G.R. No. L-27448. November 29, 1977
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, PETITIONER, VS. REPARATIONS COMMISSION, THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE HON. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS, THE HON. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS, THE P…
CONCEPCION JR ., J.:
Petition for mandamus, with preliminary injunction, to
compel the respondent Reparations Commission to execute the formal documents
transferring certain reparations equipment and machinery to the petitioner,
and to restrain the other respondents from excluding the petitioner from the use,
control, and disposition of the said reparations equipment and machinery.
On November 25, 1963,
the petitioner Province
of Pangasinan filed with the respondent Reparations
Commission an application for reparation goods worth US $1,500,000.00, to be used
for “non-revenue projects”, such as equipment and machinery for road
building, improvement of existing irrigation systems, and garbage collection
for different municipalities.[1]
As a pre-requisite, the petitioner was required to set aside sufficient amounts
in its budget for maintenance of said equipment and machinery.[2]
On October 13, 1964,
the respondent Reparations Commission forwarded to the President far approval,
through the National Economic Council, the tentative schedule for the ninth
reparations year.[3]
Included therein, was the petitioner’s application for road building equipment.[4]
On March 9, 1965, the National Economic Council, by its
Resolution No. 96 (65), submitted to the President, for his final action, the
tentative ninth year reparations schedule as revised by it.[5]
In said revised schedule, the road building equipment applied for by the
petitioner was not recommended as a “non-revenue producing project.”[6]
On April 6, 1965,
the President approved the tentative ninth reparations year schedule as revised
and recommended by the National Economic Council,[7]
and thereafter, returned the same to the Reparations Commission for
implementation.[8]
The reparations goods and equipment arrived at the Port
of Manila in October, 1966, and
were released to the petitioner, upon payment by the latter, of the necessary
inspection fee, bank commission, costs of publications, etc.[9]
On November 16, 1966,
Atty. Panfilo M. Manguera,
Reparations Adviser, Director and Head of the Legal Department of the
Reparations Commission, forwarded to the Chairman of the Commission, for his
signature, copies of the “Contract of Transfer of Reparations Goods”
in favor of the petitioner, covering the road building equipment
aforementioned.[10]
The contract, however, was not acted upon despite representations made in
behalf of the petitioner. Instead, on November 26, 1966, the respondent
Reparations Commission required the petitioner to place the reparations goods
in the custody of the Highway District Engineer until the petitioner is given
clearance by the Secretary of Finance, Auditor General, Budget Commissioner,
and the Office of the President.[11]
Concordantly, a telegram of similar import was received by the petitioner from
the Office of the President,[12]
and the Highway District Engineer of Pangasinan was
likewise directed by the Secretary of Public Works to take custody of the said
reparations goods.[13]
Representations made in behalf of the petitioner with the respondent
Reparations Commission[14]
yielded no favorable results as the respondent Commission required pre-payment
of the procurement costs before return of the reparations goods is made, the
reparations goods in-question not having been classified as intended for
non-revenue producing projects.
Thereafter, the respondent Reparations Commission ordered the deletion
and removal from the reparations goods of all inscriptions indicating the
proprietary right of petitioner over said goods.[15]
The Provincial Governor of Pangasinan
considered the action taken as politically motivated which deprives the province
of its lawfully acquired right to own and enjoy the use of said reparations
goods, and, accordingly, caused the filing of the instant petition.
The Court gave due course to the petition and issued a temporary
restraining order on April 20, 1967, ordering the respondents to cease and
desist from continuing acts of interference, use, control, and disposition of
the road building equipment machineries and vehicles obtained by the petitioner
through the Reparations Commission.[16]
The respondents seek the dismissal of the petition upon the
grounds that mandamus is not the proper remedy to enforce contractual
rights and that the reparations goods in question are not intended for
“non-revenue producing projects” so that the petitioner has to pay its
procurement costs, and since the petitioner has failed to pay the same, the reparations
goods remain the property of the Government, subject to the control of the
respondent Commission. The respondents also claim that the petitioner is not
dispossessed, much less deprived, of the use of the reparations equipment since
the reparations goods were merely placed in the custody of the respondent
Highway District Engineer of Pangasinan, who is also
an official of the petitioner province.
It should be emphasized that the present proceeding is a petition
for mandamus under Rule 65, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, to compel
“the defendant Reparations Commission to immediately execute the formal
documents transferring the reparations equipment and machinery to the plaintiff
Province of Pangasinan
without costs.” Under said section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus
will lie: 1) in case any tribunal
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty; 2) in case any corporation, board, or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station; and 3) in case any tribunal, corporation,
board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use. But, mandamus
does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel
a course of conduct.[17]
The case under consideration, under the allegations of the
petition, constitute an attempt to settle contractual rights and obligations,
express or implied, between the petitioner and the respondent Reparations
Commission and to regulate a course of conduct on the part of the respondent
Commission. Accordingly, a mandamus is not the proper remedy.
It has also been held[18]
that it is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the
plaintiff should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be
the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. It never
issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be
absolutely express, it is necessary that it should be clear. The writ will not
issue to compel an official to do anything which it is not his duty to do or
which it is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he
is not entitled, by law. The writ
neither confers powers nor imposes duties.
It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to
perform a duty already imposed.
A reading of the application in this proceeding discloses that
there is an absence of adequate evidence that it is the duty of the respondent
Reparations Commission to perform the act whose performance is prayed for in
the petition. Thus, the basis of
petitioner’s complaint is that the reparations goods in question were awarded
to the province to be used in non-revenue producing projects and, hence, the
petitioner is not liable to pay the procurement costs pursuant to Sec. 12 of
Republic Act No. 1789; wherefore, it is the duty of the respondent Commission
to execute in petitioner’s favor the formal documents of transfer.
Indeed, the petitioner applied for reparations road building
equipment to be used in non-revenue producing projects. But, the record clearly shows that the road
building equipment applied for were not ultimately classified as such. As a matter of fact, the petitioner had even
agreed to convert its application to one intended for revenue producing
projects as eloquently shown by Resolution No. 1532 of the Provincial Board of Pangasinan on May
17, 1965 wherein it was:
“RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to make representation
with the Reparations Commission, Manila, to transform the equipment
requisitioned by the Province of Pangasinan, from
non-revenue producing to revenue producing machineries, with the agreement that
the province shall pay the said equipment on installment basis for a period
from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the first installment to be paid twenty
four (24) months after the delivery.”[19]
The reparations equipment being intended for revenue producing
projects, it is not incumbent upon the respondent Reparations Commission to
execute the formal transfer documents until after the petitioner shall have
paid the procurement costs of the said reparations goods, and since the petitioner
has not yet complied with its obligation, the respondent Reparations Commission
has no ministerial duty to perform. Mandamus,
therefore, will not lie.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. The temporary restraining order heretofore
issued is hereby set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo,
Antonio, Aquino, and
Santos, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, p. 123.
[2]
Id., p. 30.
[3]
Id., p. 130.
[4]
Id., p. 132.
[5]
Id., p. 149.
[6]
Id., p. 159.
[7]
Id., p. 157.
[8]
Id., p. 172.
[9]
Annexes H, I, J, and K, pp. 34 et seq, rollo.
[10]
Annexes A and B, rollo, pp. 24-27.
[11]
Rollo, p. 296.
[12]
Id., p. 297.
[13]
Id., p. 40.
[14]
Id., p. 44.
[15]
Id., p. 46.
[16]
Id., p. 86.
[17]
Tabique vs. Duvall, 16 Phil. 324.
[18]
Gonzales vs. Board of Pharmacy, 20 Phil. 367.
[19]
Rollo, p. 195.