🎧 Case Brief Lecture

WILSON NG, COMPLAINANT, VS. ARACELI A. ALFARO, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT, BRANCH 3, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, RESPONDENT.

A.M. No. P-93-959. December 01, 1994 December 1, 1994

← Read the full text of the decision

Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.

Wilson Ng versus Araceli Alfaro

The Case

This is an administrative case for willful omission of the performance of official duty, filed by Wilson Ng, president of Golden Flame Sawmill Corporation, against Araceli Alfaro, the branch clerk of court of Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The complainant blames the respondent for failing to send his corporation copies of an order of default and of the judgment rendered against it in a civil case for the recovery of two barges. The case matters because it shows the Court refusing to let an administrative complaint serve as a substitute for the judicial remedies of appeal and certiorari, and because it restates the rules on notice of pre-trial.

Procedural History

The complainant filed a sworn complaint against the respondent, who answered by way of comment. The complainant replied, and the parties then manifested that they were willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings already filed. The Supreme Court resolved the administrative matter in that posture. In the background ran the civil case itself: the trial court declared Golden Flame in default, received the plaintiff's evidence ex parte, and rendered judgment against Golden Flame. Golden Flame filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of default, which was denied. It then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed, and a second petition for certiorari, which was likewise dismissed in a decision dated 22 January 1993. No appeal was taken from the trial court's judgment.

Facts

Golden Flame Sawmill Corporation was the defendant-intervenor in a civil case for the recovery of two barges, assigned to Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, where the respondent served as branch clerk of court. The case was set for pre-trial on 15 October 1991. According to the complainant, all the parties except Golden Flame and its counsel were furnished copies of the notices of pre-trial. For failure of Golden Flame and its counsel to appear, Golden Flame was declared as in default.

The complainant alleges that the respondent did not send Golden Flame a copy of the order of default. The court received the plaintiff's evidence ex parte on 18 October 1991 and rendered judgment against Golden Flame on 7 November 1991. Again, the complainant says, the respondent did not furnish Golden Flame a copy of the decision. Golden Flame obtained a copy on 15 November 1991, and it claims that because of the respondent's nonfeasance it was prevented from presenting strong evidence of its ownership of the barges and was deprived of that ownership without due process of law.

The respondent denies the charges. She asserts that Golden Flame was served with the notice of pre-trial through its counsel on 8 October 1991, and that having been declared in default, it lost its standing in court and was no longer entitled to notice of subsequent pleadings except that of the judgment. She states that on 15 November 1991 a representative of counsel or of the complainant came to the court and was furnished copies of the order of default and of the decision, and that copies were also sent by registered mail to counsel. The complainant, in his reply, insists that the order of default reached counsel only on 31 October 1991 and that the decision was furnished by registered mail only on 18 July 1993.

Issues

  • Whether or not the respondent branch clerk of court is administratively liable for willful omission of the performance of official duty in failing to furnish Golden Flame copies of the order of default and of the decision.
  • Whether or not the administrative complaint may be used to review the final findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that Golden Flame and its counsel were duly notified of the pre-trial.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a statute; it quotes the governing rule on notice of pre-trial, which provides:

A notice of pre-trial must be served on the party affected separately from his counsel, and the same may be served directly to him or through his counsel otherwise the proceedings will be null and void.

This rule bears on the case because the validity of the default order, and therefore of everything that followed, depended on whether notice of pre-trial reached Golden Flame and its counsel.

The same passage continues with the duty of counsel:

It is the duty of counsel upon whom such notice is served, to see to it that his client receives such notice and attends the pre-trial, otherwise he will be liable for grave administrative disciplinary action.

This bears on the case because the failure to appear at the pre-trial was the counsel's, not the clerk's, and the remedy lay against the counsel, not in an administrative charge against a court employee.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held the complaint clearly without merit. The Court of Appeals had already sustained the trial court's finding that Golden Flame and its counsel were notified of the pre-trial, treating the corporation's own allegation of excusable negligence with reference to its late receipt of the notice as an admission that notice was received. The Court of Appeals had also observed that since Golden Flame knew of the judgment before it filed its petition, the proper procedure was to move for reconsideration of the decision and then to appeal, asserting as error the deprivation of the opportunity to be heard. The complainant never claimed that the decision of the Court of Appeals did not attain finality, nor that Golden Flame ever appealed the trial court's judgment. The Court therefore presumed that the decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court had long become final.

On the second issue, the Court held that the correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Golden Flame and its counsel were duly notified of the pre-trial is beyond its power to review, and that an administrative complaint by a complainant who was not a party to the civil case but merely the president of the intervenor should not be allowed as a vehicle for such review. The Court saw some truth in the respondent's claim that, because counsel failed to appeal the judgment by default, the complaint was filed to save face, if not to harass the respondent.

The Court took the occasion to stress the rule on pre-trial notice and to remind lawyers that, as officers of the court, they should not encourage groundless administrative cases against court officers and employees, whose time should be reserved for the enhancement of public service.

Doctrine

A notice of pre-trial must be served on the party affected separately from his counsel, and it may be served directly on the party or through his counsel; otherwise the proceedings will be null and void. It is the duty of counsel upon whom the notice is served to see to it that his client receives the notice and attends the pre-trial, and his failure makes him liable for grave administrative disciplinary action.

An administrative complaint against a court officer or employee is not a substitute for the judicial remedies of motion for reconsideration, appeal, or certiorari, and it cannot be used to review findings that have already become final. Lawyers, as officers of the court, should not encourage groundless administrative cases against court personnel.

Disposition

The complaint was dismissed for lack of merit, and the respondent was exonerated.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a notice of pre-trial must be served on the party affected separately from his counsel, and that it is counsel's duty to see that his client receives it and attends. Examiners use this case on pre-trial notice and default, and on the rule that administrative complaints cannot substitute for appeal.