NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, RESPONDENTS.

This is a case for review from the Court of Industrial Relations. The
pertinent facts are the following.

At the National Development Co., a government-owned and controlled
corporation, there were four shifts of work. One shift was from 8 a.m. to 4
p.m., while the three other shifts were from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.; then from 2 p.m.
to 10 p.m. and, finally, from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. In each shift, there was a
one-hour mealtime period, to wit: from (1) 11 a.m. to 12 noon for those working
between 6 a.m. and 2 p.m. and from (2) 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. for those working
between 2 p.m. and 10 p.m.

The records disclose that although there was a one-hour mealtime, petitioner
nevertheless credited the workers with eighth hours of work for each shift and
paid them for the same number of hours. However, since 1953, whenever workers in
one shift were required to continue working until the next shift, petitioner,
instead of crediting them with eight hours of overtime work, has been paying
them for six hours only, petitioner claiming that the two hours corresponding to
the mealtime periods should not be included in computing compensation. On the
other hand, respondent National Textile Workers Union whose members are employed
at the NDC, maintained the opposite view and asked the Court of Industrial
Relations to order the payment of additional overtime pay corresponding to the
mealtime periods.

After hearing, Judge Arsenio I. Martinez of the CIR issued an order, dated
March 19, 1959, holding that mealtime should be counted in the determination of
overtime work and accordingly ordered petitioner to pay P101,407.96 by way of
overtime compensation. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was dismissed by the CIR en banc on the ground that petitioner
failed to furnish the union a copy of its motion.

Thereafter, petitioner appealed to this Court, contending, first, that the
CIR has no jurisdiction over claims for overtime compensation and, secondly,
that the CIR did not make “a correct appraisal of the facts, in the light of the
evidence” in holding that mealtime periods should be included in overtime work
because workers could not leave their places of work and rest completely during
those hours.

In support of its contention that the CIR lost its jurisdiction over claims
for overtime pay upon the enactment of the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act
No. 875), petitioner cites a number of decisions of this Court. On May 23, 1960,
however, We ruled in Price Stabilization Corp. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, et al., 108 Phil., 138, 139, that

“Analyzing these cases, the underlying principle, it will bt noted in all of
them, though not stated in express terms, is that were the employer-employee
relationship is still existing or is sought to be reestablished because of its
wrongful severance, (at where the employee seeks reinstatement), the Court of
Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or in
connection with the employment, such as those related to the Minimum Wage Law
and Eight-Hour Labor Law. After the termination of their relationship and no
reinstatement is sought, such claims become mere money claims, and come within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

“We are aware that in 2 cases, some statements implying a different view have
been made, but we now hold and declare the principle set forth in the next
preceding paragraph as the one governing all cases of this
nature.”

This has been the constant doctrine of this Court since May 23, 1960^[1]

A more recent definition of the jurisdiction of the CIR is found in Campos,
et al. vs. Manila Railroad Co., et al., G. R. No. L-17905, May 25, 1962, in
which We held that, for such jurisdiction to come into play, the following
requisites must be complied with: (a) there must exist between the parties an
employer-employee relationship or the claimant must seek his reinstatement; and
(b) the controversy must relate to a case certified by the President to the CIR
as one involving national interest, or must have a bearing on an unfair labor
practice charge, or must arise either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, or under
the Minimum Wage Law. In default of any of these circumstances, the claim
becomes a mere money claim that comes under the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. Here, petitioner does not deny the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between it and the members of the union. Neither is there any
question that the claim is based on the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Com. Act No. 444,
as amended). We therefore rule in favor of the jurisdiction of the CIR over the
present claim.

The other issue raised in the appeal is whether or not, on the basis of the
evidence, the mealtime breaks should be considered working time under the
following provision of the law:

“The legal working day for any person employed by another shall be of not
more than eight hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time during
which the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can rest
completely shall not be counted.” (Sec. 1, Com. Act No. 444, as amended.
Italics ours.)

It will be noted that, under the law, the idle time that an employee may
spend for resting and during which ha may leave the spot or place of work though
not the premises^[2] of his employer, is
not counted as working time only where the work is broken or is not
continuous.

The determination as to whether work is continuous or not is mainly one of
fact which We shall not review as A long as the same is supported by evidence.
(Sec 15, Com. Act No. 103, as amended; Philippine Newspaper Guild vs. Evening
News, Inc., 86 Phil. 303).

That is why We brushed aside petitioner’s contention in one case that workers
who worked under a 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. schedule had enough “free time” and,
therefore should not be credited with four hours of overtime and held that the
finding of the CIR “that claimants herein rendered services to the Company from
6:00 a.m. to 6 p.m. including Sundays and holidays, * * * implies either that
they were not allowed to leave the spot of their working place, or that they
could not rest completely.” (Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., vs. Luzon Marine
Department Union, et al., 101 Phil., 257).

Indeed, it has been said that no general rule can be laid down as to what
constitutes compensable work, but rather the question is one of fact depending
upon the particular circumstances, to be determined by the courts in
controverted cases. (31 Am. Jur. Sec. 626 pp. 877-378)

In this case, the CIR’s finding that work in the petitioner company was
continuous and did not permit employees and laborers to rest completely is not
without basis in evidence and following our earlier rulings, We shall not
disturbed the same. Thus, the CIR found:

“While it may be corrected to say that it is well-nigh impossible for an
employee to work while he is eating, yet under Section 1 of Com. Act No. 444
such, a time for eating can only be segregated or deducted from his work, if the
same is not continuous and the employee can leave his working place and rest
completely. The tune cards show that, the work was continuous and without
interruption. There is also the evidence adduced by the petitioner that the
pertinent employees cannot freely leave their working places nor rest
completely. There is furthermore the aspect that during the period covered by
the computation the work was on a 24 hour basis and as previously stated divided
into shifts.”

From these facts, the CIR correctly concluded that work in petition company
was continuous and therefore the mealtime breaks should be counted as working
time for purposes of overtime compensation.

Petitioner gives an eight-hour credit to its employees who work a single
shift, say from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.. Why cannot it credit them sixteen hours should
they work in two shifts?

There is another reason why this appeal should be dismissed and that is that
there is no decision by the CIR en banc from which petitioner can appeal
to this Court. As already indicated above, the records show that petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of the order of March 19, 1959 was dismissed by the
CIR en banc because of petitioner’s failure to serve a copy of the same
on the union.

Section 15 of the rules of the CIR, in relation to Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 103, states:

“The movant shall file the motion (for reconsideration), in six copies within
five (5) days from the date on which he receives notice of the order or
decision, object of the motion for reconsideration, the same to be verified
under oath with respect to the correctness of the allegations of fact, and
serving a copy thereof, personally or by registered mail, on the adverse
party. The latter may file an answer, is six (6) copies duly verified under
oath.” (Italics ours)

In one case (Bien, et al. vs. Castillo, etc., et al. G. R. No. L-7428, May
24, 1955), We sustained the dismissal of a motion for reconsideration filed
outside of the period provided in the rules of the CIR. A motion for
reconsideration, a copy of winch has not been served on the adverse party as
required by the rules, stands on the same footing. For “in the very nature of
things, a motion for reconsideration against a ruling or decision by one Judge
is in effect an appeal to the Court of Industrial Relations, en banc,”
the purpose being “to substitute the decision or order of a collegiate court for
the ruling or decision of any judge.” The provision in Commonwealth Act No. 103
authorizing the presentation of a motion for reconsideration of a decision or
order of the judge to the CIR, en banc, and not direct appeal therefrom
to this Court, is also in accord with the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies before resort can be made to this Court (Broce, et al.
vs. The Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 106 Phil. 388; 56 Off. Gaz. (49)
7445).

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been dismissed for its failure
to serve a copy of the same on the union, there is no decision of the CIR en
banc that petitioner can bring to this Court for review.

Wherefore, the order of March 19, 1959 and the resolution of April 27, 1959
are hereby ammend and the appeal is dismissed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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[1] Board of Liquidators, et al. vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-14366, Oct. 31, 1962; Gagalawan vs.
Customs Canteen, et al., 113 Phil., 386; Sy Huan vs. Bautista, et al., 112
Phil., 914; Cuison vs. Gaite, G.R. No. L-16611. March 25, 1961; Elizalde Paint
& Oil Factory Inc. vs. Bautista, 110 Phil., 49; Sampaguita Pictures Inc. et
al., vs. CIR, et al., 109 Phil., 816; Ajax Int. Corp. vs. Seguritan, et al., 109
Phil., 813 New Angat-Manila Transp. Co., et al., vs. CIR, et al., 110 Phil., 319
National Shipyards and Steel Corporation vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et
al., 107 Phil., 1006.

[2] Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., vs. Luzon Marine
Department Union, et al., 101 Phil., 257. See also Isaac Peral Bowling Alley vs.
United Employees Welfare Ass’n., et al., 102 Phil., 219.