ELIGIO T. LEYVA AND EUFEMIA L. LEYVA, PETITIONERS, VS. MANUELA JANDOC AND HON. JOSE S. BORROMEO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF COTABATO, RESPONDENTS.

On September 10, 1958, Manuela Jandoc applied, in the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato, for the registration of three (3) parcels of land
situated in Dadiangas, General Santos, Cotabato, and more particularly
known as Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-124647. Eligio T. Leyva
objected thereto on December 10, 1958, with respect to a portion of
said land of about one (1) hectare which he claimed to have adversely
possessed in good faith and under legal title since 1937. On or about
December 17, 1958, his wife Eufemia L. Leyva filed another opposition
alleging that she and her husband had occupied a portion of the land in
question, which they had acquired from the defunct “narra”, and that
both had similarly occupied as owners since 1937, another portion of
said land of about 88 meters by 6.66 meters, “with their improvements *
* * made in good faith”. Later, other oppositions were filed, also,
including one by the Bureau of Lands, which claimed the land applied
for as part of the public domain.

After declaring in default all those who had not objected to the
petition for registration, the court proceeded with the hearing of the
case on the merits, which covered a period of several days. In one of
these hearings, while counsel for the Leyvas—hereafter referred to as
petitioners—was cross-examining a witness for Jandoc, the latter
objected thereto. What transpired, then, is set forth in the decision
of the Court of Appeals, as follows:

“* * * In the course of argument, the counsel for
the Leyvas admitted that the right which his clients desire to protect
in the case is based merely on a foreshore lease contract between them
and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Declaring that
the claim of the Leyvas may be recognized only if the land in question
is public land, and since the Director of Lands has already filed an
opposition based on the ground that the land sought to be registered is
public land, the court ruled that the Leyvas have no right to appear as
independent oppositors, but could collaborate with the provincial
fiscal. Leyva’s counsel was allowed to stay in court to collaborate, as
in fact he did collaborate, with the provincial fiscal.”

A reconsideration of the court’s ruling was subsequently denied. As
the court continued receiving evidence, despite several petitions for
postponement filed by petitioners, the latter filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition, docketed therein as CA-G. R. No. 26737-R, praying
that a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato from further proceeding in the case adverted to
above be issued, and that, after due hearing, the orders of said court
denying their right to intervene therein, except in a condition of
subordination to the opposition of the Director of Lands, be annulled
and that they be allowed to assert and defend their rights
independently of that of said officer. In due course, the Court of
Appeals dismissed said petition, with costs against petitioners (the
Leyvas). Hence, this appeal by certiorari.

Petitioners maintain that the decision of the Court of Appeals
assumed that their opposition in the main case was predicated
exclusively upon the foreshore lease contract executed in their favor
by the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and that such
assumption is erroneous for their afore-mentioned opposition reveals
that they are

“(a) the purchasers from the Government of a portion of the land sought to be registered by Manuela Jandoc.

“(b) the possessors under bonafide claim of ownership of another portion of the said land.

“(c) the lessees from the Government of still another portion of the same land, and

“(d) the owners of the permanent improvements introduced on the portions afore-mentioned.”

We find no merit in this pretense. Regardless of the allegations
in their opposition, it appears that, when the provincial fiscal
objected to the cross-examination of applicant’s witnesses by counsel
for petitioners, the latter, in the language of the Court of Appeals,
“admitted that the right which his clients desire to protect in the
case is based merely on a foreshore lease contract between them and the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources”. In view of this
finding of fact, which is conclusive upon us, it is clear that
petitioners’ interest in a small portion of the land sought to be
registered is dependent upon the question whether or not the same forms
part of the public domain and, hence, upon the success of the
opposition of the Director of Lands. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
did not err, much less, commit an abuse of discretion, in holding that
petitioner’ interest-

“* * * being merely that of foreshore lessees, can
therefore be amply protected by the provincial fiscal who represents
the Government, with the collaboration of their counsel. This being so,
their presence in court is not indispensable. Upon the other hand,
their active independent intervention may not only unduly prolong the
proceedings but may even result in confusion of the evidence for the
Government.

“From the point of view of the end result of the
registration proceedings, the interest of the petitioners is likewise
amply protected. If the land applied for is finally adjudged to be
private property, the right of the petitioners as foreshore lessees
either automatically terminates or would depend entirely at the
pleasure of the private party to whom the lands is adjudged. If, on the
other hand, the land is ultimately declared part of the public domain,
their right as foreshore lessees would have suffered no impairment.”

Petitioners insist on their alleged right to intervene independently
of the Director of Lands, relying upon section 34 of Act No. 496:

“Any person claiming an interest, whether named in
the notice or not, may appear and file an answer on or before the
return day, or within such further time as may be allowed by the court.
The answer shall state all the objections to the application, and shall
set forth the interest claimed by the party filing the same and apply
for the remedy desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or by
some person in his behalf.”

The Court of Appeals rejected such pretense for the following reasons:

“Although the provision of Jaw just cited apparently
authorizes any person claiming any kind of interest to file an
opposition to an application for registration, it is our view
nevertheless that the opposition must be based on a right of dominion
or some other real right independent of, and not at all subordinate to,
the rights of the Government. We have examined Soriano vs. Cortes, 8
Phil. 459, Roxas vs. Cuevas, 8 Phil., 469, and Archbishop of
Manila vs. Barrio of Sta. Cruz, et al., 39 Phil., I, all of which cases
are discussed in the petition and answer, and we find that in all these
cases the interest of the oppositors were each private in nature;
otherwise stated, their interests were not in any manner subordinate to
those of the Government. While the right claimed by the petitioners
herein seemed at first blush to be directly opposed to the adjudication
of ownership to the applicant, it developed in the proceedings that
their right, that of being foreshore lessees of public land, is
completely subordinate to the interest of the Government, and must
necessarily be predicated upon the property in question being part of
the public domain. In such case, it is incumbent upon the duly
authorized representatives of the Government to represent its interests
as well as private claims intrinsically dependent upon it. It is
well-settled that the interests of the Government cannot be represented
by private persons.”

We are fully in agreement with the foregoing view. It may not be amiss to add, also, that this being an action in rem, there is no reason why claims which do not partake of the nature of real rights or rights in rem should be settled therein.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.