MARIA LUZ ATIENZA, COMPLAINANT, VS. VICENTE EVANGELISTA, RESPONDENT.

Membership in the bar is an exacting responsibility.  It is, to quote from Justice Cardozo, “a privilege burdened with conditions.”^[1]
It imposes, at the very least, the obligation of attending with due zeal and
diligence to a client’s cause.  In a
complaint filed with this Court by Maria Luz Atienza,
respondent Vicente Evangelista, a member of the Philippine Bar, was charged
with unprofessional conduct unbecoming a member of the bar.  It was alleged that he was remiss in
attending to her case with the Manila City Fiscal’s
Office notwithstanding his having been retained and paid for his services.  He was required to answer.  That he did. 
There was an admission on his part of his having been retained, but he
denied any imputation of lack of due diligence in performing the legal services
required of him.  He asserted that he had
always conducted himself in a manner expected of a lawyer.  This notwithstanding, there was a
recommendation by the investigating fiscal, that the case be dropped for
insufficiency of evidence.  Then and
there, complainant dispensed with his services and shortly thereafter took from
him all the papers connected with such a case. 
It was his assumption therefore that he “was no longer under
obligation to participate in any proceeding in connection with said case.  That duty had been shifted to the new lawyer
of Mrs. Atienza in the case involving her
husband.”^[2]

Thereafter, this Court, on December 5, 1975, resolved to refer the administrative
complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and
recommendation.  There was such an
investigation, with the report being submitted to this Court on March 17, 1977.  The recommendation was for the dismissal of
the complaint against respondent.

In such report and recommendation submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,^[3]
it was stated that respondent was retained to assist complainant in the
prosecution of the persons allegedly responsible for her husband’s death.  It was agreed that she should pay him the sum
of P8,000.00 as attorney’s fees with P3,000.00 as down payment and P100.00 to
be paid per appearance.  A complaint was
duly filed by respondent with the City Fiscal’s
Office in Manila.  It was assigned to Assistant Fiscal Fernando Agdamag for preliminary investigation.  Respondent presented the complainant and her
witnesses.  Two of them refused to submit
themselves to cross-examination.  That
prompted the fiscal to recommend that the case be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.  Such recommendation was concurred in by
another fiscal, Roberto D. Cabrera, and the then City Fiscal, Jose Gamboa.

The report then proceeded in this wise:  “The primary issue in this case is
whether the respondent was wilfully negligent in the
performance of his duties as counsel to the complainant to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.  As a rule, an
attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges until
the contrary is proved, and, as an officer of the court, he has performed his
duty in accordance with his oath.  (In re
Tiongko, 43 Phil. 191).  Thus, in every case of disbarment the burden
of proof lies with the complainant to show that the respondent is guilty of the
acts charged.  In the present case, there
is no sufficient evidence
showing that the respondent lawyer violated his oath or was negligent in
handling the complainant’s case.  The
respondent personally prepared the complaint of Mrs. Atienza
and filed this with the Fiscal’s Office.  When the case was set for preliminary
investigation, he was present in no less than 15 scheduled hearings.  He presented as witnesses the complainant and
four other persons.  These, facts are
borne by the case record and admitted by the complainant.  (pp. 73-400, t.s.n.,
March 10, 1976).  The complainant’s case was dismissed
apparently because of the failure of the complainant’s witnesses to submit to
cross-examination.  This is clear from a
reading of Fiscal Agdamag’s memorandum * * *.  The said memorandum reads:  that the hearing of the case has been
continuously postponed several times because of the failure of the prosecution
witnesses to appear; that on October 10, 1972, the counsel for the complainant,
together with his client, manifested into the record that should they be
unable to produce the witnesses at the next hearing they would submit their
case on the basis of the evidence already on record;’ that on October 25, 1972,
‘only the counsel for the complainant appeared. 
His client and their witnesses did not arrive.  * * *’ Atty. Evangelista was, thus,
constrained to submit the case on the basis of the evidence already on
record.  These facts do not indicate
negligence on the part of the respondent. 
The complainant who was present during the hearing of October 10, 1972 was fully aware
that she still had to present two of her witnesses for cross-examination on the
next scheduled hearing.”^[4]

 As to the allegation by complainant
that respondent did not inform her that the case had been dismissed and that he
did nothing to remedy the same, there is this relevant excerpt from such
report:  “The record does not
support this claim.  The respondent met
the complainant in the house of Sgt. Bo sometime in December, 1972, immediately
after he learned that the case was dismissed. 
He informed the complainant then that her case had been dismissed.  He also informed her that he could appeal or
ask for a reconsideration of the same but the complainant took the case record
from him and said that she has hired another lawyer to handle her case.  The complainant admits the said
incident.  She also confirms that she
terminated the respondent’s services on the same day.  (pp. 31-33, t.s.n.,
March 10, 1976).”^[5]

The concluding paragraph of the report follows:  “The complaint against the respondent
Atty. Vicente Evangelista has not been established by competent evidence.  The dismissal of Mrs. Atienza’s
case is not imputable to respondent.  A member
of the bar can not be subjected to the peril of disbarment simply because of
decision adverse to his client.  The
serious consequence of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there
is a clear preponderance of evidence showing the basis thereof.”^[6]
Accordingly, the recommendation was for the dismissal of the complaint.

This Court is in agreement.^[7]
It would be to place an intolerable burden on a member of the bar if just
because a client failed to obtain what is sought by her after due exertion of
the required effort on his part, he would be held accountable.  Success in a litigation is certainly not the
test of whether or not a lawyer had lived up to his duties to a, client.  It is enough that with the thorough
preparation of the case handled by him, he had taken all the steps to prosecute
his suit.  If thereafter the result would
be the frustration of his client’s hopes, that is a cause for disappointment,
no doubt for him no less than for his client, but not for disciplinary
action.  He is more to be sympathized
with than condemned – on the assumption
of course that he did what was expected of him.

WHEREFORE, the complaint against Attorney Vicente
Evangelista is dismissed.  Let a copy of
this resolution be spread on his record.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., and Santos,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
New York ex rel
Karlin v. Culkin,
162 NE 489 (1928), cited in Albano
v. Coloma, Adm. Case No. 528, October
11, 1967, 21 SCRA 411.

^[2]
Report and Recommendation, 5.

^[3]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Nathanael
P. de Pano, Jr. and Trial Attorney Blesila O. Quintillan.

^[4]
Report and Recommendation, 16-17.

^[5]
Ibid, 17-18.

^[6]
Ibid, 18.

^[7]
The report made mention of In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191
(1922).  The Tionko
opinion of Justice Malcolm was cited with approval in the following cases:  Javier v. Cornejo,
63 Phil. 293 (1936) De Guzman v. Tadeo, 68
Phil. 554 (1939); In re Attorney C. T. Oliva, 103
Phil. 312 (1958); Blanza v. Arcangel, Adm. Case No. 492 Sept. 5, 1967, 21 SCRA 1; Magno v. Gellada, Adm. Case
No. 767, Dec. 20, 1971, 42 SCRA 549; Argana v.
Cruz, Adm. Case No. 1236, July 31, 1975, 65 SCRA 550; Misamin
v. San Juan, Adm. Case No. 1418, Aug. 31, 1976, 72 SCRA 491; Acosta v.
Serrano, Adm. Case No. 1246, Feb. 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 253; Obrero
v. Tagala, Adm. Case No. 984, April 22, 1977,
76 SCRA 316; Santiago v. Bustamante, Adm. Case
No. 827, April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 527.