CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, CEBU, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

In two separate
actions, plaintiff-appellant Cebu Portland Cement Company sought to test the
validity of the distraint and thereafter the sale at
public auction by the principal defendant-appellee,
Municipality of Naga, Cebu,
of 100,000 bags of cement for the purpose of satisfying its alleged deficiency
in the payment of the municipal license tax for 1960, municipal license tax for
1961 as well as the penalty, all in the total sum of P204,300.00.  The lower court rendered a joint decision
sustaining the validity of the action taken by defendant-appellee Muni­cipality
of Naga.  The
case is now before us on appeal.  We
affirm.

According to the appealed decision: “From all the evidence,
mostly documentary, adduced during the hearing the following facts have been
established.  The efforts of the
defendant Treasurer to collect from the plaintiff the municipal license tax
imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1959 on cement factories located
within the Municipality of Naga, Cebu,
have met with rebuff time and again.  The
demands made on the taxpayer * * * have not been entirely successful.  Finally,
the defendant Treasurer decided on June 26, 1961 to avail of the Civil reme­dies
provided for under Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code and gave the plaintiff a period of ten days
from receipt thereof with­in which to settle
the account, computed as follows * * *: 
Deficiency Municipal License Tax for 1960 – P80,250.00; Municipal
License Tax for 1961 – P90,000. 00; and 20% Penalty – P34,050.00, stating in
exasperation. ‘This is our last recourse as we had exhausted all efforts for an amicable solution of our
problem.'”^[1]

It was further
shown: “On July 6, 1961, at 11:00 A.M., the defendant Treasurer notified
the Plant Manager of the plaintiff that he was ‘distraining
100,000 bags of Apo cement in satisfaction of your delinquency
in municipal license taxes in the total amount of P204,300.00′ * * *. This
notice was received by the
acting officer in charge of the plaintiff’s plant, Vicente T. Garaygay, according to his own admission.  At first, he was not in accord with the said
letter, asking the defendant Treasurer for
time to study the same, but in the afternoon he [acknowledged the] distraint * * *.”^[2]

As was noted in the decision, the defendant Treasurer in turn
“signed the receipt for goods, articles or effects seized under authority of
Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code, certi­fying that he has
constructively distrained on July 6, 1961 from the Cebu Portland Cement Company at its plant at Tina-an, Naga, Cebu, 100,000 bags of Apo cement in tanks, and that ‘the said articles or goods
will be sold at public auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, and the proceeds thereof will be utilized in part satisfaction of the
account of the said company in municipal licenses and penalties in the total
amount of P204,300.00 due the municipality of Naga-Province of Cebu‘ * *
*.”^[3]

The lower court likewise
found as a fact, that on the same day, July. 6, 1961, the municipal
treasurer posted the notice of sale to the effect that pursuant to the
provisions of Section 2305 of the Revised Administrative Code, he would sell at
public auction for cash to the highest bidder at the main entrance of the
municipal building of the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu,
Philippines on the 27th day of July, 1961, at 9 o’clock in the morning, the
property seized and distrained or levied upon from the Cebu Portland Cement Company in satisfaction of the municipal license taxes and penalties in
the amount of P204,300.00, specifying that what was to be sold was 100,000 bags of Apo
cement.^[4]
No sale, as thus announced, was held on July 27, 1961.  It
was likewise stated in the appealed decision that there was stipulation by the parties to this
effect: “1. The auction sale took place on January 30, 1962, * * *. “^[5]

In this appeal from the above joint decision, plaintiff-appellant
Cebu Portland Cement Company upholds the view that
the distraint of the 100,000 bags of cement as well as the sale at public auction
thereafter made ran counter to the law. 
As earlier noted, we do not see it that way.

1.      On
the validity of the distraint
– In the first two errors assigned, plaintiff-appellant submits as illegal
the distraint of 100,000 bags of cement made on July 6,
1961.  Its contention is premised on the fact
that in the
letter of defendant-appellee dated June 26, 1961,
requiring plaintiff-appellant to settle its account of P204,300.00, it was
given a period of 10 days
from receipt within which it could pay, failure to do so being the occasion for
the distraint of its property.  It is now alleged that the 10-day period of
grace was not allowed to lapse, the distraint having
taken place on July 6, 1961.

It suffices to answer such a contention by referring to the explicit language
of the law.  According to the Revised
Administrative Code: “The remedy by distraint
shall proceed as follows:  Upon the
failure of the person owing any municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal
treasurer may seize and distraint any personal
property belonging to such person or any property subject to the tax lien, in
sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question, together with any
increment thereto incident to delinquency, and the expenses of the distraint.”^[6]

The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt.  The municipal treasurer “may seize and distrain any personal property” of the individual or
entity subject to the tax upon failure “to pay the same, at the time
required * * *.”  There was such a
failure on the part of
plaintiff-appellant to pay the municipal tax at the time required.  The power of the municipal treasurer in
accordance with the above
provision therefore came into play.

Whatever might have been
set forth in the letter of the municipal treasurer could not change or amend
the law.  It has to be enforced as
written.  That was what the lower court
did.  What was done then cannot be
rightfully looked upon as a failure to abide by what the statutory provision requires.  Time and time again, it has been repeatedly
declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation. 
There is only room for application. 
That was that occurred in this case.^[7]

2.      On
the validity of the auction sale – The validity of the auction sale held on
January 30, 1962 is
challenged in the next two errors assigned as allegedly committed by the lower
court.  Plaintiff-appellant’s argument is
predicated on the fact that it was not until January 16, 1962 that it was notified that the public
auction sale was to take place on January
29, 1962.  It is its view
that under the Revised Administrative Code^[8]
the sale of the distrained property cannot take place
“less than twenty days after
notice to the owner or possessor of the property [distrained]
* * * and the publication or posting of such notice.”

Why such a contention could not prosper is explained clearly by
the lower court in the appealed decision. 
Thus: “With respect to the claim that the auction sale held on
January 30, 1962 pursuant to the distraint was null and
void for being contrary to law because not more than twenty days have elapsed
from the date of notice, it is
believed that the defendant Municipality
of Naga
and Municipal Treasurer of Naga have substantially
complied with the requirements provided for by Section 2305 of the Revised
Administrative Code.  From the time that
the plaintiff was first notified of the distraint on July 6, 1961 up to the date of the
sale on January 30, 1962,
certainly, more than twenty days have elapsed. 
If the sale did not take place, as
advertised, on July 27, 1961, but only on January 30, 1962, it was due
to the requests for deferment made by the plaintiff which unduly delayed the
proceedings for collection of the tax, and the said taxpayer should not be
allowed now to complain that the required period has not yet elapsed when the
intention of the tax collector was already well publicized for many
months.”^[9]
The reasonableness of the above observation of the lower court cannot be
disputed.  Under the circum­stances, the
allegation that there was no observance of the twenty-day period hardly carries
conviction.

The point is further made that the auction sale took place not on
January 29, 1962, as stated
in the notice of sale, but on
the next day, January 30, 1962.  According to plaintiff-appellant: “On
this score alone, the sale * * *, was illegal as it was not made on the time
stated in the notice.”^[10]

There is no basis to sustain such a plea as the finding of the
lower court is otherwise.  Thus: “On January 16, 1962, the defendant Treasurer informed Garaygay that he would cause the readvertisement
for sale at public auction of the 100,000 bags of Apo cement which were under constructive distraint * * *.  On
January 19, 1962, the said defendant issued the corresponding notice of sale,
which fixed January 30, 1962, at 10:00 AM., as the date of sale, posting the
said notice in public places and delivering copies thereof to the interested
parties in the previous notice, * * *. 
Ultimately, the bidding was conducted on that day, January 30, 1962, with the representatives of the
Provincial Auditor and Provincial Treasurer present.  Only two bidders submitted sealed bids.  After the bidding, the defendant-Treasurer
informed the plaintiff that an award was given to the winning bidder, * * *.^[11]

This being a direct appeal to us, plaintiff-appellant must be
deemed to have accepted as conclusive what the lower court found as established
by the evidence, only questions of law being brought to us for review.  It is the established rule that when a party appeals directly to this Court,
he is deemed to have waived the right to dis­pute any finding of fact made by
the court below.^[12]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated July 23, 1964, is affirmed in toto.  With
costs against plaintiff-appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and
Angeles, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Decision of July 23, 1964
of the lower court, Record on Appeal, pp.
166-167.

^[2]
Ibid, pp. 167-168.

^[3]
Ibid, pp. 169-170.

^[4]
Ibid, pp. 170-171.

^[5]
Ibid, p. 172.

^[6]
Section 2304, Act No. 2711 as amended.

^[7]
Cf. Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. 504 (1913); People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967; Pacific Oxygen and Acytelene
Co. v. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-21881, March 1, 1968; Dequito v. Lopez.
G.R. No. L-27757, March 28, 1968.

^[8]
“Sec. 2305. Proceedings subsequent to seizure. – The officer levying the distraint
shall make or cause to be made an account of the goods or effects distrained, a copy of which signed by himself shall be left
either with the owner or person from whose possession such goods or effects
were taken, or at the dwelling or place of business of such person and with
some one of suitable age and discretion, to which list shall be added a statement
of the sum demanded and note of the time and place of sale; and the said
officer shall forthwith cause a notification to be exhibited in not less than
two public places in the municipality
where the distraint is made, specify­ing the time and
place of sale and the articles distrained. The time
of sale shall not be less than twenty days after notice to the owner or
possessor of the property as above specified and the publication or posting of
such notice.  One place for the posting
of such notice shall be at the office of the mayor of the municipality in which the property is distrained.  At the time and place fixed in such notice the said
officer shall sell the goods, or effects, so distrained,
at public auction, to the highest bidder for cash. * * *.”

^[9]
Decision of the lower court, Record on Appeal, p. 180.

^[10]
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 37.

^[11]
Decision of July 23, 1964
of the lower court, p. 175.

^[12]
Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., G.R. No. L-21749,
September 29, 1967.  See also Perez v. Araneta,
G.R. No. L-18414, July 15, 1968
and the cases cited herein.