatedly referred to as CIR Case No. 4873-ULP.
As already stated, the said case was pending before Judge
Ansberto Paredes. The CIR refused to
consolidate it with the unfair labor practice case filed by the two companies
against GOP-CCP Workers Union and its officers, CIR Case No. 4881-ULP, now
L-33015, which has been disposed of earlier herein. After the abolition of the CIR, Case No.
4873-ULP was transferred to the National Labor Relations Commission.
The Labor Arbiter in his decision of May 27, 1975 dismissed the
charges and refused to rule on complainants’ petition for reinstatement with
back wages because the matter of the legality of the strike was sub judice
in L-33015, ante. As already
stated, that decision was affirmed by the NLRC, by the Acting Secretary of
Labor and, with the authority of the President of the Philippines, by the
Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs.
Thus, no less than four administrative officials of ascending
rank ruled against the one hundred twelve petitioners. Presidential Assistant Ronaldo B. Zamora
found that it was not proven that the two companies refused to bargain, or
bargained in bad faith, concerning wage adjustments. He regarded as unfounded the charge that
Honofre, Sanchez and Tuatis were dismissed because of their union activities.
He said that their dismissal was due to causes unconnected with
their union activities.
Honofre was on an unauthorized leave of absence in view of his
involvement in the alleged malversation of the money of his co-workers in a
“paluagan” system. Sanchez and
Tuatis were implicated in a theft case and were likewise on an unauthorized
leave of absence because they were eluding the police.
These factual findings of the four administrative officials are
binding on this Court and they render untenable petitioners’ argument that the
public respondents committed a grave abuse of discretion in not holding that
the two companies were guilty of unfair labor practice.
In this certiorari case, which was filed on April 18, 1978,
the principal issue is whether the two companies committed an unfair labor
practice in refusing to readmit the one hundred fifteen striking members of the
union despite their unconditional and voluntary offer to return to work on
January 29, 1968.
The two companies refused to readmit the strikers because the
agreement containing the conditions for their return to work was not formalized
and because of the pendency of the case wherein the employers had sought a
declaration that the strike was illegal (Annex NN and page 7 of memo, pp. 150
and 525 of Rollo).
In view of our finding in L-33015 or Case No. 4881-ULP that the
strike was illegal, the corollary conclusion is that the two companies did not
commit any unfair labor practice in refusing to readmit the strikers.
And considering that, as indicated hereinafter in the third case,
L-30833, another union has supplanted the petitioner, GOP-CCP Workers Union,
which at present has no member working in the two companies (Manifestation of
April 16, 1979, pp. 454-6, Rollo), the cause of industrial peace would not be
served if the one hundred eleven strikers or petitioners were to be reinstated.
Therefore, the petition should be dismissed and the decision of
the Office of the President dated November 18, 1977 should be upheld. The individual petitioners have lost their
status as employees of the two companies because of the illegality of their
strike (Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant Employees Association-ALU vs. Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Corporation, L-33935, May 11, 1978, 83 SCRA 56, 66-67).
However, as a matter of compassionate justice, the strikers may
be considered as dismissed employees entitled to the benefits of the
Termination Pay Law as of October 27, 1967 when they stopped working.
The two companies should give the strikers separation pay if on
that date they were already entitled to the benefits of that law (See Adame vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, L-33221 and L-33262-63, April 28, 1975, 63 SCRA
469, 484).
L-30833. – As already stated in the two preceding cases,
L-33015 and L-47776, in 1967, the GOP-CCP Workers Union had collective
bargaining agreements with the General Offset Press, Inc. and the Container
Corporation of the Philippines which were effective up to July 31, 1968. On October 27, 1967, or while the said
agreements were in force, the union declared a strike as a protest against the
alleged unfair labor practices committed by the said firms.
As a consequence of that strike, some members of the union
shifted their allegiance to another union, the Philippine Labor Alliance
Council (PLAC), Local 129, GOP-CCP Chapter.
On November 9, 1967, the PLAC filed with the Court of Industrial
Relations a petition for the holding of a certification election to determine
which union should be the sole bargaining agent of the workers in the two
firms. Later, the PLAC asked that the
certification election be restricted to the workers in the General Offset
Press, Inc. (CIR Case No. 2048-MC).
The GOP-CCP Workers Union was allowed to intervene in that
certification election case. The two
unions agreed that “a consent election” should be conducted by the
CIR among the rank-and-file employees.
Judge Amando C. Bugayong in his order of March 8, 1969 ordered the holding
of the certification election on March 28, 1969 among the rank-and-file
employees excluding those performing supervisory, confidential and managerial
functions.
Judge Bugayong in that same order allowed to participate in the
election the employees who were paid monthly (instead of only those workers who
were paid daily). He also allowed to
vote thirty-four employees, who were made permanent after the strike was
declared, and those members of the GOP-CCP Workers Union who were involved in
the unfair labor practice case filed by the company against the union. However, their votes were ordered segregated
for further disposition by the court.
Disagreeing with those rulings of Judge Bugayong, the GOP-CCP
Workers Union filed motions for reconsideration and for the suspension of the
certification election. Those motions
were not resolved right away. The
election was held, as scheduled, on March 28, 1969. The GOP-CCP Workers Union did not take part
in the election. The workers voted for
the PLAC as their collective bargaining agent.
On March 31, 1969, the GOP-CCP Workers Union filed a protest
against the election and prayed that it be declared void. The PLAC filed an opposition to the
protest. The CIR en banc in its
resolution of June 16, 1969 affirmed Judge Bugayong’s order. From that resolution, the GOP-CCP Workers
Union appealed to this Court.
This Court in its resolution of December 11, 1978 required the
parties to state whether there is an existing collective bargaining agreement
between the General Offset Press, Inc. and its employees and whether
supervening events have rendered the appeal moot and academic.
Respondent PLAC in its manifestation stated that a collective
bargaining agreement was concluded between said union and the company on
October 21, 1969; that thereafter the agreement was renewed every three years;
that the latest one duly certified by the Bureau of Labor Relations, is for the
period from January 1, 1978 to December 31, 1980, and that at present the
GOP-CCP Workers Union has no member working for the company, all the workers
being affiliated with the PLAC, and they have ratified the collective bargaining
agreement. The PLAC prayed that the case
be dismissed for having become moot.
Appellant union in its manifestation admitted that at present
it has no member working for the company.
However, it countered that the issues in this appeal have not become
moot because its members are still considered employees of the company, who
can participate in future certification elections, and that the question of
their reinstatement is pending before this Court in L-33015, GOP-CCP Workers
Union, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations.
Appellant union contends that it was denied substantial justice
because the certification election was held notwithstanding that it had moved
for its suspension and for the reconsideration of the order scheduling it.
There is a ruling that in the absence of any restraining order
issued by a competent court, the filing of a motion for reconsideration with
the CIR en banc does not suspend ipso facto a scheduled
certification election (Philex Miners Union vs. National Mines & Allied
Workers Union, 116 Phil. 1282).
Appellant union argues that the ruling in the Philex case does
not apply to this case because the motion for suspension in that case was
denied before the scheduled election was held.
In the instant case, the CIR held that appellant’s motions were
dilatory. It should be recalled that,
originally, appellant union had agreed to the holding of the certification
election. Foreseeing its defeat in the
election, it resorted to the expedient of asking for the suspension of the
certification election.
We hold that no injustice was perpetrated against the appellant
when the certification election was held notwithstanding the pendency of its
motions for reconsideration and for the suspension of the election. The CIR rightly sensed that those
eleventh-hour maneuvers did not conduce to industrial peace and, instead,
fomented uncertainty on the matter of representation of the workers.
The prior collective bargaining agreement expired on July 31,
1968. Appellant union, as the former
collective bargaining agent, had lost the support of the majority of the
workers. Another union had appeared on
the scene. It was imperative that the
question of representation should be set at rest as soon as possible. Hence, Judge Bugayong, with the consent of
the two rival unions (appellant and the PLAC), set the certification election
on March 28, 1969.
Considering that the appellant union did not take part in the
election and that at present it has no member working for the company, it had
ceased to have any interest in the issues raised by it, that is, whether the
CIR erred in holding that the workers paid on a monthly basis should be allowed
to vote and that the votes of the strikers and the scabs should be
segregated. There is no point in
resolving those issues at the behest of a union that has no member working for
the company. (See Velasco vs. Rosenberg,
29 Phil. 212, 214.)
WHEREFORE, the petitions in these three cases are dismissed. In L-33015, the order of Judge Tabigne
dated August 19, 1970 and the CIR’s resolution of October 9, 1970 are affirmed.
In L-47776, the decision rendered by Presidential
Assistant Zamora is affirmed. The prayer
of the individual petitioners for reinstatement and back wages is denied but
respondents General Offset Press, Inc. and Container Corporation of the
Philippines are directed to give separation pay under the Termination Pay Law
to those strikers who were already entitled to the benefits of that law on
October 27, 1967 when the illegal strike was declared and when they should be
regarded as dismissed employees.
In L-30833, the union’s appeal is dismissed for having
become moot and academic. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
Santos, J., on abroad.