MANUEL R. GO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ROMULO CANDOY, ADMITTED TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR:  MARCH 9, 1957, RESPONDENT.

This is an administrative case for disbarment instituted by
Manuel R. Go on October 24, 1966
against Atty. Romulo Candoy
on the basis of acts committed by the latter allegedly constituting
“deceit and grossly immoral conduct”.

The complaint recites that by virtue of a “previous
agreement” between the complainant Go and the respondent Candoy over “Lot 11, Block 16 (LRC) Psd-12510 Magallanes Village P-1 with an area of 350 sq. m. located
at Makati, Rizal,” Go
gave to the Makati Development Corporation^[1]
on March 4, 1964 his personal check for P7,140, which sum represents the initial
payment on the said lot plus the required cash bond; that by virtue of this
payment, the corporation executed an “Agreement to Purchase and Sell”
in favor of Candoy; that on the same date, “in
view of the foregoing consideration and the additional amount of P2,000 in cash
given” by Go to Candoy, the latter executed an
“Agreement to Purchase and Sell” in favor of Go; that on March 31,
1964 Go gave to the corporation another personal check for P16,337.01, which
amount represents the “unpaid balance of the purchase price of the said
lot”; that in view of this last payment, the corporation on the same date
executed a “Deed of Absolute Sale” in favor of Candoy;
that on August 30, 1965 Candoy and his wife, by
virtue of a “Contract to Sell”, sold the land to the spouses Amado Barrientos and Astrid N. Barrientos; that to protect his rights, Go instituted a
civil case (9047, CFI of Rizal) against Candoy and his wife, the spouses Barrientos
and the corporation, as well as a criminal prosecution for estafa
(15756, CFI of Rizal) against Candoy;
and that both cases are now pending adjudication.

In answer to the complaint, Candoy
admits the existence of the “Agreement to Purchase and Sell” in favor
of Go as well as the “Deed of Absolute Sale” executed by the corpora­tion
in his (Candoy’s) favor.  He likewise admits having executed a
“Contract to Sell” in favor of the spouses Barrientos,
but avers that he did so only “after the petitioner (complainant) had
defaulted and after the respondent had given him all the opportunity to comply,
but nevertheless, the petitioner failed, so the respondent was compelled to rescind his agreement with the
petitioner and it was only then that the respond­ent sold the lot in question to the spouses Amado Barrientos and Astrid Barrientos“.  As
a special and affirmative defense, he asserts that there was no deceit, much less any immoral
conduct, on his part in rescinding the sale to Go and selling the land to the
spouses Barrientos, because he gave Go “all the
opportunity to comply with their agreement and it was only after the petitioner
refused to comply with their agreement that the respondent decided to rescind
the agreement.”

The case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and, recommendation.  On January 23, 1967 Candoy,
with the conformity of Go, moved to dismiss the case on the ground that they
had reached an amicable settlement.  On March 17, 1967 the Solicitor General,
without any hearing had in the case, submitted his report and recommendation,
the pertinent portions of which read as follows:

“Although this case may
be disposed of in the light of the joint motion for dismissal filed by the
parties and their counsel, it appears from the very answer of respondent that
the double sale complained of was occasioned by a very trivial alleged
violation of the first vendee of the condition of the sale, namely, the alleged
non-payment of association dues
in the amount of around P52.50 which in the mind of the undersigned should not have
been taken advantage of by respondent. 
Besides, it is hard to believe the denial made under oath by respondent
of receipt of P2,000.00 as additional consideration of the land sale as alleged
in paragraph 3 of the petition;

“Under the circumstances, in order that lawyers may be
restrained from doing any act which in any manner may be tainted with some
degree of unfairness or oppressiveness, albeit legal, which, in this case is doubtful
because the alleged lesion was not serious, it is advisable that the respondent
be correspondingly admonished.”

Commenting on the foregoing recommendation, Candoy
in his memorandum expressed surprise “as to how the Solicitor General has
arrived at the conclusion that ‘it is hard
to believe the denial made under oath by the respondent of receipt of P2,000.00
as additional
consideration’ when there was no investigation whatsoever conducted and the
complainant has not presented any evidence to prove his allegation.” Candoy argues that even on the assumption that the
violation committed by Go is trivial, the fact remains that the latter
committed a breach of contract justifying rescission of their agreement, and
that such rescission cannot in any manner be regarded as constituting
“deceit and grossly immoral conduct” on Candoy’s
part.

Notwithstanding the joint motion to dismiss filed by
the parties, this Court can still hold the respondent Candoy
accountable for breach of professional conduct, if he has committed any
relative to his contractual relations with the complainants.  A lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, should satisfy this Court
that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the
Bar.  He can not dispense with nor
downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law profession.  For this reason, a case of suspension or
disbarment may proceed “regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainants if
the facts proven so warrant.”^[2]
It is of no moment, therefore,
that the parties herein “have considered this matter closed with the
termination of the transaction had” by them.  What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been
duly proven.

It is quite elementary that in disbarment proceedings, the burden
of proof rests upon the complainant.  To
be made the ba­sis for suspension
or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must be established by
convincing proof.  The record must disclose
as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise
by this Court of its disciplinary powers. 
The dubious character of the
act done as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated.^[3]

Coming back to the case at hand, it is our view that the Solicitor General erred in concluding that
“it is hard to be­lieve the denial made under oath by the respondent of
receipt of P2,000 as additional consideration of the land sale”.  Apart from the bare allegation that the
complainant gave the respond­ent “the additional amount of P2,000.00 in
cash”, which allegation was squarely traversed by the latter under oath,
the record is absolutely bereft of any proof that the said amount was in fact
paid to, and received by, the respondent. 
It was easy enough for the complainant to prove payment of the amount of
P2,000, by the mere tender of the
corresponding receipt.  Since there was
no investigation conducted in the case, and the complainant has not at all
presented any evidence of payment by him of the said amount, the respondent was
under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.

In his report and
recommendation, the Solicitor General observed “that the double sale
complained of was occasioned by a very trivial alleged violation of the
first vendee of the condition of the sale, namely, the alleged non-payment of
association dues in the amount of around P52.50,”
and concluded that the rescission of the contract by the respondent was
“tainted with some degree of unfairness or oppressiveness.” We disagree.  The Solicitor General overlooks the fact that
the breach of the “Agreement
to Purchase and Sell” committed by the complainant did not embrace alone
“non-payment of association dues” but as well and, more importantly,
failure to pay the full consideration of the sale of the lot in question.  In the said agreement, the complainant bound
himself to “pay to Makati Development
Corporation the balance of P19,460.00 on or before April 1, 1965 including 12% interest per annum on the said
balance”.  The complainant paid the sum of only P16,337.01, leaving, therefore, the sizeable unpaid balance of
P3,122.99.  Although the question of rescission is now academic, the
parties having settled their differences amicably, this Court is not prepared
to say that in rescinding the agreement the respondent acted with
“unfairness and oppressiveness”, as he merely exercised a power
explicitly conferred upon him by the said agreement, this power being one of
the special stipulations and covenants thereof “strict and full
compliance” with which the complainant unequivocally bound himself.

ACCORDINGLY, the complaint for disbarment against Atty. Romulo Candoy is hereby
dismissed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
The Makati Development Corporation was the original
owner of the lot in question which the respondent was au­thorized by the corporation to purchase.

^[2]
Bolivar vs. Simbol, Adm. Case 377, April 29, 1966, and the authorities
therein cited.

^[3]
See People vs. Hammond, 191 N.E. 215, 216, and the cases therein cited.