G. R. No. L-16951. February 28, 1962
ROBERTO LAPERAL, JR. AND PURIPICACION M. LAPERAL, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. RAMON L. KATIGBAK, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. EVELINA KALAW-KATIGBAK, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
LABRADOR, J.:
Hon. Magno Gatmaitan presiding, holding that the decision rendered by
this Court in G. R. No. L-4299,[*]
promulgated January 31, 1952, dismissing the action instituted by
Roberto Laperal, Jr. and Purification M. Laperal against Ramon L.
Katigbak and Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak, Civil Case No. 11767 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, insofar as Evelina Kalaw-Katigak was
concerned does not bar the present action, Civil Case No. 25235, and
finally deciding this latter case, and sentencing Evelina
Kalaw-Katigbak to pay unto plaintiffs one-half of the sum of P14,000,
with legal interest and one-half of P97,500, also with legal interest.
A review of the facts and circumstances involved, as well as the
proceedings had in the case at bar and in G. R. No. L-4299, is
necessary for an understanding of the issues involved. G. R. No.
L-4299, Laperal, et al., vs. Katigbak, et al., was filed in
the Court of First Instance of Manila as Civil Case No. 11767, to
collect the sum of P14,000, with interest, and another sum of P97,500,
also with interest, against the defendants spouses Ramon L. Katigbak
and Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak. The complaint alleges as causes of action
that defendants are husband and wife; that from March 1, 1950 to May
31, 1950, the husband Ramon L. Katigbak borrowed and received various
sums of money from plaintiffs amounting to P14,000; that on the same
dates defendant Ramon L. Katigbak received from plaintiffs jewelry
valued at P97,500; that notwithstanding demands made upon them they
have failed to pay the same. The promissory notes constituting the
first amount of P14,000 was signed by Ramon L. Katigbak alone; he also
signed a receipt for a jewelry the value of which totals P97,500,
alone. Defendant Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak thereupon filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that since the receipts for the amount borrowed,
as well as for the jewelry received, were signed by Ramon L. Katigbak
alone and without the concurrence of his wife, the latter is not liable
for the reason that she is not bound by obligations contracted by her
husband nor answerable in a suit for the enforcement thereof. The court
trying the case granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that since
the wife did not take part in the execution of the documents sued upon,
she is not responsible therefor. The above resolution of the lower
court was appealed to this Court, which on January 31, 1952, affirmed
the order of dismissal of the action against Evelina Kalaw Katigbak. We
held, as to the first cause of action that as the notes were not signed
by Evelina, the latter is not personally liable, as the husband was not
her agent; as to the second cause of action, that as it is not alleged
that the obligation contracted redounded to the benefit of the family,
the same rule applies, because the receipts for jewelry were not also
signed by Evelina.
On February 10, 1955, plaintiffs filed another action, Civil Case
No. 25235, against the same spouses, alleging that in the previous
case, No. 11767, defendant Ramon L. Katigbak confessed judgment, as a
result of which said defendant was ordered to pay P14,000, with
interest, and P97,500, also with interest until full payment. The other
principal allegations of the complaint are: that defendants were
married since September 11, 1938; that they did not execute any
ante-nuptial contract before the celebration of their marriage, so that
they entered the marriage under the system of conjugal partnership;
that on December 18, 1950, Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak filed an action for
judicial separation of property and separate administration by the
wife; that on September 25, 1951, the defendants submitted an agreement
of facts wherein the parties to the action agreed to dissolve the
conjugal partnership; that all the proceedings and steps leading to the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership were made without notice to the
creditors of the conjugal partnership and especially the plaintiffs
herein and that said agreement was made to defraud creditors and,
therefore, void; that a certain real property on Evangelista Street,
City of Manila, described under Certificate of Title No. 57626,
although in the name of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak, is in truth and in fact
conjugal partnership property of the spouses, and at least the fruits
thereof are conjugal partnership property; that a theatre known as
Center Theatre on Quezon Boulevard, registered in the name of Teodoro
Kalaw, Jr., is Evelina Katigbak- Kalaw’s property, the fruits of which
are also conjugal partnership property; that of the amount of the
judgment plus 6% interest totalling P141,047.50, only P20,000 has been
paid, leaving a balance of P121,047.50 still unpaid.
As second cause of action it is alleged that the fruits of the
conjugal partnership properties, as well as the fruits of the
paraphernal property of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak belonged to the conjugal
partnership; that plaintiff’s cause of action arose before the
effectivity of the New Civil Code and, therefore, their liability as
above described is chargeable against the conjugal partnership of
Katigbak and Kalaw, including the fruits of the paraphernal property of
the wife; that demand was made by plaintiffs upon the defendant
Katigbak as well as on defendant Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak, on the fruits
of the properties mentioned hereinbefore, but neither one nor the other
paid the same.
In the prayer it is demanded that the proceedings for the judicial
separation of the properties of the spouses be declared null and void
or inefficacious against the plaintiffs; that Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak be
sentenced to render an accounting and turn over to plaintiffs the net
fruits of the Center Theatre, the property covered by TCT No. 57626 and
all other properties, as well as the fruits of the paraphernal
properties of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak, until the full amount of the
judgment be paid. The last prayer is that the property covered by TCT
No. 57626 and improvements thereon, be declared conjugal partnership
property subject to the indebtedness in favor of the plaintiffs.
Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak answered the complaint denying the
allegations as to the existence of conjugal partnership properties
alleged in the complaint and the imputation to her that her properties
were fraudulently registered in the name of others. As special
defenses, she alleges “that as a matter of fact, the answering
defendant in this case who was impleaded as one of the defendants in
Civil Case No. 11767 of the Court of First Instance of Manila was
absolved from said complaint which was dismissed insofar as it concerns
her; said dismissal having been confirmed by the Supreme Court;” that
she does not have in her possession property belonging to the conjugal
partnership nor fruits thereof derived from any paraphernal property,
which may be considered as conjugal; and that the fruits of any of her
own properties belonged to her, and neither her husband nor creditors
have any interest therein. As a counterclaim it is alleged that
plaintiffs have registered a notice of lis pendens in the
office of the register of deeds of Manila on TCT No. 25626, thus
causing her damage to the extent of P10,000. She prays for a dismissal
of the complaint and that the plaintiffs be sentenced to pay the amount
of her counterclaim. On August 31, 1956, the Court of First Instance of
Manila rendered a decision on the issues presented by the answer of the
defendants in the following language:
“One of the points in debate is whether plaintiffs
have the right to insist that notwithstanding the decree of judicial
separation in Civil Case No. 12860 they can secure a pronouncement from
this Court to the effect that the conjugal properties the spouses Ramon
Katigbak and Evelina Kalaw should answer for the judgment secured by
plaintiff against Ramon Katigbak; and in that eventuality what
properties should be made to answer therefor. Defendant Evelina Kalaw
contends that the decision of the Supreme Court absolving her of
liability in Civil Case No. 11767 would be enough to bar the present
action as against her; the Court does not concur; for what was decided
in that case was whether on the promissory notes signed by Ramon
Katigbak, Evelina Kalaw could be personally liable with her paraphernal
properties and the Supreme Court said that she could not; it was not
there decided whether the conjugal property, and this would include the
fruits of the paraphernal, could not be liable; in fact a reading of
the decision of the Supreme Court would show that the ratio decidendi
there was that her husband alone was liable with his private funds and
at most the assets of the conjugal partnership, * * *.”
The court further held that for the reason that no proof was
submitted to show that the obligations contracted by Ramon Katigbak
redounded to the benefit of the family, the obligation subject of the
complaint could not be enforced upon the paraphernal properties or the
fruits thereof, although they could be enforced upon the conjugal
partnership property; that since the Civil Code has been amended and
“the exemption from liability for personal obligations of the husband
is a right given to the conjugal partnership for the first time by the
amendment in the new Code, it should be operative at once, unless it
should impair a right vested under the old legislation (Art. 2253), New
Civil Code. But the right of the Laperals so far as the judgment
against Ramon Katigbak is concerned is one thing and their right to
proceed against the conjugal properties of Ramon and Evelina is
another, the first one was a property right vested under the Old Code;
the second was a right also under that but one that had not yet vested
before the New Code came into being. AH vested rights are property but
not all rights are, the Legislature can come in and destroy rights not
yet vested without impairment of due process. Perhaps the case can be
illustrated by analogy to Article 2261 of the New Civil Code; the
legislator there has decreed that exemptions from liability under
Article 302 were operative at once; and as this is a case analogous it
should under Article 2269, be solved in the same manner. The result
will be a dismissal.” Hence the court dismissed the action, without
costs.
The above decision of the court was appealed to Us in G. R. No. L-11418[*] In this Court, the plaintiffs Roberto Laperal, Jr. and Purification M. Laperal assigned the following errors:
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
OBLIGATIONS INCURRED BY KATIGBAK DID NOT REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE
FAMILY OF KATIGBAK AND KALAW.THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE OBLIGATIONS INCURRED BY KATIGBAK CANNOT BE ENFORCED
AGAINST THE FRUITS OF THE PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY OF KALAW.THE
COURT BELOW ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING KALAW TO ACCOUNT AND PAY TO THE
LAPERALS THE NET FRUITS OF THE CENTER THEATER BUILDING ON QUEZON
BOULEVARD, MANILA AND OF OTHER PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY OF KALAW IN
SATISFACTION OF DECISION IN FAVOR OF THE LAPERALS.” (G. R. No .
L-11418, R.O.A., pp. 11-12.)
The defendants Ramon L. Katigbak and Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak did not
appeal from the decision of the lower court, evidently because the case
against them was dismissed by the lower court. In the decision rendered
by Us in the appealed case, the matters considered are those raised in
the briefs of the plaintiffs-appellants. After considering those points
we held:
“The question is whether or not any vested or
acquired right is involved in the instant case. The answer, in our
opinion, is in the affirmative. When the Laperals granted the loans and
delivered the jewelry to Katigbak to be paid and accounted for by him,
the law then in force (Article 1408, Old Civil Code) made the conjugal
partnership liable for the obligation. In other words, in giving the
loan and delivering the jewelry to Katigbak, the Laperals, for purposes
of security and assurances, presumably or undoubtedly looked to the
conjugal properties as security to answer for the obligation, should
Katigbak fail to make good his undertaking. Stated differently, the
Laperals acquired a sort of lien on said conjugal properties. * * * The
right of the Laperals vested at the very moment the obligation was
contracted, under the provisions of the Old Civil Code. For this
reason, the provisions of Article 161 of the New Civil Code cannot
apply, and the trial court erred in applying the same.“However,
our holding does not write a finis to the case. Because the trial court
held that the conjugal partnership was not liable, it naturally, saw no
reason or necessity for ruling upon the other issues involved, such as
the legality of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 12860 for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, and whether or not the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title 27626 belongs to the
conjugal partnership.“In conclusion, we hold that while the
fruits of the paraphernal property of Kalaw are not liable for the
enforcement of the obligation contracts by Katigbak, nevertheless, the
conjugal properties are.” (G. R. No. L-11418, pp. 16-18 Decision.)
When the case was returned to the trial court for determination of
the issues of facts pointed out by Us in our decision, the judge, after
trial, rendered the Judgment appealed from in this, case, which is as
follows:
“with the finding that this property is paraphernal,
what only remains is to apply as plaintiffs desire, the rule in
National Bank vs. Quintos, 46 Phil. 370 under that, it was
held that the spouses are subsidiarily liable with their private
properties in the event of insolvency of the conjugal assets; there is
no showing why that rule should not apply here; we should therefore
apply it since the insolvency is clear; the result will be a judgment
against Evelina for one-half (1/2) of the credit already settled in the
decision.“IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment is rendered condemning
Evelina Kalaw to pay the plaintiffs the sum of one-half (1/2) of
P14,000.00 with legal interest from August 8, 1950 until fully paid,
plus another one-half (1/2) of P97,500.00 also with legal interest from
August 8, 1950 until full payment.” (G. R. No. L-16951, R. O. A. pp.
95-96)
Upon the appeal to Us the defendant-appellant assigned the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONDEMNING KALAW
TO PAY ONE-HALF OF THE CLAIMS OF THE LAPERALS, IT HAVING BEEN FINALLY
AND CONCLUSIVELY DECIDE BY THE SUPREME COURT IN DECISION 1-B (G. R. NO.
L-4299, JANUARY 31, 1952) AND DECISION III-A (G. R. NO. L-11418.
DECEMBER 27, 1958) THAT KALAW. NOR HER PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY OR ITS
FRUITS. IS NOT LIABLE FOR KATIGBAK’S PERSONAL OBLIGATION IN FAVOR OF
THE LAPERALS.
II
THAT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPLYING TO
THIS CASE THE DOCTRINE OF NATIONAL BANK VERSUS QUINTOS, 46 PHIL. 370,
THE FACTS AND THE LAW INVOLVED IN SAID CASE BEING ABSOLUTELY DIFFERENT
FROM THOSE IN THIS CASE.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SENTENCING KALAW
TO PAY ONE-HALF OF THE CLAIM OF THE LAPERALS, SAID PRONOUNCEMENT BEING
NOT INCLUDED WITHIN THE DIRECTIVE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN DECISION
III-A, REMANDING THE CASE TO THE LOWER COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING KALAW TO PAY
ONE-HALF OF THE CLAIMS OF THE LAPERALS FOR THE REASON THAT SAID REMEDY
IS NOT SOUGHT IN THIS ACTION NOR COVERED BY THE ALLEGATIONS OF
COMPLAINT.
V
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THE DECISION IN CASE II AS “NOT EFFECTIVE” IN SO FAR AS THE LAPERALS ARE CONCERNED.
VI
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING KALAW
TO ESTABLISH THAT THE “AGREEMENT OF FACTS” IN CASE II WAS PROMPTED, NOT
BY THE DESIRE OF THE PARTIES, BUT BY THE SUGGESTION OF THE presiding
judge OF the court.” (Brief of Defendant-Appellant’ pp. 1-2).
It will be seen that the first error assigned is the ruling of the
trial court in its first decision, which is that the present action,
which is the second one, is barred by the judgment rendered by Us in G.
R. No. L-4299, entitled Roberto Laperal, Jr. and Purificacion M,
Laperal, plaintiffs-appellants versus Ramon L. Katigbak and Evelina
Katigbak, defendants-appellees.[*]
The legal provision involved in this supposed error is known as the bar
by former judgment or estoppel by former judgment, as set forth in
Section 44, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. This section should be
distinguished from Section 45 of the same Rule, which is as follows:
“Section 45.—That only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been
so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.”
The distinction between the first rule, which is the rule of bar by
former judgment, and the second one, which is the rule of collusiveness
of judgment, has been set forth by Mr. Justice Carson in Peñalosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil., 303, thus:
* * * * * * *
“The subject of res judicata or estoppel by judgment
as known to Anglo-American jurisprudence is governed by two main rules
uniformly recognized by the authorities, which are very distinctly laid
down and defined by Mr. Justice Field in the following citation from
his opinion in the case of Cromwell vs. Sac County (94 U. S., 351):“In
considering the operation of this judgment, it should be borne in mind,
as stated by counsel, that there is a difference between the effect of
a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim or demand, and its effect as an estoppel in
another action between the same, parties upon a different claim or
cause of action. In the former case, the judgment, if rendered upon the
merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a
finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding1 parties
and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, hut as
to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that
purpose. Thus for example; a judgment rendered upon a promissory note
is conclusive as to the validity of the instrument and the amount due
upon it, although it be subsequently alleged that perfect defenses
actually existed, of which no proof was offered, such as forgery, want
of consideration, or payment. If such defenses were not presented in
the action, and established by competent evidence, the subsequent
allegation of their existence is of no legal consequence. The judgment
is as conclusive, «o far as future proceedings at law are concerned, as
though the defenses never existed. The language, therefore, which is so
often used, that a judgment estops not only as to every ground of
recovery or defense actually presented in the action, but also as to
every ground which might have, been presented, is strictly accurate,
when applied to the demand or claim in controversy. Such demand or
claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again be brought into
litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon any ground
whatever.“But where the second action between the same
parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior
action operates as an estoppel only as to those matter in issue or
points controverted upon the determination of which the finding or
verdict was rendered. In all cases, therefore, where it is sought to
apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action to
matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of action, the inquiry
must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and
determined in the original action; not what might have been thus
litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the judgment
conclusive in another action.“The rules thus referred to in the opinion of Mr. Justice Field may be summarily stated as follows:
- A judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
on the merits is a bar to any future suit between the same parties or
their privies upon the same cause of action so long as it remains
unreversed. - A point which was actually and directly
in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and
determined by a domestic court of competent jurisdiction cannot be
again drawn in question in any future action between the same parties
or their privies, even when the causes of action in the two suits are
wholly different.
“These two main rules mark a sharp distinction
between the principles governing the two typical cases in which a
judgment may operate as evidence. No intelligent discussion of the
subject of res judicata or of the multitude of authorities and varying
statutes touching that subject can be maintained without keeping
clearly in mind the distinction between the principles governing these
two typical cases. Indeed, in speaking of these cases the term ‘bar by
former judgment’ is uniformly employed to indicate the case governed by
the first general rule above laid down; and the phrase “conclusiveness
of the judgment’ in referring to the second.” (Peñalosa vs. Tuazon, 22 Phil., 303, 311-313).
As stated in the above-quoted decision the issue depends upon the
following question: Is the claim or demand made in the second action,
Civil Case No. 25235, the same as the demand made in the original case,
Civil Case No. 11767. The trial court held that the second cause of
action is a different demand or claim, because what was decided in the
original case No. 11767 is whether or not Evelina Kalaw Katigbak could
be held responsible with her paraphernal properties for the promissory
notes and the other obligation signed by Ramon Katigbak. We hold that
the trial court committed error in this respect; for the original claim
or demand made upon the spouses Katigbak and Kalaw was to hold them
liable for the said promissory notes and obligation. The prayer in the
complaint of the original case No. 11767 demands that a writ of
attachment issue against the properties of the defendants, or any of
them, and for any other relief as may be legal and equitable. In this
previous case, No. 11767, the claim or demand was to make Evelina Kalaw
Katigbak liable in any capacity whatsoever, whether personally or with
her conjugal properties, or with the fruits of her paraphernal
property. If Evelina Kalaw Katigbak was not responsible in any manner
under the cause of action, there is no cause or reason why she could
still be made responsible for the supposed fruits of her paraphernal
property. As indicated in the above quoted decision of ours in the case
of Peñalosa vs. Tuason, supra, the previous case No.
11767, is final not only as to Evelina Kalaw Katigbak’s personal
liability for the obligations sought to be enforced, but as to the
liability of the properties of the conjugal partnership or of the
fruits of Evelina Kalaw Katigbak’s paraphernal properties. In the
language of that decision, the judgment in the previous case No. 11767
“estops not only as to every ground of recovery or defense actually
presented in the action, but also as to every ground which might have
been presented.” The reason for the rule is because the demand or claim
on the obligations having passed into judgment, the said claim or
demand “cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties in
proceedings at law upon any ground whatever.”
The trial court seems to have believed that the original action is
limited to making Evelina Kalaw Katigbak personally responsible for the
obligations and that the subsequent suit, which is to make the conjugal
properties or the fruits of the paraphernal property responsible, is of
a different nature. This view is incorrect. The demand or claim has
always been against both spouses, not only personally but also to make
their properties or the fruits thereof responsible. The prayer of the
complaint is to make all their properties liable. An action to make a
wife personally responsible is not different from one to make the
paraphernal property of the wife subject to the same obligation. But
assuming that there is some difference, section 3 of Rule 2 of the
Rules of Court, prohibits multiplicity of suits, and any party is
prohibited from dividing the causes of action that he has upon the same
claim or demand, or pursuing the remedies to which he is entitled by
virtue of the demand in one suit after another. The first action was to
make Evelina Kalaw Katigbak and her properties responsible, and the
second, was to make the fruits of her paraphernal property responsible.
Both actions are against Evelina Kalaw Katigbak on the same claim and
demand. The rule prohibiting multiplicity of suits prohibits Evelina
Kalaw from being sued personally in one suit then and making the fruits
of her paraphernal property responsible subsequently in another.
It is argued on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees than our decision
in G. R. No. L-11418, to the effect that the conjugal properties of
Evelina Kalaw and her husband are responsible—
“In conclusion, we hold that while the fruits of the
paraphernal property of Kalaw are not liable for the enforcement of the
obligation contracted by Katigbak, nevertheless, the conjugal
properties are.” (Record, p. 91; Italics ours; p. 4, Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellees).
is the ratio decidendi of the case, evidently meaning, that
the question of bar by former judgment was passed upon by Us
unfavorably. It is true that the court did not consider the question of
bar by former judgment raised by defendant Kalaw in the case, but the
reason why we did not pass upon the same was because there was no
occasion, no such question being raised on appeal; Evelina Kalaw having
won the suit in the court below, there was no necessity for her to
raise that question in the brief. Besides, our decision, by declaring
that the conjugal partnership of the spouses are responsible, decided
the main issue raised in the appeal by spouses Laperals. We could not
have passed upon the issue of bar by former judgment because that was
not the issue on appeal and we did not have to decide it any way,
because there was no need to do so, as the case was being returned to
the lower court for determination of certain facts arising from
questions raised on the appeal, which questions refer to those raised
by the appellants Laperal in that case.
Furthermore, our decision in said case, G. R. No. L-11418, cannot be
considered in deciding the question of bar by former judgment because,
according to the rule of conclusiveness of judgment, that which can be
considered as decided is what was actually decided in the case,
in accordance with Section 45 of Rule 39, Rules of Court. In other
words, nothing having been stated by Us in our decision in L-11418 on
the matter of bar by former judgment, said decision can not be
considered as having ruled upon said rule adversely in the appeal of
Evelina Kalaw in the present case.
In view of our resolution on the defense of bar by former judgment
against the action, it is unnecessary to consider the other questions
involved in the appeal.
For the foregoing considerations the order appealed from is hereby
set aside and defendant Evelina Kalaw Katigbak absolved from the
action. Without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
[*] Laperal vs. Katigbak, 90 Phil., 770.
[*] Laperal vs. Katigbak, 104 Phil., 999; 56 Off. Gaz., [18] 3394.
[*] 90 Phil., 770.