WILSON NG, COMPLAINANT, VS. ARACELI A. ALFARO, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT, BRANCH 3, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, RESPONDENT.

In a sworn complaint filed on 29 July 1993, the complainant, who
is the president of Golden Flame Sawmill Corporation (hereinafter Golden
Flame), charged the respondent branch clerk of court of Branch 3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Manila, with “willful omission of the
performance of official duty.”

He alleges in his complaint that his corporation was the defendant-intervenor
in Civil Case No. 91-57097, entitled “Max B. Alfaro vs. Capt. Arturo Y.
Capada,” an action for the recovery of two barges, which was assigned
to Branch 3 of the RTC. The case was
set for pre-trial on 15 October 1991. All the parties to the case, except Golden Flame and its counsel, were
furnished with copies of the notices of pre-trial. For failure of Golden Flame and its counsel, Atty. Datu Firdausi
Abbas, to appear at the pre-­trial, Golden Flame was declared as in
default. The respondent did not send a
copy of the order of default to Golden Flame. The court received ex-parte the plaintiff’s evidence on 18
October 1991, and on 7 November 1991 it rendered a decision against Golden
Flame. Again, the respondent did not
furnish Golden Flame with a copy of the decision. The latter obtained a copy thereof “for purposes of filing
the necessary pleadings in court” on 15 November 1991. As a consequence of the respondent’s
nonfeasance, Golden Flame was prevented “from presenting strong evidence
of its ownership of the barges … and the decision rendered has deprived it of
its ownership of said barges without due process of law.”

In her comment, the respondent denies the charges and alleges
that the complaint “is absolutely without basis in fact and in law, and
was filed merely either to save face, on the part of complainant’s counsel, or
for pure harassment.” She asserts that Golden Flame, as shown in the
notice,^[1]
was served with the notice of pre-trial through its counsel on 8 October 1991;
having been declared as in default on 15 October 1991^[2]
for the failure of its counsel to appear at the pre-trial, it lost its legal
standing in court and was no longer entitled to notice of subsequent pleadings,
except that of the judgment. On 7
November 1991, the court rendered its decision.^[3]
On 15 November 1991, a representative of Atty. Abbas or the complainant came to
the court and was furnished with a copy of the 15 October 1991 order of default
and the decision of 7 November 1991. In
addition, copies of the order and the decision were separately sent by
registered mail to Atty. Abbas.

The respondent further alleges that on 18 November 1991, Golden
Flame filed a motion to reconsider the order of default, which the plaintiff
opposed. These incidents were not
resolved at first because Golden Flame filed a petition for certiorari
(CA-G.R. SP No. 26241) with the Court of Appeals which issued a temporary
restraining order. This petition was
later dismissed by the Court of Appeals. The motion to reconsider the default order was eventually denied in the
order of 23 October 1992.^[4]
On 22 January 1993 the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 29437 — ­a petition
for certiorari filed by Golden Flame to annul the trial court’s order of
default and its decision of 7 November 1991 — promulgated a decision
dismissing the petition therein.^[5]

In his reply to the comment,^[6]
the complainant claims that he happened to obtain a copy of the 7 November 1991
decision on 15 November 1991 because at the hearing on 15 November 1991 in the
Court of Appeals of CA-G.R. SP No. 26241, he and his counsel were informed that
Golden Flame had been declared as in default on 15 October 1991 and that a
decision had been rendered on 7 November 1991. He avers that the order of default was sent to Golden Flame’s counsel
only on 31 October 1991, and that the respondent furnished Golden Flame’s
counsel with a copy of the decision of 7 November 1991 only on 18 July 1993
through registered mail.

Issues having been joined, the Court required the parties to
inform it if they wished to submit the case for decision on the basis of the
pleadings already filed.

Both the complainant and the respondent manifested their
willingness to submit this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings.

The Court gathers from the reply to the comment and the trial
court’s order of 23 October 1992^[7]
that Golden Flame had earlier filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals which was docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 26241. The Court of Appeals dismissed that petition
in its decision of 8 June 1992. The dispositive
portion thereof, as quoted in the aforesaid order of 23 October 1992, reads as
follows:

“IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Amended Petition filed on November 19,
1991 is dismissed and the trial court now presided by the Honorable Senecio O.
Ortile is directed to resolve petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order of Default with all deliberate speed. Petitioner’s Motion to Cite for Contempt Atty. Felix Seriña is also
denied for lack of merit.”

After the trial court denied its motion for reconsideration,
Golden Flame filed another petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals to annul (1) the trial court’s order of 15 October 1991 declaring it as
in default, (2) the aforesaid order of 23 October 1992 denying the motion for
reconsideration, and (3) the decision of 7 November 1991. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
29437. In its petition, it asserted
that it was denied due process and that the respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he issued the order of default, rendered the decision,
and denied the motion to reconsider the order of default.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its decision of 22
January 1993.^[8]
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s finding that Golden Flame and
its counsel were notified of the pre-trial and found Golden Flame’s allegation
in its motion for reconsideration that its absence “during the pre-trial
conference as well as his counsel is excusable negligence if not an accident in
the light of the questionable date of the receipt of the handcarried
notice” as an admission of the receipt of the notice.

“If the petitioner had not really been sent a notice of the
pre-trial as averred, what need was there for it to allege ‘excusable negligence
if not an accident’ with reference to its ‘late receipt’ of the notice? There would be no excusable neglect to talk
about for the simple reason that no notice whatsoever was sent to it.

In view of the foregoing, this Court finds it proper to give due
weight and respect to the statement of the court a quo that due notice
had been sent to petitioner Golden Flame Sawmill through counsel considering
the accepted presumption that official duty has been regularly performed as
against what appears to Us to be a doubtful and sometimes equivocal assertions
of the petitioner to the contrary.”

The Court of Appeals further observed that since Golden Flame and
its counsel were aware before the filing of the petition that the trial court
had already rendered judgment in the case

“the proper
procedure to have been followed was for the petitioner to file a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. Upon
denial of such motion for reconsideration, what should have been done was for
the said petitioner to appeal, asserting as an error its alleged deprivation of
the opportunity to be heard as far as its claim to the two subject barges is
concerned.”

The complainant does not claim that this decision of the Court of
Appeals did not attain finality. Nor
does he claim that at any time during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 29437 or
after the promulgation of the decision therein, Golden Flame had appealed the
trial court’s decision of 7 November 1991. It is thus assumed that the aforesaid decisions of the Court of Appeals
and that of the trial court had long become final. The correctness of the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Golden
Flame and its counsel were duly notified of the pre-trial is beyond our power
to review and this administrative complaint by a complainant who is not a party
to Civil Case No. 91-57097 but merely a president of the intervenor should not
be allowed as a vehicle for such review.

The instant complaint is thus clearly without merit. There seems, indeed, to be some truth to the
claim of the respondent that because the counsel of the complainant failed to
appeal the judgment by default, the instant complaint was filed “to save
face for such a grave error, if not to harass herein respondent.”

The Court takes this opportunity to stress that:

“A notice of pre-trial must be served on the party affected
separately from his counsel (Heirs of Fuentes, et al. vs. Macadaeg, et al.,
L-45445, June 16, 1978), and the same may be served directly to him or through
his counsel (Lim vs. Animas, L-39094, April 18, 1975) otherwise the proceedings
will be null and void (Sagarino vs. Pelayo, L-27927, June 20, 1977; Patalinjug
vs. Peralta, et al., L-43324, May 5, 1979). It is the duty of counsel upon whom such notice is served, to see to it
that his client receives such notice and attends the pre-trial, otherwise he
will be liable for grave administrative disciplinary action (Taroma, et al. vs.
Sayo, et al., L-37296, October 30, 1975).”^[9]

Lawyers, as officers of the court, should not encourage
groundless administrative cases against court officers and employees. The time of the latter should not be wasted
in answering or defending groundless complaints; every minute of it is precious
and must be reserved for the enhancement of public service.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant complaint is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Photocopy is attached as Annex “1.”

^[2]
Annex “2” of Answer.

^[3]
Annex “3,” Id.

^[4]
Annex “4” of Comment.

^[5]
Annex “5,” Id.

^[6]
Rollo, 55.

^[7]
Annex “4” of Comment; Rollo, 20.

^[8]
Annex “5” of Comment; Rollo, 23.

^[9]
1 FLORENZ D. REGALADO, Remedial Law Compendium 144 (3d.
rev. ed.).