IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF YU KIU TIAN ALIAS JACINTO CHUA TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES YU KIU TIAN ALIAS JACINTO CHUA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT VS. REPUBLIC…

His petition for naturalization having been denied by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Yu Kiu Tian alias Jacinto Chua appealed to this Court,
alleging that the trial court erred in finding that his character witnesses,
Teotimo Geologo and Agustina L. Carbonell had not known him sufficiently during
the ten years preceding the filing of the petition; and in declaring that his
evidence does not show adequately that he is of good moral character and
irreproachable conduct.

At the trial below appellant, by means of his evidence, sought to prove that:
He was born on March 11, 1929 in Ning Po, Chinkang, Fukien, China; came to the
Philippines on February 14, 1988 on board the “Anking”; and was permitted to
enter the country as a permanent resident (Exhibits O and Q). He studied at the
Anglo-Chinese School and later at the Far Eastern University, where he finished
first year high school, his highest educational attainment. He is registered
with the Bureau of Immigration (Exhibit N) as an alien and a citizen of the
Republic of China (Exhibit S-17). In this country, he was first employed as an
office boy, later as waiter in a downtown restaurant, and subsequently as an
agent of the Kai Ming Press up to 1952. In 1953 he became the owner and operator
of the A. Jacinto Printing Press,” registered in his name (Exhibit G), from
which he derived a net income of P13,273.47 in 1956 and P15,264.26 in 1957 (as
shown by income tax returns, Exhibits H and H-1). He has paid the taxes due from
him (Exhibits K, I and I-1). From the time of his arrival he has continuously
resided in the Philippines, first in Manila, then at this present address, 133
Yakal Street, Makati, Rizal, except for a visit to Hongkong in 1954, during
which he married Lim Siu Kong, by whom he has a child, Jacinto Chua, Jr., born
in Hongkong on November 14, 1954. In January 1957 his wife and child were
admitted to this country as temporary visitors (Exhibits L and M), but they are
now back in Hongkong. While his wife was here, they had their Chinese marriage
confirmed on July 10, 1957 at the Singalong Catholic Church (Exhibit K). He
speaks and writes English and Tagalog (Exhibit I). He is of good moral character
and has never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude as shown by
clearances issued by the pertinent government offices (Exhibits S, S-1 to S-15)
and is not suffering from any incurable contagious disease (Exhibit S-16). He
believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, has mingled
socially with the Filipinos and has shown a desire to learn and embrace the
customs and traditions of the Filipinos. He is not one of the persons
specifically disqualified by law from becoming a Filipino citizen.

Attached to appellant’s petition for naturalization is the Joint affidavit of
Teotimo Geologo, councilor and resident of Makati, Rizal, of legal age, and
Agustina L. Carbonell, business-woman, of legal age, resident of Makati, Rizal,
wherein they state that since 1953 they had personal knowledge that appellant
“has been a person of good repute, and morally irreproachable”; and that in
their opinion, he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
of a person who may be lawfully naturalized.

At the trial Geologo testified that he first met appellant in 1947 when the
latter was a waiter at a downtown restaurant which the witness used to frequent,
but that their acquaintanceship then was purely casual, until 1953 when they
became intimate friends, starting from the time he asked appellant to do a
printing job for him. Since then they had been going together to boxing bouts,
basketball games, church, parties and barrio fiestas.

Mrs. Carbonell also first met appellant in 1947 because she and her husband
used to go to the restaurant where he was working. However, it was only in 1952
that they became familiar with each other. Starting that year she often met him
at lauriat parties and town fiestas, and in church on Sundays. Both witnesses
were sponsors at appellant’s wedding. They affirmed that appellant is of good
moral character and voiced their belief that he would be an asset to the
community in which he is living.

In view of the testimony of Geologo and Carbonell that they first met
appellant in 1947, their joint affidavit was amended (at the suggestion of and
with the conformity of the government counsel, pp. 28-30, t. s. n., Sept. 15,
1958) to make it appear that they had personally known him since that year.

The law requires that the petition for naturalization must “be supported by
the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they are citizens
of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the
Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good
repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion
all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and not
in any way disqualified under the provisions of the act.” Section 7 Revised
Naturalization Law.

The original affidavit attached to appellant’s petition was defective,
because the affiants affirmed that they had known him only for a period of 5
years, that is, from 1953 up to the time he filed his petition for
naturalisation in 1958. On the other hand, if the affidavit as amended be taken
into account, then their statement that they personally knew appellant from 1947
to 1958 should have been confirmed on the witness stand. Otherwise, the petition
should be denied (Cuaki Tan Si vs. Republic, L-18006, October 31, 1962). But
both vouching witnesses openly admitted that they knew appellant only casually
from 1947 to 1952 (Geologo started being close to appellant only in 1953.) This
period cannot be counted as part of the requisite ten year period, because
during that time the witnesses merely recognized appellant as one of the waiters
in a restaurant where they used to eat. Such recognition can hardly be called
acquaintance, much less personal knowledge, so as to make the witnesses
sufficiently competent to testify on appellant’s moral character and to
determine if he is qualified to acquire Philippine citizenship. It is doubtful
if any conversation between them ever went beyond the ordinary routine of
ordering food in an eatery.

“The law requires that a vouching witness should have actually known an
applicant for whom he testified for the requisite period prescribed therein to
give him the necessary competence to act as such. The reason behind tins
requirement is that a vouching witness is in a way an insurer of the character
of petitioner because on his testimony the court is of necessity compelled to
rely in deciding the merits of his petition. It is, therefore, Imperative that
he he competent and reliable. And he is only competent to testify on his
conduct, character and moral fitness if he has had the opportunity to observe
him personally, if not intimately, during the period he has allegedly known
him.” (Lim Ching Tian vs. Republic, L-12001, Feb. 28, 1961).

“The law thus, in effect, requires that the character witnesses be, not
merely ordinary acquaintances of the applicant, but possessed of such intimate
knowledge of the latter as to be competent to testify, of their personal
knowledge, that he has each one of the requisite qualifications and none of the
statutory disqualifications.” (Cuaki Tan Si vs. Republic,
supra).

The cases cited by appellant do not support his contention that casual
acquaintances may vouch for the character of an applicant for
naturalization.

The rule has been stated that the character witnesses’ knowledge of the
petitioner for naturalization need only be such as is appropriate to the
possibilities of the case (In re Reichenburg, 238 F. 859). Thus in the case just
cited, it was considered sufficient that the witnesses saw petitioner, a
travelling agent, upon his return from his trips abroad and often while at home
with his wife and family; that they corresponded with him, visited, and had
personal knowledge of his life and habits during the requisite period. In this
jurisdiction, it has been held, in cases cited by appellant, that where the
witnesses had had plenty of time to inform themselves as to a petitioner’s
behavior and habits (Tan Bee Chiu vs. Republic, 105 Phil., 437; 56 Off. Gaz.
[45] 6922; Yu Neam vs. Republic, 103 Phil., 677) not only from their own
observation but also from existing records, common reputation and mutual friends
and acquaintances (Lay Kock vs. Republic, 102 Phil., 657; 54 Off Gaz. [16] 4713
who would have informed them of petitioner’s unworthiness, if such be the case
(Yu Tong Su vs. Republic, 101 Phil., 169; 53 Off. Gaz. [15] 4825), then their
credibility is not affected by their lack of knowledge of insignificant facts
about petitioner (Te vs. Republic, L-10805, April 23, 1958). In the instant
case, however, the character witnesses neither had the chance to observe
appellant personally, nor to obtain the appraisal of mutual friends, there
appearing none to speak of, at least during the years 1947 to 1952, so that it
cannot be said that the possibilities of contact between appellant and said
witnesses had been fully availed of to enable them to testify authoritatively in
the premises.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, and Regala, JJ., concur.