JOSE GARRIDO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. PILAR G. TUASON, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, certified
to us by the Court of Appeals, only questions of law being raised by
plaintiff-appellant.

On October 17, 1959, Jose Garrido commenced Civil Case No. 71763
of the Municipal Court of Manila, for the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage,
executed in his favor by defendant, Pilar G. Tuason, to guarantee the payment
of a debt in the sum of P1,000, as well as for the recovery of attorney’s fees
and the costs.  After appropriate
proceedings, decision was rendered, on November 14, 1959, ordering the defendant
to pay to plain­tiff “the sum of P1,000 with interest thereon at the rate
of 1% per month from June 30,
1959 until the whole amount is fully paid, plus the sum of P100 for attorney’s
fees, and the costs. “

In compliance with a writ of execution, issued on December 9,
1959, after this decision had become final, a car of the defendant was, on
January 2, 1960, sold, by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, at public auction,
to the plaintiff, as the highest bidder, for the sum of P550.  On January 28, 1960, plaintiff filed two (2)
motions, namely: one, praying that the sum of P165, allegedly spent by him to
carry out said writ of execution, be added to the unsatisfied portion of the
aforementioned decision, presumably as part of the costs; and another, for an
alias writ of execution for the sum of P1,290.58, as the aggregate outstanding
balance allegedly due under said decision. 
Both motions were denied in an order dated February 27, 1960.  Plaintiff’s motion for recon­sideration of
this order was denied on March 19, 1960.

Soon later, or on April 1, 1960, plaintiff commenced Civil Case
No. 76462, of said court, against the same defendant-whose husband was
included, as her co-defendant, on May 27, 1960 – for the recovery of said
alleged balance of P1,290.58. On motion of said defendants, plaintiff’s
complaint in said case No. 76462 was dismissed by the Municipal Court, on
August 31, 1960.  Plaintiff appealed to
the Court of Firs Instance of Manila, which, in due course rendered its
decision, on April 17, 1961, dismissing the case, without pro­nouncement as to
costs, upon the ground that, pursuant to Article 2115 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendants.  Hence, this appeal by the plaintiff.

Article 2115 of said Code reads:

” x x x The sale of the thing pledged shall extinguish the
principal obligation, whether or not the proceeds of the sale are equal to the
amount of the principal obligation, interest and expenses in a proper
case.  If the price of the sale is more than
said amount, the debtor shall not be entitled to the excess, unless it is other­wise
agreed.  If the price of the sale is
less, neither shall the creditor be entitled to recover the deficiency,
notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary.”

The Court of First Instance must have applied this precept in
view of Article 2141 of the same Code, pursuant to which the provisions thereof
on pledge shall be applicable to chattel mortgages “insofar as they are
not in conflict with the Chattel Mortgage Law.” We have already held,
however,^[1]
that said Article 2115 is inconsistent with the provisions of the Chattel
Mortgage Law,^[2]
and that, accordingly, the chattel mortgage creditor may maintain an action^[3]
for the deficiency.

Then, again, said Court would seem to have acted under the
impression, that, since Case No. 71763 was one for the foreclosure of a chattel
mortgage, the decision therein ren­dered was for such foreclosure; but such was
not the nature of said decision, for it merely ordered the defendant to pay the
sum of P1,000, with interest
thereon, in addition to attor­ney’ s fees and the costs.  It did not order the sale of the property
mortgaged to the plaintiff or of any other particular pro­perty, for the
satisfaction of his credit against the defendant.  It did not purport to enforce plaintiff’s lien
over the mortgaged property.  In other
words, it was an ordinary money judgment to which said Articles 2115 and 2141
were absolutely irrelevant.

The municipal court erred, therefore, in denying plaintiff’ motion
of January 28, 1960, for the issuance of an alias writ of 1960 execution
in Case No. 71763, less than five (5) years having elapsed since the decision
therein was rendered on Novem­ber 14, 1959. 
As a consequence, plaintiff could have and should have appealed from the
order of denial of said motion; but, he did not do so, and, instead, he brought
the case at bar, thereby allowing said order to become final.  Thus, the principle of res adjudicata
bars the present action, which, ac­cordingly, was dismissed properly.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against
plaintiff-appellant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Olutanga Lumber Co., 47 Phil. 20, 22;
Manila Trading & Supply Co. v Tamaraw Plantation Co., 47 Phil. 513,
520-521; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Santos, 66 Phil. 237, 244;
Ablaza v. Ignacio, L-11466, May 23, 1958.

^[2]
The last part of the second paragraph of section 14 of Act No. 1508, provides:

“x x x The proceeds of such sale shall be applied to the
payment, first, of the costs and expenses of keeping and sale, and then to the
payment of the demand or obligation secured by such mortgage, and the residue
shall be paid to persons holding subsequent mortgages in their order, and the
balance, after paying the mortgages, shall be paid to the mortgagor or person
holding under him on demand.”

^[3]
After the lapse of five (5) years from the date when the original decision
became final.